IN RE ANDREW GAUTREAUX AND PHILLIP PETERSON, Relators No. 05-25-00380-CV Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas Opinion Filed July 23, 2025 Original Proceeding from the 14th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-01503 Panel members: Miskel, Emily, Kennedy, Nancy, Lee, Mike Lee, Mike, Justice MEMORANDUM OPINION In this original proceeding, relators seek a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to (1) vacate a discovery order compelling relators to respond to various discovery requests and (2) vacate an order requiring relators to turn over their electronic devices for forensic imaging. Regarding the first order, relators argue the trial judge erred by refusing to hear their objections and ordering them to produce communications that they made long after they had expressed the original alleged defamatory statements at issue. Regarding the second order, relators claim that the trial judge's order failed to comply with In re Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). Specifically, relators complain the order erroneously requires relators to turn over their cell phones and hard drives when real parties had not shown that the information they seek is likely to be found on the cell phones and hard drives and that less intrusive measures would not work. We agree with relators and conditionally grant the petition. Background A. The Pleadings On December 13, 2024, real parties in interest Derrick May, Joseph Shelton, John Griffin, Daniel Hibbs, Chance Smith, Jon Pearson, and Optimum Energy Partners, LLC filed their seventh amended petition against relators Andrew Gautreaux and Phillip Peterson. This is the operative pleading. Real parties assert defamation and defamation per se, business disparagement, and conspiracy claims against relators. The following summary is drawn from the pleadings. Gautreaux and Peterson are owners of a Dallas oil-and-gas company, Legacy Exploration, LLC (Legacy). Real parties May, Shelton, Hibbs, and Griffin used to work for Legacy. Real party Pearson owned a company that used to be a vendor for Legacy. Real party Smith owned a company that used to be a vendor, investor, or both for Legacy. During the time that real parties worked for or with Legacy, CEO Gautreaux allegedly treated Legacy's funds as his own personal bank account. In December 2019, Gautreaux terminated Peterson, the minority owner and Chief Legal Officer of Legacy. Peterson then sued Gautreaux for breach of fiduciary duty and misuse of company funds (the First Suit). Real parties May and Shelton were also named as defendants in the First Suit. In 2021, May and Shelton negotiated a full release and settlement of all claims in the First Suit. Shortly thereafter, real parties May, Shelton, Griffin, Hibbs, Smith, and Pearson departed from or ceased doing business with Legacy. In April 2021, May, Shelton, Griffin, Smith, and Pearson formed a competing company, Optimum Energy Partners, LLC, with Hibbs joining shortly thereafter. In September 2021, Gautreaux and Peterson settled the First Suit. Thereafter, they allegedly began a campaign of harassment and intimidation aimed at real parties, including threats of blackmail, extortion, violence, and financial ruin, accusations of adultery, and accusations of real parties' engaging in criminal conduct. They further allegedly threatened and disparaged real parties' lead counsel and accused him of conspiring with and participating in criminal activities with real parties. The pleadings contain a series of allegedly defamatory and disparaging statements made in 2022. B. Discovery 1. Relators' Motion to Compel In August 2024, real parties served relators with First Requests for Production. The instructions for the requests asked that relators produce responsive electronically stored information (ESI) in its native format. The requests also defined the “Applicable Time” as “January 1, 2021, through the pendency of this litigation.” Relators responded, including objections and production. Relevant to this Petition for Writ of Mandamus, the following requests were propounded by real parties and objections and responses served by relators: 9. All communications between Gautreaux and any third-party related to May and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 10. All communications between Peterson and any third-party related to May and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. ... 13. All communications between Gautreaux and any third-party related to Shelton and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 14. All communications between Peterson and any third-party related to Shelton and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. ... 16. All communications between Gautreaux and any third-party related to Griffin and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 17. All communications between Peterson and any third-party related to Griffin and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. ... 19. All communications between Gautreaux and any third-party related to Hibbs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 20. All communications between Peterson and any third-party related to Hibbs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. ... 22. All communications between Gautreaux and any third-party related to Smith and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 23. All communications between Peterson and any third-party related to Smith and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. ... 25. All communications between Gautreaux and any third-party related to Pearson and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 26. All communications between Peterson and any third-party related to Pearson and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. ... 