Vera Mona, LLC v. Target Corporation Case No. 5:23-cv-02340-JGB-SHK United States District Court, C.D. California Filed November 18, 2024 Kewalramani, Shashi H., United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO COMPEL [ECF No. 54-1; ECF No. 55-1] *1 Before the Court are Plaintiff Vera Mona, LLC's (“Plaintiff” or “Vera Mona”) Motion to Compel Discovery Responses to Plaintiff's Interrogatories (“ROGs”) and Motion to Compel Discovery Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), filed on August 29, 2024. Electronic Case Filing Number (“ECF No.”) 54-1, Motion to Compel Discovery Responses to Plaintiff's ROGs (“MTC ROGs”); ECF No. 55-1, Motion to Compel Discovery Responses to Plaintiff's RFPs (“MTC RFPs” and together with MTC ROGs, “Motions”). On September 19, 2024, Target Corporation (“Defendant” or “Target”) opposed Plaintiff's Motions. ECF No. 69, Opposition to MTC ROGs (“ROGs Opp'n”); ECF No. 68, Opposition to MTC RFPs (“RFPs Opp'n” and together with ROGs Opp'n, “Oppositions”). On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff replied to Defendant's Oppositions. ECF No. 70, Reply in Support of MTC ROGs (“ROGs Reply”); ECF No. 71, Reply in Support of MTC RFPs (“RFPs Reply”). After reviewing the parties' arguments, for the reasons set forth in this Order, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motions as discussed below. I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History and Background On November 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed the initial complaint (“Complaint” or “Compl.”) against Defendant and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, ECF No. 1, Compl., and, on February 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 21, FAC. The operative complaint is the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), filed on October 29, 2024. ECF No. 82, SAC. Even though the instant briefing was based on Plaintiff's FAC, Plaintiff's allegations do not appear to have materially changed in the SAC in a way that would affect the Court's analysis of the instant Motions. Compare ECF No. 21, FAC with ECF No. 82, SAC. In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that after Defendant became aware of Plaintiff's brush cleaner product (“Plaintiff's Product”), which is marked with its trademark “Color Switch” symbol and identifiable Trade Dress, Defendant began selling a brush cleaner (“Accused Product”) with similar branding as Plaintiff's product, including use of the mark “Color Switch” on the packaging, and that “Defendant's sale of a virtually identical trade-dress, combined with Defendant's use of Plaintiff's trademarked Color Switch mark, and Defendant's use of identical promotional graphics for its identical product is likely to result in customer confusion.” ECF No. 82, SAC at 8, 13 (capitalization normalized). As a result, Plaintiff asserted the following three federal causes of action: (1) trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 et seq.; (2) unfair competition and trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) et seq.; and (3) unregistered trade dress infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) et seq. Id. at 16–20. Plaintiff also asserted two causes of action under state law. Id. at 23–24. Plaintiff seeks the following relief: (1) compensatory damages for an amount to be determined at trial; (2) statutory damages “of up to $100,000 for each trademark infringement, and up to $1,000,000 for each willful trademark infringement” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c); (3) “punitive damages for Defendant's willful and malicious conduct”; (4) “treble damages for willful infringement” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b); (5) full litigation costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees; (6) prejudgment interest; and (7) “such relief as the Court deems just and equitable.” Id. at 25. *2 On May 22, 2024, Plaintiff served its first set of ROGs on Defendant, ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 4, and on May 31, 2024, Plaintiff served its first set of RFPs on Defendant, ECF No. 41 at 9. On June 7, 2024, the parties submitted a joint Rule 26(f) discovery plan (“Discovery Plan”), a joint stipulation for a protective order, and an Electronically Stored Information agreement (“ESI Agreement”). ECF No. 41, Discovery Plan; ECF No. 42, Protective Order; ECF No. 43, ESI Agreement. On June 20, 2024, Defendant timely responded to Plaintiff's ROGs, ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 4, and on July 1, 2024, Defendant timely responded to Plaintiff's RFPs and supplemented its responses on July 15, 2024 and July 31, 2024, ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs at 5 n.1. On June 21, 2024, the Court issued a Civil Trial Scheduling Order (“CTSO”), requiring all discovery to be completed on or before February 23, 2025. ECF No. 45, CTSO. On June 24, 2024, the Court issued an order establishing the protocol for the production of documents, ESI, and privilege logs. ECF No. 47. On June 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended stipulation for a protective order, ECF No. 48, which the Court ordered on June 26, 2024, ECF No. 49. At the request of the parties, the Court ordered an informal discovery dispute conference on July 8, 2024, ECF No. 50, and the parties engaged in that conference on July 24, 2024, ECF No. 52. On August 15, 2024, the parties participated in a continued informal discovery dispute conference to address the outstanding discovery issues. ECF No. 53. Following extensive discussions between the parties, the Court ordered the parties to brief the issues related to Defendant's responses to the ROGs and RFPs to which Plaintiff seeks to compel responses. Id. On August 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Motions. ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs; ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs. On September 19, 2024, Defendant opposed Plaintiff's Motions, ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n; ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n, and on September 23, 2024, Plaintiff replied to Defendant's Oppositions, ECF No. 70, ROGs Reply; ECF No. 71, RFPs Reply. The Motions are now fully briefed and ready for decision. B. The Disputed Discovery At issue are the following ROGs: Interrogatory No. 1: Identify all persons and/or employees who participated or assisted in the preparation of your Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories herein. Interrogatory No. 2: State how and when you became aware of Plaintiff's Color Switch® mark and/or product. Interrogatory No. 3: Identify all persons and/or employees who were involved in any way in considering or deciding to create a Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, and state their titles and the nature of each person's involvement. Interrogatory No. 4: Identify all persons and/or employees who participated or assisted in the conception, development, selection, clearance, or approval and adoption of Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, and state their titles and the nature of their involvement. Interrogatory No. 5: Identify all persons and/or employees who participated or assisted in the design or approval of any aspect of Target's accused infringing mark/product, including, but not limited to, its overall appearance and graphics, font size and style, stylization, or other characteristics, and state their titles and the nature of their involvement. Interrogatory No. 6: Identify all persons and/or employees who participated or assisted in the preparation of inspiration boards, concept boards, and/or development materials for Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, and state their titles and the nature of their involvement.\ *3 Interrogatory No. 7: Identify all persons and/or employees who participated or assisted in any of your clearance searches, investigation of, and/or opinions regarding the manufacture and sale of Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, and state their titles and the nature of their involvement. Interrogatory No. 8: Identify all persons and/or employees who provided designs and/or specifications to your manufacturer, Shanghai Shengda, for the manufacturing of Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, and state their titles and the nature of their involvement. Interrogatory No. 12: Identify all persons and/or employees who have communicated with any third-party person or entity, including, but not limited to, Mercari and/or its vendors, distributors, and/or retailers concerning Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, and state their titles and the nature of each person's communication. Interrogatory No. 13: Identify all persons and/or employees with whom you have communicated from any third-party person or entity, including, but not limited to, Mercari and/or its vendors, distributors, and/or retailers concerning Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, and state their titles and location. Interrogatory No. 17:What actions did you take, and on what date(s) did you take the actions, concerning Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product in your stores, on your website and with third-party vendors or affiliates after Plaintiff notified you that your Target accused infringing mark/product was infringing upon Plaintiff's trademarked mark and product, Color Switch®. Interrogatory No. 18: Identify any and all persons and/or employees involved with your decision not to carry Plaintiff's trademarked Color Switch® product on your website or in your stores. ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 5–12. Defendant's responses to the above ROGs are lengthy, see ECF No. 54-2; therefore, the Court focuses on the portions of Defendant's responses relevant to the Court's analysis, as detailed subsequently in this Order. The following RFPs are also at issue: Request for Production No. 2: All documents concerning your conception, development, selection, clearance, or approval and adoption of Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product. Request for Production No. 3: All documents concerning the design or approval of any aspect of Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, including, but not limited to, its overall appearance and graphics, font size and style, stylization, color palette or other characteristics. Request for Production No. 5: All documents constituting or concerning inspiration boards, concept boards, and/or development materials for Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product. Request for Production No. 7: All documents concerning any business meetings, agendas and/or plans