EL PASO DISPOSAL, LP, WASTE CONNECTIONS OF TEXAS, LLC, WASTE CONNECTIONS LONE STAR, INC., and WASTE CONNECTIONS US, INC., Plaintiffs, v. ECUBE LABS CO. d/b/a HAULLA SERVICES, Defendant EP-24-CV-00097-KC United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division Filed July 03, 2025 Berton, Anne T., United States Magistrate Judge MEMORANDUM ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENA *1 Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs El Paso Disposal, LP, Waste Connections of Texas, LLC, Waste Connections Lone Star, Inc., and Waste Connections US, Inc.'s (collectively, Waste Connections) “Motion to Compel Discovery from Third Party Rio Grande Waste Services, Inc.” (ECF No. 113). The motion asks the Court to order Rio Grande Waste Services, Inc. (Rio Grande), a nonparty to this litigation, to produce the documents requested in Waste Connections' subpoena duces tecum issued under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the motion. I. BACKGROUND Waste Connections brought this lawsuit against Defendant Ecube Labs Co. d/b/a/ Haulla Services (Haulla). Waste Connections is a waste hauler: it provides waste collection, transfer, recycling, and disposal services to its customers, and Haulla is a waste services broker: it acts as an intermediary between a customer and a waste hauler, such as Rio Grande which is a direct competitor of Waste Connections, and sells waste services on behalf of the waste hauler, taking a percentage of the service fees for itself. Waste Connections alleges that Haulla unlawfully accessed Waste Connections' online customer portal through a network of agents in the Philippines and elsewhere; obtained Waste Connections' confidential customer-related information such as customer identity, contact information, service pricing data, and other terms of service; used that information to contact Waste Connections' customers; and induced them to breach their service contracts with Waste Connections and sign contracts with Haulla instead.[1] Waste Connections asserts multiple federal and Texas state law claims against Haulla. Specifically, Waste Connections asserts statutory claims for violations of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 et seq.; the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.002 et seq.; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq.; Texas Harmful Access by Computer Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143.001 et seq.; and the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (false advertising).[2] Waste Connections also asserts Texas common law claims for tortious interference with contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and false advertising.[3] In March 2024, Waste Connections initiated this lawsuit. On July 1, 2024, Waste Connections served on Rio Grande the subpoena duces tecum that is the subject of the instant motion.[4] On July 11, 2024, Rio Grande served its objections to the subpoena.[5] On September 18, 2024, Rio Grande served its response to the subpoena and produced one document together with its attachments.[6] *2 In the meantime, on July 8, 2024, Haulla moved to quash the subpoena.[7] On August 30, 2024, this Court denied Haulla's motion, finding that Haulla lacked standing to challenge the subpoena directed to Rio Grande.[8] Relatedly, on June 24, 2024, Waste Connections served its First Set of Requests for Production on Haulla.[9] On September 24, 2024, Waste Connections moved to compel Haulla to produce the documents that Waste Connections requested in the First Set of Requests for Production, and on November 15, 2024, this Court granted in part and denied in part Waste Connections' motion to compel.[10] More recently, on April 30, 2025, Waste Connections filed a second motion to compel Haulla, arguing that Haulla's document productions were deficient.[11] On June 30, 2025, the Court denied as withdrawn in part and denied in part Waste Connections' second motion to compel Haulla.[12] Back to the subpoena at issue. Between September 2024, when Rio Grande responded to the subpoena and produced one document, and December 2025, no further efforts were made by Waste Connections regarding any additional production from Rio Grande.[13] In January 2025, Waste Connections' counsel emailed Rio Grande's counsel, stating that Waste Connections recently received from Haulla a production of hundreds of Haulla-Rio Grande communications and asking Rio Grande's counsel to double-check to see if Rio Grande had additional responsive documents.