DFW DANCE FLOORS, LLC, D/B/A/ CENTER STAGE FLOORS, PLAINTIFF, v. BENJAMIN SUCHIL AND IMPERIAL FLOORS, LLC, DEFENDANTS CIVIL CASE NO. 3:22-CV-1775-N-BK United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division Filed April 04, 2025 Toliver, Renee H., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the District Judge's Order of Reference, Doc. 52, this cause is before the Court for a ruling on Plaintiff's Eight Motion to Compel and Brief in Support, Doc. 312. Upon consideration, the motion is GRANTED IN PART. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY According to the operative Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff DFW Dance Floors, LLC, d/b/a Center Stage Floors (“Plaintiff” or “Center Stage”) makes custom dance floors for events and formerly employed Defendant Benjamin Suchil (“Suchil”) was its operations manager. Doc. 302 at 1, 5. The parties' relationship deteriorated, however, when Suchil made efforts to go into business for himself. Doc. 302 at 6. Ultimately, Suchil started a competing business, Defendant Imperial Floors, LLC (“Defendant” or “Imperial”), and all of Plaintiff's employees but one resigned in unison to work for Suchil. Doc. 302 at 6, 9-10. Defendants poached several of its clients, and Suchil reneged on a binding offer to purchase Plaintiff's business. Doc. 302 at 9-10. Plaintiff raises claims against both Defendants for misappropriating trade secrets and violating the Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA), as well as claims against Suchil for (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) breach of contract; (3) fraud; (4) tortious interference with a contract; and (5) unjust enrichment. Doc. 302 at 13-21. Defendant Imperial Floors asserts counterclaims and seeks damages against Plaintiff arising from Plaintiff's alleged unlawful appropriation of Imperial's floor panels, acrylic, and trim used for an event held at the Dallas Country Club (“DCC”) in 2023, including counterclaims for (1) violating the TTLA; and (2) conversion. Doc. 147-2. At the parties' request, the Court entered a Protective Order setting forth a procedure whereby parties can designate their discovery responses as “Confidential Information” (“CI”) or “Confidential Attorney Eyes Only” (“AEO”). Doc. 29 at 2. The Protective Order defines CI as: trade secrets or commercial information that is not publicly known and is of technical or commercial advantage to its possessor, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7), or other information required by law or agreement to be kept confidential. Doc. 29 at 2. An AEO designation is reserved for: information that the producing party deems especially sensitive, which may include, but is not limited to, confidential research and development, financial, technical, marketing, or any other sensitive trade secret information. Doc. 29 at 2. The discovery period is closed, and trial is set before the Chief District Judge Godbey's one-week docket beginning May 6, 2025. Doc. 174. In February 2025, Plaintiff filed its Eighth Motion to Compel, explaining that it has “had difficulties in two main areas of discovery: (1) determining what Defendants are hiding with their AEO and redactions, and (2) determining what Defendants stole from Plaintiff through requests for production and inspection.” Doc. 321 at 3. Plaintiff contends that it has “uncovered direct evidence of theft committed by Suchil and thereafter concealed by Defendants during this litigation.” Doc. 321 at 3. Plaintiff further asserts that because of these issues and “in light of other less-than forthcoming and duplicitous conduct during discovery,” it files the instant motion. Doc. 321 at 3. *2 Per the Court's Standing Order on All Discovery Matters, Doc. 56, the parties have submitted a Joint Status Report (JSR) presenting their respective arguments concerning the relief requested by Plaintiff's motion. See Doc. 324. II. LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specify the scope of discovery in all civil cases. Unless otherwise limited by the court, [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). More simply, under Rule 26(b)(1), discoverable matter must be relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Yang Kun Chung, 321 F.R.D. 250, 279 (N.D. Tex. 2017). “To be relevant under Rule 26(b)(1), a document or information need not, by itself, prove or disprove a claim or defense or have strong probative force or value.” Id. at 280. A party is required to supplement its response to a request for production “in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the ... response is incomplete ... and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing ... or ... as ordered by the court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1)(A)-(B). A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling production or answers from another party when the latter has failed to answer interrogatories or produce documents. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv). For purposes of a motion to compel, “an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4). The party seeking to resist discovery bears the burden of demonstrating how the requested discovery is overly broad and unduly burdensome by submitting affidavits or other evidence revealing the nature of the burden. Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 475, 477 (N.D. Tex. 2005); see also S.E.C. v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 437 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (“A party asserting undue burden typically must present an affidavit or other evidentiary proof of the time or expense involved in responding to the discovery request.”). “Failing to do so, as a general matter, makes such an unsupported objection nothing more than unsustainable boilerplate.” Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 490 (N.D. Tex. 2014). Whether responding to an interrogatory or request for production, any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, decides otherwise. Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 582 (N.D. Tex. 2018). Further, “[s]erving unsupported and boilerplate or stock objections does not preserve or accomplish anything other than waiver and subjecting the responding party to sanctions.” Id. at 581 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 477). Finally, in responding to a motion to compel, the objecting party must “urge and argue in support of its objection to an interrogatory or request, and, if it does not, it waives the objection.” Id. at 583 (citing Orchestrate HR, Inc. v. Trombetta, 178 F. Supp. 3d 476, 507 (N.D. Tex. 2016)). III. DISCOVERY DISPUTES AT ISSUE A. Defendants' Redactions *3 Plaintiff contends that Defendants have redacted documents, and it requests the Court compel Defendants to amend all responses to remove redactions. Doc. 324 at 13-15. Plaintiff asserts, Defendants maintain redactions on many documents, including invoices to third parties. Dkt. 313 at pp. 3-8. (Defendants' Fourth Amended Production Log of Designations and Redactions, Ex. 1). Defendants have redacted portions of documents that contain information as to tasks they perform for clients. These redactions make it impossible for Plaintiff to determine which of Plaintiff's trade secrets, including the clients, processes, and methods, are documented in Defendants' invoices. Doc. 324 at 14. Plaintiff argues that “Defendants' redactions have impeded discovery in this case.” Doc. 324 at 15. In response, Defendants acknowledge that they have redacted two categories of documents. First, they “redacted certain information on invoices for jobs in the future because Center Stage uses the invoices to find out where Defendants' jobs are, and Center Stage's agents then clandestinely interfere with Defendants' business.” Doc. 324 at 51. Defendants assert that these “redactions are proper to avoid further interference and harassment by Center Stage and its agents.” Doc. 324 at 51. Second, Defendants “redacted portions of limited invoices that contain information about Imperial Floors's items/services that Center Stage does not provide to protect the proprietary information.” Doc. 324 at 51. In support, Defendants have provided Suchil's Declaration, in which he states I asked my attorneys to redact information on Imperial Floors's invoices that divulges services Imperial Floors offers and to my knowledge Center Stage does not. This redacted information has nothing to do with dance floors or toppings applied to dance floors. The information does not contain any information about Center Stage's vendor and supplier information, employee information, client information, or any other information Center Stage's identifies as its purported trade secrets. Imperial Floors did not begin offering these services until well after this litigation was commenced. The redactions are to protect my business from my biggest competitor and not to hide anything in discovery. Doc. 325-2 at 174 (Suchil Decl. ¶ 2). Defendants propose an in camera review of the redacted documents to allow the Court to determine relevancy. Doc. 324 at 52. This Court has previously concluded that a party “was not entitled to unilaterally redact information it believed to be irrelevant or non-responsive[,]” especially where “any concerns regarding proprietary information and confidentiality” are sufficiently addressed by an agreed protective order in the case. Pavillion Bank v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., No. 3:12-CV-05211-G-BK, 2013 WL 12126258, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2013) (Toliver, J.). “Redaction is, after all, an alteration of potential evidence, and a party should not take it upon him, her or itself to decide unilaterally what context is necessary for the non-redacted part disclosed, and what might be useless to the case.” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Simms v. Austin Radiological Ass'n, 292 F.R.D. 378, 386 (W.D. Tex. 2013)) (cleaned up). “This position finds support in the rules governing document production.” Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i) (requiring a party to produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business)). As summarized by another judge of this Court, three themes pervade decisions on the propriety of redactions: *4 (1) that redaction of otherwise discoverable documents is the exception rather than the rule; (2) that ordinarily, the fact that the producing party is not harmed by producing irrelevant information or by producing sensitive information which is subject to a protective order restricting its dissemination and use renders redaction both unnecessary and potentially disruptive to the orderly resolution of the case; and (3) that the Court should not be burdened with an in camera inspection of redacted documents merely to confirm the relevance or irrelevance of redacted information, but only when necessary to protect privileged material whose production might waive the privilege. TNA Australia Pty Ltd. v. PPM Techs., LLC, No. 3:17-CV-642-M, 2018 WL 2010277, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2018) (Horan, J.) (quoting ex rel. Simms, 292 F.R.D. at 386) (declining to allow redactions of responsive documents or conduct an in camera review where protective order sufficiently addressed concerns regarding trade secrets and confidentiality). The Court finds the rationale set forth in these opinions to be persuasive and well-reasoned. Thus, the undersigned concludes that Defendants were not entitled to unilaterally redact information they believed to be irrelevant or non-responsive; nor were they permitted to unilaterally redact invoices “to avoid further interference and harassment by Center Stage and its agents.” Doc. 324 at 51. Further, any concerns regarding proprietary information and confidentiality are sufficiently addressed by the Protective Order to which the parties agreed, Doc. 29, as it provides protections for the responsive information that Defendants must produce, and which they can—but only if appropriate and permitted under Protective Order's terms—designate as AEO. Finally, like Judge Horan in TNA Australia, 2018 WL 2010277, at *15, under these circumstances, the Court declines Defendants' invitation to conduct an in camera review of the redacted documents. See id. For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion seeking to compel unredacted documents is GRANTED. Defendants are ORDERED to amend their responses and provide Plaintiff with unredacted copies of all documents listed as redacted in Defendants' Fourth Amended Production Log of Designations and Redactions (Doc. 313 at 7-8). B. Documents and Information Pertaining to the Reed and DCC Cases These discovery requests pertain to documents and information supporting Defendants' damages claims in two state court lawsuits they initiated and have since non-suited. See Imperial Floors, LLC v. Mike's Dance Floor and Party Rentals, LLC, Michael Thomas Reed, and John Christian Soiset, No. DC-23-09682 (Dallas Cty. 193rd Dist. Ct.) (the “Reed case”); Imperial Floors, LLC v. Dallas Country Club, et al., No. 23-09679 (Dallas Cty. 95th Dist. Ct.) (the “DCC case”). The undersigned previously summarized these cases in a prior decision resolving Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel (Doc. 178). In the Reed case, “Plaintiff contends it previously sold floor panels to Alliant AV, which Suchil attempted to purchase for Imperial Floors while still employed by Plaintiff. Alliant AV ultimately sold the panels to another company whom Defendants have sued in state court together with Soiset.” Doc. 178 at 10. In the DCC case, Plaintiff alleges that in May 2023, it received a call from a wedding planner working on an event at the [DCC]. The planner allegedly informed Plaintiff that Defendants had installed an event floor improperly and would not return, so Plaintiff agreed to put down another floor. Upon arriving, Plaintiff's owner, Chris Soiset, determined that most of the floor panels were Plaintiff's and “must have been stolen by Defendants.” Plaintiff filed a police report and took the floor panels, which spurred Imperial Floors to file suit against the DCC and Soiset in state court. *5 Doc. 178 at 6-7 (internal citations omitted). 1. RFPs 5, 8, and 11 (Plaintiff's Eighth Set of Requests for Production) These requests relate to the Reed case and seek “documents and correspondence that support any claim for damages” (RFP 5); “documents representing your missed business opportunities, that represent your damages” (RFP 8); and a copy of “Alliant AV's listing of the dance floor panels for sale” (RFP 11). Doc. 313 at 37-38. In response to RFPs 5 and 8, Defendants stated that no responsive documents exist “because Defendants do not seek damages” in the Reed case (as it was non-suited). Doc. 313 at 37-38. As to RFP 11, Defendants responded that they “have already produced all responsive documents.” Doc. 313 at 38. In the JSR, Defendants now state with respect to RFPs 5 and 8 that they “amended their responses to these RFPs with citations to bates labels containing potentially responsive information. This issue is moot.” Doc. 324 at 54. As to RFP 11, Defendants now assert that they “believed they had produced the Alliant listing [but] [u]pon further review, [they] have not located the listing.” Doc. 324 at 53. Nevertheless, they