28. All communications between Gautreaux and any third-party related to Optimum and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 29. All communications between Peterson and any third-party related to Optimum and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. In response to each request, relators made the following identical objection, substituting the name of the individual about whom the communications were related for the name “May”: Response: Defendant objects to this request as communications with third parties are not relevant to the claims and defenses in this action, nor are they reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects as the request for all communications with “any third party” is overly broad, vague and ambiguous. Defendant further objects to this request seeking all communications related to May, which are not limited to those pertaining to this Lawsuit or the Federal Lawsuit, per Optimum's Definitions using “and” and “or” interchangeably. For this reason, and to the extent that “and” means “or,” the request is overly broad and burdensome, seeks information that is not relevant to the claims and defenses in this action, and seeks information that is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and without waiving such objections, Defendant refers you to the documents produced in the Federal Lawsuit, as that term is defined in the Definitions section of Plaintiff's First Request for Production. Optimum is a party to the Federal Lawsuit and has access to all documents that have been produced therein. The following requests related to communications with vendors in the oil and gas industry: 30. All communications with Oil Patch Group, Inc. related to Plaintiffs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 31. All communications with Centurion Group, Ltd. related to Plaintiffs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 32. All communications with Newpark Drilling Fluids, LLC related to Plaintiffs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 33. All communications with Legacy Directional Drilling, LLC related to Plaintiffs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 34. All communications with Trojan Tubular Services, LLC related to Plaintiffs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 35. All communications with North American Tubular Services, LLC related to Plaintiffs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 36. All communications with any investor related to or concerning Plaintiffs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 37. All communications with Mark Elliott related to Plaintiffs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 38. All communications with Summitt Ventures, including its agents, employees and representatives related to Plaintiffs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. 39. All communications with any vendor related to Plaintiffs and any of the claims in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. Relators made the following objection to these requests: Response: This request is overly broad and burdensome, seeks information that is not relevant to the claims and defenses in this action, and seeks information that is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects to the extent this request seeks confidential or proprietary information. The following request related to social media postings, to which relators objected: 49. All social media postings, including but not limited to Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Instagram, TikTok, WeChat, Facebook Messenger, Telegram, Snapchat, Pinterest, Instagram [sic], Twitter, and X, relating to or referencing Plaintiffs and any of the claims made in this Lawsuit and/or the Federal Lawsuit. Response: This request is overly broad and burdensome, seeks information that is not relevant to the claims and defenses in this action, and seeks information that is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Finally, as relevant to this petition, the following request and objection was served: 53. Communications between Andrew Gautreaux and Mark Elliot Regarding Optimum Energy Partners or Derrick May. Response: Defendant objects to the extent this request assumes there are any such documents. This request is overly broad and burdensome, seeks information that is not relevant to the claims and defenses in this action, and seeks information that is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant further objects to the extent this request seeks confidential or proprietary information. In February 2025, real parties filed a motion to compel regarding these requests for production. In their motion, real parties explained that, at his February 7, 2025 deposition, Gautreaux testified about various communications with third parties via phone, text, and email regarding real parties and the allegations made against them in a pending federal lawsuit. He testified that he could not recall exactly how many emails or communications he had sent to investors about this matter. Real parties asserted that the communications Gautreaux testified to making with third parties had not been produced. Real parties argued that relators' generic, boilerplate objections were improper and failed to adequately specify the bases for the objections. In their response to the motion to compel, relators accused real parties of seeking discovery to fish for other defamatory communications to add to their suit. Relators maintained that the requested discovery was not relevant to the claims at issue because each new allegedly defamatory statement would be a separate transaction with an independent injury that must be specifically alleged. Thus, they urged, any new statements made after 2022, when the alleged defamatory statements were made, were irrelevant. At the February 19, 2025 hearing which resulted in the February 25 discovery order, the trial judge heard real parties' motion to compel. The trial judge commenced the hearing by noting that many of the objections are “cut and paste.” The trial judge stated, “I am overruling all of the boiler-plate objections,” then said, “I see no evidence that would support a conclusion that a request for communications is overly broad. I don't see any effort to resolve that issue by attempting to narrow the issue. In short, I find the responses to be in bad faith.” The trial judge then instructed the parties to confer. The record reflects they did so. Upon returning to the hearing, counsel for real parties advised that counsel for relators stated she was “standing on her relevancy objection.” The trial judge immediately intervened, stating, “Obviously the standard [for] discovery is not relevancy.”