ALBERT RENN, Plaintiff, v. OTAY LAKES BREWERY, LLC, Defendant Case No.: 23CV1139-GPC (BLM) United States District Court, S.D. California Filed April 25, 2025 Major, Barbara L., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND ISSUING MONETARY SANCTIONS [ECF No. 46] *1 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery (“MTC”) [ECF No. 46], Defendant's Opposition (“Oppo.”) [ECF No. 38], and Plaintiff's Reply (“Reply”) [ECF No. 64]. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case was initiated on June 20, 2023 when Plaintiff Albert Renn (“Plaintiff”) filed a purported class action complaint alleging deceptive and fraudulent marketing on the part of Defendant Otay Lakes Brewery LLC (“Defendant”) for its alcoholic beverage “Nova Kombucha” (“Product”). ECF No. 1. On September 14, 2023, District Judge Gonzalo Curiel sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with leave to amend and denied Defendant's motion to dismiss as moot. ECF No. 11. On September 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 12. In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's labelling of the Product as “good for you” and “promoting ‘health, balance and goodness’ ” are “false and misleading” as the Product “contain[s] 6-8% alcohol by volume and consuming alcohol causes a wide variety of health risks and problems.” Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant advertised the Product on billboards around San Diego with the phrase “Your Happy Healthy Hour” and this billboard artwork is also displayed on Defendant's Facebook page, as well as the “LinkedIn page of Tiago Carneiro,” one of Defendant's founders. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. On March 1, 2024, Defendant answered Plaintiff's FAC. ECF No. 23. PLAINTIFF'S POSITION Plaintiff states that since discovery was opened in this case, he has propounded three sets of discovery requests which include “39 requests for production of documents, 22 interrogatories, and 7 requests for admissions.” Mot. at 4. In response, Defendant claimed in most instances to have no responsive documents. Id. Initially, Plaintiff accepted these representations as accurate. Id. However, Plaintiff later took the deposition of Defendant's Rule 30(b)(6) designee, Tiago Carneiro, and Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Carneiro revealed “several troubling things about [Defendant's] non-compliance with its preservation and discovery obligations.” Id. Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to “implement a discovery hold, failed to conduct a good faith document search, and spoliated evidence during the litigation.” Id. at 4. As a result, Plaintiff requests the Court issue an order: 1. Requiring OLB to search its entire Google Drive and relevant other storage media (hard drives, flash drives, external drives, etc.), employee email accounts, and instant messaging apps (particularly WhatsApp) using the proposed search terms and connectors set forth in Appendix A; 2. Requiring OLB to produce a detailed, line-item breakdown, for each line item in the summary Profit and Loss Statement it produced as OLB001494 (i.e., a detailed Profit and Loss Statement, which like the summary statement, can be generated from QuickBooks); *2 3. Requiring Mr. Carneiro to provide written responses, verified under oath, to the questions he improperly refused (and was instructed not) to answer during his deposition; 4. Requiring OLB to serve amended initial disclosures, and to produce “any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A); 5. Awarding Plaintiff his reasonable attorneys' fees in bringing this Motion; and 6. Providing any other relief the Court deems necessary or appropriate. Id. at 5-6. DEFENDANT'S POSITION Defendant maintains that it has “complied with its responsibilities under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure having produced all information and documents after a reasonable and diligent search.” Oppo. at 11. Defendant argues that the discovery sought by Plaintiff in this motion is “impermissibly” beyond the scope of the previously propounded discovery and Plaintiff should have requested “further discovery as opposed to [filing a] meritless Motion.” Id. Nonetheless, “after being given a reasonable time to review, consider, and respond to Plaintiff's demands and meet and confer with Plaintiff's counsel, Defendant has agreed to perform the requested search and produce all of the additional information and documents sought by way of Plaintiff's motion.” Id. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's motion is “without merit and now moot.” Id. PLAINTIFF'S REPLY Plaintiff replies that Defendant has conceded, in part, to many of the discovery requests propounded by Plaintiff but it is clear that an order from this Court is necessary to ensure compliance. Reply at 5. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's intention to perform another client-led search of its records is not reasonable given its prior search efforts and failures and notes that Defendant still has not produced a detailed profit and loss statement through the present and it has only provided a partial version of its insurance policy. Id. at 6-9. Plaintiff also reiterates that Mr. Carneiro should be required to provide additional testimony regarding the Defendant's assets and financial condition. Id. Finally, Plaintiff disputes Defendant's assertion that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith. Id. at 9. In fact, it was Defendant that ignored requests to meet and confer, as well as ignoring this Court's attempts to resolve the dispute. Id. Plaintiff's request for reimbursement for the expenses incurred in filing the motion to compel is reasonable in light of Defendant's conduct necessitating the motion. Id. at 11-13. LEGAL STANDARD The scope of discovery under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) is defined as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. *3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Typically, the relevance standard is broad in scope and “encompass[es] any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in a case.” Doherty v. Comenity Capital Bank, 2017 WL 1885677, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 9, 2017). Relevance, however, is not without limits. Id. The 2015 amendment to Rule 26(b) removed the phrase “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” because it was often misconstrued to define the scope of discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's notes (2015 amendment). Instead, to fall within the scope of discovery, the information must also be “proportional to the needs of the case,” requiring lawyers to “size and shape their discovery requests to the requisites of a case” while “eliminat[ing] unnecessary or wasteful discovery.” Fed. Civ. R. P. 26(b)(1); Cancino Castellar v. McAleenan, 2020 WL 1332485, at *4 (S.D. Cal Mar. 23, 2020) (quoting Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. 2016)). DISCUSSION A. Data Search Plaintiff seeks an Order from the Court compelling Defendant to “search its entire Google Drive and relevant other storage media (hard drives, flash drives, external drives, etc.), employee email accounts, and instant messaging apps (particularly WhatsApp) using the proposed search terms and connectors set forth in Appendix A.” Mot. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's previous “manual Google Drive Search,” performed by Mr. Carneiro, purportedly did not locate any responsive documents. Id. at 16. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks a Court order requiring Defendant to perform a new search, using the terms found in “Appendix A,” in which Defendant must also: “(1) identify in a declaration relevant custodians; (2) image the emails and instant messages of those custodians and OLB's Google Drive; (3) use a professional service to run Plaintiff's list of search terms against that imaged data; and (4) produce all non-duplicative, non-privileged documents (and identify on a privilege log any documents withheld under a claim of privilege).” Id. In response, Defendant asserts that it responded to this discovery with “proper objections raised in good faith” which Plaintiff “does not challenge or even address by way of his Motion.” Oppo. at 14. However, Defendant states that “[i]n a good faith effort to resolve this dispute,” Defendant has “agreed to perform yet another search for records using the search terms and queries listed in Appendix A and produce all relevant documents.” Id. Defendant acknowledges that the list of terms that it has agreed to search for in “Appendix A” is an” extensive list of Boolean queries that only a highly experienced person or expert in electronic discovery could prepare.” Id. at 13. Defendant has not identified who will perform this search on its behalf. Defendant states that Mr. Carneiro testified that the prior search that found no responsive documents was “performed by one of the Defendant's employees (Mr. Carneiro's ‘right hand man’) who is currently on medical leave.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff confirms that Defendant has now agreed to perform the search he requested. Reply at 6. However, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is “wrong that ‘Plaintiff's Motion in this regard is moot’ ” and seeks an order from this Court requiring Defendant to “timely, i.e., within 7 days of this Order, hire a vendor to conduct a real, methodical search of all relevant custodians’ emails, instant messenger communications, and [Defendant's] Google Drive.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff argues that Defendant should be required to hire a vendor to conduct this search because a “client-led search like the one” that Defendant “may be anticipating doing, ‘where [defendant] ha[s] no experience with electronic discovery, [i]s not reasonable.’ ” Id. (citing Optrics Inc. v. Barracuda Networks, Inc., 2021 WL 411349, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (citation omitted)). *4 The Court finds that given Defendant's acknowledged lack of expertise in these types of document searches, the unavailability of Defendant's representative to perform a new search, the fact that Defendant's initial search of its electronic data resulted in no responsive documents and subsequent evidence indicates the search was faulty, Defendant's failure to propose a more effective search protocol, and the lack of any specific objection to this request, Plaintiff's request for a professional search of the requested discovery is reasonable and appropriate. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's unopposed request and orders Defendant to “search its entire Google Drive and relevant other storage media (hard drives, flash drives, external drives, etc.), employee email accounts, and instant messaging apps (particularly WhatsApp) using the proposed search terms and connectors set forth in Appendix A” attached to Plaintiff's Motion. See ECF No. 46 at 19. Defendant is further ordered to: (1 ) identify in a declaration provided to Plaintiff all relevant custodians; (2) image the emails and instant messages of those custodians and Defendant's Google Drive; (3) use a professional service to run Plaintiff's list of search terms against that imaged data; and (4) produce all non-duplicative, non-privileged documents (and identify on a privilege log any documents withheld under a claim of privilege). The Defendant must complete this search no later than May 9, 2025. B. Profit and Loss Statement Plaintiff seeks an order requiring Defendant to “produce a detailed, line-item breakdown, for each line item in the summary Profit and Loss Statement it produced as OLB001494.” Mot. at 5. Defendant states in response to the current motion, it has “produced its profit and loss statement, which provided its total income and expenses for the last four years in conformity with Defendant's obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Oppo. at 17. The request for the profit and loss statement was propounded in Plaintiff's Request for Production (“RFP”) No. 36. Mot. at 7; Decl. of Jack Fitzgerald in Supp. of Mtn. to Compel (“Fitzgerald Decl.”), Ex. 10. RFP No. 36 and Defendant's responses are as follows: REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 36: YOUR detailed Profit & Loss Statement(s) from June 20, 2019 to the present, at ACCOUNT-LEVEL DETAIL. RESPONSE: Defendant incorporates its general objections as if fully set forth in this Response. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Defendant states that after a reasonable search and diligent inquiry for responsive documents, no such documents exist.” Id. at Ex. 10, ECF No. 46-11 at 5. Plaintiff acknowledges that on April 3, 2025, after this motion was filed, Defendant produced a “detailed Profit & Loss Statement” but this document which was “generated in April 2025, contains information only through June 20, 2023.” Reply at 7. Plaintiff asserts that this recent production is “insufficient” because the RFP requested Defendant to produce this information “to the present” and instead, Defendant chose to use the date the complaint was filed in this action as the end date.” Id. Plaintiff argues that the information between June 20, 2023 and the present is “highly relevant” in “deciding how to proceed in this class action” because Defendant has “portrayed its Nova business as operating at a loss, suggesting the company may be judgment proof.” Mot. at 11-12. Defendant acknowledges that the “general purpose of such discovery is to ascertain the net worth of Defendant with regards to potential damages,” but fails to address the relevancy of the timeframe sought by Plaintiff. Oppo. at 17. *5 The Court finds that the requested financial information from June 20, 2023 to the present is relevant to the issues in this case and therefore, GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Compel as to RFP No. 36 and orders Defendant to produce responsive documents through the date of this Order no later than May 9, 2025. C. Deposition of Mr. Carneiro Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court requiring Mr. Carneiro to “provide written responses, verified under oath, to the questions he improperly refused (and was instructed not) to answer during his deposition.” Mot. at 6. In response, Defendant states “[n]otwithstanding Plaintiff's improper attempt to invade Mr. Carneiro's right to privacy, he has agreed to sit for a further deposition and/or respond to further written discovery and answer the few objectionable financial questions posed to him at his deposition to further dispel Plaintiff and his counsel of their conspiracy theories.” Oppo. at 16. In her declaration, Defendant's counsel declares that “Defendant has agreed to produce Mr. Carneiro for a further 30(b)(6) deposition” and “Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed, in theory, upon the form of questions to be asked of Mr. Carneiro regarding his personal finances to limit the invasion into his privacy.” Decl. of Monica Hernandez in Oppo. of Mtn. to Compel (“Hernandez Decl.”). Plaintiff acknowledges in his reply that Defendant has “yield[ed] to Plaintiff's requested relief” to have Mr. Carneiro provide further testimony. Plaintiff asks that this Court order both parties to “timely, i.e., within 7 days of the Order, meet and confer with Plaintiff to agree on written questions to be answered by Mr. Carneiro under oath.” Reply at 9. The parties appear to have resolved the issue of obtaining further testimony but still require meet and confer efforts to agree upon the questions that will be posed either by deposition or written discovery to Mr. Carneiro. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to compel further testimony from Mr. Carneiro and ORDERS the parties to meet and confer in person within seven (7) calendar days after the filing of this order to agree on the questions to be answered by Mr. Carneiro under oath. Mr. Carneiro's deposition or his written responses (under oath) to the agreed upon questions must be completed on or before May 9, 2025. The decision as to whether there will be a second deposition or written discovery will be made by Plaintiff. D. Insurance Discovery Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court requiring Defendant to “serve amended initial disclosures,” and to produce “any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Mot. at 6. Defendant's initial disclosures dated May 28, 2024 stated “Defendant is not aware at this time of any insurance agreements under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy a judgment.” Fitzgerald Decl. at ¶ 22, Ex. 16. Defendant has not served supplemental initial disclosures. Id. Plaintiff claims that during the deposition of Mr. Carneiro, he initially testified “there is no insurance,” but subsequently amended his responses and testified “we checked with our insurance company and we are not insured for this claim.” Id., Ex. 12, Depo. of Tiago Carneiro, 156:3-17. *6 Defendant claims that it has “produced to Plaintiff the letter from its insurance carrier indicating it has no insurance coverage related to any of Plaintiff's claims.” Oppo. at 18; Hernandez Decl. at ¶ 9. In addition, Defendant maintains that it has “again agreed to obtain and provide a copy of its insurance policy despite having already produced the carrier's letter denying coverage.” Id. at 19. In response, Plaintiff argues that even though counsel for Defendant confirmed in a phone call to Plaintiff's counsel on March 24, 2025 that there was an “insurance agreement under which [Defendant] had tendered its defense,” Defendant initially only disclosed the denial letter and not the policy itself as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant did produce a version of the insurance policy on April 1, 2025 but it was “still incomplete, omitting the exclusions upon which the insurer based its denial of coverage decision.” Reply at 8. Mr. Carneiro indicated that he did not disclose the policy because the insurer was denying coverage. Fitzgerald Decl., Ex. 12, ECF No. 46-13 at 29. That is not a valid basis for failing to disclose the policy. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) mandates that disclosure of insurance coverage is required even if the insurer contests liability under the policy. See Alves v. Riverside County, 339 F.R.D. 556, 560 (C.D. Cal. 2021). The Court finds that Defendant must provide the entire insurance policy, including all exclusions, to Plaintiff. See Excelsior College v. Frye, 233 F.R.D. 583, 586 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) requires “disclosure of an insurance policy or other agreement that gives rise to an insurer's obligations to indemnify or hold its insured harmless for a judgment.”) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant's insurance policy and orders Defendant to amend its initial disclosures and produce the full insurance policy, including all forms applicable to coverage and all exclusions, no later than May 2, 2025. MONETARY SANCTIONS A. Legal Standard If a motion to compel discovery is granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) requires a court to order the “party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees” unless the movant failed to meet and confer, the objection was substantially justified, or other circumstances militate against awarding expenses. See Brown v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., 2013 WL 5800566, *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2013) (“[t]he party that loses the motion to compel bears the affirmative burden of demonstrating that its position was substantially justified”) (internal citations omitted). A court “must award reasonable expenses” when a party does not provide discovery until after a motion to compel is filed. Estate of Moreno by and through Moreno v. Correctional Healthcare, 2019 WL 10733236, *2 (E.D. Wa. 2019); see also Menchu v. Legacy Health, 2014 WL 2855042, *12 (D. Or. 2014) (citing Lee v. Walters, 172 F.R.D. 421, 430 (D. Or. 1997) (Sanctions are warranted not only when the court grants a motion to compel but also if the opposing party provides the requested discovery after the motion is filed)). “The Ninth Circuit provides District Courts with wide discretion to fashion appropriate sanctions for discovery violations under the Federal Rules.” Brady v. Grendene USA, Inc., 2015 WL 5177760, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2015) (citing Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001)). *7 Civil Local Rule 26.1 provides, “The Court will entertain no motion pursuant to Rules 26 through 37, Fed.R.Civ.P., unless counsel shall have previously met and conferred concerning all disputed issues.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 26.1(a). Counsel for the moving party must serve and file a certificate of compliance with this rule when filing a discovery motion. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 26.1(b). Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 37 states a motion to compel discovery responses “must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make the disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Finally, pursuant to Judge Major's Chamber Rules, if the parties fail to resolve their dispute through the meet and confer process, then counsel for all parties are required to determine a mutually agreeable time to conduct a conference call with all counsel and Judge Major's clerk to discuss the dispute, and should a lawyer fail to respond to opposing counsel's request for more than 72 hours, counsel may contact chambers and request the conference absent the nonresponsive lawyer. Hon. Barbara L. Major Chamber R. (V)(A)-(B). As set forth above, the Court is granting Plaintiff's motion to compel and Defendant's agreement to produce some of the requested discovery did not occur until after Plaintiff filed his motion to compel. Accordingly, Rule 37 requires the Court to order Defendant or Defendant's counsel to pay Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys fees unless one of the three factors is present. The Court will address each factor. B. Meet and Confer Requirement The Court finds Plaintiff complied with his meet and confer obligations prior to filing the instant motion but Defendant did not. On March 3, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel contacted both of Defendant's counsel via email requesting available times to discuss the discovery issues that arose from Mr. Carneiro's deposition testimony. Fitzgerald Decl. at ¶ 2. Only one of Defendant's counsel responded by stating that she was starting trial in two days and to “[l]et [her] know the discovery issues.” Hernandez Decl. at ¶ 3. On March 6, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel sent both of Defendant's counsel an email titled “Request for In-Person Meet-and-Confer” pursuant to this Court's Chambers Rules requesting that they provide, no later than the following week, their ability to meet and confer and included five paragraphs outlining the discovery problems at issue. Fitzgerald Decl., Ex. 1; see also Chambers Rules V.A. (“Under no circumstances may counsel satisfy the “meet and confer” obligation by written or emailed correspondence.”). Neither counsel for Defendant responded to this email. Fitzgerald Decl. at ¶ 4; Hernandez Decl. at ¶ 5. Defendant's counsel declares in the opposition pleadings that she had just started trial and needed time to “properly respond” which she claims required time to “review the discovery at issue” but the declaration does not indicate why she did not respond with proposed dates to meet and confer. Hernandez Decl. at ¶ 5. Defendant's other counsel of record at the time did not respond to the email and has not provided a declaration to this Court. Five days later, having received no response regarding defense counsel's availability to meet and confer, Plaintiff's counsel contacted the Court pursuant to this Court's Chambers Rules requesting a telephonic discovery conference with the Court. Fitzgerald Decl. at ¶ 4 (citing Chambers Rules V.A. “If a party or lawyer fails to respond to opposing counsel's request to meet and confer for more than 72 hours, counsel may contact chambers and request at telephonic conference with the clerk assigned to the case or an appropriate briefing schedule). On March 11, 2025, this Court's Law Clerk sent an email to all counsel requesting their availability for a conference to take place on March 12, 17, or 18. Id. Plaintiff's counsel promptly responded with their availability. Defendant's counsel, Ms. Hernandez, failed to provide her availability and instead responded “Defendant will respond once the mandatory in-person meet and confer has taken place.” Id. In the current pleadings, Defendant's counsel declares that she was “shocked by the Court's involvement” and it was her belief that the “discovery dispute could have been resolved without Court intervention,” which formed the basis of her rationale for refusing to provide the Court with her availability as required by the Chambers Rules. Hernandez Decl. at ¶ 5. Ms. Hernandez's declaration does not explain why if she was so shocked she did not provide more information to Plaintiff's counsel and the Court such as indicating that she thought the dispute could be resolved without the Court's involvement and providing a specific date or timeframe when she would meet with Plaintiff's counsel. *8 Given Ms. Hernandez's terse and non-responsive email, the Court scheduled the telephonic discovery conference call for March 18, 2025. Three days later, on Friday, March 14, 2025, Ms. Hernandez informed the Court that she was not available on March 18, 2025 but would make herself available on Monday, March 17, 2025 at 4:00 p.m. Hernandez Decl., Ex. C. Because the Court was no longer available on March 17, 2025 at 4:00 p.m., the Court issued a briefing schedule for the motion in accordance with its Chambers Rules. Plaintiff was ordered to file his motion to compel on March 21, 2025 and Defendant's opposition was due on or before March 28, 2025. ECF No. 45. The Court later modified the briefing schedule to require Plaintiff to file a reply. ECF No. 61. Two days before Plaintiff was to file the motion to compel, Defendant's counsel sent an email to Plaintiff's counsel stating “[w]e are willing to produce