assert the issue is “moot” because they “produced documents associated with the Alliant listing.” Doc. 324 at 53. Plaintiff contends that, with respect to RFPs 5 and 8, the bates-numbered documents “are not responsive to specific requests and do not reflect the value Defendants assigned to Center Stage floor panels, the alleged interference with Imperial's business, or Defendants' $1 million alleged lost profits,” as alleged by Imperial in its petition in the Reed case. Doc. 324 at 24. As to RFP 11 and the Alliant listing, Plaintiff states that, “[a]s many times as Plaintiff has asked for this document and as many times as Defendants have claimed it existed and they produced it, it is ridiculous for them now to claim that this was an innocent mistake [T]his is emblematic of Defendants' misleading and misrepresenting conduct throughout this litigation, and it is categorically unfair that Defendants continue to behave this way without consequence.” Doc. 342 at 26. Upon review, the Court finds that RFPs 5, 8, and 11 seek relevant information pertaining to damages and are proportional to the needs of the case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Samsung Elecs. Am., 321 F.R.D. at 279. That the Reed and DCC cases have been non-suited does not render the requests any less relevant in light of the claims, counterclaims, and defenses in this action. Further, the Court is not persuaded that these requests are moot, particularly after considering Defendants' inconsistent discovery responses and disinclination to point Plaintiff to bates numbers in their production responsive to this and other requests where they claim to have produced documents (e.g., Doc. 313 at 41, January 16, 2025 Cochran e-mail). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel as to RFPs 5, 8, and 11 is GRANTED, and Defendants' objections to these requests are OVERRULED. Defendants are ORDERED to serve amended responses, without objections, and produce all previously unproduced documents in Defendants' possession, custody, or control that are responsive to RFPs 5, 8, and 11, in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)'s requirements. In the event Alliant AV's Listing does not exist, Defendants must provide a sworn declaration to that effect. 2. Interrogatories 33, 34, and 35 (Plaintiff's Fourth Set of Interrogatories) *6 Interrogatories 33, 34, and 35 concern the factual basis for various statements in the petition in the Reed case, including that Soiset's purpose “was to deprive Imperial Floors of the opportunity to purchase [floor panels] and to interfere with Imperial Floors' and Alliant AV's business relationship and contract”; that “Soiset's conduct injured Plaintiff in that it was unable to obtain particular dance floor panels to start operating”; and that Soiset could not purchase the dance floor panels from another dance floor panels vendor. Doc. 313 at 48-49. Defendants objected to these interrogatories on the basis that Plaintiff served them with more than 25 interrogatories. Doc. 313 at 48-49. In the JSR, Defendants contend that their objections should be sustained on that basis and because the matter is moot. Doc. 324 at 54.[1] Plaintiff argues that there “are two Defendants, and therefore the Rules provide Plaintiff with 25 interrogatories per Defendant.” Doc. 324 at 27. Rule 33(a)(1) provides that, unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may serve “on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.” FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1). Here, Plaintiff did not submit more than 25 interrogatories to any one defendant. Plaintiff directed a total of 48 interrogatories to Defendants Suchil and Imperial.[2] The plain language of the rule allows a party to serve “on any other party” no more than 25 interrogatories. Defendants may be associated and represented by the same attorney, but each of them is a party, and Plaintiff did not serve more than 25 interrogatories on any one party. The Court has discretion to prevent abuses of this rule if a party shows that to be the case. However, Defendants have not asserted any abuse, aside from the number of interrogatories. But the number alone does not warrant relief in this case. Thus, Defendants' objections to Interrogatories 33, 34, and 35 (and to other interrogatories propounded by Plaintiff to which Defendants raise this same objection) are OVERRULED, and Defendants' contention that the motion to compel answers to these interrogatories is moot is rejected. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED. Defendants are ORDERED to amend their responses, removing all objections and privilege claims, to Interrogatories 33, 34, and 35, or provide a sworn declaration that they have no information with which to provide a response. 