[1] The parties and the court then had a brief discussion about two of the requests for production, numbers 49 and 53, and relators' objections thereto. The judge then stated, “All of your objections are overruled. The court finds them to be in bad faith.” The trial court then set a date – February 28 – by which full responses to the requests were to be made. Counsel for relators then asked the judge, “And I gather I'm not able to explain my position at all.” The judge replied, “You got that right.” Following the hearing, on February 25, 2025, the trial judge signed two versions of an order granting the motion to compel. One version contained a finding that relators' discovery objections were made in bad faith; the other version omitted the bad faith finding. The latter is the version relators included in the mandamus record; the former was then provided by real parties in their reply. In both versions, the trial judge overruled relators' objections and directed relators to produce documents responsive to real parties' requests for production numbers 10, 11, 13–14, 16–17, 19–20, 22, 23, 25–26, 28–39, 49, and 53. The trial judge directed that such production be made in accordance with relators' request that the documents, including ESI, be provided in native format, and that such production be made within three days of the date of the order. Relators filed a motion to reconsider the February 25, 2025 order granting real parties' motion to compel. At the hearing, the trial judge specifically asked relators' counsel, “Has there been a change in the law since I entered my last order?” and “Has there been a change or were there facts that were not known to the parties at the time when I entered my order that would have changed my order?” Relators' counsel answered no to both questions. On March 24, 2025, the trial court denied the motion to reconsider. 2. Real Parties' Motion to Show Cause and Motion for Entry of Electronic Discovery Protocol In March 2025, real parties filed a (1) motion to show cause why relators have failed to comply with the trial court's order on their motion to compel, (2) motion for entry of discovery protocol, and (3) request for continuance and special setting. Real parties complained that relators had produced only a total of 54 pages of documents that were arguably responsive. Relators had informed real parties that they could not produce the responsive emails because they no longer owned the “legacyexploration.com” URL and needed to pay $10,000 to regain access to their emails. Real parties noted that no emails from other email addresses were produced either. In support of their motion to show cause, real parties attached a declaration from their technology and system administration expert, Thomas Lima. He had conducted an analysis of the domain registration and server activity for www.legacyexploration.com. His investigation confirmed that the domain was initially registered on February 27, 2014, through Namecheap Inc., and remains continuously registered through February 27, 2027. According to Lima, this continuous registration, evidenced by public data from GoDaddy.com, demonstrates the domain's uninterrupted active status. A ping of the website revealed that its servers were currently active and registered, confirming ongoing operation. Lima further explained how Microsoft Outlook would have created local data files on employee computers, populated by the email server through either POP3 or IMPAC protocols. Thus, emails created or received by Legacy employees would be stored both on the server and on the local hard drives of the users. Real parties noted that relators had produced no text messages. Relators had advised them that because Gautreaux was such a prolific texter, he was unable to save the texts on his phone. Real parties further observed that relators had never claimed they were unable to access the requested emails or text messages at any time before the trial court ordered relators to produce communications with third parties. Real parties also argued that the late objection was improperly based on lack of possession because actual possession is unnecessary if the party has control over the requested information. Real parties also pointed to Gautreaux's deposition testimony showing that he (1) sent text messages to investors, (2) maintained his old phones, and (3) provided his attorneys with access to his cell phones in order to retrieve the very data that relators were then claiming was unavailable. Real parties also asserted that they learned of multiple social media posts made by relators about real parties, but none had been produced. They further claimed that correspondence recently received from a single investor indicated that relators failed to produce hundreds of communications. In their response to the motion to show cause, relators argued that real parties were seeking this discovery for purposes other than supporting their existing causes of action by discovering relevant evidence. Relators argued that the purpose of the discovery was to find other communications that real parties could use to add new causes of action, each allegedly defamatory statement being a separate transaction with an independent injury that must be specifically alleged. Relators claimed that real parties were attempting “to essentially restart the discovery process in the hopes of finding new claims just one week before trial” and that “the requests have always been a fishing expedition to find new claims to bring against” relators. Real parties also filed a supplemental motion to show cause, motion to enforce order on their motion to compel, motion for entry of discovery protocol, request for continuance and special setting, and motion to strike relators' late filed response. Real parties asserted that they had confirmed the existence of responsive documents that had not been produced, as indicated by Gautreaux's deposition testimony and correspondence received from an investor. They argued that relators' claims that such documents are inaccessible or non-existent are belied by (1) a legacyexploration.com email confirming the existence of various backup protocols and programs, (2) the original and supplemental declarations of Lima, and (3) May's declaration attached to real parties' response to relators' first anti-SLAPP motion back in May 2022 in which he confirmed that the company backed up its information on “Legacy servers” and a “cloud based system.” Lima's supplemental declaration explained that if a renewal of registration lapses, only the domain name is affected, and the underlying information, domain name server, hosting