UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. KELVIN O. THOMAS, et al., Defendants 1:23-CR-00126 JLS (MJR) United States District Court, W.D. New York Filed April 24, 2025 Roemer, Michael J., United States Magistrate Judge REPORT, RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER *1 This case has been referred to the undersigned by the Hon. John L. Sinatra, Jr. pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) for all pre-trial matters and to hear and report upon dispositive motions. (Dkt. No. 27) BACKGROUND Defendant Kelvin Thomas (“defendant” or “Thomas”) is charged with: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, 400 grams or more of fentanyl; 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine; and heroin, from in or about 2020 and continuing to in or about December 2022, as well as conspiracy to use and maintain the premises at 232 West Main Street, Upper Apartment, Town of Ellicott, New York, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and using fentanyl and methamphetamine, all in violation of Section 846 of Title 21 of the United States Code; (2) conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force or coercion, between in or about October 2022 through in or about December 2022, in violation of Section 1594(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code; (3) two counts of sex trafficking by force or coercion between in or about October 2022, and in or about December 2022, in violation of Sections 1591(a) and 1591(b)(1) and (2) of Title 18 of the United States Code; and (4) using and maintaining a drug-involved premises at 232 West Main Street, Upper Apartment, Town of Ellicott, New York, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and using fentanyl and methamphetamine, from in or about October 2022, and continuing until in or about December 2022, in violation of Section 856(a)(1) of Title 21 of the United States Code and Section 2 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the “Indictment”). (Dkt. No. 25)[1] On December 2, 2024, defendant filed various omnibus discovery demands as well as a motion to suppress evidence. (Dkt. No. 78) The Government filed responses to defendant's motion and omnibus demands on January 23, 2025, as well as a request for reciprocal discovery. (Dkt. No. 86) Defendant filed a reply on February 17, 2025. (Dkt. No. 94) The Court heard oral argument on February 26, 2025, at the conclusion of which the Court requested supplemental briefing. (Dkt. No. 97) The Government filed a supplemental brief on March 14, 2025 (Dkt. No. 100) and defendant filed a supplemental reply on March 28, 2025 (Dkt. No. 102), at which time the Court considered the matter submitted. DISCUSSION The Court will first address defendant's motion to suppress evidence before turning to his non-dispositive omnibus discovery demands and the Government's request for reciprocal discovery. Motion to Suppress Defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered from the search of Facebook Account Number 1009840195, registered under the username of “Kelvin Thomas.” The account was searched pursuant to a warrant signed by the Hon. Jeremiah J. McCarthy, United States Magistrate Judge, on November 2, 2023. (Dkt. No. 86, Exh. 1; Dkt. No. 87) The warrant application was supported by an affidavit authored by Patricia Calleri, Special Agent for the Department of Homeland Security. (Id.) *2 The Government contends that defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of the Facebook account. Defendant filed a standing affidavit stating that he is “the subscriber of the Facebook account having the following identifiers: account number 1009840195; username Kelvin Thomas.” (Dkt. No. 95) The Government submits that Thomas’ affidavit establishes only that he is a “subscriber” to the Facebook account, and that Thomas has failed to demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the public or private content of the account. In order to establish that a search violated the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must show that they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or item searched. United States v. Lyle, 919 F.3d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 2019). The burden of establishing the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy rests on the defendant. United States v. Watson, 404 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Cruz, 475 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). That burden “is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of an affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge.” United States v. White, 17-CR-611, 2018 WL 4103490 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2018); quoting United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Courts in this Circuit have generally found that whether the Fourth Amendment precludes the government from viewing a Facebook user's profile absent a showing of probable cause depends, inter alia, on the user's privacy settings. See e.g., United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012). Thus, courts have found that when a social media user disseminates his postings and information to the public, they are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. In contrast, “postings using more secure privacy settings reflect the user's intent to preserve information as private and may be constitutionally protected.” Id. Courts outside this Circuit have reached similar conclusions. See e.g., United States v. Weber, 599 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (D. Mont., April 22, 2022) (“[W]hether someone can assert a subjective expectation of privacy in their social media accounts depends on the privacy settings they had in place at the time the intrusion occurred.”); United States v. Khan, 15-CR-00286, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82493 (N.D. III. May 31, 2017) (no expectation of privacy in Facebook account not invoking any privacy settings). According to the Government, the search of defendant's Facebook account uncovered non-private communications by defendant, such as public postings and interactions with posts by other Facebook account holders. The defendant's affidavit contains no information as to the privacy settings on the Facebook account. Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate that he had an expectation of privacy as to the general contents of his Facebook account, including his posts, pictures, or interactions with other Facebook account holders. See United States v. Westley, 3:17-CR-171, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118571 (D. Conn. July 17, 2018) (“Because Defendants have not submitted any information regarding steps they took to keep their Facebook content private, they have not met their burden to demonstrate that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in any of the information searched.”); United States v. Whitcomb, 2:18-CR-00123, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214485 (D. Vt. Nov. 5th, 2021) (motion to suppress denied where defendant failed to submit any information regarding steps he took to keep his Facebook account private and therefore failed to demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in any of the information searched). *3 The search of the Facebook account also uncovered private, direct messages between defendant and others utilizing Facebook Messenger. “Most federal courts...have agreed that Facebook and other social media users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in content that they exclude from public access, such as private messages.” United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 333 (4th Cir. 1994). But here, defendant's bare bones affidavit provides no information as to any specific steps defendant took to exclude his Facebook Messenger account, or the messages contained therein, from access by others, nor does defendant state that he had exclusive ownership, possession, or control over the account. See United States v. Chavez, 423 F. Supp. 3d 194, 202-04 (W.D.N.C. 2019) (holding that a Facebook user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in content which he has intentionally excluded from public access); Weber, 599 F. Supp 3d at 1033 (“[defendant], not the United states, bears the burden of establishing he has a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his Instagram accounts”). But even assuming that Thomas has standing to challenge the search of the Facebook account, including his direct messages, he has failed to demonstrate that the instant warrant was not supported by probable cause. Upon a challenge to a probable cause finding made in a search warrant, a reviewing court must give deference to the issuing judge. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1969). The court is not to conduct a de novo review nor is it to “interpret[ ] affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.” Id. Instead, the role of a reviewing court “is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. at 238 (internal citations omitted). To that end, warrant affidavits are entitled to “a presumption of validity.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). Where, as here, the Court is reviewing the probable cause determination of an independent magistrate, it asks solely “whether the issuing judicial officer had a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause.” United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1993). Doubts regarding the existence of probable cause should be resolved in favor of upholding the search warrant. See United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983). When considering whether to grant an application for a search warrant, “[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit...there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236-38. See also United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2004) (probable cause does not demand “certainty” but only a “fair probability” that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found). In determining whether probable cause exists to justify a search, courts must look for a reasonable nexus between the criminal activities described in the warrant application and the places to be searched. United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 182 (2d Cir. 2004). Defendant argues that the warrant affidavit contains conclusory statements which “tend to undercut the totality of probable cause factors set forth in the affidavit.” The Court disagrees. The affidavit submitted in support of the warrant application is lengthy, detailed, and contains specific information linking Thomas, together with co-defendants Ziad Mendoza and Cora Waddington, to ongoing narcotics distribution and sex trafficking activities. This information includes details of SA Calleri's interview with a victim witness who was living with Mendoza and Waddington and engaging in commercial sex acts in exchange for drugs, food, and shelter. The victim witness identified Thomas as an individual who participated in the sex trafficking scheme, including by facilitating commercial sex acts for the victim. The warrant affidavit also contains specific information tending to show that evidence of Thomas’ involvement in drug distribution and sex trafficking was likely to be found within his Facebook account, including in direct messages that Thomas exchanged with co-defendants and others through Facebook Messenger.[2] *4 For these reasons, the Court finds that the information presented to the issuing magistrate contained sufficient probable cause to search the Facebook account. And even if the warrant had not been supported by probable cause, the Court still would not recommend suppression of evidence here. “Evidence seized pursuant to a warrant for which actual probable cause does not exist or which is technically deficient is admissible if the executing officers relied on the warrant in ‘objective good faith.’ ” United States v. Cancelmo, 64 F.3d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1995); quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). As a result, “[s]earches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. There are four circumstances in which the good faith exception does not apply: (1) where the issuing judge has been knowingly misled; (2) where the issuing judge wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; (3) where the application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance on it unreasonable; and (4) where the warrant is so facially deficient that reliance upon it is unreasonable. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008). None of these circumstances apply here. Indeed, an officer is not “required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he requested.” United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1987); quoting Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981-90 (1984). Thus, the Court recommends that defendant's motion to suppress evidence be denied in its entirety.