MATTHEW TYE v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, et al Case No. 8:18-cv-00544-RGK-KES United States District Court, C.D. California Filed April 03, 2025 Scott, Karen E., United States Magistrate Judge PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): Order Granting in Part Plaintiff's Motions to Compel (Dkt. 151-60) I. BACKGROUND *1 The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC” at Dkt. 73) brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Orange County (“the County”) and Defendants Grantham and Gomez, probation officers, violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights while he was on probation. On March 2, 2025, Plaintiff moved to compel Defendants to provide better responses to his 390 interrogatories (“rogs”), 222 requests for admission (“RFAs”) and 251 requests for production (“RFPs”). (Dkt. 151-60.) Defendants filed oppositions to the motions (Dkt. 167-70), and Plaintiff filed replies (Dkt. 171-76). The Court held a hearing on the motions on April 1, 2025. (Dkt. 166.)[1] Accordingly, the motions are now ripe for review. The motions and requests at issue are as follows: Motion Dkt. 151 Dkt. 152 Dkt. 153 Dkt. 154 Dkt. 155 Dkt. 156 Dkt. 157 Dkt. 158 Dkt. 159 Dkt. 160 Discovery Requests RFAs 1-222 RFAs 1-222 RFAs 1-222 RFPs 13-251 RFPs 13-251 RFPs 13-251 Rogs 21-390 and RFP 8 Rogs 13-20 RFPs 11-12 Rogs 1-12 Responding Defendants The County Defendant Grantham Defendant Gomez The County Defendant Grantham Defendant Gomez The County The County The County The County Date Requests Served Jan. 17, 2025 Jan. 17, 2025 Jan. 17, 2025 Jan. 17, 2025 Jan. 17, 2025 Jan. 17, 2025 Jan. 17, 2025 Jan. 31, 2022 Jan. 31, 2022 Dec. 17, 2021 Date Responses or Objections Served Feb. 28, 2025 Feb. 28, 2025 Feb. 28, 2025 Feb. 28, 2025 Feb. 28, 2025 Feb. 28, 2025 Feb. 28, 2025 Sept. 1, 2022 Sept. 1, 2022 Jan. 28, 2022 and Sept. 2, 2022 II. DISCUSSION A. Defendants' Procedural Arguments. 1. Compliance with the Local Rule 37 Joint Stipulation Procedure. Defendants argue that the motions to compel should be denied because Plaintiff did not meet and confer with them before filing the motions or follow the joint stipulation procedure in Local Rule 37-1. (Dkt. 169 at 16-17 (opposition brief re RFAs).) Plaintiff responds he was “freed of [his] obligations to follow the stipulation procedure” because defense counsel “refused to meet [and] confer on the prior discovery in substance in late 2024 despite [Plaintiff's] efforts....” (Dkt. 171 at 17.) Plaintiff also complains that the Court “create[d] [an] intentional pitfall[ ] for unwary litigants” by setting the last date to serve written discovery as January 17, 2025, even though this would not give the parties time to complete the joint stipulation process prior to the March 3, 2025 deadline for filing discovery motions. (Dkt. 171 at 19; see also id. at 35 (arguing this “must be a common problem” because the “motion cutoff date here was 6 weeks after the service date for written discovery, leaving about 2 weeks to meet [and] confer”).) *2 The Court notes that the case management deadlines were in part dictated by the parties, who jointly requested and were granted many extensions of those deadlines. (See Dkt. 150 (order summarizing procedural history).) The Court further notes that parties were not required to wait until the last permissible day to serve discovery, and the Court warned the litigants to leave sufficient time to use the joint stipulation process. (See, e.g., Dkt. 113, 142.) However, given that denying Plaintiff's motions to compel on this ground would likely deny him discovery essential to his case (particularly since he will not be taking any depositions), the Court declines to deny the motions to compel based on this procedural defect. The purpose of Local Rule 37's joint stipulation procedure is to require parties to meet and confer meaningfully and in detail before seeking involvement by the Court. It is clear from the record that there was no good faith meet and confer effort about this discovery. It is disappointing that, even though discovery has been open in this case for many years, Plaintiff served more than 800 discovery requests on Defendants on the very last day for doing so. As a practical matter, this made it virtually impossible for Defendants to respond before the fact discovery cut-off, which was only 45 days away. On the other hand, Local Rule 37 is not meant to be used as a sword by litigants to avoid meaningfully responding to discovery, or as a “get out of jail free” pass because their adversary will run out of time to move to compel. The Court has discretion to enforce the rule, and based on the unique facts of this case, it declines to deny the motions to compel on this ground. As discussed in this Order, the Court will excuse the County from responding to discovery that is clearly duplicative and overbroad and will impose time and subject matter limitations to try to reduce burden and delay. Given how long this case has been pending, the Court expects the parties to use their best efforts to conclude fact discovery by the deadlines set forth below. 2. Timeliness. The County argues that the motions are untimely because Plaintiff “unduly delayed” in bringing the motion as to Rogs 1-20, which were served in 2021 and 2022. (See, e.g., Dkt. 168 at 21-23.) Yet Plaintiff's motions were timely under the March 3, 2025 deadline for filing discovery motions. (Dkt. 142 at 2.) Moreover, the out-of-circuit cases cited in the County's briefing do not stand for the proposition that undue delay is grounds for denying this type of discovery motion. See Kendrick v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 253, 258 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting language from prior version of FRCP 45(d)(1), regarding subpoenas to nonparty witnesses, which provided that the “party serving the subpoena may, if objection has been made, move upon notice to the deponent for an order at any time before or during the taking of the deposition”; concluding that discovery could be compelled even though the movant waited eight months to file the motion) (emphasis added); Byrnes v. Jetnet Corp., 111 F.R.D. 68, 70-71 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (same, where the movant waited six months). Accordingly, the motions are not untimely. Defendants also argue that the remaining motions are untimely “since should Plaintiff be successful, Defendants cannot comply with the fact discovery cut-off deadline since that elapsed on January 17, 2025—the Court would necessarily have to grant another—the eighth continuance—due solely to Plaintiff's delay.” (Dkt. 167 at 19; Dkt. 169 at 17 (emphasis omitted).) Defendants misconstrue the Court's scheduling order, which stated that January 17, 2025 was the last day on which to serve opposing parties with written discovery and March 3, 2025 was the fact discovery cutoff. (Dkt. 142, 150.) In any case, this does not render the motions untimely. This type of relief is within the Court's discretion to grant if the motions to compel are granted. B. General Guidelines for Providing Supplemental Responses. 1. Time Frame. *3 Some of the requests do not define the relevant time frame, while others define the relevant time frame as 2014 to present. Both types of requests are overbroad as to time frame. The relevant time period (unless the Court states otherwise) is when Plaintiff was on probation. The FAC alleges that Plaintiff pled guilty to the relevant criminal offenses in state court on December 13, 2013. (FAC at 2 ¶ 6.) At the hearing, the parties agreed that the probationary period ended in December 2018 or January 2019. In providing the supplemental responses discussed below, Defendants shall assume the relevant time frame is December 13, 2013 to January 31, 2019. 2. Burden Defendants object to some requests as unduly burdensome. (See, e.g., Dkt. 151-1 at 78, 80 (responses to RFAs 1, 4).) To the extent Defendants are asserting burden apart from the burden of responding to an allegedly vague request, the objections do not sufficiently explain why responding would be burdensome (with the exception of the burden of responding to RFPs seeking electronically stored information, which is discussed further below in section II.E.2). If Defendants assert such objections in the future, they should be prepared to offer specifics about the burden of responding to the request in question. 3. Relevance of Requests About Training. To the extent rogs, RFAs, or RFPs request information about how probation officers were trained, the only relevant information is about what training Defendants Grantham and Gomez received, not training that other officers received. 4. Sex Offender Caseloads. To the extent the requests seek information about the County's “sex offender caseload,” that term shall be understood to mean any caseload created to comply with California Penal Code § 1203(f), which states: Every probation department shall ensure that all probationers under active supervision who are deemed to pose a high risk to the public of committing sex crimes, as determined by the State-Authorized Risk Assessment Tool for Sex Offenders, as set forth in Sections 290.04 to 290.06, inclusive, are placed on intensive and specialized probation supervision and are required to report frequently to designated probation officers. The probation department may place any other probationer convicted of an offense that requires him or her to register as a sex offender who is on active supervision to be placed on intensive and specialized supervision and require him or her to report frequently to designated probation officers. Cal. Penal Code § 1203f. C. Rogs to the County (Dkt. 157, 158, 160). 1. Procedural History. Plaintiff served Set One Rogs 1-12 and Set Two Rogs 13-20 on the County in 2021 and 2022. (Dkt. 160-1, 158-1.) On January 28, 2022, the County responded to Rogs 1-12 by serving objections. (Dkt. 160-1 at 7-23.) The County did not respond at all to Rogs 13-20. In August 2022, Plaintiff moved to compel further responses from the County. (Dkt. 110 at 2 (identifying the discovery at issue as Rogs 1-20 and RFPs 8-12).) On August 25, 2022, the Court held a telephonic informal discovery conference (“IDC”) with the parties and then ordered as follows: 1. Plaintiffs motion to compel (Dkt. 110) is stayed and the hearing noticed for September 20, 2022 is taken off calendar. 2. Defendants shall make a supplemental production in response to Plaintiff's discovery requests on or before September 2, 2022. *4 3. The parties shall meet-and-confer about this production within five (5) business days of receipt. 4. For any remaining discovery disputes, the parties may seek resolution by the Court using: (a) the joint stipulation procedure in Local Rule 37-2, (b) the Court's procedure for informal telephonic discovery conferences,1 or (c) another briefing schedule agreed upon by the parties. (Dkt. 112.) On September 2, 2022, the County provided supplemental responses to Rogs 1-12. (Dkt. 160-1 at 7-25.) The County provided substantive responses to all rogs except Rogs 8, 9, and 12, to which it objected. (Id.) On September 1, 2022, the County provided responses to Rogs 13-20. (Dkt. 158-1 at 7-15.) The County objected to all but one of the rogs (Rog 16), but it also provided substantive responses to the objected-to rogs. (Id.) Plaintiff did not immediately file a motion challenging these responses. On September 21, 2022, the Court issued an order stating, “Having received nothing from the parties indicating that disputes regarding this production remain unresolved, Plaintiff's motion to compel is denied as moot. For any remaining discovery disputes, the parties may seek resolution by the Court using: (a) the joint stipulation procedure in Local Rule 37-2, (b) the Court's procedure for [IDCs], or (c) another briefing schedule agreed upon by the parties.” (Dkt. 113) (footnote omitted). On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff served a third set of rogs on the County, Rogs 21-390. (Dkt. 157-1 at 2-112.) The County responded by serving objections on February 28, 2025. (Dkt. 157-1 at 114-616.) The Court held an IDC about these rogs. (Dkt. 150.) The County argued they violated the 25-rog limit in FRCP 33(a). Plaintiff moved for leave of Court to serve the rogs or, alternatively, to extend the deadline for noticing depositions, which had expired. On February 19, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion because he had failed to show good cause. (Id.) Plaintiff now moves to compel additional supplemental responses to Rogs 1-12 (Dkt. 160), Rogs 13-20 (Dkt. 158), and Rogs 21-390 (Dkt. 157). The County filed one opposition to all three rog-related motions. (Dkt. 168.) Plaintiff filed reply briefing. (Dkt. 171-173.) 2. Effect of the Court's Prior Orders. The County argues that the motions to compel for Rogs 1-20 are “moot” under the Court's order of September 21, 2022. (Dkt. 168 at 20-21.) Yet nothing in the September 2022 orders stated that Plaintiff needed to move to compel within a certain time frame. The Court merely directed the parties to meet-and-confer and use its standard IDC procedure. Accordingly, the motion is not moot. The County also argues that the Court “denied Plaintiff's motion for leave to propound more than 25 [rogs] on February 19, 2025” and therefore “precluded Plaintiff from propounding [rogs] numbers 21-390.” (Dkt. 168 at 16.) The County argues the motion to compel is really “an untimely and improper motion for reconsideration” of the Court's February 19, 2025 order. (Id.) That order did find that Plaintiff had failed to show good cause to exceed the 25-rog limit. However, it made no finding that—as the County now argues—rogs 21-25 improperly exceeded the 25-rog limit in FRCP 33(a) because prior rogs were compound. In other words, the order found only that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate good cause to exceed the 25-rog limit, not where and to what that limit applied. Accordingly, the Court's prior order is not dispositive of this issue, which is discussed further below. 3. Numeric Limit. *5 The County argues it should not have to respond the third set of rogs, Rogs 21-390, because they violate the 25-rog numeric limit. (Dkt. 168 at 17-20); see FRCP 33(a)(1) (“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written [rogs], including all discrete subparts.”). They argue that Plaintiff reached the 25-rog limit before Rog 25 because some of the Set Two Rogs—specifically Rogs 13-15 and 17-20, as well as part of the definitions section for the Set Two Rogs—were improperly compound. (Dkt. 168 at 17-19.) The County failed to properly preserve its objections to the Set Two Rogs based on the numeric limit because: (a) it did not object to any of the Set Two Rogs as exceeding the numeric limit, and (b) although it did object to Rogs 13-15 and 17-20 as compound, it also substantively responded to them. (See Dkt. 158-1 at 9-13); see generally Olen Props. Corp. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., No. 15-cv-02116-AG-KESx, 2017 WL 11635014, at *3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 236257, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2017) (“[A] responding party must answer the first 25 interrogatories. If it answers more, the numerosity objection is waived as to those interrogatories that were answered”). However, as to Rogs 21-25, the County did object to these rogs as exceeding the numeric limit and stood on those objections (as well as other objections). (Dkt. 157-1 at 116-21.) Accordingly, the Court finds that rogs beyond Rogs Set One and Two (Rogs 1-20) and the first five rogs Set Three (which the Court calculates below as Rogs 21-24 because Rog 24 has “discrete subparts”) violate the numeric limit. Furthermore, as discussed below, the Court will only require the County to respond to certain of these rogs, or rogs as modified by the Court, because they are compound and/or duplicative of RFPs served by Plaintiff. See generally FRCP 26(c)(1) (“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following ... (A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; [or] (C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party seeking discovery....”).) 4. Sufficiency of County's Objections and Responses to Rogs 1-25. a. Sets One and Two, Rogs 1-20. As noted above in the procedural history section (Section II.A.B.1), the County did provide supplemental, substantive responses to most of these rogs, rather than merely objections. (Dkt. 160-1 at 9-23 (Rogs 1-12), Dkt. 158-1 at 9-13 (Rogs 13-20).) Rogs 1-6, 10-11: Regarding these rogs, the County responded, “With respect to written communications, and pursuant to Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 33(d), Responding Party hereby refers to the documents previously produced during discovery in this matter.” (Dkt. 160-1 at 9-23).) This does not comply with FRCP 33, which states that the responding party must “specify[ ] the records that must be reviewed, in sufficient detail to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the responding party could....” FRCP 33(d)(1). In serving the supplemental responses discussed in this order, the County should comply with this rule by referring to specific bates numbers, rather than referring generally to documents produced during discovery. Rog 7: This requests, “IDENTIFY all policies and customs relevant to this lawsuit.” (Dkt. 160-1 at 3.) The County responded, “Pursuant to Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 33(d), Responding Party hereby elects to produce documents in response to this request which includes the current Policy Manual of the Orange County Probation Department (identified by Bates stamp numbers OC02862 – OC02993), which has been produced with Responding Party's concurrently served Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents, Set 8.” (Id. at 18.) *6 Assuming there are no relevant policy documents outside the Policy Manual, this response complies with FRCP 33(d). If so, the County does not need to provide a supplemental response to Rog 7. Rog 8: This requests, “IDENTIFY all communications, in chronological order, constituting training given to Plaintiff's probation officers relevant to this lawsuit.” (Dkt. 160-1 at 3.) The County objected to this request as: vague and ambiguous with respect to the phrase “constituting training,” overly broad, and seeking a legal opinion or conclusion. (Id. at 18-19.) The County's overbreadth objection is sustained in part: the Court will limit this request to communications involving the two named Defendants, Grantham and Gomez, between December 13, 2013 and January 31, 2019. The Court interprets the “legal opinion or conclusion” objection as objecting to the phrase “relevant to this lawsuit.” That objection is overruled. In responding to discovery, counsel commonly assist clients in determining what is relevant and what is not relevant to the claims at issue. However, defense counsel may limit its responses to training that is relevant, in counsel's judgment, to the claims listed in the chart prepared by the Court. (Dkt. 92 at 24-31.) The County should provide a supplemental response to Rog 8. If responsive documents have already been produced, the County can respond to Rog 8 by referring to those documents' bates numbers. Rog 9: “IDENTIFY all probation officer training relevant to this lawsuit.” (Dkt. 160-1 at 3.) The County objected to this request as vague and ambiguous, overly broad, and seeking a legal opinion or conclusion. (Id. at 19.) The County's overbreadth objection is sustained. Rog 9 is cumulative with Rog 8, which already requests training given to Defendants Grantham and Gomez. The County does not need to provide a supplemental response to Rog 9. Rog 12: “IDENTIFY all documents, in chronological order, regarding PLAINTIFF, in the possession of any County Department, broken down by department.” (Dkt. 160-1 at 3.) The County objected to this request as vague and ambiguous, overly broad, and unduly burdensome. (Id. at 22.) Regarding burden, the County stated, “The County of Orange is a public entity with at least 25 distinct departments (e.g. County Health Department, Public Works, Assessor, Child Support Services, etc.), many of which have their own distinct divisions within those departments. The County employs tens of thousands of people. This does not include ‘agents’ of the County employed by third parties. A response to this request would require Responding Party to conduct a search and inquire of every single County employee and agent regarding any record that pertains in any way to Plaintiff.” (Id. at 22-23.) The County's overbreadth objection is sustained. As written, this request would cover, for example, records from the County tax assessor, records regarding child support, or other records clearly unrelated to this case. It would also cover all documents relating to this lawsuit and other litigation Plaintiff has filed against the County. Given that Plaintiff has served hundreds of RFPs seeking documents relevant to his claims in this case, the County need not respond to a rog asking them to “identify” all County documents regarding Plaintiff. The County does not need to provide a supplemental response to Rog 12. *7 Rogs 13-14: Rog 13 requests, “One of the probation conditions at issue is ‘Obey all orders, rules, regulations, and directives of the ... Probation Department...’ Identify every order, rule, regulation, and directive of Probation by providing the following information for each, in chronological order: (1) the date it was communicated to Plaintiff, (2) whether it was a[n] order, rule, regulation, or directive, (3) the content of it, (4) who communicated it to Plaintiff, (5) how it was communicated to Plaintiff.” (Dkt. 158-1 at 2-3.) Rog 14 requests, “For each order, rule, regulation, or directive identified in SI [Rog[2]] 13, for each, identify related communications by (1) identifying the order, rule, regulation, or directive indicated in SI [Rog] 13, and (2) IDENTIFY ALL COMMUNICATIONS for that item, in chronological order.” (Id. at 3.) For both of these rogs, the County responded, “Pursuant to Federal Rules Civ. Proc. 33(d), Responding Party hereby elects to produced records in response to this request. Specifically, Responding party hereby references documents previously produced as Bates Stamp Nos. OC01902 – OC1997). These documents reflect each order, directive, rule, or regulation communicated to Plaintiff by the Orange County Probation Department, the date it was communicated, the person who communicated it, and the method of communication.” (Id. at 9-10.) This response complies with FRCP 33(d) because it identifies specific documents produced during discovery. The County does not need to provide a supplemental response to these rogs. Rogs 15-20: The County provided substantive responses to these rogs rather than standing on objections. The County does not need to provide supplemental responses to these rogs. b. Set Three, Rogs 21-25. Rog 21: “IDENTIFY Probation's PC § 1203f caseload, including identifying what names have been used for that caseload, and what the criteria were to be included on that caseload, from 2014 to present. If any changes in name/criteria occurred, give the date ranges for when each name & set of criteria were in use.” (Dkt. 157-1 at 2-3.) The County's objections to this rog as vague, overbroad, compound, irrelevant, and disproportional to the needs of the case (id. at 116-17) are overruled. The County should provide a supplemental response to Rog 21, but narrowed per the earlier-stated General Guidelines in Section II.B. of this Order. Rog 22: “IDENTIFY the basis for which Plaintiff was included on Probation's PC § 1203f caseload, even though he was not a PC § 290 registrant, including testimony from the person that made the assessment as well as any documents reflecting or discussing that assessment.” (Dkt. 157-1 at 3.) The County's objections to this rog as vague, overbroad, compound, and irrelevant (id. at 117-18) are overruled. The County should provide a supplemental response to Rog 22. However, the County need not provide “testimony from the person that made the assessment”; under FRCP 33(b)(3), rog responses must be answered “under oath.” Rog 23: “IDENTIFY any ‘State-Authorized Risk Assessment Tool for Sex Offenders’ aka SARATSO assessments Probation made regarding Plaintiff, including testimony from the person that made the assessment as well as any documents reflecting or discussing that assessment.” (Dkt. 157-1 at 3.) The County's objection to this rog as disproportional to the needs of the case (id. at 118-19) is sustained because it is cumulative with RFP 25, which seeks “All documents relating to an SARATSO assessment of Plaintiff.” (Dkt. 154-1 at 4.) The County does not need to provide a supplemental response to Rog 23. *8 Rog 24: “IDENTIFY each caseload managed by Probation, from 2014 to present, including for each: (1) the percentage of total probationers on that caseload, (2) the frequency of reporting & home/work searches for that caseload, & (3) any additional requirements imposed on that caseload. This includes all policies, customs, and training for each caseload related to the above, and identification of all documents containing this information and/or from which this information was derived.” (Dkt. 157-1 at 3.) The County's objection to this rog as compound (id. at 119-20) is sustained. Requesting information about training is a “discrete subpart” from requesting information about the caseloads and how they are managed. See FRCP 33(a). The request to identify documents is also cumulative with RFP 31. (See Dkt. 154-1 at 4 (RFP 31).) Accordingly, the County need only provide a supplemental response to the first sentence of Rog 24. Rog 25: “IDENTIFY all policies regarding Probation residence searches 2014-present, including identifying the source/witness for this information, as well as identification of all documents containing this information and/or from which this information was derived.” (Dkt. 157-1 at 3.) Because the Court determined that Rog 24 is compound, Rog 25 is over the numeric limit. The County need not respond to Rog 25. The County shall provide supplemental responses to Rogs 1-6, 8, 10-11, 21-22, and 24, consistent with the analysis in this Order by the deadlines set forth in the Conclusion section. D. RFAs to All Defendants (Dkt. 151, 152, 153). 1. Procedural History. On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff served three identical sets of RFAs, numbered 1-222, on the County, Defendant Grantham, and Defendant Gomez.[3] (Dkt. 151-1, Dkt. 152-1, Dkt. 153-1.) Defendants responded on February 28, 2025 by serving objections. (Dkt. 151-1 at 76; Dkt. 152-1 at 40; Dkt. 153-1 at 40.) Plaintiff now moves to overrule the objections and compel better responses. (Dkt. 151-153.) Defendants filed a single opposition brief to all three motions. (Dkt. 169.) Plaintiff filed reply briefing. (Dkt. 171, 175.) 2. Supplemental Responses. Due to the large number of RFAs, it is impractical for this order to discuss each RFA individually. However, after carefully reviewing the RFAs and responses, the Court finds that Defendants should supplement their responses to many of the RFAs. The Court has attached a table with all of the RFAs served on Defendants and rulings on whether Defendants should provide supplemental responses to each. Some RFAs have been modified to address the objections discussed below. This Order provides further guidance into how Defendants should provide supplemental responses. “On finding that an answer does not comply with this rule, the court may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served.” FRCP 36(a)(6) (emphasis added). Here, given that Defendants were served with a voluminous number of RFAs on the last day that written discovery could be served, it is more equitable to allow Defendants to serve amended answers to the RFAs rather than deem them admitted. a. Purpose of RFAs. The purpose of RFAs is “to expedite trial by establishing certain material facts as true and thus narrowing the range of issues for trial.” Safeco of Am. v. Rawstron, 181 F.R.D. 441, 445 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citation omitted). This is distinct from the purpose of an answer, which is to establish which allegations in a complaint are admitted or denied. Many of the RFAs that ask the County to admit that certain things are unlawful, unconstitutional, etc. have already been admitted or denied in the answer and do not serve the purpose of an RFA. *9 In order to reduce the burden on the County of responding to this voluminous set of RFAs, the Court excuses the County from responding to requests that can be interpreted in good faith as asking for these types of legal determinations. (See, e.g., Dkt. 151-1 at 23 (RFA 130, asking “Admit This policy/custom makes the ‘presence’ condition grossly unconstitutional.”)) The County is also excused from responding to portions of the RFAs that ask it to admit Plaintiff's opinion, mental state, or characterization of events. The County should focus on responding to factual allegations. b. Relevance. Defendants objected to all or nearly all of the RFAs as irrelevant. (Dkt. 151-1, 152-1, 153-1; see also Dkt. 169 at 18-21 (opposition briefing discussing relevance).) However, in reviewing the RFAs, the Court generally is able to determine what claim in the FAC each RFA is related to, particularly after referencing the chart the Court previously created numbering Plaintiff's claims. (Dkt. 92 at 24-31 (the chart).) c. Vagueness. Defendants object that the terms “policy,” “custom,” and “training” are vague and ambiguous. (See, e.g., Dkt. 151-1 at 94-95 (response to RFA 16).) These are legal terms of art that are frequently used in civil rights litigation. See generally Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). These objections are overruled. Defendants sometimes object to a term being undefined or vague, when that term can be understood if read in reference to prior RFAs. For example, RFA 18 begins, “Admit [w]hen Plaintiff refused to sign the form unless this waiver language was crossed out” (Dkt. 151-1 at 5), and Defendants object that the term “form” is vague (id. at 97). However, when read in conjunction with RFAs 15-17, it is clear that this refers to a financial disclosure form. (Id. at 4-5.) These objections are overruled. Defendants should use their best efforts to reasonably interpret all of the RFAs. Any assumptions they make about the meaning of ambiguous terms can be clarified in their response. Defendants object that the term “Probation” is vague because it is “unclear who or what is being referred to,” and it “implicates an entire department and Responding Party cannot speak for everyone that works in ‘Probation.’ ” (See, e.g. Dkt. 151-1 at 93-94, 96 (responses to RFAs 15 and 17).) Each Defendant should interpret this term as referring to the Defendant that was served with the discovery response. The County should interpret the term as referring to any County employee. As so interpreted, these objections are overruled. d. Compound. Defendants object to all or nearly all of the RFAs as compound. Unlike rogs, there is no numerical limit for RFAs. See FRCP 33, 36. However, FRCP 36(a)(2) does require that “[e]ach matter must be separately stated.” See generally Safeco of Am. v. Rawstron, 181 F.R.D. 441, 446 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“as a general matter, [RFAs] deal with discrete or separate subjects”). As set forth in the attached chart, some of these objections are sustained. Where the rogs are too long to reasonably respond, the Court has modified them. While others remain compound, but Defendants should be able to reasonably respond to them. e. Compliance with FRCP 36(a)(4). All or nearly all of Defendants' responses to the RFAs make objections and then state, “Pursuant to FRCP(a)(4) [sic] and the above objections, Responding Party is unable to admit or deny the matter, and on that basis denies the request.” (See, e.g., Dkt. 151-1 at 100 (County's response to RFA 20); id. at 245 (County's response to RFA 151).) This appears to be a reference to FRCP 36(a)(4), which provides: *10 If a matter is not admitted, the answer must specifically deny it or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it. A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the matter; and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest. The answering party may assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or deny only if the party states that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). To the extent the County or other Defendants want to invoke this rule, the response must state that the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information after a reasonable inquiry. f. Premise RFAs. Some of the RFAs can be grouped into a category of three, where (1) the first RFA asks Defendants to admit X; (2) the second RFA asks Defendants to admit X was done in accordance with an official County policy, custom, or practice; and (3) the third RFA asks Defendants to admit X was done in contravention of an official County policy, custom, or practice. (See, e.g., Dkt. 151-1 at 4-5 (RFAs 15-17).) If a Defendant denies the first RFA in this kind of set, it can respond “not applicable” to the third and second RFAs in the set. g. Lacks Foundation or Assumes Facts Not in Evidence. Objections that an RFA “lacks foundation” or “assumes facts not in evidence” (see, e.g., Dkt. 153-1 at 234 (response to RFP 176)) may be appropriate for trial, but they are not proper objections to a discovery request. All such objections are overruled. E. RFPs to All Defendants (Dkt. 154, 155, 156, 159). 1. Procedural History. On January 31, 2022, Plaintiff served Set Eight RFPs 11 and 12 on the County. (Dkt. 159-1.)[4] As discussed above in Section B, in August 2022, Plaintiff moved to compel and, after an IDC, the Court directed the County to serve responses. (Dkt. 110 at 2 (identifying the discovery at issue as Rogs 1-20 and RFPs 8-12); Dkt. 112.) The County responded to RFPs 11 and 12 on September 2, 2022. (Dkt. 159-1 at 7-12.) Sometime during 2022 through 2024, “Defendants produced 2,993 documents to Plaintiff in response to Plaintiff's [RFPs], Sets 1 through 8....” (Dkt. 167 at 30.) These included, according to Defendants, (a) “County emails regarding Plaintiff, Kimberly Tso, Eric Papp, Justin Tye, David Haner, Alex Fernandez, Heather Brown, Jason Gomez, and others”; (b) “Probation's contact history report on Plaintiff”; (c) Plaintiff's “probation file”; and (d) the “Orange County Probation Department Policy Manual.” (Dkt. 167 at 30; see also Dkt. 167-2 at 3-4 (decl. from defense counsel G. Craig Smith).) On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff served Set Nine RFPs 13 to 251 on the County, Defendant Grantham, and Defendant Gomez. (Dkt. 154-1 at 1-27; Dkt. 155-1 at 1-27; Dkt. 156-1 at 1-27.) Defendants responded by serving objections on February 28, 2025. (Dkt. 154-1 at 29-307; Dkt. 155-1 at 29-307; Dkt. 156-1 at 29-307.) Plaintiff now moves to compel further responses to the Set Eight and Set Nine RFPs from all Defendants. (Dkt. 154, 155, 156, 159.) Defendants filed a single opposition responding to all four RFP-related motions. (Dkt. 167.) Plaintiff reply briefing. (Dkt. 171, 176.) 2. Defendants Must Provide a Declaration as to Burden. Defendants argue that they should not be required to produce further electronically stored information (“ESI”) or documents about other probationers because those are overly burdensome and disproportionate to the needs of the case. At the April 1 hearing, Defendants stated that prior defense counsel for the County had already produced over 1,000 pages of emails. However, current defense counsel could not explain how or from whom those emails were collected. Without knowing that information, the Court cannot determine whether further ESI discovery is proportionate to the needs of the case under FRCP 26. *11 Accordingly, by the deadline set forth below in the Conclusion section of this order, defense counsel shall provide a declaration that states, for the prior email production: (a) what custodians were searched, (b) what search terms were used, (c) any other information relevant to understanding the scope and methodology of the prior search, and (d) any other information relevant to understanding how County documents are stored and can be searched. To the extent current defense counsel needs to consult former counsel to obtain this information, former counsel has a professional duty, both to their former clients and as officers of the Court, to be cooperative and forthcoming. If former counsel fails to respond, Defendants should alert the Court immediately. At the hearing, Plaintiff suggested searching ESI stored by the Probation Department and the District Attorney's Office for his criminal case number. Counsel's declaration shall also address any undue burden in doing this. As discussed further below, this Order requires Defendants to provide supplemental responses to Plaintiff's RFPs. However, if it appears that locating documents responsive to certain RFPs would require extensive keyword searches, queries, or other automated searches of ESI, Defendants can so state in their supplemental responses, and Defendants need not conduct such searches at this time.[5] The Court will determine whether to order Defendants to conduct these types of ESI searches after reviewing the declaration described in this section. 3. Privileges. The County objected to many RFPs on the basis of attorney-client privilege, work product privilege, the official information privilege, and/or the privacy rights of third parties. At the April 1 hearing, Defendants stated that they had not yet identified specific documents implicated by these privileges, instead standing on their arguments that Plaintiff's RFPs are too overbroad and vague to reasonably answer. Defense counsel also admitted that certain documents related to training policies had been redacted, not because counsel believed these sections were privileged, but because counsel believed these sections were irrelevant. In any supplemental responses ordered by the Court, Defendants should not redact documents based merely on relevancy. “Redaction is generally an inappropriate tool for excluding information that a party considers to be irrelevant or nonresponsive.” Magana-Munoz v. W. Coast Berry Farms, LLC, No. 20-cv-02087, 2022 WL 6584545, at *2, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177988, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2022) (quoting Doe v. Trump, 329 F.R.D. 262, 275 (W.D. Wash. 2018)). If Defendants believe redactions or withholding of documents are warranted, they must provide a privilege log explaining the basis for the redactions. If the redactions or withholding are based on the official information privilege, Defendants must provide a declaration that complies with Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987). The Court will scrutinize the declaration for the specific details required by case law. A garden variety declaration that could be used in any case will likely be insufficient. 4. Set Eight RFPs to the County. a. RFP 11. RFP 11 requests “Copies of all documents identified in the attached set of interrogatories [i.e., Rogs 13-20], in order and organized categorically by interrogatory.” (Dkt. 159-1 at 4.) The County objected to RFP 11 as “overly broad and unduly burdensome in that it requires Responding Party to compile records for Plaintiff in a manner in which those records are not typically maintained in the normal course of business.” (Dkt. 159-1 at 9.) However, it also responded, “All Responsive documents have been produced to Plaintiff as part of Plaintiff's probation file which is identified as Bates Stamp Nos. OC01032 – OC02861.” (Id. at 9.) *12 Plaintiff argues this response is insufficient because: (a) the objection must be stricken as untimely; (b) “there were no documents identified in the companion set of [Rogs] (13-20) so this RFP will need to be properly [and] fully answered once the compelled [rog] responses are produced, particularly for [Rogs] 13 and 14”; and (c) “ ‘Plaintiff's probation file’ is not responsive to the request.” (Dkt. 159 at 6.) The County should update this response if its supplemental rog responses identify new documents. The County may refer to the documents by bates number. b. RFP 12. RFP 12 requests “Any communications regarding Plaintiff or his property between any agent of the County (including but not limited to Heather Brown and Probation), and any person working for/with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department.” (Dkt. 159-1 at 4.) The County responded, “Responding Party has produced documents responsive to this request which are identified by Bates Nos. OC01812 – OC01895. Discovery is continuing and ongoing.” (Dkt. 159-1 at 9.) Plaintiff argues that the cited documents “are nothing more than some documents from the police dating back to 2010 long before Probation started in 2014. It is not ‘communications’ but rather just some police file, and therefore not responsive. ... I am aware that Heather Brown and/or Probation was in communication with the LASD during the pendency of my Probation [and] these documents are being withheld.” (Dkt. 159 at 6-7.) The County does not address this RFP in its “unilateral stipulation” (Dkt. 167-5) or its opposition (Dkt. 167). The Court narrows this RFP to address only property relevant to the terms of Plaintiff's probation (like the seized USB drives) and not property that was the subject of other litigation (like Plaintiff's seized laptop[6]). 5. Set Nine RFPs to All Defendants. Due to the large number of RFPs in this set (more than 200), it is impractical for this Order to discuss each RFP individually. However, after carefully reviewing the rogs and responses, the Court finds that Defendants should supplement their responses to the RFPs. Although some may be objectionable, the record shows that Defendants did not use their best efforts to reasonably interpret the requests, respond to the requests, and locate and produce relevant documents. This Order provides guidance into how Defendants should provide supplemental responses. a. Relevance. Plaintiff argues that Defendants' relevancy objections are “boilerplate” and therefore “a nullity.” (Dkt. 154 at 21.) Defendants did object based on relevance to all or nearly all of RFPs 13 to 251. (Dkt. 154-1; Dkt. 155-1; Dkt. 156-1.) Defendants argues it is Plaintiff's burden to establish relevance as to each RFP, and the motion should be denied because he has not attempted to do so. (Dkt. 167 at 20-22 (“It would be improper for the Court to analyzing the merits of the objections without Plaintiff first meeting his burden of showing why the requests seek discoverable records.”).) The “unilateral stipulation” filed with the opposition brief, which purports to address each request individually, largely argues the requests are overbroad and burdensome rather than addressing relevance. (See, e.g., Dkt. 167-5 at 8-9 (discussing RFP 15).) *13 After reviewing the RFPs in conjunction with the chart the Court prepared of Plaintiff's claims (Dkt. 92 at 24-31), the Court is able to glean the relevance of all or most of the RFPs. Indeed, some of the RFPs appear to quote from or parrot allegations from the FAC itself. (See, e.g., Dkt. 154-1 at 5, 70-71 (RFP 45: “ ‘Probation imposed a number of additional initial conditions on Plaintiff using a form it drafted and uses for this purpose as policy, without court approval, and without having been permitted by the plea agreement.’ ” Produce the form used for this purpose.”).) The Court does not believe that Defendants have used their best efforts to reasonably interpret the RFPs in determining relevance. If Defendants wish to object based on relevance in the future, they should be prepared to specifically address the allegations in the FAC. b. Overbreadth Objections based on Timeframe. These objections are overruled. In responding to the RFPs, the County should follow the General Guidelines set forth above in Section II.B. c. Vagueness and Unintelligibility. Plaintiff argues Defendants made frivolous vagueness objections to terms used in the RFPs. (Dkt. 154 at 20-21.) The County responds that “most requests as written are extremely overbroad, vague and ambiguous, and unintelligible.” (Dkt. 167 at 22; see also id. at 27-30.) For purposes of guiding Defendants' supplemental responses, the Court addresses the nine specific RFPs discussed in Defendants' opposition brief (Dkt. 167 at 23-25, 27-29): RFP 125: requests, “All communications which discuss the constitutionality of the ‘Presence’ condition.” (Dkt. 154-1 at 13.) Defendants argue the failure to define the “Presence condition” renders the RFP vague. (Dkt. 167 at 23.) The FAC alleges, “Plaintiff was subject to the Presence Condition, which stated: ‘Do not be in the presence of children under the age of 18, unless accompanied by a responsible adult 21 years of age or older and approved in advance by your probation or mandatory supervision officer.’ ” (FAC at 25 ¶ 78.) Reasonably construed, this RFP refers to that condition of probation. RFP 56: requests, “For the form from the preceding request, all communications from/to any Probation personnel regarding its use, including methods, policies, customs, and/or training.” (Dkt. 154-1 at 7.) Defendants argue the request is vague because it “is not self-contained and refers to a separate request....” (Dkt. 167 at 24.) Reasonably construed, the RFP refers to the form used to impose a no-contact order on Plaintiff, which is sought in RFP 55. (Dkt. 154-1 at 7.) RFP 78: This requests, “Documents showing the overall violation rate for Orange County probationers on each caseload.” (Dkt. 154-1 at 9.) Defendants objected that this RFP was irrelevant and vague “in its use of the phrases ‘overall,’ ‘violation rate’ and ‘caseload.’ ” (Id. at 109-10.) In their opposition brief, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “has failed to explain the relevancy of this request.” (Dkt. 167 at 24.) The relevancy objection is sustained. RFP 250: This requests, “Provide all violation petitions, in chronological order from 2014 to present, for any violation alleging flushing (or otherwise hiding) a lawful substance (e.g. marijuana) prior to a search.” (Dkt. 154-1 at 26.) Defendants argue, “This request is wildly overbroad in both scope and time. Plaintiff is requesting more than 10 years' worth of documents relating to random ‘violation petitions’ (which are undefined) of unknown parties and not solely related to Plaintiff. Defendants should not have to guess as to what the request is seeking. Plaintiff does not define what he means by ‘violation petitions’ or ‘otherwise hiding’ or what type of ‘search’ is referenced.” (Dkt. 167 at 24-25.) *14 The Court interprets this RFP as seeking information about whether other probationers were violated for flushing marijuana prior to a search. This is relevant to Plaintiff's claim that he was treated differently. RFP 88: This requests, “Documents showing all training re: Plaintiff was wrongfully arrested in August 2014 for attending Comic-Con in San Diego.” (Dkt. 154-1 at 10.) Defendants objected that the request was vague “in its use of the phrases ‘training,’ ‘wrongfully arrested’ and ‘Comic-Con.’ ” (Id. at 120-21.) In their opposition brief, Defendants argue, “Plaintiff asserts a declaratory statement here and not a request that can be responded to. Is Plaintiff seeking training records? Training policies? Documents related to Plaintiff's ‘arrest’? ‘Training’ for what—attending Comic-Con in San Diego? ‘Training’ for whom?” (Dkt. 167 at 27.) The County's objections are overruled. All requests regarding training should be limited to training that Defendants Grantham and Gomez actually received or that the County made available to probation officers during the relevant time period. The County's objections are overruled. Reasonably interpreted the RFP seeks information about how probation officers were trained to determine what kind of events violated the condition prohibiting probationers from going to places where children are common. RFP 66: This requests, “All documents related to the following incident: ‘When Plaintiff refused to sign the form unless this waiver language was crossed out, Probation refused to accept the change, and lied to the Superior Court in an illegal ex parte communication, claiming Plaintiff had not cooperated in its investigation, when in truth Plaintiff fully cooperated in all respects except willingness to be coerced into a waiver of his right to challenge an illegal fee.’ ” (Dkt. 154-1 at 7-8.) Defendants objected that the request was vague “in its use of the phrases ‘Probation,’ ‘incident,’ ‘form,’ ‘waiver language,’ ‘lied,’ ‘Superior Court,’ ‘illegal ex parte communication,’ ‘cooperated,’ ‘investigation,’ ‘fully cooperated,’ ‘except willingness,’ ‘coerced,’ ‘waiver,’ ‘right,’ ‘challenge’ and ‘illegal fee.’ ” (Id. at 95-96.) In their opposition brief, Defendants argue, “Plaintiff asserts an allegation and simply tacks on the useless phrase: ‘All documents related to the following incident.’ Plaintiff is merely testifying here and has not articulated specific documents that he is requesting. Defendants cannot even understand this request, as written. Plaintiff does not include a time frame here. Plaintiff refers generically to ‘Probation’ and does not indicate who refused to accept ‘the change.’ It does not describe what ‘the change’ is. It does not indicate what “form” Plaintiff “refused to sign.” The list of defects in this request is endless.” (Dkt. 167 at 28.) The County's objections are overruled. This is one of many RFPs that describes an “incident” and seeks documents related to that incident. In responding, the County does not have to admit that the incident occurred or occurred in the way Plaintiff described. The County can still determine whether documents referenced in the description exist. For example, the request is plainly referring to (a) a waiver form with language to which Plaintiff objected, and (b) statements to a court, which are generally memorialized in a declaration or transcript. The County should make a reasonable search for these responsive documents. *15 RFP 52: This requests, “ ‘Probation assigned Plaintiff to Probation's PC § 1203f ‘sex offender’ registrant caseload despite Plaintiff never having been a ‘sex offender’ PC § 290 registrant.’ Produce all documents showing customs re: Plaintiff's assignment to his caseload.” (Dkt. 154-1 at 6.) Defendants objected that the request was vague “in its use of the phrases ‘Probation,’ ‘PC § 1203f,’ ‘‘sex offender’ registrant,’ ‘caseload,’ ‘PC § 290 registrant,’ ‘customs’ and ‘assignments.’ ” (Id. at 79.) In their opposition brief, Defendants argue, “Is Plaintiff seeking Defendant County's customs to how probationers are assigned to their caseload? Is Plaintiff seeking customs specifically related to him and his asserted caseload? Is Plaintiff seeking customs related to “sex offender” registrant caseloads—there is also no definition for this term, so it is not definitive what Plaintiff is referencing.” (Dkt. 167 at 28.) The County's objections are overruled. Reasonably interpreted, this request seeks documents showing customs that played a role in Plaintiff's assignment to the sex offender caseload. RFP 47: This requests, “ ‘Probation demanded, under threat of arrest, a waiver of Plaintiff's psychotherapist-patient privilege.’ Produce the form used for this purpose.” (Dkt. 154-1 at 6.) Defendants objected that the request was vague “in its use of the phrases ‘Probation,’ ‘demanded,’ ‘threat,’ ‘arrest,’ ‘waiver,’ ‘psychotherapist-patient privilege,’ and ‘form.’ ” (Id. at 73.) In their opposition brief, Defendants argue, “Not only is this request unintelligible because it is speculative as to what specifically Plaintiff seeks, it also expects Defendants to accept that “Probation,” (even though it is not defined) actually committed this action in order to respond.” (Dkt. 167 at 29.) The County's objections are overruled. The County can produce the referenced form without admitting that it made demands as Plaintiff alleges. RFP 211: This requests, “Documents showing all policies re: ‘Submit your person and property, including any residence, premises, container or vehicle under your control, to search and seizure at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement officer, probation officer, or mandatory supervision officer, with or without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.’ Specifically interpretation of ‘submit’ and ‘control.’ ” (Dkt. 154-1 at 21.) Defendants objected that this request was vague “in its use of the phrases ‘policies,’ ‘submit,’ ‘control,’ ‘search and seizure,’ ‘mandatory supervision officer,’ ‘warrant,’ ‘probable cause,’ and ‘reasonable suspicion.’ ” (Id. at 260.) In their opposition briefing, Defendants argue, “[I]t is unclear what documents Plaintiff is referencing. It is also unclear whether Plaintiff seeks policies related only to the terms ‘submit’ and ‘control,’ and in what context are these terms used and by whom?” (Dkt. 167 at 29.) The County's objections are overruled. The Court reasonably interprets this request as seeking as documents that reasonably show how the County interpreted the terms “submit” and “control” for purposes of enforcing the referenced probation condition. d. Duplicative Requests. Defendants argue that some of the Set Nine RFPs at issue are duplicative of earlier RFPs that Plaintiff served on them. (Dkt. 167 at 35-36.) However, it is unclear which RFPs Defendants are claiming to be duplicative. Their opposition briefing states: Plaintiff's [RFPs] propounded in sets 1 through 8 encompass and are duplicative of the following [RFPs], Set Nine to Defendant County of Orange, and [RFPs], Set One to Defendants Grantham and Gomez: 14-23, 68, 89, 93-94, 107-108, 111, 118, 134, 138, 139, 140, 141, and 162. Defendants' objections to these requests should be sustained on the basis that they are duplicative of prior requests that have been asked and answered. *16 Therefore, the following [RFPs], Set Nine to Defendant County of Orange and [RFPs], Set One to Defendants Grantham and Gomez are duplicative and the objections should be sustained on that basis: 31, 34, 36, 41, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50-52, 56, 58-59, 61, 62, 70, 72, 73, 75-76, 80-81, 83-84, 86-87, 90-91, 95-96, 98-99, 101-102, 104-105, 115-116, 119-120, 122-123, 127-128, 143-144, 146-147, 149-150, 152-153, 156-157, 159-160, 163-164, 166-167, 169-170, 172-173, 175-176, 178-179, 182-183, 187-188, 190-191, 199-200, 202-203, 205-206, 208-209, 211-212, 214-215, 217-218, 220-223, 226-227, and 229-230. Plaintiff has not established how any of the preceding requests are relevant to his claims or the defenses in this case, therefore, there is no reason to further respond to these requests. (Id. at 35-36.) Plaintiff responds, “There is no serious effort made by County Counsel to prove any duplication. It has to be unreasonably duplicative. The fact that prior County Counsel turned over 3k documents doesn't even begin to show any duplication at all. I'm not asking for the documents I already have, I'm asking for what I don't have. This whole section is just a legal conclusion that says ‘these numbers are duplicative, trust me bro.’ No, that's not how this works. [Y]ou have to actually prove it, not just say it.” (Dkt. 176 at 16.) Because Defendants have not provided the Court with copies of the prior RFPs, the Court cannot confirm whether the requests are duplicative. To the extent the County, in supplemental responses, maintains an objection that an RFP is duplicative, each supplemental response should state the number of the specific, prior RFP that the County contends is duplicative of the specific request being answered. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff's motions to compel (Dkt. 151-60) are granted in part and denied in part. 2. Within 60 days of the date of this Order, Defendants shall (a) serve supplemental responses to Rogs 1-6, 8, 10-11, 21-22, and 24; (b) serve supplemental responses to the RFAs as shown in the table attached to this Order; (c) serve supplemental responses to the RFPs, and (d) file a declaration with the Court consistent with Section II.E.2. above. 3. Leave of Court is required to extend the deadline for Defendants to serve the supplemental responses and declaration; the parties may not stipulate to any extensions of this deadline without Court approval. 4. If Plaintiff believes that Defendants' supplemental responses are deficient, within 21 days of service of the supplemental responses, Plaintiff must serve Defendants with a letter (a) listing the deficiencies, and (b) requesting a conference consistent with Local Rule 37-1. 5. Within 10 days of service letter, the parties must conduct a conference consistent with Local Rule 37-1. 6. Within 7 days of the conference, the parties shall file a joint status report with the Court that states: (a) whether and when additional responses will be provided and for which requests, and (b) any requests for which Plaintiff requested supplemental responses at the Local Rule 37-1 conference but Defendants have not agreed to provide supplemental responses. After reviewing the status report, the Court will decide whether to resolve the matter with an IDC or have the parties submit further written briefing. 7. The deadline to file dispositive motions is vacated and will be reset by further order of the Court. Initials of Deputy Clerk jd TABLE RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S RFAs Tye v. County of Orange, No. 8:18-cv-00544-RGK-KES RFA 1. Admit Plaintiff was never a “sex offender” PC 290 registrant. 2. Admit Plaintiff was placed on Probation's PC § 1203f “sex offender” registrant caseload. 3. Admit Plaintiff was never assessed on the “State-Authorized Risk Assessment Tool for Sex Offenders” because he was never a sex offender. 4. Admit Plaintiff was required to report weekly throughout his time on probation. 5. Admit Plaintiff never failed to report as directed to Probation. 6. Admit Probation imposed on Plaintiff a number of additional one or more initial conditions on Plaintiff not in the plea agreement using a form it drafted and uses for this purpose as policy., without court approval, and without having been permitted by the plea agreement. These conditions include, for example, barring probationers from leaving the state for the duration of supervision. 7. Admit Probation demanded, under threat of arrest, a waiver of Plaintiff's psychotherapist-patient privilege. 8. Admit Probation imposed a no-contact order on Plaintiff without court approval, and in contradiction of Plaintiff's plea agreement. 