IPs, and email provider are not transferred. Real parties thus requested entry of an electronic discovery protocol. On March 28, 2025, the trial judge issued the subject order on electronic discovery and forensic examination protocol. The trial judge directed relators to hand over devices and external devices to be made available to a qualified computer forensic expert for imaging and collection of ESI relevant to this action. The order defines “devices” as “any personal and/or work electronic devices or the images of the personal and/or work electronic devices of [relators] and/or Legacy, including any desktop, laptop, computer, tablet, server, phone, or other device (including any cloud-based services/accounts) used to transmit, store, save or receive data from February 26, 2021, to present.” The order defines “external devices” as “any removable media or external storage devices utilized by Defendants and/or Legacy to store or transfer data from February 26, 2021, to present, including but not limited to, any flash drives or external hard drives.” The electronic discovery and forensic examination protocol order provides that, after performing the initial imaging and collection work, the analyst would give the parties an initial results-only report, which shall include a list of results found from keyword searches provided by real parties. The parties would then have the opportunity to confer with the analyst regarding the initial work. The parties would then authorize the analyst to access the ESI contained on the devices. The analyst would compile and produce a list of all deleted files residing on any device. The analyst would then provide a copy of the documents and items located using real parties' search list to counsel for relators. The order provides that relators shall have fourteen days to review the responsive files for privileged data. After such review and any appropriate assertion of privilege, relators' counsel shall promptly produce such portions of the responsive files to real parties or direct the release of such portions of the responsive files by the analyst to real parties' expert, contemporaneously with a privilege log of any materials withheld on grounds of a non-waived privilege. In addition, the trial judge equally split the costs of forensic services between relators and real parties. C. This Mandamus Proceeding This mandamus proceeding combined with an emergency motion for a stay of both orders followed. We granted the emergency motion and stayed both the February 25, 2025 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendants to Respond to Plaintiffs' Requests for Production and the March 28, 2025 Order on Electronic Discovery and Forensic Examination Protocol. We also requested a response, and such response was filed by real parties. No response was filed by the respondent judge. Relators then filed a reply brief responding to real parties' response. We therefore turn to the merits of the petition for writ of mandamus. Relators seek a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to (1) vacate his February 25, 2025 discovery order and (2) vacate its March 28, 2025 order regarding electronic discovery. With regard to the first order, relators complain that the trial judge erred by refusing to hear their relevance objections and by ordering them to produce communications they made long after they conveyed the original alleged defamatory statements at issue. Relators generally rely on the Supreme Court's opinion in Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. 2003), and this Court's opinion in Cruz v. Van Sickle, 452 S.W.3d 503, 517 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (“Evidence of events after an article has been printed and distributed has been held to have little if any bearing on the defendant's state of mind at the time of publication.”), for the premise that statements made by relators after the alleged defamatory statements in the live petition cannot be relevant on any issue, including relators' state of mind at the time of the alleged defamatory statements. Relators note that the subject requests for production seek, and the trial judge's order requires production of, communications made years after the alleged defamatory statements. These communications, in relators' view, cannot be relevant, and the trial judge erred in overruling their relevance objection. Relators continue that the trial judge refused “to even hear [relators'] argument on relevance” which, in relators' telling, demonstrates an abuse of discretion in its own right. Relators generally argue that real parties are engaged in a “fishing expedition” looking for later communications that might themselves be actionable. Relators then contend the trial judge abused his discretion under In re Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding), by ordering relators to turn over their cell phones and hard drives when real parties had failed to show the information sought was likely to be found on the devices or that less intrusive measures would not work. Real parties respond by contending that relators failed to show the trial judge abused his discretion by compelling discovery because (1) relators waived their objections to the discovery's temporal scope and request for production of ESI by failing to timely and specifically object to such discovery in their initial responses; (2) the trial judge properly overruled the objections relators did raise, after expressly finding they were asserted in bad faith; (3) the compelled discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence concerning waiver of asserted privileges, among other claims and defenses; and (4) relators later conceded no new law or facts warranted reconsideration of the trial judge's initial ruling compelling discovery. As to the first of these arguments, real parties appear to be arguing that relators failed to object to the “Applicable Time” definition in the definitions prologue to the requests for production. Therefore, in real parties' telling, relators waived any objection that the subject time period is “January 1, 2021, through the pendency of this litigation.” Real parties argue that this “waiver” results in the relevance and overbreadth objections being “boilerplate” without specifically advising as to the nature of the relevance and overbreadth objections. Regarding the second and