a witness for a further [Rule 30(b)(6)] deposition regarding the profit and loss sheet.” Hernandez Decl., Ex. D. This email does not address the other discovery issues raised by Plaintiff's counsel in the original March 6, 2025 email requesting to meet and confer in person. Three days after the motion to compel was filed, on March 24, 2025, Defendant's counsel wrote an email to Plaintiff's counsel indicating that Defendant “remains willing to resolve the discovery disputes” and are “amenable to providing the relief sought in the motion (minus the income/mortgage question).” Hernandez Decl., Ex. E. Plaintiff's counsel responded that if Defendant “is willing to satisfy some of the relief we requested in our motion,” Defendant should “do so.” Id. Plaintiff's counsel also indicated that while they believed that the motion was still necessary, they remained “available and willing to discuss by phone or in person any aspect of the relief we are requesting.” Id. Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant had a telephone conference on March 24, 2025 discussing the motion to compel after which Plaintiff's counsel wrote an email to Defendant's counsel that Plaintiff would “agree to a one-week extension of time for you to respond [to the motion to compel]” which would allow Defendant to “produce additional records.” Id. at ¶ 8, Ex. F. The parties filed a joint motion, which the Court granted, permitting Defendant to have an additional week to file an opposition “in order to facilitate informal resolution of the discovery disputes or narrow the issues for the Court to decide.” ECF Nos. 53, 54. However, the parties did not engage in any further discussions with respect to the discovery issues presented in the motion to compel. Defendant's counsel emailed Plaintiff's counsel on March 31, 2025 seeking an agreement to amend the Court's scheduling order due to the “current deadlines and outstanding discovery.” Hernandez Decl., Ex. H. It is not clear whether this communication was directed to the discovery at issue in the motion to compel or other unrelated outstanding discovery. Plaintiff's counsel responded that he did not “presently see a need to amend the scheduling order.” Id. The parties apparently did not engage in any further discussions related to the discovery dispute currently before the Court. As summarized above, the submitted evidence establishes that Plaintiff's counsel complied with his meet and confer obligations and followed this Court's Chambers Rules. Plaintiff's counsel made several efforts to meet and confer with Defendant's counsel prior to contacting the court. When those efforts failed to result in a substantive response from Defendant's counsel and pursuant to this Court's Chambers Rules, Plaintiff properly contacted the Court. Defendant's counsel failed to provide timely and substantive responses to the Court which resulted in the instant briefing schedule. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff complied with his meet and confer obligations, Defendant did not, and therefore, the first factor does not negate the Court's obligation to impose sanctions. C. Substantially Justified Objections *9 The second factor authorizes the Court to not order Defendant to pay Plaintiff's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion if Defendant's opposition to the motion was substantially justified. See Brown v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., 2013 WL 5800566, *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2013) (“[t]he party that loses the motion to compel bears the affirmative burden of demonstrating that its position was substantially justified”) (internal citations omitted). This dispute does not focus on the validity of Defendant's objections, it focuses on the adequacy of Defendant's discovery responses. While Defendant does not admit that its discovery responses were inadequate, it does agree to provide supplemental responses and to conduct an additional search of its electronic data. In addition, as set forth above, Plaintiff provided substantial evidence establishing that Defendant's discovery responses were inaccurate or inadequate and the Court has made the same findings and ordered additional discovery. Finally, the Court notes that to the extent Defendant agreed to supplement its discovery responses or produce additional documents, that agreement occurred around or after the motion to compel was filed. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has not established that its original discovery productions were substantially justified. D. Other Circumstances The final basis on which Defendant may establish that monetary sanctions are inappropriate is by identifying other circumstances that make an award of attorneys' fees unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(iii). Defendant asserts that awarding sanctions is “unnecessary, unwarranted, and would be unjust.” Oppo. at 19. Defendant claims that had it been “given a reasonable opportunity to respond” these issues would have been resolved and it was “[t]he parties scheduling conflicts that prevented them from being able to meet and confer.” Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added). There is nothing in the declarations, or emails submitted by both parties, to suggest that Plaintiff's counsel had any scheduling conflicts that prevented a meeting from taking place. In addition, Defendant's claim to have been “deprived of a reasonable opportunity to avoid Plaintiff's meritless motion” is simply not supported by any evidence before the Court. The Court itself attempted to facilitate a conference between the parties to resolve the issues but Defendant's counsel rebuffed that attempt. For the reasons set forth above, the Court again finds that Defendant's arguments are without merit, that Defendant's responses were incomplete, inaccurate, and insufficient, and that Plaintiff's motion to compel was properly filed and is meritorious. The Court further finds that there are no other circumstances that make an award of attorneys' fees unjust. Because the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to compel and found that Defendant has not established that any of the three identified factors negating the imposition of factors is present, the Court finds that it must, and should, order Defendant to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiff in making the motion to compel. E. Reasonableness of Requested Attorneys' Fees The Court must determine the reasonableness of the Plaintiff's “expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A). The Ninth Circuit utilizes the “lodestar” method for assessing reasonable attorney's fees. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). Under the “lodestar” method, the number of hours reasonably expended is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. The fee applicant bears the initial burden of substantiating the number of hours worked and the rate claimed. Id. at 1206. *10 Plaintiff seeks $19,463 for attorneys' fees incurred in filing the instant motion to compel. To support his request, Plaintiff submitted declarations from his two lead counsel, both of whom are partners at Fitzgerald Monroe Flynn PC. See Fitzgerald Decl., Declaration of Trevor Flynn in Supp. of Mot. to Compel (“Flynn Decl.), ECF No. 64-1. In Mr. Fitzgerald's declaration, he attests that his firm, at the time the motion was filed, had spent 27.1 hours preparing the motion to compel. Fitzgerald Decl. at ¶ 25. Mr. Fitzgerald declares that he spent 8.3 hours at an hourly rate of $885, Mr. Flynn spent 15.1 hours at an hourly rate of $680, and Allison Ferraro, an associate, spent 3.7 hours at an hourly rate of $500 per hour preparing this motion. Fitzgerald Decl. at ¶ 25. Mr. Flynn also submitted a declaration in support of Plaintiff's reply in which he attests that Plaintiff's counsel “spent even more time than the 27.1 hours” but prior to filing the motion to compel Plaintiff's counsel “exercised their discretion to cut hours for duplicative efforts.” Flynn Decl. at ¶ 6. Mr. Flynn explained that they spent an additional 10 hours “drafting the reply” and stated they are not seeking reimbursement of those additional fees. Id. Defendant challenges both the amount of time allegedly billed by Plaintiff's counsel to prepare the motion and the billing rate of the associate attorney. Oppo. at 21-24. Initially, Defendant argues that the declarations of Plaintiff's counsel contain insufficient detail regarding the billing amounts and that it is unreasonable that two partners performed “over 85% of the billable hours” for a “simple discovery motion.” Id. at 21. Defendant claims, without any factual basis, that Mr. Fitzpatrick's declaration “strongly suggests Plaintiff is intentionally attempting to hide substantial non-recoverable and unnecessary time.” Id. at 21-22. Defendant does not specifically identify an amount of time it believes would be reasonable to prepare this motion. Instead, Defendant requests that, in the event the Court finds that sanctions are necessary, the Court “limit the award to $1,228.40” which is based on the 3.7 hours billed by the associate attorney, Ms. Ferraro, and at a rate Defendant believes is reasonable which is $332 per hour. Oppo. at 23-24. The Court finds Defendant's request is without merit as it cannot imagine a persuasive and legally and factually supported motion to compel that could be prepared in 3.7 hours. The instant motion to compel was brought in large part because the deposition of Mr. Carneiro, taken by Mr. Fitzpatrick, revealed that there were a significant number relevant and responsive documents that were not produced by Defendant in response to Plaintiff's original discovery requests. As a result, preparing the motion to compel would require an extensive review of Mr. Carneiro's deposition transcript, a careful review of Defendant's previous discovery responses, including the initial disclosures, and an analysis of which responses were inaccurate or deficient and why. This process necessarily involved the active participation of both Mr. Flynn and Mr. Fitzgerald as they were the attorneys involved in conducting the discovery and attempting to resolve the discovery disputes. The Court also notes that the motion to compel was nearly twenty pages long with almost two hundred pages of exhibits and two supporting declarations. In addition, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a reply and Plaintiff's counsel is not seeking to recover the additional 10 hours they billed preparing the reply. Therefore, Defendant's