[14] On May 6, 2025, Waste Connections' and Rio Grande's counsel met and conferred over the phone regarding additional responsive documents.[15] In a follow-up email dated May 8, 2025, Rio Grande's counsel stated that he would talk to his client about Waste Connections' request for certain purchase orders and would respond not later than May 13, 2025.[16] On May 14, 2025, Waste Connections filed the instant motion to compel Rio Grande. As of the filing of the motion, Waste Connections' counsel did not receive any further communication from Rio Grande's counsel.[17] On May 23, Rio Grande filed its response to the motion.[18] On May 30, 2025, Waste Connections filed its reply.[19] II. DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 authorizes a party to command a person to “produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person's possession, custody, or control” via a subpoena duces tecum. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). “The subpoena duces tecum is the only way to compel a nonparty to produce documents or other materials.” 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2456 (3d ed. updated May 21, 2025); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c) (providing that a nonparty may be compelled to produce documents and tangible things “[a]s provided in Rule 45”). After the subpoenaed person serves objections to the subpoena, the subpoenaing party, i.e., the requesting party, may move the court “for an order compelling production.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i). *3 The scope of discovery allowed under Rule 45 is limited by “the relevancy requirement” of Rule 26(b)(1). Jordan v. Comm'r, Miss. Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2020).[20] Thus, the documents and information sought in a subpoena “must be ‘relevant to any party's claim or defense.’ ” Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Jordan, 921 F.3d 180, 188 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). Under Rule 26(b)(1), “information is relevant if it ‘bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue related to the claim or defense of any party.’ ” Leonard v. Martin, 38 F.4th 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991)). Although “relevance” is “construed ... broadly,” Coughlin, 946 F.2d at 1159, “Rule 26(b) ‘has never been a license to engage in an unwieldy, burdensome, and speculative fishing expedition,’ ” Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Murphy v. Deloitte & Touche Grp. Ins. Plan, 619 F.3d 1151, 1163 (10th Cir. 2010)). On a motion to compel production under a subpoena, the court “should consider not just the relevance of information sought, but the requesting party's need for it.” Va. Dep't of Corr., 921 F.3d at 189 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004)). Further, the court “must enforce” the subpoenaing party's duty to “take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense” on the subpoenaed person. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). Moreover, where, as here, a subpoena requests information from a nonparty, “the court must be sensitive to the nonparty's compliance costs.” Leonard, 38 F.4th at 489. If the court orders the nonparty to comply with the subpoena over objections, it “must protect” the nonparty “from significant expense resulting from compliance.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(ii). Therefore, “the court may also consider the expense and inconvenience to the non-party.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 & n.32 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)). With the above exposition of the relevant laws, the Court turns to the specific discovery requests in the subpoena. The subpoena lists four Requests for Production (RFPs). Below, the Court addresses each in turn. A. RFP No. 1 RFP No. 1 seeks any and all “agreements or contracts” with Ecube Labs Co. and/or Haulla. RG's Ex. 1 at 5. Waste Connections argues that although Rio Grande produced one such agreement, to wit, a “Hauler Agreement” executed by Rio Grande and Haulla, it has not produced “responsive purchase orders” from Haulla to Rio Grande. Pls.' Mot. to Compel at 5; see also id. at 4 (arguing that “purchase orders with Rio Grande ... are responsive at least to [RFP] No. 1 of the subpoena (‘All agreements or contracts with Haulla’)”); Pls.' Reply at 1 (arguing that “purchase orders are contracts” and therefore, are responsive to RFP No. 1) (cleaned up)).