Lamya Brewster v. City of Los Angeles, et al Case No. EDCV 14-2257 JGB (SPx) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed June 27, 2025 Bernal, Jesus G., United States District Judge Proceedings: Order (1) DENYING Plaintiffs' Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge's Discovery Order (Dkt. No. 369); and (2) VACATING the June 30, 2025 Hearing (IN CHAMBERS) *1 Before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for review of Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym's December 23, 2024 discovery order. (“Motion,” Dkt. No. 369.) The Court determines the Motion is appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the Court DENIES the Motion. The hearing scheduled for June 30, 2025 is VACATED. I. BACKGROUND Since the parties are familiar with this case's extensive procedural history, the Court provides only the background necessary to understand the Motion. This is a class action lawsuit brought by Plaintiffs Lamya Brewster, Elias Arizmendi, and Julian Vigil (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Defendants City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles Police Department (jointly, “Defendants”) for wrongfully impounding class members' vehicles between November 2012 and June 2017. (See Dkt. No. 344 at 2.) On May 9, 2023, this Court granted summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. (“MSJ Order,” Dkt. No. 314.) Plaintiffs now seek to identify the approximately 35,000 class members so that a damages judgment can be entered. (See Dkt. Nos. 330, 355.) On August 15, 2023, Plaintiffs served non-party California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) with a subpoena seeking class members' names and addresses. (Dkt. No. 330-1 at 30.) Specifically, Plaintiffs provided DMV with three data files of class members' vehicles (identified by VIN and/or license plate number) and requested the names and addresses of those vehicles' registered owners. (Id.) On November 17, 2023, Plaintiffs served another subpoena on DMV, requesting the driver's license or identification (“DL/ID”) numbers of the same vehicles' registered owners. (Id.) Plaintiffs sought to run the owners' DL/ID numbers against one of DMV's databases, the DL database, to obtain class members' current addresses as reflected in DMV records. (Id.) The DMV agreed to produce the data sought, subject to a protective order and Plaintiffs' payment of the associated costs. (Id.) In November 2023, DMV provided Plaintiffs access to another of its databases, the vehicle registration (“VR”) database, by giving Plaintiffs a “commercial requestor account,” with which they could use DMV's “pre-programmed non-urgent overnight batch processing mode” to obtain the data. (See id. at 30-31.) Users of the batch process upload formatted files with one or more vehicle records identifying the vehicle by either license plate number or VIN. (Id.) The users then receive an output file containing registered owner names and addresses for the requested vehicles. (Id.) Plaintiffs have used their commercial requestor account to access the VR database but have been unable to obtain ownership data for all 35,000 class members. (Id.) On February 16, 2024, when the batch process DMV made available to Plaintiffs did not return ownership information for vehicles that can no longer be titled, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel DMV to produce computer data in response to Plaintiffs' subpoena. (“First MTC,” Dkt. No. 330.) On May 21, 2024, Judge Pym granted-in-part and denied-in-part the First MTC. (“First MJ Order,” Dkt. No. 344.) Judge Pym ordered the DMV to create and run a file pass program to access and produce ownership data for vehicles that can no longer be titled. (Id. at 4-6.) However, Judge Pym denied Plaintiffs' MTC as to DL/ID numbers, holding that the court did “not find that an order compelling DMV to retrieve DL/ID numbers via a file pass or R60 inquiries is warranted” because “many of those numbers are no longer being stored due to a transfer of vehicle ownership” and “the likely benefit of ordering DMV to create and run a file pass or run R60 inquiries for each individual vehicle is outweighed by the substantial burdens such an order would impose.” (Id. at 6-8.) *2 Plaintiffs filed a motion for review of the First MJ Order on June 4, 2024. (“First Motion for Review,” Dkt. No. 345.) On July 3, 2024, this Court issued an order denying Plaintiffs' motion for review, determining that Judge Pym did not err “in holding that the burden of producing the DL/ID numbers outweighs the benefit.” (“Order,” Dkt. No. 350 at 6.) On July 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the deposition of DMV employee Gerald Zielinski. (“Zielinski Motion,” Dkt. No. 351.) Plaintiffs sought to depose Zielinski because he “appeared to have technical knowledge of the capabilities of the DMV's information systems, including the VR database.” (See id. at 5-6.) On August 15, 2024, Judge Pym granted-in-part the Zielinski Motion, finding that prior statements made by Zielinski suggests “there is a possibility that an alternate programming process might exist that could retrieve the ownership data [P]laintiffs need with less cost and effort than the other methods.” (“Zielinski Order,” Dkt. No. 354 at 5.) Plaintiffs deposed Zielinski on September 19, 2024. (“Zielinski Depo.,” Dkt. No. 355-5.) Zielinski explained that he did not have the requisite technical knowledge to address the programming issues, and instead indicated that the Information Services Division (“ISD”) may have more information about the feasibility of generating the data Plaintiffs seek using ad hoc programming “provided the information is available.” (See id. at 47:4-20, 48:7-20, 83:12-17.) Plaintiffs then sent two subpoenas to DMV's