concerning Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product. Request for Production No. 8: All documents and communications concerning the design and specifications you provided to your manufacturer, Shanghai Shengda, for the manufacturing of Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product. Request for Production No. 12: All communications you have had with any third party vendor or retail location/online marketplace, including but not limited to Mercari or its vendors, concerning Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, including, but not limited to, any licensing agreement, contractual relationship, assignment, and/or sales of Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product to Mercari or its vendors. *4 Request for Production No. 13: All communications you have had with any third-party entity, including, but not limited to, distributors, retailers or other business entities, concerning Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, including, but not limited to, any licensing agreement, contractual relationship, assignment, and/or sales of Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product to such third-party entity or entities. Request for Production No. 18: All documents identifying all other entities or third parties that have advertised, promoted, marketed, displayed, distributed, offered for sale or sold Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, including but not limited to Mercari and/or its vendors, and the name(s) of any other third party or entity. Request For Production No. 30: All internal communications by, from and among your employees, including but not limited to Michael Kroll, concerning Plaintiff, Plaintiff's CEO/founder, and Plaintiff's Color Switch mark/product, excluding privileged communications. Request for Production No. 31: All internal communications by, from and among your employees concerning Target's accused infringing Color Switch mark/product, excluding privileged communications. Request for Production No. 38: All internal communications by, from and among your employees concerning your use of the words “color switch” on or in association with Target's accused infringing Color Switch product. Request for Production No. 45: All documents and communications by, from and among your employees concerning your decision not to carry Plaintiff's Color Switch mark/product, including but not limited to Michael Kroll's decision as reflected in his February 12, 2019 denial to carry Plaintiff's Color Switch mark/product. ECF No. 55-2, MTC RFPs at 6–57. Again, for the sake of brevity and convenience, the Court does not list all of Defendant's responses to the above RFPs, see ECF No. 55-2, and only discusses below the portions of Defendant's responses relevant to the Court's analysis. C. Parties' Arguments Regarding ROGs 1. ROG No. 1 a. Plaintiff's Motion In its response, Defendant objected that ROG No. 1 “seeks Privileged Materials, including attorney/client communications and protected work product [,]” ECF No. 54-2 at 5, but Plaintiff claims ROG No. 1 “is requesting information that Defendant concedes is discoverable, namely, only individuals with relevant knowledge of the action[,]” and “not [ ] information related to an investigation[,]” ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 5–6. b. Defendant's Opposition Plaintiff “seeks to compel, without any supporting authority, information that is unquestionably protected by the Attorney Work-Product Protection—the identities of persons who helped prepare Target's responses to Vera Mona's interrogatories.” ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n at 7 (citing Becker v. TIG Ins. Co., No. 3:21-cv-05185-JHC, 2022 WL 13925733, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 24, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 23-35261, 2023 WL 4572316 (9th Cir. June 5, 2023)). c. Plaintiff's Reply Plaintiff “rests on its submitted motion as it relates to [ROG] No. 1.” ECF No. 70, ROGs Reply at 6. 2. ROG No. 2 a. Plaintiff's Motion In its response to ROG No. 2, Defendant states that two of its employees became aware of Plaintiff's Product at least as early as January 30, 2019 based on an email from Ms. Cabrera-Calvo, ECF No. 54-2 at 7, but Defendant “does not identify the employee[s] or whether or when other individuals became aware of [Plaintiff's Product].” ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 6. Further, Defendant's response must be incorrect as to when Defendant first became aware of Plaintiff's Product because in March 2018, “Defendant ‘short listed’ Plaintiff's product on the RangeMe product discovery platform used by retailers to source new products.” Id. As a result, Plaintiff requests the Court compel Defendant to provide “how and when it became aware of Plaintiff's [Product] before the January 30, 2019 email referenced [in Defendant's response].” Id. at 6–7. b. Defendant's Opposition *5 “Target has responded to [ROG No. 2] in full[.]” ECF No. 69 at 8. Plaintiff's Motion is based on Plaintiff's “mere disagreement with Target's responses[,]” which is an “improper basis for a motion to compel.” Id. (citations omitted). Further, Defendant “has not discovered information that corroborates Vera Mona's short-listing allegation.” Id. at 17. Finally, ROG No. 2 is overly broad and unduly burdensome because Defendant would be required “to state how and when any of Target's 