WHITE CAP, L.P., Plaintiff, v. HEYDEN ENTERPRISES, LLC, d/b/a HEYDEN SUPPLY, BRIAN WELSH, MIGUEL RIVAN, WAYNE ROSENBLUM, TIMOTHY KAVNEY, and GOMER BLACK, JR., Defendant CASE NO. 23-14248-CIV-MARTINEZ/MAYNARD United States District Court, S.D. Florida, FORT PIERCE DIVISION Entered on FLSD Docket February 18, 2025 Martinez, Jose E., United States District Judge ORDER AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER *1 THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Notice of Appeal of Non-Dispositive Ruling (hereinafter, “Objections”), (ECF No. 440), filed by Heyden Enterprises LLC d/b/a Heyden Supply, Brian Welsh, Miguel Rivan, Wayne Rosenblum, and Timothy Kavney (“Heyden Defendants”), and Gomer Black, Jr. (collectively referred to as the “Defendants”). The Court has considered the Objections, Plaintiff's Response, (ECF No. 463), the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons stated herein, the Objections are OVERRULED and Magistrate Judge Maynard's Order, (ECF No. 417), is AFFIRMED. “Any party may appeal from a Magistrate Judge's order determining a motion or matter ... within fourteen (14) days after being served with the Magistrate Judge's order.” S.D. Fla. L.R. 4(a)(1). “The District Judge shall consider the [objections] and shall set aside any portion of the Magistrate Judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id. “Clear error is a highly deferential standard of review.” Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 425 F.3d 1325, 1350 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). An order is clearly erroneous if “the reviewing court, after assessing the evidence in its entirety, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515, 1523 (11th Cir. 1997). “In the absence of a legal error, a district court may reverse only if there was an ‘abuse of discretion’ by the magistrate judge.” S.E.C. v. Merkin, 283 F.R.D. 699, 700 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 49 U.S. 384, 404 (1990)). Judge Maynard's Order denying Defendants’ Expedited Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff's Corporate Representative, (ECF No. 417), stated: PAPERLESS ORDER denying Defendants’ Expedited Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff's Corporate Representative [399]. Defendants seek to compel a deposition of Plaintiff's corporate representative. Plaintiff opposes the request on grounds of undue delay. Correspondence attached to the parties’ briefing confirms that defense counsel requested the deposition of Plaintiff's corporate representative on August 27, 2024 and Plaintiff's counsel responded the next morning, August 28, 2024, with a reasonable request for a proper Rule 30(b)(6) notice. See DE 404-1. Defendants did not respond to this request until three months later on the Wednesday before the Thanksgiving holiday and mere weeks before the discovery deadline. This delayed response consisted of a draft Rule 30(b)(6) notice with a list of 49 proposed topics. See DE 404-2. Plaintiff asserts that this undue delay left insufficient time for adequate review and preparation, especially given the parties’ intensive schedule of nine other depositions over the course of two weeks leading up to the discovery deadline. I agree. Discovery was open for over one year and there were multiple continuances of the discovery deadline upon request of the parties. Discovery is now closed. Compelling a corporate representative deposition at this late stage given Defendants’ unreasonable delay in properly pursuing the deposition in the first place is unjust and unfairly prejudicial. Had Defendants timely pursued the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, they would not be in this situation. See S.O.S. Res. Servs., Inc. v. Bowers, Case No. 14-22789-Civ-Cooke, 2015 WL 6735540, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2015) (“[h]ad Plaintiff complied with this Court's Scheduling Order, timely served requests for production on Defendants, timely requested relief from this Court in the form of a motion to compel, and timely designated an expert witness, Plaintiff would not be in this situation”). Stated plainly, time is up. Moreover, as Plaintiff persuasively points out, Defendants will not be unduly prejudiced considering that they have or had planned to take the deposition of several of Plaintiff's employees in key leadership positions and have been provided with substantial documentation regarding Plaintiff's claims in this case. Motion denied. Signed by U.S. Magistrate Judge Shaniek Mills Maynard on 01/06/2025. *2 Defendants appealed the Order to this Court. First, Defendants argue that denying their Motion “is a significant injustice, especially since discovery remains open and there has been no protective order entered.” (Objections at 5). Second, Defendants argue that “while Defendants have had the opportunity to depose several individuals that work for Plaintiff, Defendants have not yet had the opportunity to depose an official representative from Plaintiff whose responses are binding on the corporation and who has been prepared to testify about the material issues in the case.” (Id.). Discovery is now closed. Defendants had ample time during discovery to depose Plaintiff's corporate representative or to move to extend the discovery deadline. They did not do so. In their Objections, Defendants merely reiterate their original arguments made to Judge Maynard. The Court finds no clear error or abuse of discretion in Judge Maynard's decision. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 1. Defendants’ Objections to the Order, (ECF No. 440), are OVERRULED. 2. Magistrate Judge Maynard's Order, (ECF No. 417), is AFFIRMED. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 14 day of February 2025.