third of these arguments, real parties claim subsequent communications “can demonstrate” intent or malice by demonstrating a “continuing pattern of behavior.” They argue that the communications “could reveal republications of the original defamatory statements” or new such statements. They claim the subsequent communications may be relevant to their own damages. They state the subsequent communications “might directly rebut” relators' “potential defenses.” They suggest the later communications are relevant to establishing the existence and scope of an alleged conspiracy. And they claim relevance of the subsequent communications due to their attempt “to uncover potentially unknown tortious acts.” Despite the qualifications in the foregoing argument (“can demonstrate,” “could reveal,” “might” rebut, effort “to uncover potentially unknown” acts, and the like), real parties deny their requests for production were “an attempt to ‘dredge the lake in hopes of finding a fish.’ ” They argue the requests are a targeted effort to uncover evidence reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As for the electronic discovery order, real parties argue that relators failed to show the trial judge abused his discretion where the record showed relators' discovery default and non-compliance with the prior compel order, and the protocol incorporates specific safeguards (including a neutral third-party analyst and mandatory pre-production privilege review by relators' own counsel), to ensure that the process is appropriately tailored. Replying to real parties, relators show that the discovery and electronic devices order allows “for an unfettered forensic examination of every text and email they sent or received during the past four years” (emphasis in original). They insist that they did not waive their relevance objections, noting that they specified that their objection was on relevance grounds. They further argue that the communications real parties seek are not relevant to the judicial proceedings privilege defense because the pleadings do not allege that the communications were disseminated other than to the intended recipients of the communications. In addition, they argue that the trial judge's ESI protocol order was an abuse of discretion because real parties did not address the Weekley Homes prerequisites in the trial court. Discussion Entitlement to mandamus relief requires relators to show that the trial judge clearly abused his discretion and that they lack an adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Mandamus relief is available when the trial judge compels production beyond the permissible bounds of discovery. In re Arpin Am. Moving Sys., LLC, 416 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, orig. proceeding). A. February 25, 2025 Discovery Order The scope of discovery is outlined in Rule 192.3. “In general, a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action ....” TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). Notably, the phrase “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” does not define the scope of discovery in Texas. That language comes from former federal rule of civil procedure 26, which included within discovery's scope any discovery reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; but that phrase was removed by the 2015 amendments to rule 26. E.g., Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 573 (N.D. Tex. 2018). In Texas, the phrase remains, but only in this context: “It is not a ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a) (emphasis added). Thus, discovery is permitted of “any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action,” and this includes information that “will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” See In re K & L Auto Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239, 247–48 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). In other words, consideration of whether information appears “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” is unnecessary unless the trial judge has first determined the information (1) is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action, (2) is not privileged, and (3) will be inadmissible at trial. See In re Nat'l Lloyds Ins. Co., 532 S.W.3d 794, 808 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding). But the mistaken idea that discovery's scope in this state includes any matter reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence lives on. At the hearing on the motion to compel, the trial judge articulated the standard as follows: Obviously the standard to discovery is not relevancy. It's whether a discovery [request] is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In this regard, the trial judge clearly misstated the scope of discovery. Yes, the phrase “relevant to the subject matter” is to be broadly construed. See In re Nat'l Lloyds Ins. Co., 449 S.W.3d 486, 488 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). But relevance (and privilege) still set the bounds of what is discoverable.[2] So, the first question to ask when analyzing a discovery request is: does the request seek information, documents, or things within the scope of discovery? As we recently articulated, the discovery requests must be tailored to include only relevant matters, with the requests showing a reasonable expectation of obtaining information that will aid the dispute's resolution. See In re Sarosi, No. 05-25-00264-CV, 2025 WL 1737329, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 23, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op. nunc pro tunc). The second question follows: did the responding party waive a requirement that the propounded discovery fit within the scope of discovery? A party may waive such compliance by failing to object that a matter is within that scope. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.2. Real parties argue that relators did so here. At the threshold, real parties argue that relators waived their objections to the discovery requests because they failed to lodge a specific objection challenging the definitional time-period set forth in the prologue to the discovery requests. We disagree. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.2, “[a] party must make any objection to written discovery in writing—either in the response or in a separate document—within the time for response.