9. Admit that when Probation imposed a number of additional initial conditions on Plaintiff using a form it drafted and uses for this purpose as policy, without court approval, and without having been permitted by the plea agreement, it was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 10. Admit that when Probation imposed a number of additional initial conditions on Plaintiff using a form it drafted and uses for this purpose as policy, without court approval, and without having been permitted by not in the plea agreement, it was done under the Probation Officer's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 11. Admit Probation when demanded, under threat of arrest, a waiver of Plaintiff's psychotherapist-patient privilege, it was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 12. Admit Probation when demanded, under threat of arrest, a waiver of Plaintiff's psychotherapist-patient privilege, it was done under the Probation Officer's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 13. Admit Probation when imposed a no-contact order on Plaintiff without court approval, and in contradiction of Plaintiff's plea agreement, it was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 14. Admit Probation when imposed a no-contact order on Plaintiff without court approval, and in contradiction of Plaintiff's plea agreement, it was done under the Probation Officer's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 15. Admit Probation's financial “disclosure” form includes an relatively hidden and illegal requirement that probationers waive all legal challenges to any/all fees as a condition of signing the form. 16. Admit Probation's use of the financial “disclosure” form includes a relatively hidden and illegal requirement that probationers waive all legal challenges to any/all fees as a condition of signing the form & it was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 17. Admit Probation's financial “disclosure” form includes a relatively hidden and illegal requirement that probationers waive all legal challenges to any/all fees as a condition of signing the form & it was done under the Probation Officer's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 18. Admit When Plaintiff refused to sign the form unless this waiver language was crossed out, Probation refused to accept the change, and lied to the Superior Court in an illegal ex parte communication, claiming Plaintiff had not cooperated in its investigation, when in truth Plaintiff fully cooperated in all respects except willingness to be coerced into a waiver of his right to challenge an illegal fee. 19. Admit When Plaintiff refused to sign the form unless this waiver language was crossed out, Probation refused to accept the change, and lied to the Superior Court in an illegal ex parte communication, claiming Plaintiff had not cooperated in its investigation, when in truth Plaintiff fully cooperated in all respects except willingness to be coerced into a waiver of his right to challenge an illegal fee & it was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 20. Admit When Plaintiff refused to sign the form unless this waiver language was crossed out, and Probation refused to accept the change, and lied to the Superior Court in an illegal ex parte communication, claiming Plaintiff had not cooperated in its investigation, when in truth Plaintiff fully cooperated in all respects except willingness to be coerced into a waiver of his right to challenge an illegal fee & it this was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 21. Admit Probation is obligated by law tofails to disclose, but instead conceals, that probationers cannot be assessed any fees without first being afforded a judicial hearing and judicial determination. 22. Admit Probation, as a matter of policy, imposes the maximum fee on every probationer, regardless of the probationer's ability to pay, and sends probationers regular “bills” with massive unpaid fees. 23. Admit Probation continuesd to send these bills for fees to Plaintiff as of 2020, long after Plaintiff successfully completed probation, despite the fact that Probation has no legal entitlement to these bills, as no cost of probation was assessed or imposed by a judge at any point. 24. Admit that for “Probation is obligated by law to disclose, but instead conceals, that probationers cannot be assessed any fees without first being afforded a judicial hearing and judicial determination. Probation, as a matter of policy, imposes the maximum fee on every probationer, regardless of the probationer's ability to pay, and sends probationers regular “bills” with massive unpaid fees. Probation continues to send these bills to Plaintiff as of 2020, long after Plaintiff successfully completed probation, despite the fact that Probation has no legal entitlement to these bills, as no cost of probation was assessed or imposed by a judge at any point.” the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 25. Admit that for “Probation is obligated by law to disclose, but instead conceals, that probationers cannot be assessed any fees without first being afforded a judicial hearing and judicial determination. Probation, as a matter of policy, imposes the maximum fee on every probationer, regardless of the probationer's ability to pay, and sends probationers regular “bills” with massive unpaid fees. Probation continues to send these bills to Plaintiff as of 2020, long after Plaintiff successfully completed probation, despite the fact that Probation has no legal entitlement to these bills, as no cost of probation was assessed or imposed by a judge at any point.” the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 26. Admit that: PC 1203.1b provides “The probation officer shall inform the defendant that the defendant is entitled to a hearing, that includes the right to counsel, in which the court shall make a determination of the defendant's ability to pay and the payment amount. The defendant must waive the right to a determination by the court of his or her ability to pay and the payment amount by a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Probation, as policy and custom, does not do this. Probation's goal is to trick probationers into an unknowing and ineffective waiver by getting Probationers to sign its “financial disclosure” statement including the waiver, but which does not inform probationers of their right to a court hearing. Probation's malicious purpose is to save time and money by eliminating court hearings, and to maximize the amount it collects from probationers, which judges are required to tailor to the probationers' ability to pay, but which Probation always imposes in full on every probationer with no regard for any ability to pay. 27. Admit that: While ability to pay might be considered in setting a monthly payment amount, the full and total liability is imposed by Probation without regard for ability to pay. 28. Admit that for : “PC 1203.1b provides “The probation officer shall inform the defendant that the defendant is entitled to a hearing, that includes the right to counsel, in which the court shall make a determination of the defendant's ability to pay and the payment amount. The defendant must waive the right to a determination by the court of his or her ability to pay and the payment amount by a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Probation, as policy and custom, does not do this. Probation's goal is to trick probationers into an unknowing and ineffective waiver by getting Probationers to sign its “financial disclosure” statement including the waiver, but which does not inform probationers of their right to a court hearing. Probation's malicious purpose is to save time and money by eliminating court hearings, and to maximize the amount it collects from probationers, which judges are required to tailor to the probationers' ability to pay, but which Probation always imposes in full on every probationer with no regard for any ability to pay.” the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 29. Admit that for : “PC 1203.1b provides “The probation officer shall inform the defendant that the defendant is entitled to a hearing, that includes the right to counsel, in which the court shall make a determination of the defendant's ability to pay and the payment amount. The defendant must waive the right to a determination by the court of his or her ability to pay and the payment amount by a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Probation, as policy and custom, does not do this. Probation's goal is to trick probationers into an unknowing and ineffective waiver by getting Probationers to sign its “financial disclosure” statement including the waiver, but which does not inform probationers of their right to a court hearing. Probation's malicious purpose is to save time and money by eliminating court hearings, and to maximize the amount it collects from probationers, which judges are required to tailor to the probationers' ability to pay, but which Probation always imposes in full on every probationer with no regard for any ability to pay.” the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 30. Admit that for: “While ability to pay might be considered in setting a monthly payment amount, the full and total liability is imposed by Probation without regard for ability to pay.” the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 31. Admit that for: “While ability to pay might be considered in setting a monthly payment amount, the full and total liability is imposed by Probation without regard for ability to pay.” the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 32. Admit that since Plaintiff did not waive his right to a court hearing, PC 1203.1b provides that only the court, not Probation, can assess any “cost of probation”. 33. Admit probation never sought another Court hearing re: cost of probation after its first attempt was denied. 34. Admit Plaintiff owes Probation nothing, yet it continued to send him regular “bills” years after he completed probation. 35. Admit Probation misrepresents payment of the “cost of probation” as a probation condition that its officers can arrest probationers for non-compliance of. 36. Admit the Orange County Superior Court and Court of Appeal expressly held that consistent with well-settled and long-standing California law, assessment of the “cost of probation” is not a permissible condition and can never be enforced by arrest. 37. Admit Probation, including Grantham and Gomez, refuse to explain to Mr. Tye in advance whether a probationer'shis conduct comports with or violates a condition of probation. 38. Admit Probation, including Grantham and Gomez, refuse the refusal to explain in advance whether a probationer's conduct comports with or violates a condition of probation. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 39. Admit Probation, including Grantham and Gomez, refuse to explain in advance whether a probationer's conduct comports with or violates a condition of probation. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 40. Admit Gomez even stated, on March 26, 2018, that he has never informed a probationer in advance whether something is a violation or not, and he has worked for Probation for about 28 years. 41. Admit Gomez even stated, on March 26, 2018, that he has never informed a probationer in advance whether something is a violation or not, and he has worked for Probation for about 28 years. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 42. Admit Gomez even stated, on March 26, 2018, that he has never informed a probationer in advance whether something is a violation or not, and he has worked for Probation for about 28 years. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 43. Admit Grantham responded when asked by Plaintiff whether something was a violation “I don't have to tell you that.” 44. Admit Grantham responded when asked by Plaintiff asked whether something was a violation and Grantham responded, “I don't have to tell you that,.” & the foregoingthis was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 45. Admit Grantham responded when asked by Plaintiff whether something was a violation “I don't have to tell you that.” & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 46. Admit All probation officers, including Grantham and Gomez, claim to follow a “reasonableness” standard, where they will arrest probationers based on whether or not the officer, in hindsight, believes the probationer's actions or omissions were “reasonable”. 47. Admit All probation officers, including Grantham and Gomez, claim to follow a “reasonableness” standard, where they will arrest probationers based on whether or not the officer, in hindsight, believes the probationer's actions or omissions were “reasonable”.& the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 48. Admit All probation officers, including Grantham and Gomez, claim to follow a “reasonableness” standard, where they will arrest probationers based on whether or not the officer, in hindsight, believes the probationer's actions or omissions were “reasonable”.& the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 49. Admit the overall violation rate for Orange County probationers on the sex caseload is higher than the other caseloads. 50. Admit when inputting Plaintiff's terms into the minute order, the clerk used the wrong code and included the “congregate” condition from the addendum. 51. Admit that when Probation notified Plaintiff of the congregate condition,. Plaintiff pointed out that he had no such condition, was aware of the “Addendum”, and never would have agreed to any of its terms. 52. Admit Probation reviewed Plaintiff's Plea agreement and saw that the “congregate” condition was not present, and therefore could not be enforced, yet decided to enforce it anyway. 53. Admit Probation reviewed Plaintiff's Plea agreement and saw thatdecided to enforce the “congregate” condition was not present, and therefore could not be enforced, yet decided to enforce it anyway. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 54. Admit Probation reviewed Plaintiff's Plea agreement and saw that decided to enforce the “congregate” condition was not present, and therefore could not be enforced, yet decided to enforce it anyway. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 55. Admit Plaintiff was wrongfully arrested in August 2014 for attending Comic-Con in San Diego, even though this was not a violation of any condition, and even though his probation officer admitted on the stand that he never informed Plaintiff in advance that attending Comic-Con or any similar activity would be a violation of any condition. 56. Admit when Plaintiff was wrongfully arrested in August 2014 for attending Comic-Con in San Diego, even though this was not a violation of any condition, and even though his probation officer admitted on the stand that he never informed Plaintiff in advance that attending Comic-Con or any similar activity would be a violation of any condition. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 57. Admit when Plaintiff was wrongfully arrested in August 2014 for attending Comic-Con in San Diego, even though this was not a violation of any condition, and even though his probation officer admitted on the stand that he never informed Plaintiff in advance that attending Comic-Con or any similar activity would be a violation of any condition. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 58. Admit Plaintiff's 1st violation was ultimately reversed on appeal. 59. Admit Probation sought four additional ridiculous and severe “Addendum” conditions completely unrelated to the alleged violation: (1) Probation gaining the ability to restrict Plaintiff's internet use, (2) forcing Plaintiff onto GPS monitoring, (3) barring Plaintiff from “sexually explicit material”, and (4) barring photographic devices. 60. Admit while ultimately stricken as void on appeal, Plaintiff was subject to the gross a deprivation of liberty from these conditions for approximately two years. 