3. Interrogatories 43, 44, 45, and 46 (Plaintiff's Fifth Set of Interrogatories) *7 Interrogatories 43, 44, 45, and 46 relate to allegations in the petition in the DCC case concerning how and when Defendants purchased materials and equipment for use in their business. Doc. 313 at 52-53; Doc. 313 at 61-63. Defendants objected that the “allegations in [the DCC] case are not relevant to any party's claim or defense in this case”; that the information sought “can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient and less burdensome, namely, a deposition”; and “because Plaintiff has exceeded the allotted amount under Rule 33.” Doc. 313 at 52-53; Doc. 313 at 61-63. These objections are OVERRULED. Alleged misrepresentations made in the DCC case are relevant in this matter given Defendants' counterclaims for theft and conversion of floor panels and trim at the 2023 DCC event and the requests are proportional to the needs of the case and not unduly burdensome. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Samsung Elecs. Am., 321 F.R.D. at 279. Further, the Court has reviewed Suchil's deposition transcript (see Doc. 324 at 3-18) and agrees with Plaintiff that his failure to recall information hindered Plaintiff's ability to discovery this information from a source other than its interrogatories. And, the Court has already found that Plaintiff has not exceed 25 interrogatories per party. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED. Defendants are ORDERED to amend their responses, removing all objections and privilege claims, to Interrogatories 43, 44, 45, and 46, or provide a sworn declaration that they have no information with which to provide a response. 4. RFPs 13 and 16 (Plaintiff's Ninth Set of Requests for Production) These RFPs seek more information about the DCC case. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks “all documents and communications reflecting the purchase of toppings” and “other material” as described in particular paragraphs of the petition in the DCC case. Doc. 313 at 63, 67-68. Defendants object based on relevance, proportionality, and vagueness. Doc. 313 at 63, 67-68. Nevertheless, in the JSR, Defendants inform the Court they have already produced information about their purchase of toppings and “other materials.” Doc. 324 at 54 (citing Doc. 325-1 at 9-135 (IMPERIAL FLOORS 000001-73, 000705-709, 005227-5261, 040256-40263, 040335-40341, 040594-040596)). Further, Defendants contend that “blanketly requesting all documents and communications relating to purchasing toppings and other materials is unduly burdensome and disproportional especially considering that the allegations prompting the requests are from an entirely different lawsuit.” Doc. 324 at 55. Upon review, Defendants' objection that “other materials” is vague and that, in light of Defendants' production, see Doc. 325-1 at 9-135, a request for “all documents and communications” relating to purchasing toppings and “other materials” is unduly burdensome and not proportional to the needs of the case, is SUSTANIED. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Samsung Elecs. Am., 321 F.R.D. at 279. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses to RFPs 13 and 16 is DENIED. C. Employee Information 1. RFPs 113, 114, 115, and 121 (Plaintiff's Fifth Set of Requests for Production) These requests relate to employee work schedules, calendars, and records of payroll payments to employees. See RFPs 113, 114, 115, and 121, Doc. 324-1 at 23-24. In its motion to compel, Plaintiff argues that it needs “Suchil's employee work schedules from when he worked for Plaintiff and after he started at Imperial Floors, so [it] can determine which of Defendants' employees will have the knowledge Suchil cannot provide,” because Suchil, at his deposition, could not recall which employees purchased carts and casters, he could not recognize himself in a video, and he could not remember the name of a DCC employee who gave him a cart. Doc. 312 at 13-14. Plaintiff additionally claims it needs to know the identity of Defendants' employees since they have likely been exposed to Plaintiff's trade secrets. Doc. 312 at 14. *8 In the JSR, Defendants maintain that this issue is moot because they have produced all Center Stage work schedules “in multiple formats.” Doc. 324 at 55 (citing IMPERIAL FLOORS 005415-5426, Defs.' APP. 214-225, IMPERIAL FLOORS 005429-005430, Defs.' APP. 226-27, IMPERIAL FLOORS 041498, Defs.' APP. 228-230; Pltf.'s Appendix to Eighth Motion to Compel at APP. 77-78 (interrogatory responses containing name, address, and phone number of employees)).” Moreover, Defendants state that they “produced all Center Stage work schedules (RFP 113 and 115) in their possession, custody, or control, and this issue is moot.” Doc. 324 at 55. Defendants also contend that “Center Stage does not explain why work schedules and detailed payroll statements will provide it with knowledge of to whom Defendants gave access to Center Stage's purported trade secrets or why the various other discovery information disclosing the identities of Imperial Floors's employees is insufficient.” Doc. 324 at 56. Plaintiff counters that Defendants' assertion to the Court that they already produced information regarding how much employees were paid and when, appear to be false. For example, SANCHEZ 030 reflects the time that Suchil had his brother Aron Sanchez drive to California and back to purchase floor panels on behalf of Defendants while on Plaintiff's payroll. See Dkt. 313 at p.72 Defendants have never produced this document, even though it is clearly responsive and must be within their possession. Defendants sent three other employees to California or Ohio to acquire floor panels on behalf of Imperial. Defendants have handicapped Plaintiff's ability to determine how much Defendants stole in payroll because they refuse to provide these documents. The fact that they still refuse to produce a document we know exists that provides this information, SANCHEZ 030, just shows that Defendants are willfully hiding information and documents from Plaintiff. Doc. 324 at 32-33.