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.2. “The party must state specifically the legal or factual basis for the objection and the extent to which the party is refusing to comply with the request.” Id. But it is also sufficient for a party to specifically state the basis for the objection and then elaborate further in a response to a motion to compel. See In re VERP Inv., LLC, 457 S.W.3d 255, 261 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, orig. proceeding) (objection that request was burdensome and that the information could be obtained “through more appropriate means” was sufficiently specific where relator also elaborated the bases for the objection in response to motion to compel). Here, relators did not lodge a specific objection to the “Applicable Time” definition in the requests.[3] But, relators objected on the basis of relevance and that the requests were “overly broad,”[4] among other objections, and then they elaborated that the applicable time period was overly broad in their response to the motion to compel. Accordingly, the objections were sufficient to put the trial court and real parties on notice that they were challenging relevance and the breadth of the discovery requests, including the time period from which production was sought. As we noted earlier, the trial judge commenced the February 19 hearing by noting that many of relators' objections are “cut and paste” and then “overruling all of the boiler-plate objections.” We are not aware of any Texas rule or case defining “boilerplate objections,” though we are aware of a definition recently cited by a federal district judge from our state. See VeroBlue Farms USA Inc. v. Wulf, 345 F.R.D. 406, 419 (N.D. Tex. 2021). That court defined boilerplate objections as those using standardized text or ready-made or all-purpose language, not tailored to the specific discovery request. Id. In so ruling, we can only assume the trial judge was invoking either rule 193.2(c) (a party may object “only if a good faith factual and legal basis” exists for the objection) or rule 193.2(e) (an objection “that is obscured by numerous unfounded objections” may be waived). The trial judge likely observed that the objections were “cut and paste,” reasoned they were boilerplate, and concluded they were accordingly waived under rule 193.2. There are significant problems analyzing the objections in this manner. We first note that the federal trial court providing the definition above also noted that “copying and pasting an objection by itself does not render that objection a boilerplate objection.” Veroblue Farms, 345 F.R.D. at 419 (cleaned up). Turning to the specific requests and objections, we cannot conclude that copying and pasting the objections runs afoul of rule 193.2. For example, real parties' requests numbers 9 through 29 appear themselves to have been the product of copying and pasting – they are all identical with the exception of the names of the parties involved. It is unsurprising that the objections to requests numbers 9 and 10 would be identical to the objections to requests numbers 13 and 14, with the sole difference being the names of the parties involved. To employ the copy and paste function of a word processor, then change the name of a party to match the objection to the specific request, is not necessarily inconsistent with rule 193.2. The pertinent question remains whether the party has met the standards provided in rule 193.2. In any event, we cannot conclude the mere use of the copy and paste function is, of itself, a waiver of the objection under the circumstances present here. We conclude relators' objections were not waived. Returning to the first question – whether the requested discovery is within the scope of discovery – the parties both have legitimate arguments. A review of the relevancy of a discovery request is generally done on a close examination of the pleadings and specific claims and defenses made. In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 180 n.1 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding). Relators argue that communications after the alleged defamatory statements cannot be relevant. They argue that the Supreme Court's opinion in Forbes, 124 S.W.3d at 173, and our opinion in Cruz, 452 S.W.3d at 517, set the timeframe for relevance at the time of the publication of the defamatory statements outlined in the seventh amended petition and that the subject requests clearly demand discovery of communications outside that timeframe. Real parties argue that they might generally find relevant communications through the subject requests. Although the alleged defamatory statements were made in 2021, real parties argue that subsequent communications were relevant to the defense of the judicial proceedings privilege. Communications made preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding contemplated in good faith may be privileged and cannot serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander. Landry's, Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 46–48 (Tex. 2021). However, the privilege is lost if the statements are repeated outside the protected judicial or quasi-judicial context, such as republication to the media or the public. See id. at 49. Thus, real parties argue that statements made after 2021 might be relevant to relator's defense if such statements were repeated. We note the “might” argument sounds very much like real parties are “fishing” for relevance. While such later statements may not be generally relevant, and real parties do not know if any such communications exist, real parties are – to use the terms they put in their response – “dredg[ing] the lake in hopes of finding a” communication that might provide a defense to a privilege. We need not decide that issue at this time. The trial judge clearly employed the wrong standard in determining the scope of discovery and further denied relators an opportunity to explain their objections. Accordingly, we conclude the trial judge abused his discretion and that relators have no adequate appellate remedy. See In re Tri-Cnty. Elec. Coop., Inc., No. 02-24-00337-CV, 2024 WL 3978167, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (noting that by denying relators a meaningful opportunity to present oral argument and evidence regarding specific discovery objections, trial judge