61. Admit these Addendum conditions were and are unconstitutional. 62. Admit after Plaintiff informed Grantham that he intended to relocate to Los Angeles County,. Grantham responded that if Plaintiff attempted to move out of Orange County for any reason, Grantham would arrest him. 63. Admit Plaintiff informed Grantham that he intended to relocate to Los Angeles County. Grantham's responded response that if Plaintiff attempted to move out of Orange County for any reason, Grantham would arrest him. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 64. Admit Plaintiff informed Grantham that he intended to relocate to Los Angeles County. Grantham's responded response that if Plaintiff attempted to move out of Orange County for any reason, Grantham would arrest him. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 65. Admit the residence condition was later stricken as unconstitutional on state court appeal. 66. Admit California law and the Constitution guarantee all probationers the right to relocate anywhere within the state without prior approval. While parolees in some cases require approval, probationers do not. 67. Admit California law regarding probationer relocation only relates to the transfer of supervision after such relocation, and this transfer of supervision is discretionary. 68. Admit probationers can live in any county, and no court or probation department can say otherwise. This is well settled law established as a Constitutional right in a published case from the 1980s which has been relied upon ever since. 69. Admit Grantham barred Plaintiff from moving out of Orange County because it was Probation's intention to see Plaintiff violated in bad faith and sent to prison. Grantham intended to block Plaintiff's “escape” to another county, where Plaintiff might thrive and easily succeed when supervised by a good faith probation department. 70. Admit Grantham used the internet restriction discretion to bar Plaintiff from having any internet access at his residence for any reason. 71. Admit Grantham's used of the internet restriction discretion to bar Plaintiff from having any internet access at his residence for any reason. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 72. Admit Grantham's used of the internet restriction discretion to bar Plaintiff from having any internet access at his residence for any reason. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 73. Admit settled case law stated that such an internet restriction could not be used to completely deny access. 74. Admit Plaintiff was representing himself, and Grantham did not allow Plaintiff to conduct internet legal research, use required e-filing, check email, or anything else, no matter how legitimate the use. 75. Admit Grantham wrongfully barred Plaintiff from all internet access for approximately two years, violating his Constitutional rights. 76. Admit It is Probation's policy and custom to treat this “discretion” instead as an outright ban, which it knows is not Constitutionally permitted and a condition specifying a ban would be struck down, so it uses language in the condition to make it seem as though the probation officer is carefully tailoring only limited restrictions, when in practice it is simply a contrivance to impose unconstitutional bans. 77. Admit Grantham threatened to use an “association” condition to bar Plaintiff from associating with his long-term girlfriend, unless she “consented” and waived her 4th Amendment rights so that Grantham could search her property. 78. Admit Grantham's threatened to use an “association” condition to bar Plaintiff from associating with his long-term girlfriend, unless she “consented” and waived her 4th Amendment rights so that Grantham could search her property. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 79. Admit Grantham's threatened to use an “association” condition to bar Plaintiff from associating with his long-term girlfriend, unless she “consented” and waived her 4th Amendment rights so that Grantham could search her property. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 80. Admit Grantham also barred Plaintiff from visiting his girlfriend at her residence unless she agreed to permit full Probation searches of that residence. 81. Admit Grantham also barreding Plaintiff from visiting his girlfriend at her residence unless she agreed to permit full Probation searches of that residence. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 82. Admit Grantham also barreding Plaintiff from visiting his girlfriend at her residence unless she agreed to permit full Probation searches of that residence. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 83. Admit the association condition was later stricken as unconstitutional on by state court appeal consistent with settled case law which Probation was aware of. 84. Admit Grantham, during a search of Plaintiff's residence, seized two USB drives belonging to Plaintiff's girlfriend containing television shows and Plaintiff's legal files for his self-representation. 85. Admit in response to repeated and persistent questioning regarding the scope of the “sexually explicit material” condition, Grantham had eventually conceded that the television show “Game of Thrones”, for example, was not considered “sexually explicit material” even though it portrayed some nudity and sexual content. 86. Admit Plaintiff also informed Grantham that the USB drives were not his, and were used by his girlfriend to download things of her choosing to bring to Plaintiff's residence to watch together, since Plaintiff had no internet access, as well as to conduct internet legal research and then save the results for Plaintiff's review. 87. Admit Grantham conducted an exhaustive study of hundreds of television shows on the drives, looking for any pretext to violate Plaintiff. The most he could find wasbut only found a single animated show, which had been saved for potential viewing by Plaintiff's girlfriend, but not yet watched by Plaintiff, and which showed extremely brief partial nudity, far far less than depicted in Game of Thrones. 88. Admit Grantham painstakingly took approximately 20 still “screenshots” total from approximately 10-12 episodes of this show. None of these screenshots showed sexual activity of any kind. Some, but not all of them, showed a topless animated adult female. The “nudity” was extremely brief, representing only seconds of total run time out of about 4.5 hours. 89. Admit Despite having already informed Plaintiff that this was not a violation, Grantham wrongfully arrested Plaintiff and for alleged violation of the “sexually explicit material” condition based on the animated show. 90. Admit Despite having already informed Plaintiff that this was not a violation, Grantham wrongfully arrested Plaintiff and alleged violation of the “sexually explicit material” condition. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 91. Admit Despite having already informed Plaintiff that this was not a violation, Grantham wrongfully arrested Plaintiff and alleged violation of the “sexually explicit material” condition. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 92. Admit Grantham did this primarily in bad faith retaliation for Plaintiff's court challenges of his prior misconduct. 93. Admit in his violation petition, Grantham perjured himself by alleging that the show depicted “full frontal nudity”. 94. Admit in his violation petition, Grantham perjured himself by alleging that the show depicted “full frontal nudity”.& the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 95. Admit in his violation petition, Grantham perjured himself by alleging that the show depicted “full frontal nudity”. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 96. Admit Full frontal nudity means the explicit depiction of genitalia from the front. 97. Admit The animated show did not depict full frontal nudity, and none of in Grantham's screenshots showed any. 98. Admit But for Grantham's perjury, Plaintiff would have escaped incarceration at his “probable cause” hearing. 99. Admit because of Grantham's perjury, Plaintiff was incarcerated for a total of 59 actual days awaiting trial. 100. Admit Grantham admitted on the stand that he informed Plaintiff that “Game of Thrones” was not a violational. 101. Admit the prosecution stipulated to the sexual nature of “Game of Thrones” being far in excess of what was depicted in the animated material alleged to be a violation. 102. Admit Plaintiff won at trial and the alleged violation of the “sexually explicit material” condition was denied. 103. Admit the trial court found that nothing in the evidence from the animated show was of a sexual nature, and that the “sexually explicit material” condition was unconstitutional. 104. Admit During one residence search of Plaintiff's residence by Grantham & his partner, Grantham seized Plaintiff's girlfriend's belongings. She was present & visiting at the time. 105. Admit Grantham seized Plaintiff's girlfriend's bag, which included her laptop. 106. Admit Grantham activated the laptop & demanded Plaintiff's girlfriend give him her password to unlock the laptop under threat of arrest of Plaintiff. 107. Admit after coercing Plaintiff's girlfriend's password out of her, Grantham attempted to search for a wifi to connect to, telling Plaintiff that if Grantham was able to connect to the internet, he would arrest Plaintiff for violation of his internet condition. 108. Admit after Grantham's coercing Plaintiff's girlfriend's password out of her, Grantham attempted to search for a wifi to connect to, telling Plaintiff that if Grantham was able to connect to the internet, he would arrest Plaintiff for violation of his internet condition. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 109. Admit after coercing Plaintiff's girlfriend's password out of her, Grantham attempted to search for a wifi to connect to, telling Plaintiff that if Grantham was able to connect to the internet, he would arrest Plaintiff for violation of his internet condition. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 110. Admit Grantham was unsuccessful in connecting to the internet with the girlfriend's laptop. 111. Admit On threat of arrest, Grantham ordered Plaintiff to submit to a polygraph examination, even though Plaintiff had never agreed to any such condition as part of his Plea Agreement. Grantham admitted to having done so under oath. 112. Admit On threat of arrest, Grantham ordered Plaintiff to submit to a polygraph examination, even though Plaintiff had never agreed to any such condition as part of his Plea Agreement. Grantham admitted to having done so under oath. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 113. Admit On threat of arrest, Grantham ordered Plaintiff to submit to a polygraph examination, even though Plaintiff had never agreed to any such condition as part of his Plea Agreement. Grantham admitted to having done so under oath. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 114. Admit At Plaintiff's 2nd violation hearing, Superior Court Judge Paer, who presided over that hearing, explicitly held that the “sexually explicit material” condition was unconstitutional on its face. Judge Paer rewrote the condition to narrow it to comply with the Constitution. Both Grantham & other representatives of Probation were present at the hearing, & Judge Paer directed them to update the condition for their caseloads. This was never done. Probation ignored Judge Paer's ruling & refused to modify the condition for any other probationers. 115. Admit It is Probation's policy and/or custom to attempt to force everyone on the sex offender caseload to submit to polygraphs under threat of arrest, regardless of whether they have the polygraph condition or not. 116. Admit there is a polygraph condition, contained in the “Addendum”, which some 290 registrants do have. Plaintiff was not subject to it. 117. Admit Throughout supervision, under the “presence” condition which bars Plaintiff from being in the “presence” of minors unless in the company of a “responsible adult”, Plaintiff had a right to the appointment of a “responsible adult” of his choosing, so long as that “responsible adult” was age 21 or older. 118. Admit Once approved, the deprivations of Plaintiff's liberty would be greatly diminished if accompanied by this “responsible adult”. 119. Admit Plaintiff offered his girlfriend, who was well over 21, with no criminal record, and who could not be denied. 120. Admit In bad faith, Probation, including Grantham and Gomez, refused to approve Plaintiff's girlfriend as a “responsible adult”. 121. Admit Grantham attempted to justify his denial by claiming that he did not believe that the girlfriend would report violations, but this is not a duty of the “responsible adult” under the condition. 122. Admit Without judicial approval, and absent from any plea agreement, Probation, including Grantham and Gomez, impose a convoluted scheme on anyone who seeks approval of a “responsible adult”: (1) the probationer is required to take a “sexual history” polygraph examination, in which his entire life's sexual history is investigated in detail, together with every conceivable deeply personal and embarrassing sexual interest or fetish. This information is used against probationers in subsequent judicial proceedings, including sentencing. (2) the probationer and “responsible adult” are required to see a therapist and obtain therapist approval, in addition to reviewing and agreeing to 25+ new conditions listed on a Probation-drafted form. (3) Finally, the “responsible adult” meets with the probation officer alone, the probation officer reviews the results/contents of the probationer's “sexual history” polygraph with the proposed “responsible adult”, divulging the probationer's deepest, most embarrassing secrets to this person, and even after all this, might decide to not approve. 123. Admit Probation, including Grantham and Gomez, only want to approve a “responsible adult” when they believe that person will act as a surrogate probation officer and spy, and show greater loyalty to Probation than to the probationer. 124. Admit in tacit admission that “presence” was unconstitutional, the Superior Court's updated mandatory Plea Agreement form eliminated itthe “presence” condition, and replaced it with an “association” condition instead. 