[3] Upon review, Defendants' objections with respect to payroll records requested in RFPs 113 and 115 is OVERRULED, and Plaintiff's motion to compel insofar as it requests payroll records, is GRANTED. Defendants are ORDERED to supplement their prior discovery responses and produce any and all payroll documents relating to Suchil, Aron Sanchez, or any other employee or contractor driving to any state (or returning therefrom) to purchase floor panels (or related materials) on behalf of Defendants while on Plaintiff's payroll, or provide a sworn declaration that no other responsive documents exist other than specific references to bates numbers in Defendants' production. Defendants' remaining objections are SUSTAINED, and the motion to compel is DENIED as to the requests for further responses to RFP Nos. 113, 114, 115, and 121, which the Court finds cumulative and disproportionate to the needs of the case.[4] 2. Interrogatory 14 Interrogatory 14 asks Defendants to “[i]dentify all persons who, at any time, worked for Defendant Imperial, as an employee or contractor, including their name, physical address, email address, and phone number.” Doc. 324-1 at 27. *9 In June 2023, in ruling on a prior motion to compel, the Court ordered Defendants to amend their answer to Interrogatory No. 14 to “include all Defendants' employees and contractors.” Doc. 81 (electronic order). Plaintiff informs the Court that, although updated, Defendants left off one employee, namely, Aron Sanchez, Suchil's brother, and states that it needs to know which other employees Defendants omitted from the interrogatory answer. Doc. 312 at 16. Thereafter, Defendants amended their response to include missing names of many employees, including Aron Sanchez. Doc. 313 at 77-78. In the JSR, Plaintiff contends that given this belated disclosure, it again requests that Defendants update the list and verify to the Court that there are no others missing. Doc. 324 at 39. Defendants assert they “amended their answer to Interrogatory 14 to include Suchil's brother, Aron Sanchez, as Center Stage requested.” Doc. 324 at 56. Upon review, the Court finds Defendants have complied with its prior Order; thus, Plaintiff's motion to compel any additional response to Interrogatory 14 is DENIED AS MOOT. D. Financial Information The document requests at issue seek “Imperial Floors's bank records, including account statements, deposits, and checks, from January 1, 2022, until the present” (RFP 68); 2022 and 2023 tax returns (RFPs 28 and 29); “[a]ll documents that reflect statements, deposit images, or withdrawal images, for each Account” that received money or something of value in the name of, or on behalf of Imperial (RFP 3); and “[a]ll documents that reflect statements, deposit images, and withdrawal images, for each Account” that has paid, or otherwise transferred, money or other value, on behalf of, or in the name of, either Defendant, “in exchange for goods and services that are the subject of this Litigation.” (RFP 4). Doc. 313 at 87-88; Doc. 313 at 69-70; Doc. 313 at 92. Defendants object to RFP 68 as overly broad and invasive, cumulative, and not proportionate to the needs of the case. Doc. 313 at 87-88. They object to RFPs 28 and 29 (seeking tax returns) because the information sought can be obtained from other sources and as harassing. Doc. 313 at 69-70. Defendants objected to RFPs 3 and 4 because the use of the words “that reflect” is superfluous and confusing, but agreed to produce bank statements from January 2023 through the present. Doc. 313 at 92. In its motion to compel, Plaintiff contends that, “[i]n response to requests for production, Defendants have produced summary bank statements, with no details, and financial statements, that do not appear verified or certified.” Doc. 312 at 18. It argues that “Defendants' income is both material and profit [sic] to the facts and damages in this case” and “requests the Court order Defendants to produce their complete bank statements and tax statements.” Doc. 312 at 18. Plaintiff also asserts that its “experts have requested Defendants' tax returns in order to verify the accuracy of the Defendants' financial statements given missing invoices and Defendants' supplemental production that occurred after initial expert reports were exchanged.” Doc. 312 at 19. In the JSR, Defendants assert that “have already produced financial statements which Center Stage's expert relied upon in submitting his expert report.” Doc. 324 at 58. They state they do not have “verified” financial statements, nor did Center Stage ever request “verified” financial statements. Doc. 324 at 58. Defendants further state they “produced the financial statements in their possession custody or control, which are automatically generated by QuickBooks.” Doc. 324 at 58. Defendants also cite to Suchil's Declaration in which he states that “Imperial Floors produced all of its financial statements in its possession, custody, or control. These statements include Imperial Floors's balance sheets and profit and loss statements from 2022-2024. Imperial Floors has no other financial statements.” Doc. 325-2 at 174 (Suchil Decl. ¶ 3, sealed). Defendants also assert they produced “29 months of detailed bank statements long before Center Stage filed its motion to compel.” Doc. 324 at 59 (citing IMPERIAL FLOORS 005638-5683, Defs.' APP. 231-276; IMPERIAL FLOORS 040597, Defs.' APP. 277-366). *10 “Because “tax returns are highly sensitive documents, courts are reluctant to order their routine disclosure as a part of discovery.” McElvy v. Southewestern Corr., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-1264-N, 2022 WL 1050312, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2022) (Godbey, J.) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). “While ‘tax returns are neither privileged nor undiscoverable,’ [c]ourts generally require a threshold showing of relevance to compel disclosure of tax information.” Id. (quoting Gondola v. USMD PPM, LLC, 223 F. Supp. 3d 575, 588 (N.D. Tex. 2016). After a showing of relevance, district courts “proceed[ ] to determine whether there is a compelling need because the information is not obtainable through other means.” Id. at n.2 (citation omitted). Upon review, Defendants' objections to RFPs 62, 28, 29, 3, and 4 are SUSTAINED. In light of Defendants' production to date and Suchil's Declaration, Doc. 325-2 at 174 (Suchil Decl. ¶ 3, sealed), the Court finds that these requests are cumulative and disproportionate to the needs of the case. Further, no compelling need has been demonstrated for the tax returns. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED with respect to RFPs 62, 28, 29, 3, and 4. E. Smoked Mirror Panels In support of its motion to compel, Plaintiff explains: At the July 30, 2024 inspection with the Special Master, Center Stage discovered that Defendants had in their possession “smoked mirror” panels that looked to be exactly the same design as the “smoked mirror” design that Center Stage commissioned to have designed and created, and is one of Center Stage's trade secrets that are alleged to have been stolen and are central to this case. Center Stage suspected that Defendants merely copied its “smoke mirror” design file from the password-protected computer. Doc. 312 at 20. In November 2024, Plaintiff served additional discovery specifically requesting Defendants produce “[a]ll documents or files with or regarding the artwork [Defendants] used to create smoked mirror dance floor panels.” Doc. 313 at 95. In response, Defendants stated they “are producing responsive documents.” Doc. 313 at 95. When Defendants failed to produce responsive documents, in late December 2024, Plaintiff requested an inspection of Defendants' computers to create a forensic backup/image of the Defendants' computer ... [to be] conducted by IST Management Services, a certified digital forensic examiner ... to identify the presence of the file Defendants used to create smoked mirror dance floor panels, along with other forensic artifacts to show the origination of this file on the information system. Doc. 313 at 100. Defendants objected on numerous grounds, including that the request “does not specify what specific computer or computers Plaintiff wishes to inspect”; they already produced the file they used “to create the smoked mirror dance floor panels”; and the proposed discovery is “not proportional to the needs of the case” because “the burden and expense outweigh[ ] its likely benefit.” Doc. 313 at 100-01. In January 2025, Defendants produced a document responsive to Plaintiff's initial request for “[a]ll documents or files with or regarding the artwork [Defendants] used to create smoked mirror dance floor panels.” Doc. 324 at 47. Plaintiff asserts that the design in the file presented does not match what it witnessed at the July 2024 inspection. Doc. 324 at 47. In February 2025, Plaintiff served another request for production, targeting the graphic files, file folders, and snapshots of file folders Defendants use to creating a smoked mirror effect on dance floor panels, which information it intends to use for forensic analysis. Doc. 313 at 102-04. Defendants objected to providing computer file information, see id., and have submitted Suchil's Declaration in which he states that neither he nor Imperial Floors “took or stole Center Stage's smoked mirror artwork file” and that “Imperial Floors has only one smoked mirror file, which was produced to Center Stage.” Doc. 325-2 at 174 (Suchil Decl. ¶ 4). *11 Plaintiff now asks the Court to overrule Defendants' objections to the above-described requests and compel Defendants to