[21] For support, Waste Connections submitted copies of five purchase orders from Haulla to Rio Grande, which Haulla produced during discovery. Pls.' Ex. 6 at 5–14, ECF No. 115. *4 Rio Grande responds that the documents sought in RFP No. 1 are very clearly in Haulla's possession and therefore should be sought from Haulla, not from Rio Grande, who is a third party. RG's Resp. at 5. On that basis, Rio Grande asks the Court to deny Waste Connections' motion as to RFP No. 1. It adds that rather than focusing on its business, Waste Connections would have Rio Grande focus its efforts and energy on assisting Waste Connections collect documents in a case to which Rio Grande is not a party. Id. For support, Rio Grande relies on this Court's prior order denying Haulla's motion to quash the same subpoena. Id. In denying Haulla's motion—which turned on whether Haulla had standing to challenge the subpoena directed to Rio Grande—the Court wrote: [C]ourts have held that “where the sought-after documents are within the possession, custody, or control of a party, it is not appropriate to employ Rule 45 to secure such documents from a non-party who may also be in possession of the documents or copies[.]” Such holdings are grounded in the rationale for avoiding unnecessary burden on the non-party: “there is simply no reason to burden nonparties when the documents sought are in the possession of the party defendant.” El Paso Disposal, 2024 WL 5711797, at *4 (cleaned up) (first quoting Suntrust Mortg., Inc. v. Busby, No. 2:09CV10, 2009 WL 5511215, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 18, 2009), and then quoting Weatherly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins., No. CIV.A. 07-4371-EEH-S, 2009 WL 1507353, at *3 (E.D. La. May 28, 2009)). The above-quoted propositions do not, however, dispense with a nonparty's production all together under all circumstances. As the above-cited cases and other cases suggest, a court may compel production from a nonparty, if the subpoenaing party demonstrates that it cannot obtain the sought-after documents directly from a party to the litigation. See, e.g., Suntrust Mortg., 2009 WL 5511215, at *2 (granting a nonparty's motion to quash subpoena because the subpoenaing party, the plaintiff in that case, “has not shown why it cannot or should not be required to first seek production directly from defendants”); Andra Grp., LP v. JDA Software Grp., Inc., 312 F.R.D. 444, 453 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (explaining that the defendant-subpoenaing party's “need to have a non-party search for and produce th[e] [requested] communications is—at least absent a showing that [the plaintiff] has not produced and will not be able to produce all of those communications—much lower” and further stating that the defendant “can revisit this issue once [the plaintiff's] production is complete if ... it can show that production of what should be the same documents by [the nonparty] likely will reveal omissions or missing documents from [the plaintiff's] production”). Here, Waste Connections attempts to make such a showing. Specifically, in its reply brief, Waste Connections argues that both Haulla and Rio Grande continue to dodge discovery requested by Waste Connections, so it has no choice but to seek what it can from both. Pls.' Reply at 2. Waste Connections adds that it highly doubts that Haulla has preserved or produced all of the agreements and contracts that Waste Connections seeks from Rio Grande. Id. at 1 n.1. As evidence, Waste Connections asserts, citing to its other motion to compel filed against Haulla, that Haulla failed to produce certain “agreements and contracts.” Id. (citing Pls.' Second Mot. to Compel Def., ECF No. 102). For that assertion, however, Waste Connections does not supply any pin-point citation to the other motion to compel. It appears that Waste Connection is referring to its argument on that motion about Haulla's agreements with its sales personnel in the Philippines. Pls.' Second Mot. to Compel Def. at 8. Just this week, the Court ruled on that motion, and in ruling on the motion, the Court noted that “Haulla produced these agreements on May 5, 2025,” Mem. Order at 6, ECF No. 136—that was more than three weeks before Waste Connections filed its reply brief here, wherein it made the assertion mentioned above. *5 Therefore, the record does not bear out Waste Connections' assertion, and in turn, Waste Connections has failed to demonstrate why it cannot obtain the responsive agreements