wholly unsupported assertion that the associate could have or should have drafted the entire motion is without merit. The Court therefore finds that the 27.1 hours for which Plaintiff is seeking reimbursement for preparing the instant motion to compel and reply are reasonable. The Court also finds that the hourly rates of all three attorneys are reasonable. In determining the reasonable hourly rate of an attorney, the Court must look to the “rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The prevailing market rate in the community is indicative of a reasonable hourly rate.”). Here, Mr. Fitzgerald attests that in April of 2024, “a court in the Southern District of California approved rates of $885 for myself and $680 for Mr. Flynn in a case involving similar allegations of false health and wellness advertising.” Fitzgerald Decl. at ¶ 26 (citing Andrade-Heymsfield v. NextFoods, Inc., 2024 WL 3871634, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2024)). *11 Defendant does not challenge the hourly rate for Mr. Fitzgerald or Mr. Flynn but instead challenges the hourly rate for Ms. Ferraro. As stated in Mr. Fitzgerald's declaration, Ms. Ferraro's hourly billed rate is $500 but Defendant argues that the “rates regularly charged by associate attorneys in San Diego are $295 to $390 per hour.” Oppo. at 22 (citing Kries v. City of San Diego, 2021 WL 120830 at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 2021)). Defendant adjusts these rates at “three percent per year over the past four years since Kries was decided” to argue that the billing rate for Ms. Ferraro should be in the range of $322 to $438 depending on experience. Id. In response, Plaintiff cites to a much more recent case from this District in which District Judge Dana Sabraw determined that an hourly rate of $500 to $575 for associates in San Diego was reasonable and “approximately in line with past hourly rates approved in the [Southern District of California].” Turry v. Vervent, Inc., 2025 WL 625781, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2025). Accordingly, the Court finds that the rates charged by all three attorneys in preparing this motion are reasonable and calculates the lodestar amount to be $19,463.00. For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Defendant and Defendant's counsel are jointly responsible for the inaccurate, insufficient, and improper discovery responses and related conduct that required Plaintiff to file the underlying motion to compel and that monetary sanctions are appropriate. The Court further finds Defendant did not provide any substantial justification for his failure to comply with discovery requests prior to the filing of this motion and there are no “other circumstances [that] make an award of expenses unjust.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d). Finally, the Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's request for monetary sanctions in the amount of $19,463 against both Defendant and Defendant's counsel, Monica Hernandez. CONCLUSION Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, ECF No. 46, is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to “search its entire Google Drive and relevant other storage media (hard drives, flash drives, external drives, etc.), employee email accounts, and instant messaging apps (particularly WhatsApp) using the proposed search terms and connectors set forth in Appendix A” of Defendant's motion to compel. Defendant is further ordered to: (1) identify all relevant custodians in a declaration provided to Plaintiff no later than May 2, 2025; (2) image the emails and instant messages of those custodians and Defendant's Google Drive; (3) use a professional service to run Plaintiff's list of search terms against that imaged data; and (4) produce all non-duplicative, non-privileged documents (and identify on a privilege log any documents withheld under a claim of privilege). The Defendant must complete this search no later than May 9, 2025. Defendant is ordered to produce the detailed financial information responsive to Plaintiff's RFP No. 36 for the time period from Jun 20, 2023 through the date of this Order no later than May 9, 2025. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer in person within seven (7) calendar days after the filing of this order to agree on the questions to be answered by Mr. Carneiro under oath. Mr. Carneiro's deposition or written responses (under oath) to the questions must completed on or before May 9, 2025. The Court ORDERS Defendant to amend its initial disclosures and produce the full insurance policy, including all forms applicable to coverage and all exclusions, no later than May 2, 2025. Finally, the Court imposes monetary sanctions totaling $19,463 against both Defendant and Defendant's counsel, Monica Hernandez for their failure to adequately respond to discovery and engage in the meet and confer process prior to the filing of this motion. The amount of the sanctions is based upon the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiff in preparing the motion to compel and reply. Defendant and/or Defendant's counsel must pay $19,463 to Plaintiff's counsel by May 16, 2025, and Defendant's counsel must file a declaration of payment by May 21, 2025. *12 IT IS SO ORDERED.