125. Admit In regard to the condition prohibiting Plaintiff being in the “presence” of minors, Probation, including Grantham and Gomez, refused to explain or define what that meant in terms of what conduct was actually prohibited. Instead, both relied upon the same standard: they would decide whether Plaintiff's conduct was “reasonable” in hindsight, and arrest him for violation if they believed it was not. 126. Admit In regard to the condition prohibiting Plaintiff being in the “presence” of minors, Probation, including that Grantham and Gomez's, refusedal to explain or define what that meant in terms of what conduct was actually prohibited. Instead, both relied upon the same standard: they would decide whether Plaintiff's conduct was “reasonable” in hindsight, and arrest him for violation if they believed it was not. & the foregoing the “presence” condition was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 127. Admit In regard to the condition prohibiting Plaintiff being in the “presence” of minors, Probation, including that Grantham and Gomez's, refusedal to explain or define what that meant in terms of what conduct was actually prohibited. Instead, both relied upon the same standard: they would decide whether Plaintiff's conduct was “reasonable” in hindsight, and arrest him for violation if they believed it was not. & the foregoing the “presence” condition was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 128. Admit This Probation's refusal to explain the “presence” condition made it impossible for Plaintiff to live a normal life, since even typical, everyday, good faith activities could result in violation under some ambiguous, vague prohibition that he not be in the “presence” of more than one quarter of the US population. 129. Admit ThisProbation's refusal to explain the “presence” condition has reduced Plaintiff to a state of quasi-house arrest throughout his term of probation, out of fear that - like with the wrongful Comic-Con arrest - Probation will use his good faith behavior as a pretext for an arrest in hindsight, even though Plaintiff did not believe he was violating anything at the time. 130. Admit This policy/custom makes the “presence” condition grossly unconstitutional. 131. Admit Plaintiff repeatedly informed Grantham and Gomez that the law required as a matter of constitutional right they had to inform him in advance or else any arrest would be wrongful, but they nonetheless refused. 132. Admit Plaintiff repeatedly informed Grantham and Gomez that the law required as a matter of constitutional right they had to inform him in advance or else any arrest would be wrongful, but they nonetheless refused. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 133. Admit Plaintiff repeatedly informed Grantham and Gomez that the law required as a matter of constitutional right they had to inform him in advance or else any arrest would be wrongful, but they nonetheless refused. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 134. Admit Eight months later, Grantham arrested Plaintiff for “failing” to enroll in the DRC. 135. Admit In his petition, Grantham cited the alleged violated condition as: “Cooperate with your probation or mandatory supervision officer in any plan for psychological, psychiatric, alcohol and/or drug treatment.” Grantham admitted on the stand that the DRC was none of these things for Plaintiff. 136. Admit No condition or term of Plaintiff's Plea Agreement permits Grantham to punish unemployment with a DRC referral. 137. Admit Following at trial, this attempted DRC violation was deniedthe court held that failing to enroll in DRC was not a violation. 138. Admit On or about September 2016, Plaintiff's first 3 state appeals were decided, and he won all three. This resulted in (1) overturning the “Comic-Con” violation as void and in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, and striking the four new conditions imposed as a result as void, (2) correcting the clerical error and striking the “congregate” condition, (3) striking the residency condition as unconstitutional, (4) striking the association condition as unconstitutional, and (5) striking payment of the cost of probation as a condition of probation. 139. Admit On or about October 2016, Plaintiff informed Grantham that he would be moving to a new residence with his girlfriend on or about December 1st. 140. Admit Plaintiff explained to Grantham that, in order to exclude Probation and retain her 4th Amendment rights, Plaintiff's girlfriend would maintain a separate locked room and Plaintiff would not have a key. 141. Admit Plaintiff had extensively researched this issue, and well settled case law made it clear that such facts took her room outside the scope of Plaintiff's search waiver. In fact, even if the room were unlocked and Plaintiff had access, it would be outside the scope, (search conditions only apply to probationers' room and common areas) but Plaintiff went even further to make it absolutely clear and beyond any possible dispute. Grantham did not dispute anything at the time. 142. Admit After Plaintiff moved, Grantham and Gomez conducted a search on or about December 7, 2016. Now, for the first time, after Plaintiff had already moved, Grantham suddenly had a problem with Plaintiff's new living arrangement. 143. Admit Grantham first told Plaintiff that he did “not approve” Plaintiff to live at any residence where he could not search the entire residence. Plaintiff then reminded Grantham that the residence condition had been stricken as unconstitutional by the court of appeal. 144. Then, Admit when Grantham repeatedly demanded that Plaintiff open his girlfriend's locked bedroom door., Plaintiff responded that he did not have a key, and was incapable of doing so. Grantham asked if Plaintiff was refusing to follow Grantham's directive. Plaintiff asked if Grantham was ordering Plaintiff to kick the door down. Grantham and Gomez then conducted an exhaustive search of the residence and Plaintiff's car, intentionally making a mess, dumping contents on the floor, and so on. They located numerous keys, and tried all of these keys on the bedroom door. None worked. 145. Admit Grantham had an obligation to raise any issues he had with Plaintiff's proposed living arrangement prior to Plaintiff moving, and did not do so. 146. Admit When it turned out to be true that Plaintiff had no access to his girlfriend's room and no key could be found, Grantham told Plaintiff “We will talk about this further on Monday” and left. 147. Admit Grantham did not arrest Plaintiff on or about December 7, 2016 because Plaintiff was not in violation. 148. Admit While Grantham searched Plaintiff's car, he had directed Plaintiff to stand to the side, and Plaintiff complied. This was not good enough for Gomez, who approached Plaintiff and directed him to sit on a curb. Plaintiff complied. Then Gomez commanded that Plaintiff extend his legs and cross them at the ankles. Plaintiff was puzzled and asked why. Gomez refused to explain himself and repeated his command. Plaintiff repeated his question. This impasse continued the entire time Grantham was searching the car. Gomez repeated his command numerous times, and Plaintiff repeated his questions numerous times. After many, many iterations, Gomez stated that if Plaintiff extended his legs and crossed them at the ankles, it would take slightly longer for Plaintiff to run away. Plaintiff asked why Gomez felt the need to micro-manage and puppet Plaintiff's posture to such an absurd degree, when Plaintiff had never run from law enforcement once in his life, had a years-long track record of compliance with Probation and no violations, and when there was absolutely no reason to believe that Plaintiff would run, particularly with two armed and armored officers standing in front of him. Gomez could not say. 149. Admit Gomez's commands represented gratuitous harassment, and an unconstitutional detention. 150. Admit The following week after December 7, 2016, when Plaintiff reported to Probation, Grantham immediately arrested him. 151. Admit The following week when Plaintiff reported to Probation, Grantham immediately arrested him. & the foregoing was done Plaintiff in December 2016 in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 152. Admit The following week when Plaintiff reported to Probation, Grantham immediately arrested him. & the foregoing was donePlaintiff in December 2016 under Probation's his sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 153. Admit the arrest was based on Plaintiff's “failure” to open his girlfriend's bedroom door, which Grantham alleged to be a violation of Plaintiff's 4th Amendment waiver condition. 154. Admit Under cross examination, Grantham admitted to having no basis to believe that Plaintiff either had access to the separate room, nor did he have any reason to believe that any of Plaintiff's property was behind the locked door. 155. Admit Having searched Plaintiff's prior residence for years, Grantham was familiar with Plaintiff's property, and had already seen all of Plaintiff's property elsewhere in Plaintiff's separate room 156. Admit In January 2017, the Superior Court denied the violation on both counts. 157. Admit the judge stated that probation officers might in the future have a valid security reason (exigent circumstances) to enter the locked room. 158. Admit that Despite being supposed to only use obtaining the key for use in exigent circumstances, Grantham and Gomez used the key on a routine basis in every single search subsequent to January 2017. 159. Admit Despite being supposed to only use the key in exigent circumstances,that Grantham and Gomez's used of the key on a routine basis in every single search subsequent to January 2017. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 160. Admit Despite being supposed to only use the key in exigent circumstances, that Grantham and Gomez's used of the key on a routine basis in every single search subsequent to January 2017. & the foregoing was done under Probation's their sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 161. Admit Plaintiff has repeatedly reminded both of them that it was not to be used unless they “possessed a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted’ the officer in believing that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 325, 327 (1990). 162. Admit in defiance ofthat after hearing Plaintiff's repeated admonitionsreminders, Grantham and Gomez continued to enter [GF Plaintiff's girlfriend's room] as a matter of routine policy routinely. 163. Admit in spring 2017, Probation transferred Plaintiff's supervision from Grantham to Gomez. 164. Admit while the general discretionary “association” condition had been stricken, Plaintiff was still prohibited from associating with felons, parolees, and people on PRCS (county parole). 165. Admit Plaintiff was not prohibited from associating with other probationers. 166. Admit Gomez informed Plaintiff that he was forbidden from any contact with other probationers while sitting in the waiting area at the Probation building waiting for Gomez to call him in. 167. Admit Gomez informed Plaintiff that he was forbidden from any contact with other probationers while sitting in the waiting area at the Probation building waiting for Gomez to call him in. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 168. Admit Gomez informed Plaintiff that he was forbidden from any contact with other probationers while sitting in the waiting area at the Probation building waiting for Gomez to call him in. & the foregoing was done under Probation's his sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 169. Admit Gomez cited to the association condition. Plaintiff disagreed that “associate” would include all contact, particularly when Probation was forcing these people to share the same small space, sometimes for hours, while waiting. 170. Admit Gomez's interpretation of the association condition was unreasonable, and a violation of Plaintiff's clearly established rights. 171. Admit Probation's drug testing policies are unconstitutional. 172. Admit Grantham understood that Plaintiff has no drug history and only infrequently tested him. 173. Admit Gomez adopted the opposite extreme approach, testing Plaintiff on a frequent and excessive basis. 174. Admit Despite the availability of the saliva test, Gomez would choose to require that Plaintiff comply with urinalysis. By policy, Plaintiff was required to expose his genitals in front of and in full view of Gomez while urinating into the sample container. 175. Admit When Plaintiff attempted to preserve some modicum of modesty and rotate his body slightly away from Gomez's view, Gomez became hostile and aggressive, ultimately threatening Plaintiff with a further strip search unless Plaintiff stood at a 90 degree angle to the large mirror placed in front of the urinal that Gomez was using to examine his genitals during the test. Repeated tests carried out in this fashion were degrading to Plaintiff and violated his constitutional rights. They constituted a routine and baseless strip-search. 176. Admit During one of his search of Plaintiff's residence, Gomez handcuffed Plaintiff and led him through his housing complex in handcuffs in full view of his neighbors. 177. Admit Gomez left Plaintiff in handcuffs, without cause, throughout the duration of the search. When Plaintiff asked if he was under arrest, Gomez replied that he was “being detained”. 178. Admit When removing the cuffs, Gomez commanded Plaintiff to place his hand on his head. Plaintiff placed his hand very near his head, but stopped with maybe a 1/2 inch separation, . Rather than accept this, Gomez refused to continue uncuffing him, and demanded that Plaintiff place his hand fully against his head. 179. Admit Probation, including Grantham and Gomez, impose “Halloween” conditions on probationers every year, using a document drafted by Probation, which its officers coerce their probationers to sign. 180. Admit The “Halloween” conditions signature line includes a promise to abide by the conditions, and Probation arrests and prosecutes probationers who violate it the Halloween condition. on the basis of this coerced “consent”. 181. Admit In 2015, Grantham demanded Plaintiff sign it the Halloween condition. Plaintiff asked if he would be in violation or be arrested for refusing to sign. Grantham refused to answer, and placed Plaintiff in imminent apprehension of arrest. Grantham ordered Plaintiff to wait outside while he conferred with his supervisor, and ultimately informed Plaintiff that he did not “have” to sign the form, but that he would nonetheless be arrested for violating any of the conditions therein. 182. Admit In 2016, Grantham, already aware of Plaintiffs unwillingness to sign, repeated that told Plaintiff that he must nonetheless obey the Halloween conditions. 183. Admit In 2017, Gomez became livid when Plaintiff explained that he never signed the form. Gomez was adversarial, hostile, and personally insulting to Plaintiff. when Plaintiff asked for a copy of the Halloween condition form., Gomez refused to give it to him, saying Plaintiff could only have a copy if he signed it, otherwise he said Plaintiff could subpoena it. 184. Admit Gomez ordered Plaintiff to report the following Tuesday even though no one else on his caseload was required to report that day, and admitted that he did so to punish Plaintiff for not signing. 