and documents, including purchase orders, from Haulla instead. See Va. Dep't of Corr., 921 F.3d at 189 (“[T]he requesting party should be able to explain why it cannot obtain the same information, or comparable information that would also satisfy its needs, from one of the parties to the litigation.”); see also id. (“For example, a party's email provider might well possess emails that would be discoverable from the party herself. But unless the email provider can offer important information that cannot be obtained from the party directly, there would be no cause for a subpoena against the provider.”). As for relevance, Waste Connections argues that the agreements and contracts sought in RFP No. 1 are relevant to the Haulla-Rio Grande relationship. Pls.' Mot. to Compel at 5. Although neither Waste Connection, nor Rio Grande provided the Court with a copy of the Haulla-Rio Grande Hauler Agreement, which Rio Grande produced in response to RFP No. 1, the record elsewhere contains a copy of the Hauler Agreement. Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. 2 at 3–4, ECF No. 78-2. Having reviewed the Agreement, the Court finds that the Agreement is sufficient to show the relationship between Haulla and Rio Grande, and the parameters of that relationship. Further, having reviewed the purchase orders that Waste Connections submitted with this motion, the Court finds that the purchase orders have, at most, marginal utility beyond that which is disclosed in the Hauler Agreement about the Haulla-Rio Grande relationship The Court therefore DENIES Waste Connections' request to compel production of the documents sought in RFP No. 1 insofar as Waste Connections seeks documents beyond that which Rio Grande produced, i.e., the Hauler Agreement and the attachments thereto. B. RFP No. 2 RFP No. 2 seeks any and all communications or documents exchanged with Ecube Labs Co. and/or Haulla “relating to” Waste Connections. RG's Ex. 1 at 5. Rio Grande objects, as it does regarding RFP No. 1, that the documents responsive to RFP No. 2 are in Haulla's possession and therefore, should be sought from Haulla, not from Rio Grande. RG's Resp. at 7. It points out that previously, it nevertheless responded to this request saying that Rio Grande did not locate any responsive documents. RG's Resp. at 7 (citing RG's Ex. 3). Specifically, on September 18, 2024, Rio Grande served its response to the subpoena, wherein for RFP No. 2, it responded, “[n]o documents have been identified which are responsive to this request.” RG's Ex. 3 at 3.[22] *6 For at least two reasons, the Court declines to compel production of the documents sought in RFP No. 2. First, Waste Connections argues that these documents are relevant because they will likely show the nature and extent of the “collusion” between Haulla and Rio Grande. Pls.' Mot. to Compel at 7; see also id. at 1 (asserting that Haulla “colludes with Rio Grande and other third-party waste haulers to drive business away from Waste Connections”). However, “collusion” is not an element of any of the claims Waste Connections asserted in this case. First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 24–35 (counts 1 through 9); see also Pls.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 11, 14, 15, 16 (setting forth claim elements), ECF No. 75. And Waste Connections fails to explain how such collusion, if it existed, is otherwise relevant to its claims. It must be remembered that the lawsuit is against Haulla, not Rio Grande, and it is based on Haulla's conduct, not Rio Grande's conduct. Second, Waste Connections argues that if Rio Grande and Haulla are exchanging communications or documents relating to Waste Connections, those communications likely relate to the “illegal activity” described in Waste Connections' Amended Complaint. Pls.' Mot. to Compel at 7. Waste Connections fails to provide any basis for assuming that Haulla and Rio Grande communicated about such activity. The Court finds this speculative argument unpersuasive. See Va. Dep't of Corr., 921 F.3d at 194 (“Nonparties ... should not be drawn into the parties' dispute unless the need to include them outweighs the burdens of doing so ... This undue-burden analysis must be conducted based on the concrete facts and issues in the litigation, not on vague generalities or speculation.”); see also Heidelberg Americas, Inc. v. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd., 333 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (“A litigant may not engage in merely speculative inquiries in the guise of relevant discovery.” (internal quotes omitted)). The Court DENIES Waste Connections' request to compel production of the communications and documents sought in RFP No. 2. C. RFP Nos. 3 and 4 Waste Connections and Rio Grande advance the same arguments about RFP Nos. 3 and 4; so, the Court discusses them together. RFP No. 3 seeks any and all agreements or contracts with all “former Waste Connections customers” with whom Rio Grande has or had a contract, whereas RFP No. 4 seeks any and all communications or documents exchanged with all “former Waste Connections customers” that have or had a contract or agreement with Rio Grande. RG's Ex. 1 at 5. As an initial matter, the Court is not persuaded by Waste Connections' conclusory arguments about relevance. It says that the documents sought in RFP Nos. 3 and 4 are relevant to its damages, but it does not explain why. Pls.' Mot. to Compel at 8. It also says, again without any explanation, that the documents are likely to show whether Haulla solicited those customers using Waste Connections' proprietary information, such as rate information. Id. As important, Rio Grande repeatedly argues that it is a direct competitor of Waste Connections, RG's Resp. at 1, 5, 6, 8, and objects that these RFPs seek confidential trade secret and commercial information of Rio Grande, id. at 7. Rio Grande additionally objects that the RFPs are wildly outside the scope of discovery because they are not limited to former Waste Connections customers who are somehow tied to Rio Grande's commercial relationship with Haulla: that is, according to Rio Grande, they seek agreements, documents, and communications with former Waste Connections customers regardless of whether those customers were introduced to Rio Grande via its relationship with Haulla or were otherwise secured by and through Haulla. Id. at 7–8; RG's Ex. 2 at 4. As such, Rio Grande complains, the RFPs are overbroad. RG's Resp. at 7–8; see also RG's Ex. 2 at 4 (objecting that RFP Nos. 3 and 4 are overbroad and not relevant to the subject matter of the underlying lawsuit). *7 Waste Connections implicitly concedes that these RFPs are facially overboard as it argues that the potential for capturing some irrelevant documents is no reason for Rio Grande to withhold production. Pls.' Mot. to Compel at 8. “[A] subpoena presents an undue burden when the subpoena is facially overbroad.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818; see also Va. Dep't of Corr., 921 F.3d at 190 (“Another type of burden arises when a subpoena is overbroad—that is, when it seeks information beyond what the requesting party reasonably requires.”). And at least with respect to those customers whom Rio Grande procured outside of its relationship with Haulla, the RFPs unnecessarily impinge on Rio Grande's “interest in protecting competitively sensitive information, as well as the customers' interest in protecting their privacy.” Va. Dep't of Corr., 921 F.3d at 190. Finally, the record contains compelling evidence against compelling production of the materials sought in RFP Nos. 3 and 4. According to Waste Connections' pleading, Haulla, not Rio Grande, directly contracts with Waste Connections' customers for waste disposal services (after inducing them to breach their contracts with Waste Connections), and in turn, Haulla contracts with its designated waste collection companies, such as, inter alia, Rio Grande, to physically collect or haul away waste from those customers—because Haulla does not own any trucks and it acts as a middleman. First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 12–15, 21; see also, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 51, 56, 63. And under the Hauler Agreement between Haulla and Rio Grande, the ownership of Haulla's customers' waste collection services rests solely with Haulla, Haulla is the sole point of contact between Rio Grande and the customers, and Rio Grande is prohibited from directly or indirectly communicating with the customers. Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. 2 at 3.