Sacramento, California headquarters on September 21, 2024: one to DMV employee Kim A. Rodriguez and another to the DMV seeking the testimony of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6)[1] witness concerning the feasibility of obtaining the vehicle ownership data Plaintiffs request from DMV's VR database. (Dkt. No. 355-2-3.) Plaintiffs also forwarded a copy of both subpoenas to DMV's attorney, Lorinda D. Franco, on September 23, 2024. (Dkt. No. 355-1 at 28 ¶ 4.) On October 7, 2024, Franco informed Plaintiffs that the witnesses would not appear for the depositions, which had been scheduled for the next day. (Id.) On October 22, 2024, Franco emailed Plaintiffs a letter indicating DMV was prepared to proceed with the file pass process that had been previously ordered and provided time and costs estimates to Plaintiffs. (Id. at 32 ¶ 14; Dkt. No. 355-8.) On November 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the DMV to produce for deposition its employee Kim A. Rodriguez and a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. (“Second MTC,” Dkt. No. 355.) The same day, the DMV filed a cross-motion to quash and requested that Judge Pym issue a protective order and sanctions against Plaintiffs' counsel. (“Motion to Quash,” Dkt. No. 357.) On December 23, 2024, Judge Pym denied the Second MTC and granted the Motion to Quash. (“Second MJ Order,” Dkt. No. 368.) On January 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the Motion.[2] (Motion.) In support of the Motion, Plaintiffs filed a declaration of attorney Donald W. Cook. (“Cook Decl.,” Dkt. No. 369-1.) On January 17, 2025, the DMV opposed.[3] (“Opposition,” Dkt. No. 371.) In support of its Opposition, the DMV included a declaration of attorney Lorinda D. Franco (“Franco Decl.,” Dkt. No. 371 at 20-23) alongside two exhibits (“Franco Decl., Exhibits 1-2,” Dkt. No. 371 at 25-33.) Plaintiffs replied on January 24, 2025. (“Reply,” Dkt. No. 372.) In support of their Reply, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental declaration of attorney Donald W. Cook (“Cook Supp. Decl.,” Dkt. No. 372-1) alongside two exhibits (“Cook Supp. Decl., Exhibits A-B,” Dkt. No. 372-1.) II. LEGAL STANDARD *3 A district court has authority to modify or vacate a magistrate judge's pretrial order where it has been shown that the order is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The clearly erroneous standard applies to factual determinations and discretionary decisions, while legal conclusions are reviewed to determine whether they are contrary to law. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 268 F.R.D. 344, 348 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Generally, parties may obtain discovery “that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). In class actions, parties may obtain discovery in aid of the requirements of Rule 23. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 354 (1978); see also Perez v. DirecTv Grp. Holdings, LLC, 2020 WL 3124353, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2020). On a motion to compel discovery, the moving party carries the “initial burden of demonstrating relevance.” United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014). Once relevance has been established, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that discovery should be disallowed and to support its objections with evidence. Id. Under Rule 45, a party may serve a subpoena commanding a nonparty to “to attend and give testimony or to produce and permit inspection and copying of” documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C). The scope of discovery allowed under Rule 45 is the same as allowed under Rule 26. Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 2013 WL 6774072, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013). However, “non-parties should not be burdened in discovery to the same extent as the litigants themselves” and “[r]equests to nonparties should be narrowly drawn to meet specific needs for information.” Khan v. Rogers, 2018 WL 5849010, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018) (citations omitted). The party issuing the subpoena must demonstrate that “the information sought is relevant and material to the allegations and claims at issue in the proceedings.” Id. “Where discovery is sought from a non-party, the Court should be particularly sensitive to weighing the probative value of the information sought against the burden of the production on the nonparty.” Wi-Lan Inc. v. Research in Motion Corp., 2010 WL 2998850, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 28, 2010). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs contend that Judge Pym erroneously denied their request to compel the DMV to produce for deposition Kim A. Rodriguez and a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. (See Motion 7-11.) They argue that these depositions are necessary because they would allow Plaintiffs to determine whether specialized programming could be developed to speed up the generation of class members' ownership data—instead of using DMV's file pass process previously ordered by the Court—and whether such specialized programming could retrieve the class members' DL/ID numbers from the DMV's VR database. (See id.) Plaintiffs argue that the Second MJ Order erred for the following reasons: (1) it wrongly concluded that the subpoenas are irrelevant and burdensome; and (2) it improperly issued a protective order and sanctions against Plaintiffs. (See Motion at 7-15.) The Court addresses these arguments below. A. Standard of Review As a threshold matter, the Court considers the standard of review it must apply. Plaintiffs renew their argument that the standard of review of the Second MJ Order is de novo, rather than clear error. (See Motion at 6.) The Court disagrees. *4 Plaintiffs are incorrect in their assertion that this is not a discovery matter because Rule 23(d) controls. (See id.) Though Rule 23(d) allows the Court to issue orders related to class notice, Rule 26(b) governs discovery “in aid of the requirements of Rule 23.” See Mier v. CVS Health, 2021 WL 6102518, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2021). As such, Plaintiffs' Second MTC is a discovery matter. Finally, Plaintiffs' reliance on Oppenheimer in their argument for a de novo standard under Rule 23(d) is misplaced. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., 437 U.S. at 356. In Oppenheimer, the Supreme Court held that “Rule 23(d) ... authorizes a district court in appropriate circumstances to require a defendant's cooperation in identifying the class members to whom notice must be sent.” 437 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added). It is doubtful whether the Court may order a non-party, as opposed to a defendant, to aid in the production of class member information under Rule 23(d). See Brewster v. City of Los Angeles, 2019 WL 6620505, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2019). Moreover, unlike this case, Oppenheimer did not involve a review of a magistrate judge's existing order. See Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 356. It is well-established that a district court has authority to modify or vacate a magistrate judge's order only when the order is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Accordingly, the Court reviews the Second MJ Order for clear error. Additionally, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that, here, the propriety of sanctions should be governed by Rule 45 and not Rule 37. (See Reply at 9); compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5) (limiting the payment of expenses related to discovery motions between parties and deponents whose conduct necessitated the motion), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1) (allowing sanctions, including attorney's fees, against a party if the court determines that a request for discovery imposes “undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena”). B. Review of Second MJ Order 1. Subpoenas Although Plaintiffs argue otherwise, the Motion reads largely like a motion to reconsider this Court's Order denying Plaintiffs' First Motion for Review. (Motion; Order; First Motion for Review.) Put differently, Plaintiffs initially moved to compel the DMV to create specialized programming to retrieve class members' ownership data, and now move to compel the DMV to produce employees for depositions who may have information on the feasibility of creating such programming. (See Motion; First MTC; First MJ Order; First Motion for Review; Order.) For the reasons discussed in previous orders, the Court again finds that “the burden of developing a [specialized] program would outweigh the potential limited benefit,” rendering the subpoenas also improper and unduly burdensome. (See Order at 6; Second MJ Order at 7.) The Court must weigh the probative value of the information sought against the burden of production, and the Court must be especially sensitive to the burden of production on nonparties. Wi-Lan Inc., 2010 WL 2998850, at *3 (“Where discovery is sought from a non-party, the Court should be particularly sensitive to weighing the probative value of the information sought against the burden of the production on the nonparty.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (parties may obtain discovery “that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case”) (emphasis added). Here, Judge Pym properly weighed the value and burden of compelling these depositions, finding that “while this is not as burdensome as writing a [specialized] program, it nonetheless presents a significant burden for a nonparty that has already been subjected to extraordinary burdens in this case.” (See Second MJ Order at 7.) In so holding, Judge Pym emphasized that Plaintiffs “once again ignore the finding the [C]ourt has already made based on the evidence presented that the VR database is unlikely to contain many of the DL/ID numbers for owners of no-longer-titled vehicles” and that “[n]o matter how specialized the programming, it cannot retrieve data that does not exist.” (See id.) Plaintiffs counter that “there is no evidence that DL / ID numbers are generally not recorded in the VR database” and “submit that when a DMV clerk asks a vehicle owner to provide his or her driver's license or identification number, the odds are fairly high that the owner will provide it (even though not required).” (See Reply at 7.) The Court rejects Plaintiffs' speculative assertions and reminds Plaintiffs that it found that Judge Pym—after weighing the testimony of DMV employee William Carino, who has personal knowledge of and assists with the administration of the VR database—made a reasonable factual determination that DL/ID numbers are not stored in the VR database after vehicle transfers. (See Order at 6.) Such a factual determination is not clearly erroneous and lessens the probative value of ordering the DMV to produce employees for depositions. See ExxonMobil Oil Corporation v. Southern California Edison Co., 2014 WL 12629698, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014) (“The magistrate judge's factual determinations are affirmed absent clear error.”). *5 Finally, the Zielinski Order and the statements made by DMV employee Thomas De Leon—i.e., that he has never been asked to determine the feasibility and cost of creating “any specialized programming”—do not change the Court's conclusions. (See Zielinski Order; Dkt. No. 365-2 at 4:8-17.) Judge Pym granted-in-part the Zielinski Motion because Zielinski's prior statements—“albeit unclearly, in a manner calling for further explanation”—indicated “that there may be a more efficient and less expensive method of obtaining vehicle ownership data than those already considered by the parties.” (See Zielinski Order at 4.) Judge Pym also found that Zielinski's prior statements were “worth investigating, to some degree.” (See id. (emphasis added).) Because Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to investigate the feasibility of creating the specialized program, the Court finds that the Second MJ Order was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law given the limitations of the VR database as to class members' ownership data and the Court's sensitivity to the burden of production on nonparties. (See Order at 6); see also U.S. ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 237 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“Most significantly, per Rule 26(b)(2)(C), on its own initiative or at a party's request, for example, a court may limit discovery for any one of three reasons: the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; it is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; or the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs the likely benefit.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The statements made by Zielinski and De Leon are also too speculative to justify the subpoenas. For instance, Zielinski testified that the ISD may have a means to retrieve “historical vehicle information that's outside the normal process” “[p]rovided the information is available” (see Zielinski Depo. at 47:4-20 (emphasis added)); and De Leon stated that the “only method that may retrieve DL / ID numbers for vehicles from the VR database, if the DL / ID numbers were recorded and exist in the VR database, would be a ‘file-pass’ software or program that must be developed specifically to obtain the DL/ ID numbers information, if they were recorded in and exist in the VR database, from the VR database” (see Dkt. No. 365-2 ¶ 5 (emphasis added)). As such, the Court agrees with Judge Pym that the burden of developing a specialized program would outweigh the potential limited benefit it may provide, rendering the subpoenas irrelevant and burdensome to the DMV. (See Second MJ Order at 6.) In sum, the Court agrees with Judge Pym that “[P]laintiffs' subpoenas constitute an undue burden on DMV” because: (1) the DMV has already expended significant time and resources to comply with this Court's previous orders; (2) the DMV appears ready to develop and implement the file pass already ordered by this Court as it “believes that it can develop and implement the file pass to retrieve the requested information within only three to six months, as opposed to its earlier estimate of twelve to eighteen months”; and (3) it is unclear whether a specialized program may materially assist Plaintiffs' goals of locating class members' ownership data. (See Second MJ Order at 7-8.) 2. Protective Order[4] Under Rule 26(c), the court may issue a protective order “for good cause ... to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including ... forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(D); see also McCoy v. Sw. Airlines Co., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 381, 385 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“under Rule 26(c), the Court may sua sponte issue a protective order for good cause shown”). “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002). District courts have broad latitude to grant protective orders to prevent disclosure of materials for many types of information. See id. at 1211 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). *6 Plaintiffs assert that they were “justified in believing that specialized programming can be written which can retrieve the desired data in just a few weeks—take a week (if not less) to write a program that can retrieve the data using a batch process, then using that batch process [to] retrieve the data in a few days.” (Motion at 12.) For Plaintiffs, the “DMV offered no evidence to support its assertion that file pass and R60 inquiry are the only two methods” available to retrieve class members' ownership data. (Id. (emphasis in original).) The Court disagrees. As discussed above, the subpoenas were not justified because they are seeking information on the feasibility of developing specialized programming when Judge Pym and this Court have repeatedly held that the burden of developing said programming would outweigh its potential limited benefit. (See First MJ Order at 8; Order at 6; Second MJ Order at 7.) Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to present any evidence—besides pointing to speculative and conditional statements made by DMV employees and a declaration from a programmer analyst that Judge Pym and this Court found unconvincing—regarding the feasibility of creating the specialized programming. (See First MJ Order; Order; Motion.) As such, the Court finds that Judge Pym's conclusion that “[P]laintiffs' counsel's behavior necessitates the issuance of a protective order” because he improperly sought “discovery into matters that have already been denied” “and caused ... [the] DMV to expend unnecessary resources” was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.[5] 3. Sanctions Rule 45 states, “[a] party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena. The court for the district where compliance is required must enforce this duty and impose an appropriate sanction—which may include lost earnings and reasonable attorney's fees—on a party or attorney who fails to comply.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). Here, because the subpoenas were improper and unduly burdensome to the DMV, as discussed above, Judge Pym's decision to issue sanctions against Plaintiffs' counsel was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.