185. Admit when Plaintiff sought state court intervention regarding many of the problems he was having with Gomez, including this one, and delivered a subpoena for the Halloween condition form to Gomez properly under California law by placing it on Gomez's desk., Gomez refused to accept it., and repeatedly ordered Plaintiff to pick the subpoena, including standing up and approaching Plaintiff while raising his voice. He also had his partner stand near Plaintiff's right side. Plaintiff repeatedly asked questions, and Gomez consistently refused to answer. Eventually, Gomez became frustrated enough that he demanded Plaintiff leave his office, and claimed that he “didn't know” what those documents were even though he had referred to them as a subpoena numerous times in his commands. Gomez's refusal to comply with California subpoena law was a violation of due process. 186. Admit Plaintiff sought state court intervention regarding many of the problems he was having with Gomez, including this one, and delivered a subpoena to Gomez properly under California law by placing it on Gomez's desk. Gomez refused to accept it, and repeatedly ordered Plaintiff to pick the subpoena, including standing up and approaching Plaintiff while raising his voice. He also had his partner stand near Plaintiff's right side. Plaintiff repeatedly asked questions, and Gomez consistently refused to answer. Eventually, Gomez became frustrated enough that he demanded Plaintiff leave his office, and claimed that he “didn't know” what those documents were even though he had referred to them as a subpoena numerous times in his commands. Gomez's refusal to comply with California subpoena law was a violation of due process. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 187. Admit Plaintiff sought state court intervention regarding many of the problems he was having with Gomez, including this one, and delivered a subpoena to Gomez properly under California law by placing it on Gomez's desk. Gomez refused to accept it, and repeatedly ordered Plaintiff to pick the subpoena, including standing up and approaching Plaintiff while raising his voice. He also had his partner stand near Plaintiff's right side. Plaintiff repeatedly asked questions, and Gomez consistently refused to answer. Eventually, Gomez became frustrated enough that he demanded Plaintiff leave his office, and claimed that he “didn't know” what those documents were even though he had referred to them as a subpoena numerous times in his commands. Gomez's refusal to comply with California subpoena law was a violation of due process. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 188. Admit Gomez was court-ordered to appear at the a hearing, but nonetheless failed to appear, claiming to have been sick. 189. Admit Gomez was not sick on the day he was subpoenaed to appear. 190. Admit The “Halloween” conditions imposed by Probation prohibited (1) walking on sidewalks, (2) wearing a costume, (3) trick or treating, (4) opening your door, (5) displaying Halloween decorations outside - or even inside - your home, and (6) having any candy. 191. Admit The “Halloween” conditions results in what amounts to home confinement for probationers on Halloween, and banishment from Halloween themed activities (such as adult costume parties). 192. Admit Plaintiff, while in jail in December 2016 awaiting his violation trial, met another probationer supervised by Grantham who had been arrested for no other reason than that he had worn a costume. 193. Admit Both Grantham and Gomez arrested probationers to enforce “Halloween” conditions. 194. Admit Grantham told Plaintiff that merely deleting text messages on his phone was a failure to submit to search conditions. 195. Admit Grantham toldtelling Plaintiff that merely deleting text messages on his phone was a failure to submit to search conditions. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 196. Admit Grantham toldtelling Plaintiff that merely deleting text messages on his phone was a failure to submit to search conditions. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 197. Admit Gomez told Plaintiff that flushing a lawful substance (marijuana) prior to a search violated probation for failure to submit to search and seizure, and that he had arrested probationers for having done so. 198. Admit Gomez told Plaintiff that flushing a lawful substance (marijuana) prior to a search violated probation for failure to submit to search and seizure, and that he had arrested probationers for having done so. & the foregoing was done in accordance with official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 199. Admit Gomez told Plaintiff that flushing a lawful substance (marijuana) prior to a search violated probation for failure to submit to search and seizure, and that he had arrested probationers for having done so. & the foregoing was done under Probation's sole discretion in contravention of official policy and/or custom, as well as Probation's training. 200. Admit On or about March 26, 2018, Gomez ordered Plaintiff to the DRC. When Plaintiff asked why, Gomez replied “for job skills”. 201. Admit Plaintiff asked if he meant the “Cooperate with your probation ... officer in any plan for psychological, psychiatric, alcohol and/or drug treatment” condition, and pointed out that (1) Plaintiff was already in probation-approved psychological treatment with a different provider, and (2) Gomez was not ordering him to the DRC for psychiatric, alcohol and/or drug treatment, which Probation had already conceded there was no basis for ordering. Gomez refused to respond, and to stop Plaintiff from talking, immediately ordered him to take a drug test, even though none of the other probationers on his caseload were being drug tested that day. 202. Admit Plaintiff repeatedly asked Gomez if his failure to participate in the DRC would be a violation, and Gomez repeatedly refused to answer, even after Plaintiff pointed out that he had a constitutional right to be informed in advance whether it was a violation to refuse. 203. Admit Gomez later stated that he would arrest Plaintiff if he refused to attend the DRC. 204. Admit The drug test was the saliva test in this instance, but Gomez wasn't satisfied enough that Plaintiff could not speak. Rather than handing Plaintiff the stick, Gomez insisted on making Plaintiff open his mouth widely and inserting it himself, telling Plaintiff to open his mouth wider and wider, then raise his tongue repeatedly (even though it was raised, apparently Gomez wanted Plaintiff to strain). Adding insult to injury, Gomez ordered Plaintiff to assume a demeaning position with his legs spread and his head lowered between his legs. The reason given was that if the stick was angled down, the test would go faster. Plaintiff was perfectly capable of angling his head down without the absurd posture Gomez was indicating, and did so. Gomez was visibly irritated that Plaintiff was not doing exactly what Gomez told him to do without question. 205. Admit Other officers had simply conducted the saliva drug test by givening Plaintiff the stick and not used it as an opportunity to harass him. 206. Admit The DRC requires 4 hours per day, 9am to 1pm, 5 days a week, for a 20 hour per week commitment, for 9 months. 207. Admit “Do not be in the presence of children under the age of 18, unless accompanied by a responsible adult 21 years of age or older and approved in advance by your probation or mandatory supervision officer.” is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 208. Admit “Submit your person and property, including any residence, premises, container or vehicle under your control, to search and seizure at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement officer, probation officer, or mandatory supervision officer, with or without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.” is vague as to “submit” and “control”, and overbroad as to seizure of the person. 209. Admit “Cooperate with your probation or mandatory supervision officer in any plan for psychological, psychiatric, alcohol, and/or drug treatment.” is vague and overbroad. 210. Admit “Seek training, schooling, or employment, and maintain residence as approved by your probation or mandatory supervision officer.” is vague and overbroad. 211. Admit “Do not associate with persons known to you to be parolees, on post-release community supervision, convicted felons, users or sellers of illegal drugs” is vague as to the meaning of the word “associate”. 212. Admit “Obey all orders, rules, regulations, and directives of the Court, Probation Department, Mandatory Supervision, and Jail.” is overbroad and void for vagueness. 213. Admit The “Obey” condition violates Constitutional separation of powers. 214. Admit The “Obey” condition violates the jurisdictional bar explained in People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921. 215. Admit “Use no unauthorized drugs, narcotics, or controlled substances, and that he submit to drug or narcotics testing as directed by his probation officer or a police officer.” is vague as to the word “drug”, and overbroad if read broadly to include something other than a controlled substance, as in H&S § 11014 216. Admit “Violate no law.” is vague and overbroad in that it potentially includes things other than misdemeanor or felony crimes, such as infractions, civil wrongs, and crimes from other jurisdictions. 217. Admit Plaintiff completed Probation successfully on December 12, 2018 with no violations. 218. Admit Plaintiff has never violated. 219. Admit Plaintiff has never given a dirty drug test on probation. 220. Admit Plaintiff has successfully participated in therapy throughout his term of supervision. 221. Admit Plaintiff has never failed to report as directed, weekly, for about 5 years. 222. Admit Plaintiff's risk level according to Probation's internal criteria, was minimal. Court's Ruling Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA because it is duplicative of RFA 6. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA because responding to RFAs 15 and 16 will provide sufficient information. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not respond to this RFA because there is no need for an RFA about what a law says. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the Court's attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the Court's attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the Court's attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because responding to RFAs 37 and 38 will provide sufficient information. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA. RFA 40 is about a statement, not actions. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA. RFA 40 is about a statement, not actions. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it is duplicative of RFA 44. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA. It is overbroad because it refers to “all” officers. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA. It is overbroad because it refers to “all” officers. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA. It is overbroad because it refers to “all” officers. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the Court's attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA. No RFA is needed to establish that perjury is not a County policy. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA. No RFA is needed to establish that perjury is not a County policy. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is duplicative of RFA 108. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because documents produced by Defendants will show (1) what conditions are in the Addendum and (2) what conditions were applied to Plaintiff. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is not reasonably drafted to narrow the issues remaining for trial, which is the purpose of RFAs. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA because it is duplicative of RFA 127. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA because it is duplicative of RFA 128. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because RFAs about court decisions are unnecessary. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it concerns an irrelevant opinion and a legal conclusion. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because whether Plaintiff agreed or disagreed is irrelevant. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it concerns irrelevant opinions about what conditions are tantamount to “home confinement” and “banishment.” Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not respond to this RFA because it is too long and compound. (See Section II.D.2.d. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA, because it calls for a legal conclusion. (See Section II.D.2.a. of the attached Order.) Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants need not serve a supplemental response to this RFA because it is duplicative of RFA 217. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA as modified and consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Defendants should serve a supplemental response to this RFA consistent with the attached Order. Footnotes [1] On March 31, 2025, Defendants filed a “Notice of Withdrawal of Statements in Opposition to Motion to Compel.” (Dkt. 177.) This was apparently done in response to a FRCP 11 motion that Plaintiff served on Defendants but did not file. At the April 1 hearing, Plaintiff moved to strike this notice as an improper sur-reply. As the Court stated at the hearing, it will consider this filing effective in withdrawing the statements that were the subject of the FRCP 11 motion, but the Court will not otherwise consider the filing or arguments raised therein. [2] Plaintiff's requests sometimes use the abbreviation “SI.” The Court interprets this as standing for “special interrogatory,” a term used in California state court litigation. See generally Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2030.030 (distinguishing between “form” rogs and “specially prepared” rogs). [3] Defendants' opposition says the RFAs are identical but the responses and objections “have slight variations set forth in the unilateral 37-1 stipulation.” (Dkt. 169 at 6.) Defendants do not specify where each Defendant's responses differ. [4] The RFPs themselves state they were served on “January 31, 2021,” but this appears to be typographical error. (See Dkt. 159 at 1 (Plaintiff's motion, stating the request were served in January 2022).) [5] For example, an RFP that asks Defendants to produce a specific document, like a standardized financial disclosure form, likely would not require such searches. On the other hand, an RFP that asks Defendants to provide statistical information about similarly situated probationers (apart from Plaintiff) likely would require such searches. [6] See Tye v. County of Los Angeles, No. 8:17-cv-01831-RGK-KES (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018), Dkt. 35 (“Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated a plea bargain and court order entered in a criminal case filed against him in the Orange County Superior Court ... by failing to return a computer that law enforcement seized during the underlying criminal investigation.”)