[23] Simply put, the materials sought in RFP Nos. 3 and 4 most likely have nothing to do with “Haulla's unlawful solicitation of Waste Connections' customers.” Pls.' Mot to Compel at 8. The Court DENIES Waste Connections' request to compel production of the documents sought in RFP Nos. 3 and 4. D. Attorney's Fees Waste Connections also requests an award of its expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in connection with this motion. Pls.' Mot. to Compel at 10. Waste Connections does so pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5), Pls.' Reply at 5, which provides that if a party's motion to compel another party's production under Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv) is granted, “the court must ... require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion[ ] ... to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). However, Rule 37(a)(5) is inapplicable here. The “only authority in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the imposition of sanctions against a nonparty for failure to comply with a subpoena duces tecum is Rule 45([g]).” Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 708 F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir. 1983);[24] see also Fed'n of Musicians of the United States & Canada v. Skodam Films, LLC, 313 F.R.D. 39, 57 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (“Rule 37(a) does not apply to a motion to compel production of documents based on a subpoena to a nonparty.”). *8 Rule 45(g), in turn, provides: “The court ... may hold in contempt a person who, having been served, fails without adequate excuse to obey the subpoena or an order related to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(g). Sanctions are “only available against the non-part[y] under Rule 45, after a contempt finding and notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Beverly v. Interior Elec. Inc. Nevada, No. 21-55645, 2023 WL 355692, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2023) (citing In re Plise, 506 B.R. 870, 878 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014)). Moreover, “it would be rare for a court to use contempt sanctions without first ordering compliance with a subpoena.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee's notes to 2013 amendment; see also Pennwalt Corp., 708 F.2d at 494 & n.5 (When the person subpoenaed objects in writing, “the party seeking discovery must obtain a court order directing compliance” before contempt sanctions will be available.). Because the Court has not ordered compliance with the subpoena, it DENIES Waste Connections' request for an award of its expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in connection with this motion. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Waste Connections' Motion to Compel Discovery from Third Party Rio Grande Waste Services, Inc. (ECF No. 113) is DENIED. So ORDERED and SIGNED this 3rd day of July 2025. Footnotes [1] First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 11, 15, 17, 35, 42, ECF No. 68; see also id. at ¶¶ 40–75. [2] Id. at ¶¶ 76–111, 130–137. [3] Id. at ¶¶ 112–129, 138–145. [4] RG's Ex. 1 at 3, ECF No. 119-1. In citation sentences throughout this Memorandum Order, the Court refers to Rio Grande as RG. Further, all pin citations to the exhibits of record refer to the page numbers imprinted thereon by the Court's Case Management and Electronic Case Filing system. [5] RG's Ex. 2, ECF No. 119-2. [6] RG's Ex. 3 at 1, ECF No. 119-3. [7] Def.'s Mot. to Quash, Modify, or for Protection from Pls.' Subpoenas to Non-Parties at 1, ECF No. 23. [8] Mem. Order Denying Mot. to Quash at 9, ECF No. 32, published as El Paso Disposal, LP, v. Ecube Labs Co., No. EP-24-CV-00097-KC, 2024 WL 5711797 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2024). [9] Pls.' [First] Mot to Compel [Def.], Ex. H, ECF No. 44-9. [10] Mem. Op. & Order at 21–22, ECF No. 51, published as El Paso Disposal, LP v. Ecube Labs Co., No. EP-24-CV-00097-KC, 2024 WL 4806498, at *10–*11 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2024). [11] Pls.' [Second] Mot. to Compel [Def.] at 2–3, ECF No. 102. [12] Mem. Order, ECF No 136. [13] See generally Pls.' Ex. 5 at 5–7, ECF No. 113-6. [14] Id. at 6. [15] Id. at 2. [16] Id. [17] Pls.' Mot. to Compel Disc. From Third Party RG at 12 [hereinafter Pls.' Mot. to Compel], ECF No. 113. [18] RG's Resp. to Mot. to Compel Disc. [hereinafter RG's Resp.], ECF No. 119. [19] Pls.