[6] (See Second MJ Order at 9-10); see also Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 814 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that sanctions were appropriate under Rule 45 because the subpoena was served for an improper purpose and was unduly burdensome to a non-party); cf Mount Hope Church v. Bash Back!, 705 F.3d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that sanctions were inappropriate because “the demands of the subpoena were focused and not unduly burdensome in terms of required production of documents” and that “bad faith supporting Rule 45[ ] sanctions did not exist”). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED. The hearing scheduled for June 30, 2025 is VACATED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] All subsequent references to “Rule” refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted. [2] The DMV asserts that “Plaintiffs' counsel failed to meet and confer in good faith pursuant to ... [L]ocal [R]ule 7-3 ... and Plaintiffs' motion for review should be denied on that ground alone.” (See Opposition at 4.) Plaintiffs counter that they emailed the DMV a letter on December 24, 2024, requesting a L.R. 7-3 conference. (See Reply at 7-8; Cook Supp. Decl., Exhibit A.) This Court's Local Rules require “counsel contemplating the filing of any motion first [to] contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly ... the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution.” L.R. 7-3. Such a “conference shall take place at least seven (7) days prior to the filing of the motion.” Id. The Local Rules also provide that the “Court may decline to consider a motion unless it meets the requirements of L.R. 7-3 through 7-8.” L.R. 7-4. This Court expects and requires strict compliance with the Local Rules. Any party's failure to comply assiduously with the Local Rules may result in sanctions imposed on the offending party or its counsel or both, without further notice. Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial efficiency, the Court will overlook the parties' failure to comply with L.R. 7-3 and adjudicate the Motion on the merits. [3] Pursuant to this Court's Local Rules, the DMV should have filed an opposition or a notice of non-opposition to the Motion on or before January 13, 2025. See L.R. 7-9 (“Each opposing party shall, ... not later than twenty-one (21) days before the date designated for the hearing of the motion ... , serve upon all other parties and file with the Clerk either (a) the evidence upon which the opposing party will rely in opposition to the motion and a brief but complete memorandum which shall contain a statement of all the reasons in opposition thereto and the points and authorities upon which the opposing party will rely, or (b) a written statement that that party will not oppose the motion.”). DMV's Counsel explains that the Opposition was filed late, per this Court's Local Rules, due to a calendaring error. (See Opposition at 4.) The Court admonishes the DMV and warns that “the failure to file any required document, or the failure to file it within the deadline, may be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the motion ....” L.R. 7-12. However, because Plaintiffs were not overly prejudiced by DMV's failure to comply with this Court's Local Rules and the Opposition was filed only four days late, the Court will not grant the Motion on this basis as requested by Plaintiffs. (See Reply at 4); see also Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 2010) (“the length of delay was a mere three days; filing the opposition then would not have adversely affected either the summary judgment hearing date, which was ten days away, or the trial, which was two and a half months away”). [4] Plaintiffs contend that the DMV's requests for a protective order and sanctions were procedurally improper because the DMV did not raise these issues during the parties L.R. 37-1 conference. (See Motion at 11.) Local Rule 37-1 requires that parties sufficiently meet and confer before seeking court intervention to narrow disputes presented to the Court. L.R. 37-1. However, Plaintiffs “fail to present any evidence that they have been prejudiced—even minimally—by this deficiency.” See RG Abrams Ins. v. L. Offs. of C.R. Abrams, 342 F.R.D. 461, 486 (C.D. Cal. 2022); (see Motion at 11.) Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion and excuses the DMV's non-compliance with L.R. 37-1. See RG Abrams Ins., 342 F.R.D. at 486 (excusing plaintiffs' non-compliance with Local Rule 37-1 because the defendants did not explain how they were prejudiced). [5] Plaintiffs also assert that the “protective order must be set aside because it precludes Plaintiffs from pursuing the second step for obtaining class members' current DMV-recorded addresses....” (Motion at 14 (emphasis in original).) However, the protective order does not preclude Plaintiffs from pursuing this “second step,” and instead “requires [P]laintiffs to demonstrate good cause and relevance to [Judge Pym] before they may issue any further subpoena to DMV in this litigation.” (See Second MJ Order at 10.) [6] Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that the sanctions were “clearly wrong” because they were “based on [Defendant's counsel's] complaints that Plaintiffs' counsel deposed Gerald Zielinski in person rather than by video conference, and that Plaintiffs' counsel, over DMV's objections, video-recorded th[at] deposition (in addition to stenographically recording it).” (See Motion at 14.) Instead, Judge Pym granted DMV's request for sanctions because Plaintiffs were “not substantially justified” in serving the subpoenas to the DMV. (See Second MJ Order at 9-10.)