SKATTEFORVALTNINGEN, Plaintiff, v. 470 SOUTH OCEAN BOULEVARD TRUST, et al., Defendants Case No. 24-cv-80837-MIDDLEBROOKS/MATTHEWMAN United States District Court, S.D. Florida Entered on FLSD Docket February 19, 2025 Matthewman, William, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL [DE 58] AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER [DE 38] THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Skatteforvaltningen's (“Plaintiff’) Motion to Compel Production of Documents [DE 58] and Defendants 470 South Ocean Boulevard Trust and Jonathan E. Gopman's (“Defendants”) Motion for Protective Order [DE 38]. Both Motions are ripe for review. See DEs 45, 48, 64, 68. The Court has also reviewed the parties’ Second Notices regarding their discovery disputes. [DEs 56, 57].[1] Further, the Court previously ruled on a portion of Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, but reserved ruling on the issues surrounding the subpoenas. [DE 52]. This Order rules on the discovery disputes that parties could not resolve under Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order [DEs 56, 57] and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel [DE 58]. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff asserts claims under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“FUFTA”), Florida Statutes sections 726.101–726.201. [DE 1]. Plaintiff also asserts claims for fraudulent asset conversion under Florida Statute section 222.30, equitable lien, and unjust enrichment. Id. The Court detailed the factual background in the Order on Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order [DE 52]. Defendants initially sought to have the Court limit the scope of third-party subpoenas Plaintiff issued. [DE 38 at 5]. At a previous hearing, Plaintiff asserted that it was seeking documents to trace the money to purchase the Palm Beach home and documents regarding the three underlying frauds. [DE 52 at 5]. The Court held that Defendants have standing to challenge the subpoenas to the extent the subpoenas seek non-discoverable information under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Id. at 5–6. The Court also held that “evidence of how the Palm Beach home was purchased, where the funds came from the purchase the home, the tracing of these funds, and whether any of these funds came from any of Mr. McGee's fraudulent activities, is all clearly relevant and proportional under Rule 26(b)(1) at this stage of this case.” Id. at 6. The Court also ordered Defendants to produce the documents that “show how Defendants/Mr. McGee purchased the Palm Beach home, where the funds came from, the tracing of the funds, and whether any funds came from Mr. McGee's alleged frauds[.]” Id. at 7. After this production, the parties were ordered to confer to see if they could resolve their remaining discovery disputes themselves. Id. The parties could not do so. [DEs 56, 57]. Plaintiff now moves the Court to compel Defendants to comply with the Order on Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order [DE 52] and to produce all responsive documents. [DE 58 at 4–5]. Plaintiff states that Defendants disregarded the Court's prior Order [DE 52] and have not produced the documents that Defendants were ordered to produce. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ general objections to the subpoenas are waived, any privilege objection is waived because Defendants have not produced a privilege log, and that Plaintiff seeks discoverable documents. Id. Plaintiff also seeks Defendants to pay Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs associated with filing the motion to compel. Id. at 5. In response, Defendants assert that they have complied with the Court's Order. [DE 64 at 2]. Defendants state that they have produced a declaration from Mr. McGee along with documents showing how the Palm Beach home was purchased from Mr. McGee's stock sale. Id. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to the broad discovery it seeks in light of what Defendants have already produced. Id. at 5. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff seeks improper financial worth discovery from Mr. McGee protected by the Florida Constitution. [DE 57 at 7]. In reply, Plaintiff asserts that the documents Defendants have produced are heavily redacted and do not show what is required under the Court's prior Order [DE 52]. [DE 68 at 3–4]. Further, Plaintiff claims the gaps from the redactions are only supplemented with Mr. McGee's declaration, which Plaintiff “need not accept at face value.” Id. at 4. II. DISCUSSION Under Rule 45(d)(1), “[a] party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). Further, under Rule 26(b)(1), [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The purpose of the broad discovery standard is “for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). This Court “has broad discretion to compel or deny discovery[.]” United States v. Cuya, 964 F.3d 969, 970 (11th Cir. 2020). Under FUFTA, Plaintiff must show the following: “(1) there was a creditor to be defrauded; (2) a debtor intending fraud; and (3) a conveyance of property which could have been applicable to the payment of the debt due.” Nationsbank, N.A. v. Coastal Utilities, Inc., 814 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (superseded on other grounds). Also, under Florida Statue section 222.30, [a]ny conversion by a debtor of an asset that results in the proceeds of the asset becoming exempt by law from the claims of a creditor of the debtor is a fraudulent asset conversion as to the creditor, whether the creditor's claim to the asset arose before or after the conversion of the asset, if the debtor made the conversion with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditor. A creditor harmed by a fraudulent asset conversion may avoid the conversion, seek an attachment against the asset, or other equitable remedies. § 222.30(3), Fla. Stat. While Florida protects an individual's privacy interest in financial records, the protection is not absolute. Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dept. of Bus. Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985) (discussing article I, section 23, of the Florida constitution); Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 2003). “A party's finances, if relevant to the disputed issues of the underlying action, are not excepted from discovery...and courts will compel production of personal financial documents and information if shown to be relevant by the requesting party.” Friedman, 863 So. 2d at 194. Also, Florida Statute section 655.059(2)(b) “permits disclosure of nonpublic records in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 6802, which provides for unauthorized disclosure ‘to respond to judicial process.’ Courts have interpreted this exception as providing for disclosure pursuant to civil discovery.” Ochoa v. Empresas ICA, S.A.B. de C.V., No. 11-23898-CIV, 2012 WL 3260324, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012) (Simonton, J.) (citing Sierra Equity Group v. White Oak Equity Partners, LLC, 672 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2009)). Here, the Court overrules Defendants’ objection that Plaintiff seeks improper prejudgment financial worth discovery. Notably, “FUFTA litigation invariably requires discovery of the private financial records and transactions of a defendant, in spite of the defendant's privacy interests.” Wachovia Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Birdman, No. 09-81252-CIV, 2010 WL 11505432, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2010) (Johnson, J.). Relevant here, Plaintiff seeks to prove that Mr. McGee did not intend to honor his obligation to Plaintiff under the Settlement Agreement, sought to become judgment proof, and used the 470 South Boulevard Trust to transfer his ill-gotten gains into the Palm Beach home. [DE 1 ¶¶ 69–70]. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. McGee became insolvent as a result of the transfer of funds to the 470 South Boulevard Trust and therefore has insufficient assets to satisfy his obligation to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 74–75. Plaintiff is entitled to prove intent in its FUFTA claim by considering whether the transfer was substantially all of the debtor's assets, whether the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred, and whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent after the transfer was made. § 726.105(2), Fla. Stat. Also, while the Court notes that Mr. McGee is no longer a party to this case [DE 27], he is still alleged to be a debtor under FUFTA and used Defendants as his vehicle to make a fraudulent transfer. [DE 1 ¶¶ 76–85]. Therefore, the Court finds that certain discovery regarding Mr. McGee's financial worth is relevant and is not protected by the Florida Constitution. Moreover, to the extent that Defendants object on relevance, burdensomeness, overbreadth, privilege, and proportional grounds, the Court also overrules those objections. Despite Defendants’ argument, just because Defendants have now produced some discovery does not mean that Plaintiffs are not entitled to further discovery under Rule 26(b). Indeed, Plaintiff is entitled to rely on a host of factors under section 726.105 to prove intent, going beyond what Defendants have already produced. Simply, the Court has reviewed the subpoenas [DE 38, Exs. A–H], Defendants’ objections [DE 38, Ex. I]; [DE 57, Ex. C], and Plaintiff's proposed limitations [DE 58, Ex. C] and finds that the subpoenas, including Plaintiff's proposed limitations, are proper under Rules 45 and 26. The documents Plaintiff seeks relate to (1) how Mr.McGee/Defendants purchased the Palm Beach home; (2) documents surrounding the underlying three frauds; and (3) documents that Plaintiff can use to prove intent under section 726.105. Also, Defendants have not submitted a privilege log, as required under the Local Rules, so any privilege objection is waived. See Taylor v. Bradshaw, No. 11-80911-CIV, 2014 WL 6459978, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2014) (Matthewman, J.); S.D. Fla. L.R. 26.1(e)(2). Moreover, the Court notes that Defendants have filed a supplemental declaration of Mr. McGee with accompanying exhibits [DE 71], which the Court has reviewed. However, the supplemental declaration does not relieve Mr. McGee of his obligation to produce any other documents that were requested from him in Plaintiff's subpoena. The Court has considered the imposition of sanctions or cost shifting under Rule 37. The Court will decline to make such an award at this time. However, if Defendants continue their dilatory discovery conduct, the Court will impose sanctions or cost shifting as deemed necessary and appropriate. Therefore, based on the reasons stated above, the Court ORDERS as follows: 1. The remainder of Defendant's Motion for Protective Order [DE 38] is DENIED. 2. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents [DE 58] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. On or before February 26, 2025, the documents requested in Plaintiff's subpoenas, subject to Plaintiff's limitations [DE 58, Ex. C], shall be produced. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, in the Southern District of Florida, this 19th day of February 2025. Footnotes [1] Here, the Court ordered the parties to file a Joint Notice. [DE 52 at 7; DE 55]. However, ignoring this order, the parties filed separate Notices [DEs 56, 57]. The Court does not appreciate such conduct from the parties’ counsel. The parties and their counsel are hereby put on notice that if such a violation occurs again, the Court shall impose sanctions on the offending parties and attorneys who fail and refuse to file a Joint Notice as ordered, or who fail to adhere to any other Court order. The Court finds such lack of cooperation, conferral, and compliance with Court Orders to be wholly unacceptable, and the Court shall deal with such conduct as necessary and appropriate.