[3] Omnibus Discovery Demands Testimony of Out-of-Court Identification Defense counsel indicates that he has received no discovery in connection with any out-of-court identification of defendant. (Dkt. No. 78, pg. 8) The Government responds that defendant has received reports of investigation describing a photobook containing his picture, that had been provided to some of the witnesses. (Dkt. No. 86, pgs. 11-12) The Government also proffers that most, if not all, of its witnesses will identify defendant based upon their independent memory and personal interaction. (Id. at 12-13) A trial witness may identify a defendant if: (1) an out-of-court identification procedure was not improperly suggestive; or (2) the in-court identification is grounded on “an independent basis in memory.” United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 1977). Based on the Government's representations, to the extent that defendant is requesting a Wade hearing, his motion appears to be moot and is denied. See United States v. Stephenson, 17-CR-00199, 2020 WL 2115719 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2020) (Wade hearings not required for confirmatory identifications where the witness is sufficiently familiar with defendant so as to negate the possibility of suggestiveness); United States v. Salmon-Mendez, 992 F. Supp. 2d 340, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (relying on the government's representation that an identifying witness had a prior relationship with the defendant in denying request for a Wade hearing). *5 Should an issue arise with respect to any out-of-court identification procedure with respect to any witness at the time of trial, defendant may renew this motion before Judge Sinatra at that time. Bill of Particulars Defendant moves for a bill of particulars pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Dkt. No. 78, pg. 8) Defendant seeks, inter alia, information as to whether the Government alleges that defendant acted as a principal or accomplice as to the crimes charged; how it will be claimed that the alleged sex trafficking victims were required to turn money over to defendant and/or purchase narcotics from him; statements of all “relevant social media user names of defendant”; the identity of an individual referred to as “Josh” in the search warrant application; and details regarding defendant's purported relationships with the alleged sex trafficking victims. (Id.) Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) “permits a defendant to seek a bill of particulars in order to identify with sufficient particularity the nature of the charge pending against him, thereby enabling defendant to prepare for trial, to prevent surprise, and to interpose a plea of double jeopardy should he be prosecuted a second time for the same offense.” United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987). However, “[t]he Government may not be compelled to provide a bill of particulars disclosing the manner in which it will attempt to prove the charges, the precise manner in which the defendants committed the crimes charged, or a preview of the Government's evidence or legal theories.” United States v. Rittweger, 259 F. Supp. 2d 275, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In determining whether a bill of particulars is warranted, a court is to consider “the complexity of the offense, the clarity of the indictment, and the degree of discovery otherwise afforded to defendants.” United States v. Shoher, 555 F. Supp. 346, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Further, a defendant is not generally entitled to receive details of the government's conspiracy allegations through a bill of particulars. United States v. Wilson, 493 F. Supp. 2d 364, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The charges here are neither complex nor difficult to understand. The Indictment provides the relevant dates of the alleged drug trafficking and sex trafficking conspiracies as well as the specific narcotics involved and the approximate amounts. (Dkt. No. 25) The Indictment also provides the address where defendant is alleged to have maintained a drug-involved premise and the relevant dates of such conduct. (Id.) The Government represents that it has turned over substantial discovery in this case, including search warrants and search warrant applications, grand jury transcripts, reports of investigation, and other documents that support the charges in the Indictment. (Dkt. No. 86, pg. 18) The Government further indicates that it has provided early Jencks material and witness statements. (Id.) The information provided in the Indictment, coupled with the discovery already provided to defendant, is sufficient to inform defendant of the charges against him, prepare a defense, avoid surprise at trial, and ensure against double jeopardy. *6 The additional details sought by defendant amount to an attempt to use a bill of particulars as a discovery device. See e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (defendant's request for “each alleged date, time, person present, place, nature of conversation [and] amount” is an “impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide evidentiary details of its case.”); United States v. Barret, 824 F. Supp. 2d 419, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (the nature of the wheres, when and with whoms of a conspiracy are frequently held to be beyond the scope of a bill of particulars since the government “is not required to prove exactly when or how a conspiracy formed or when or how a particular defendant joined the scheme”); United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990) (“It is well-settled that acquisition of evidentiary detail is not the purpose of a bill of particulars.”) For these reasons, defendant's request for a bill of particulars is denied. Bruton Requests Defendant moves for an order barring the admissibility of any post-arrest statements by a non-testifying co-defendant that implicate defendant, pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968). (Dkt. No. 78, pg. 9) The Government responds that to the extent there are statements by non-testifying co-defendants that incriminate defendant, such statements can be redacted and may still be admissible at trial, pursuant Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987). (Dkt. No. 86, pg. 20) The Government also indicates that it will proffer evidence in support of the admission of out-of-court co-conspirator statements at the time designated by the trial court. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(e); United States v. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). The admissibility of any co-conspirator statements, as well as any Bruton implications, are best addressed by the District Judge at the time of trial. See United States v. Anguiera, 11-CR-116; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51862 (W.D.N.Y. April 12, 2012) (“[T]he relief sought for excluding non-testifying co-conspirator statements...[i]s better considered by the District Judge prior to trial and deferred for that consideration.”) Thus, to the extent that such statements exist and may be offered by the Government at the time of trial, defendant's motion is denied without prejudice to renew the request before Judge Sinatra at the time of trial. Brady/Giglio Material Defendant moves for the disclosure of any favorable, exculpatory or impeachment materials pursuant to Brady, Giglio, and their progeny. (Dkt. No. 78, pg. 9) The Government has an obligation to disclose exculpatory material, or material favorable to an accused as to either guilt or punishment, even when no affirmative request has been made. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Material “favorable to an accused” includes not only evidence that affirmatively tends to exculpate the defendant, but also information that impeaches the credibility of Government witnesses. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). The test for materiality is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Evidence may be material for Brady purposes even if it is not admissible, as long as it could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gill, 297 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2002). “[A]s a general rule, Brady and its progeny do not require immediate disclosure of all exculpatory and impeachment material upon request by a defendant.” United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 2001). “[A]s long as a defendant possesses Brady evidence in time for its effective use, the government has not deprived the defendant of due process of law simply because it did not produce the evidence sooner.” Id. at 144. *7 Here, the Government states that it is fully aware of its obligations and responsibilities under Brady and acknowledges its continuing duty under Brady to provide defendant with exculpatory evidence, as well as evidence that defendant might use to impeach the Government's witnesses at trial, pursuant to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). (Dkt. No. 86, pgs. 21-22) The Government agrees to provide Giglio and 3500 material prior to trial, in accordance with the District Court's scheduling order, and no later than when the Government produces and delivers the Jencks Act material in this case. (Id. at pg. 24) Given the Government's representations and for the reasons just stated, defendant's motion to compel the production of Brady/Giglio material is denied as moot. The Government is reminded of its continuing Brady obligations and, consistent with Coppa, the Government shall timely disclose any Brady and Giglio material to defendant. See United States v. Padovani, 14-CR-00224, 2016 WL 5402696, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016). Disclosure of Rule 404(b) and Impeachment Evidence Defendant moves for disclosure of any evidence of prior crimes or bad acts the Government intends to introduce at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Dkt. No. 78, pgs. 9-10) Defendant also moves for pretrial disclosure of impeachment evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609. (Id.) The Government is required to provide “reasonable notice in advance of trial” of the general nature of prior uncharged crimes or bad acts it intends to introduce against a defendant. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The Government represents that it will provide notice of Rule 404(b) and impeachment evidence to defendant in advance of trial, pursuant to the District Court's pretrial order. (Dkt. No. 86, pg. 25) Thus, defendant's request is denied as moot. The issue of admissibility of evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 608, and 609 is left to the determination of Judge Sinatra at the time of trial. Disclosure of Jencks Material Defendant requests disclosure of all Jencks Act and 3500 material sufficiently in advance of trial to allow the defense the opportunity for a full examination of the materials prior to the commencement of the direct testimony of any Government witness. (Dkt. No. 78. pg. 10) The Government has no general duty to disclose the identities of its witnesses before trial. United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1990). Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that “in the absence of a specific showing that disclosure [of a witness list] was both material to the preparation of [the] defense and reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding [the] case,” the request for a pretrial witness list should be denied. Id. at 13-140. Here, defendant has failed to make a particularized showing of the need for early disclosure of the Government's witness list. Section 3500 of Title 18 of the United States Code requires that the government, on motion of defendant, disclose a government witness's prior statements that are in the government's possession and relate to the subject matter of the witness's direct testimony (“Jencks material”). See also Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2 (procedure for producing a witness statement). A witness statement is defined as: (1) a written statement by a witness that is signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the witness; (2) a substantially verbatim recording or transcription of a witness's oral statement; or (3) any statement however taken or recorded made by the witness to the grand jury. 18 U.S.C. 3500(e). Statements are not required to be produced, by law, until after the witness has testified on direct examination, and the Court cannot mandate that they be produced sooner. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a); Fed. R. Crim. P 26.2(a). *8 Here, the Government indicates that it will produce its witness list and all 3500 materials sufficiently in advance of trial to allow defendant adequate time to prepare and, in accordance with the District Court's pre-trial scheduling order, to permit the Court to conduct the trial in an orderly and efficient manner. (Dkt. No. 86, pgs. 28-29) The Government also states that it will endeavor to provide Jencks material before it is required to do so by law, pursuant to an agreement or protective order. (Id.) In light of these representations, defendant's request for disclosure of Jencks Act and 3500 material is denied as moot. Preservation of Notes Defendant moves for the preservation of all raw or rough notes made by law enforcement agents or any third party during interviews of any prospective or current government witness, including any notes made by the witnesses themselves. (Dkt. No. 78, pg. 10) The Government indicates that it has no objection to the request that government agents retain all notes taken in the course of the case. (Dkt. No. 86, pg. 29) The Court grants defendant's motion and directs the Government to continue to arrange for the preservation of all rough notes and evidence. Government's Motion for Reciprocal Discovery The Government moves for reciprocal discovery pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure including the opportunity to inspect, copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof which are in the possession, custody or control of defendant and which defendant intends to introduce as evidence at trial; the results or reports of any physical or mental examinations or scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the case; and advance disclosure of any statements defendant proposes to use at trial pursuant to Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Dkt. No. 86, pg. 30) The Government's motion for reciprocal discovery is granted, and defendant is reminded that his disclosure obligations continue up through and during trial.[4] See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(c). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that defendant Kelvin Thomas’ motion to suppress evidence be denied. (Dkt. No. 78) It is ordered that defendant Kelvin Thomas’ omnibus discovery demands are decided in the manner detailed above (Dkt. No. 78) and that the Government's request for reciprocal discovery is granted (Dkt. No. 86). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), it is hereby ordered that this Report, Recommendation and Order be filed with the Clerk of Court. Unless otherwise ordered by Judge Sinatra, any objections to the recommendation portion of this Report, Recommendation and Order must be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen days of service of this Report and Recommendation in accordance with the above statute, Rules 59(b), 45(a), and 45(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 59. Any requests for an extension of this deadline must be made to Judge Sinatra. Failure to file objections, or to request an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen days of service of this Report, Recommendation and Order WAIVES THE RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER. See Small v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989). The District Court will ordinarily refuse to consider de novo arguments, case law and/or evidentiary material which could have been, but were not, presented to the Magistrate Judge in the first instance. Pursuant to Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 59(c)(2), written objections “shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made and the basis for each objection, and shall be supported by legal authority.” Failure to comply with these provisions may result in the District Court's refusal to consider the objection. *9 SO ORDERED. Dated: April 23, 2025 Footnotes [1] Co-defendants Zaid Mendoza and Cora Waddington were also charged in various counts of the Indictment. (Dkt. No. 25) Defendant Mendoza's deadline for the filing of pretrial motions is May 14, 2025. (Dkt. No. 107) Defendant Waddington entered into a plea agreement with the Government on November 12, 2024. (Dkt. No. 67) [2] Defendant notes that the warrant affidavit refers to records of the dates and times of certain Facebook communications between Mendoza and an alleged sex trafficking victim, but does not show the text or body of these conversations. The Court finds this detail to have no effect on the probable cause showing in the affidavit. Other information recounted by SA Calleri shows that these communications most likely involved discussion of narcotics and commercial sex acts, and the totality of the other information provided in the warrant application was more than sufficient to merit a probable cause finding. See United States v. Westley, 3:17-CR-171, 2018 WL 3448161, at *8 (D. Conn. July 17, 2018) (“It is well established that law enforcement agents may reply on their training in interpreting facts to establish probable cause.”) [3] Defendant makes a single, conclusory statement that he moves to “suppress custodial statements.” The Government indicates that it does not believe that any statements were elicited at the time of defendant's arrest. Moreover, defendant has failed to submit an affidavit, by an individual with personal knowledge, indicating the factual basis on which he seeks suppression of any statements. Thus, to the extent that defendant is moving to suppress any statements made to law enforcement, his motion is denied. See United States v. Aparo, 221 F. Supp. 2d 359, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying a motion to suppress where defendant had “not submitted an affidavit alleging facts which would require the suppression of statements if those facts were proved at a hearing”); United States v. Toth, 20-CR-177, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205206 (W.D.N.Y July 13, 2022) (motion to suppress statements denied where defendant did not submit an affidavit from anyone with personal knowledge to demonstrate the existence of a disputed issue of material fact, and defendant failed to offer any legal basis for suppression of statements). [4] The Government notes that it intends to use all items of evidence that defendant has been provided with or has been made aware of in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(4)(A). (Dkt. No. 86, pg. 31)