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Compel Disc. From Third Party RG [hereinafter Pls.' Reply], ECF No. 123. [20] See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee's notes to 1970 amendment (“[T]he scope of discovery through a subpoena is the same as that applicable to Rule 34 and the other discovery rules.”). [21] Rio Grande did not challenge Waste Connections' characterization that purchase orders are responsive to RFP No. 1. As mentioned, during a meet-and-confer call a week before Waste Connections filed this motion, Rio Grande's counsel committed to discuss with his client Waste Connections' “request to produce purchase orders” and “to respond to [Waste Connections'] request no later than Tuesday,” i.e., May 13, 2025. Pls.' Ex. 5 at 2. But as of May 14, 2025, the date on which Waste Connections filed the instant motion, Waste Connections' counsel did not receive any further communication from Rio Grande's counsel. Pls.' Mot. to Compel at 12. The Court therefore accepts Waste Connections' characterization that purchase orders are responsive to RFP No. 1. [22] In its reply brief, Waste Connections took issues with Rio Grande's subpoena-response that it did not locate any responsive documents. Specifically, it asserted that “Rio Grande conveyed to Waste Connections during conferrals that it had not conducted any inquiry at all and would consider running search terms, which it still has not done.” Pls.' Reply at 3 (emphasis added). Read in context, this assertion suggests that in responding to the subpoena and with regard to RFP No. 2, Rio Grande had not conducted any inquiry at all. Prompted by this suggestion, the Court ordered Waste Connections and Rio Grande to further brief this issue and requested declarations to develop the record on this issue. Order for Suppl. Brs., ECF No. 127. The record, so developed, indicates that Waste Connections' suggestion was, at a minimum, hyperbolic. According to Waste Connections' counsel, during a meet-and-confer call on July 18, 2024, Rio Grande's counsel said that Rio Grande had not searched for documents responsive to RFP No. 2 and would consider running search terms, Samuels Declr. at ¶ 4, ECF No. 128-1, but Rio Grande's counsel declares that he does not recall saying so, Crowson Declr. at ¶ 3, ECF No. 132-2. So, what Rio Grande's counsel said during the call is a matter of he-said-he-said; the Court has not been presented with any contemporaneous record of the call, such as an email memorializing counsel's discussion during the call. Even if Rio Grande's counsel stated as Waste Connections' counsel recalls, the call took place at least two months before Rio Grande served its response to the subpoena, and so, such statements by Rio Grande's counsel does not foreclose the possibility that at a later time, Rio Grande conducted a search in order to respond to RFP No. 2. Michael O'Connor, a Rio Grande managing partner, declares that with respect to RFP No. 2, on or about September 18, 2024, he searched three specific Rio Grande email accounts, including his own account, using the search terms, “Waste Connections” and “El Paso Disposal,” but he did not locate any emails or documents. O'Connor Declr. at ¶ 4, ECF No. 132-1. O'Connor also declares that “[t]he only communications or documents exchanged between Rio Grande and Haulla are sent through the email accounts searched.” Id. at ¶ 5. And Rio Grande's counsel declares that Rio Grande's September 18, 2024 response to RFP No. 2 “was based on the search described in Mr. O'Connor's Declaration.” Crowson Declr. at ¶ 5. The Court need not dwell on this issue, for, as discussed, there are other reasons for denying Waste Connections' motion as to RFP No. 2. Regrettably, it suffices to say that Waste Connections' hyperbolic suggestion in this regard gives the Court pause about the reasonableness of Waste Connections' other assertions. [23] The Court is cognizant that Haulla filed the Hauler Agreement under seal. The recited information from the Agreement appears to be innocuous. To the extent that Haulla or Rio Grande disagrees, either may move the Court, within three (3) days of this Memorandum Order, to seal or redact this Order by “demonstrate[ing] that [its] interests outweigh the public's right to access judicial records.” United States v. Chandler, 732 F.3d 434, 440 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing S.E.C. v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1993)). [24] In the quoted proposition from Pennwalt, the Ninth Circuit recited Rule 45(f), which was recodified as Rule 45(a)(5) in 1991, which, in turn, was recodified as Rule 45(g) in 2013. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee's notes to 1991 amendment and 2013 amendment. In substance, for present purposes, the current Rule 45(g) is identical to the former Rule 45(f). See Pennwalt, 708 F.2d at 494 (“Rule 45(f) provides: ‘Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued.’ ” (quoting the former Rule 45(f))).