respond: What is the problem with a third-party forensic expert checking Defendants' electronic devices for the existence of a smoked mirror file or any other digital files potentially containing or modifying Plaintiff's trade secrets? In short, Plaintiff is entitled to this discovery and there is even more reason now to require a forensic inspection of Defendants' devices given the various production anomalies, Defendants' clear misunderstanding of the trade secret issues in this case, and Defendants' long suspected use of Plaintiff's trade secrets in Defendants' floor panel manufacturing process. Doc. 324 at 49. The expert disclosure deadline expired on December 6, 2024. Doc. 174. Before Plaintiff filed its motion to compel that is the subject of this Order, it filed Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Scheduling Order to Permit Its Forensic Expert, Doc. 309, which is pending before the District Judge. In that motion, Plaintiff contends good cause exists to modify the expired deadlines in the Scheduling Order and allow it to designate a forensic expert out of time to inspect “Defendants' computers to create a forensic backup/image of the Defendants' computer ... [to be] conducted by ... a certified digital forensic examiner ... to identify the presence of the file Defendants used to create smoked mirror dance floor panels, along with other forensic artifacts to show the origination of this file on the information system.” Doc. 309 at 3. Defendants oppose that motion, characterizing it as Plaintiff's “untimely attempt to cast a desperate net in hopes of landing the big one,” and argue that they “produced the single .pdf file they use to create the smoked mirror effect on the dance floor panels and other facades. There is nothing more to produce.” Doc. 327 at 2. Given the extensive overlap between Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Scheduling Order to Permit Its Forensic Expert (Doc. 309) and the motion sub judice, unless and until the Chief District Judge Godbey grants Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Scheduling Order to Permit Its Forensic Expert (Doc. 309), the motion sub judice is not ripe as to the request that the Court compel discovery related to smoked mirror panels for forensic examination. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery pertaining to the smoked mirror panels is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE at this juncture. F. Sanctions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(C), the Court determines that, considering all of the circumstances here and the Court's rulings above as to the discovery requests at issue, the parties will bear their own expenses, including attorneys' fees, in connection with the motion to compel. IV. CONCLUSION As detailed supra, Plaintiff's Eight Motion to Compel, Doc. 312, is GRANTED IN PART. All amendments to responses and production ordered herein must occur no later than April 21, 2025. SO ORDERED on April 4, 2025. Footnotes [1] In the JSR, Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's interrogatories “contain many discrete subparts which are counted toward its interrogatory total[,]” and that including all the discrete subparts, Defendants totaled up the interrogatories, and each Defendant has responded to more than 25 interrogatories. Doc. 324 at 64. As Defendants raised this objection for the first time in the JSR, it has been waived. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4) (“Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.”). [2] In the JSR, Plaintiff states it “has propounded 48 interrogatories. The first interrogatories contained ROGs 1-21, the second interrogatories contained ROG 22, the third interrogatories contained ROGs 23-24, the fourth interrogatories contained ROGs 23-37, and the fifth interrogatories contained ROGs 38-46. Plaintiff inadvertently propounded two ROGs 23 and 24.” Doc. 324 at 27, note 7. Although Plaintiff does not attach the entirety of its interrogatories to its appendix, providing only those in dispute, Defendants have proffered no reason the Court should question counsel's representation. [3] Plaintiff also asserts that it “does not believe that Defendants have produced all responsive documents to RFPs 113 and 115.” Doc. 324 at 35. It identifies two documents that it has already obtained from third parties and that Defendants allegedly did not produce. Id. Plaintiff also points to a “missing e-mail,” but the Court is unable to glean its relevance. Id. The Court simply does not have enough information to find that Defendants' production is not adequate. [4] Insofar as Plaintiff's motion can be interpreted to include a request to examine Suchil's electronic devices for text messages and e-mail, see Doc. 312 at 14, Defendants argue the “[d]iscovery is over ... [and] Center Stage never requested in discovery to forensically examine any electronic device for text messages or e-mails. Without such a request, there is nothing to compel.” Doc. 324 at 58 (original emphasis). On this record, the Court agrees and denies the request on that basis in the context of a motion to compel.