effectively failed to consider these individual objections and, in so doing, abused its discretion); In re Arpin Am. Moving Sys., 416 S.W.3d at 930 (“When a trial court orders discovery that exceeds that permitted by the rules of procedure, it abuses its discretion and the resisting party has no adequate remedy by appeal.”). Rather than determining whether the requests for production are within the scope of discovery or addressing relators' individual objections in this original proceeding, the more appropriate course is to allow the trial judge to make those determinations first. See In re Tri-Cnty. Elec. Coop., 2024 WL 3978167, at *4. We also note that there is a third issue to address[5] once the scope and waiver questions have been resolved: the limitations set forth in rule 192.4. When the Supreme Court adopted the 1999 amendments, the Court explained those changes at length. Relevant to this proceeding, the court wrote: Discovery in civil cases is founded on the principle that justice is best served when litigants may obtain information not in their possession to prosecute and defend claims. Discovery provides access to that information, but at a price. Recent years' experience has shown that discovery may be misused to deny justice to parties by driving up the costs of litigation until it is unaffordable and stalling resolution of cases. As any litigant on a budget knows, the benefits to be gained by discovery in a particular case must be weighed against its costs. The rules of procedure must provide both adequate access to information and effective means of curbing discovery when appropriate to preserve litigation as a viable, affordable, and expeditious dispute resolution mechanism. These revisions recognize the importance of discovery as well as the necessity for reasonable limits. See Explanatory Statement Accompanying the 1999 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Discovery, Order of Approval of the Revisions to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 98–9196, (Tex. Nov. 9, 1998).[6] The trial court is the true gatekeeper to ensure discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, is not obtainable from other less burdensome or less expensive sources, and has a likely benefit outweighing its burden and expense. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4. “The scope of discovery is generally within the trial court's discretion, but the court ‘must make an effort to impose reasonable discovery limits.’ ” In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding)). We trust the trial judge will perform this gatekeeper role. B. March 28, 2025 Electronic Discovery Order We further conclude relators have shown that mandamus relief is warranted with respect to the trial judge's March 28, 2025 electronic discovery order. At the threshold, real parties complain that relators never timely objected to the request for production in native ESI format or on the ground that they lacked possession of it. But Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.4 requires the producing party to produce only “data that is responsive to the request and is reasonably available to the responding party in its ordinary course of business.” Relators' position has always been that they have produced everything that is relevant and reasonably available to them. See In re Shipman, 540 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (concluding that objection was not waived where Shipman's position was that he produced all responsive documents that were reasonably available to him in the course of his business, and some documents had been destroyed years earlier). Accordingly, the objection was not waived. Real parties failed to satisfy the Weekley Homes requirements for electronic discovery. The Texas Supreme Court has delineated the proper procedure for electronic discovery under rule 196.4. See Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 317, 322. “An order requiring direct access to an electronic device is burdensome because it is intrusive.” In re VERP Inv., LLC, 457 S.W.3d 255, 261 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, orig. proceeding). “Providing access to information by ordering examination of a party's electronic storage device is particularly intrusive and should be generally discouraged, just as permitting open access to a party's file cabinets for general perusal would be.” Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 317. Accordingly, “as a threshold to granting access to electronic devices, ‘the requesting party must show that the responding party has somehow defaulted in its obligation to search its records and produce the requested data.’ ” Shipman, 540 S.W.3d at 567–68 (quoting Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 317). “But we do not rely on ‘mere skepticism or bare allegations that the responding party has failed to comply with its discovery duties.’ ” Id. (quoting Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 318). Under Weekley Homes and its progeny, real parties were required to show that relators defaulted in their obligation to search their records and produce the requested data, that their production was inadequate, and that a search of the cell phone and hard drives could recover relevant materials. See In re Meadowbrook Baptist Church, No. 05-22-00271-CV, 2022 WL 2155056, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 15, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). An order compelling production of an electronic storage device must contain provisions to protect the responding party's privacy and privileges, as well as the confidentiality of non-responsive information. See Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 318–19; In re Pinnacle Eng'g, Inc., 405 S.W.3d 835, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, orig. proceeding). The trial court must also consider whether less intrusive means would suffice. Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 318–19; In re Methodist Primary Care Grp., 553 S.W.3d 709, 720 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, orig. proceeding). Relators informed real parties that they could not produce the responsive emails because they no longer owned the “legacyexploration.com” URL and needed to pay $10,000 to regain access to their emails. Real parties replied with the declaration of Thomas Lima. His declaration established that, in his opinion, the emails would still be available on relators' computer hard drives. Real parties also pointed to Gautreaux's deposition testimony showing that he (1) sent text messages to investors that were not produced, (2) maintained his old phones, and (3) provided his attorneys with access to his cell phones in order to retrieve the very data that relators are now claiming is unavailable. Real parties further asserted that correspondence recently received from a single investor indicated that relators failed to produce hundreds of communications. Real parties argue Lima's declaration establishes that a search of the hard drives could recover relevant materials. The same cannot be said for the cell phones. Relators had advised real parties that because Gautreaux was such a prolific texter, he was unable to save the texts on his phone. Lima's declaration did not discuss cell phones or whether unsaved texts could be found there. Accordingly, we conclude that real parties adequately showed a search of the hard drives could recover relevant materials. Overall, it does not appear that the trial judge considered whether less intrusive means would suffice. Under rule 196.4, the responding party must produce the electronic or magnetic data that is responsive to the request and “is reasonably available to the responding party in its ordinary course of business.” In In re Methodist Primary Care Group., for example, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals explained that before resorting to this extreme and highly intrusive measure, “consideration should be given to whether less intrusive means will suffice—for example, by first ordering relators themselves to search electronic data within their possession, custody, or control, and to produce responsive data, regardless of whether the data already exists in a document on the system or has been printed in hard-copy form.” 553 S.W.3d at 720–21; see also In re Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 315 (noting that “[t]o determine whether requested information is reasonably available in the ordinary course of business, the trial court may order discovery, such as requiring the responding party to sample or inspect the sources potentially containing information identified as not reasonably available”). Here, for example, the trial judge did not consider whether an expert employed by relators might search for the backup emails on the hard drives or any deleted text messages. See In re Raizada, No. 14-23-00941-CV, 2024 WL 178140, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 17, 2024, orig. proceeding) (noting that trial judge did not consider whether less intrusive measures, such as allowing party to produce evidence through own forensic expert as to messages exchanges between parties, would suffice short of turning over the phone for forensic examination). Because the burden imposed by Weekley Homes is high, we conclude the trial judge's electronic discovery order was an abuse of discretion. The harm and burden relators will suffer from being required to relinquish control of all their devices for forensic inspection, and the harm that might result from revealing private conversations and privileged or otherwise confidential communications, cannot be remedied on appeal. See In re Meadowbrook Baptist Church, No. 05-22-00271-CV, 2022 WL 2155056, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 15, 2022, orig. proceeding). Thus, we conclude relators have shown their entitlement to mandamus relief with respect to the trial judge's electronic discovery order. Conclusion After reviewing relators' petition, the real parties' response, relators' reply, and the record before us, we conclude the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to consider relators' relevance and overbreadth objections and, on this record, granting the requested electronic discovery. We conditionally grant relators' petition for writ of mandamus and direct the judge of the trial court, Judge Eric V. Moyé, to (1) vacate his February 25, 2025 discovery order and (2) vacate his March 28, 2025 order regarding electronic discovery. The trial judge can then reconsider the requested discovery in light of the principles outlined in this opinion. We are confident that the trial judge will comply, and the writ will issue only if he fails to act promptly in accord with this opinion. Footnotes [1] But see TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a) (“party may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(b) (party may obtain discovery regarding documents and tangible things “that constitute or contain matters relevant to the subject matter of the action”). [2] The Supreme Court's comment to the 1999 rules amendments adding rule 192.3 echoes this fact: “While the scope of discovery is quite broad, it is nevertheless confined by the subject matter of the case and reasonable expectations of obtaining information that will aid resolution of the dispute. The rule must be read and applied in that context.” [3] The rules do not provide for a definitions section to a request for discovery. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.1(b) (Contents of Request). But definitions have become part of the common practice. Perhaps it is better practice for a responding party to object to any objectionable portions of the definitions, but the rules do not envision such objections. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.2(b) (“With respect to each item or category of items, the responding party must state objections and assert privileges as required by these rules, and state” whether responsive items have been found and the manner in which production will be made. (Emphasis added)). [4] It might have been better had relators more specifically stated that their objection was that the requests were outside the scope of discovery set forth in rule 192.3, then explaining why they contended the requests exceeded such scope. However, objections complaining of relevance and overbreadth clearly sound in rule 192.3. [5] We do not address questions of privilege in this analysis because privileges are not at issue in this proceeding. [6] This statement is available on the Supreme Court's website: https://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourt/AdministrativeOrders/miscdocket/98/ 98-9196.pdf.