400,000+ team members or former team members became aware of [Plaintiff's Product]—a gargantuan and impossible task.” Id. at 18. c. Plaintiff's Reply “Defendant has not produced any discovery whatsoever relating to RangeMe[.]” ECF No. 70 at 7. Further, Defendant's claim that ROG No. 2 requires a response from all 400,000+ Target employees or former employees “is simply false as it would be unimaginable that a Target cashier, warehouse employee, or similar employee would somehow have information relevant to Target's knowledge of Plaintiff's [Product] or Target's use of RangeMe to identify potential vendors.” Id. 3. ROG Nos. 3 Through 8 a. Plaintiff's Motion In its responses to ROG Nos. 3–8, Defendant focused only on Defendant's purchase of the Accused Product from Shanghai Shengda (“Shengda”) and did “not identify specific individuals who were involved in the initial stages of Defendant's decision to create [the Accused Product].” ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 8. As a result, Plaintiff requests that the Court “compel Defendant to answer [ROG Nos. 3–8] within the temporal date range beginning March 1, 2020 through March 9, 2022” because such a date range is likely to cover “the earliest design discussions ... and the product development program[.]” Id. at 9. b. Defendant's Opposition Defendant's responses to ROG Nos. 3-8 “expressly identif[y] the persons that Target believes to be responsive to the interrogatories.” ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n at 19. “What is clear, however, is that Vera Mona's actual complaint is that it simply does not agree with Target on when the development of the Accused Product occurred .... But Vera Mona's disagreements with Target's interrogatory responses [are] not grounds for a motion to compel[.]” Id. at 19-20 (emphasis in original). Further, ROG Nos. 3-8 are overly broad and unduly burdensome because Plaintiff is “requir[ing] Target to respond [to ROG Nos. 3-8] regarding Target's 400,000+ team members or former team members.” Id. at 21. c. Plaintiff's Reply “[E]arlier discovery regarding Defendant's consideration and decision to create its Accused Product must exist prior to March 9, 2022 because by that date the product was already substantially complete[.]” ECF No. 70, ROGs Reply at 8 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, Defendant's 400,000+ employees burdensome argument is “preposterous on its face.” Id. 4. ROG Nos. 12 and 13 a. Plaintiff's Motion Defendant fails to identify any individuals responsive to ROG Nos. 12 and 13, but such responses must be incomplete because MJ Entertainment and Videojam-Half are selling the Accused Product online. ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 10. Even after admitting that “MJ Entertainment was at times relevant to this lawsuit registered with Defendant as a salvage vendor[,]” Defendant still did not “identify any individuals with whom Defendant communicated at MJ Entertainment or their titles or locations or whether there are other third-party vendors with whom Defendant communicated.” Id. at 10–11 (citation omitted). The information sought by ROG Nos. 12 and 13 “is specifically relevant to the actual damages to which Plaintiff is entitled[,]” because “[t]here are [redacted] units [of the Accused Product] unaccounted for, and the [Accused Product] is still being sold on the market.” Id. *6 As a result, Plaintiff requests that the Court: (1) compel Defendant to answer ROG 12 as to all third-parties or entities, excluding Mercari, concerning the Accused Product for the time frame beginning January 30, 2023 through December 31, 2023; and (2) compel Defendant to answer ROG 13 as to any person Defendant communicated with at MJ Entertainment between January 30, 2023 through December 31, 2023. Id. b. Defendant's Opposition First, ROG Nos. 12 and 13 are overly broad and unduly burdensome because Defendant would be required “to identify any of its 400,000+ team members or former team members and ... any person in the world who has ever communicated with any other person or entity concerning the Accused Product.” ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n at 22. Second, “[ROG] Nos. 12 and 13 relate to communications concerning the Accused Product and, as Target has responded, Target has not communicated with any such third-party vendor, distributor, or retailer concerning the Accused Product. This includes MJ Entertainment and Videojam-Half[.]” Id. at 23–24 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). c. Plaintiff's Reply “Defendant's reading of these [ROGs to require a response from any person who has communicated about the Accused Product] does not track with a reasonable interpretation of the request.” ECF No. 70, ROGs Reply at 9. 5. ROG No. 17 a. Plaintiff's Motion Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant's response to ROG No. 17 was “quite thorough with respect to the actions Defendant took regarding its [Accused Product] in Defendant's stores and with its vendor, Shanghai Shengda.” ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 11. “However, Defendant nowhere addressed its actions with respect to third-party vendors[,]” which is important given the [redacted] unaccounted for units of the Accused Product. Id. at 12. Thus, Plaintiff requests that the Court compel Defendant to state “what actions Defendant took regarding salvage vendors including MJ Entertainment after Plaintiff notified Defendant that its accused infringing mark/product was infringing Plaintiff's trademark and product. Plaintiff restricts this inquiry to the date range of February 21, 2023, through December 31, 2023.” Id. b. Defendant's Opposition “The fact that Target's response does not describe a specific action with respect to third-party vendors is itself an answer that Target did not take any specific actions with respect to third-party vendors.” ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n at 21. Additionally, that Plaintiff's claim of [redacted] unaccounted for units of the Accused Product is “simply not true—they are accounted for by the issued destroy order[—]” and regardless, that is a factual dispute which is not an appropriate basis for a motion to compel. Id. at 22 (citation omitted). c. Plaintiff's Reply “Target has not produced any documents to date to contradict [the [redacted] unaccounted for units] as identified in its own document production.” ECF No. 70, ROGs Reply at 9. 6. ROG No. 18 a. Plaintiff's Motion Contrary to what Defendant claims in its response, ROG No. 18 is “extremely relevant to the trademark infringement claim, as well as damages related to Defendant's knowing, willful and intentional conduct” because “Defendant's decision not to carry Plaintiff's [Product] appears to have been a strategy perpetrated to allow Defendant to manufacture its own [Accused Product.]” ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 12. Thus, Plaintiff requests that the Court compel Defendant to provide the identities of those who were involved with Defendant's decision not to carry Plaintiff's Product within the “restricted date range of January 30, 2019 to February 21, 2023[.]” Id. at 14. b. Defendant's Opposition *7 First, Plaintiff's “blatant and unsupported speculation as to possible reasons Target may have chosen not to carry Vera Mona's products” is insufficient to establish the relevance of ROG No. 18. ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n at 26 (emphasis in original). Second, “Target has already identified the persons with relevant knowledge to trademark infringement claim and has produced emails regarding the Accused Product's development.” Id. at 27. Finally, ROG No. 18 is overly broad and unduly burdensome because Defendant would be required to seek responses from Defendant's 400,000+ employees and former employees. Id. at 28. c. Plaintiff's Reply Plaintiff repeats its relevance argument made in the MTC ROGs and states that ROG No. 18 is “very limited [in] scope ... and would not unilaterally apply to every of 400,000 + Target team members.” Id. at 13 (emphasis in the original). D. Parties Arguments Regarding RFPs 1. RFP Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 38 a. Plaintiff's Motion While Defendant did produce “some design discussions dating back to March 9, 2022,” the Accused Product was already “substantially completed” by that point, indicating that “much earlier email communications likely exist in Defendant's possession, custody, or control” “related to the initial conception and development of [the Accused Product], or the origin of Defendant's use of the term ‘Color Switch' in reference to [the Accused Product].” ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs at 12–13. Further, Defendant should be compelled to produce documents from Shengda concerning the initial concept and design of the Accused Product because Section 14 of the Partners Online Conditions of Contract agreement (“POL”) mandates Shengda's cooperation with this litigation. Id. at 13–14. Plaintiff requests that the Court compel Defendant to: (1) “produce all documents relating to the initial conception and design of its [Accused Product], including the origin of Defendant's use of the term ‘Color Switch,’ limited temporally to the timeframe beginning March 1, 2020 through March 9, 2022”; and (2) “produce all documents and communications in the possession, custody, or control of Shengda, specifically Shengda custodian Robin Labiak, relating to the initial conception, development, and design of [the Accused Product], beginning March 1, 2020 through March 9, 2022.” Id. at 14–15. b. Defendant's Opposition “Target has substantially completed its production of non-privileged documents responsive to these requests, subject to the parties' ongoing discussions on ESI.” ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 12. Any disagreement Plaintiff has about Defendant's timeline of creating and designing the Accused Product is a factual dispute better resolved through depositions than a motion to compel. Id. at 14 (citations omitted). “At this stage, however, Vera Mona's ‘mere suspicion that additional documents exist is an insufficient basis to grant a motion to compel.’ ” Id. (quoting K.C.R. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 13201-3806 PSG (SSx), 2014 WL 12725470, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2014)). Additionally, Section 14 of the POL does not mandate Shengda's cooperation in the instant litigation and “says nothing about any legal right of Target to demand documents from Shengda.” Id. at 17. c. Plaintiff's Reply “Defendant's claim[ ] of ‘substantial completion’ belies the fact that it has failed to produce any documents related to the actual conception and design of the Accused Product, or its initial use of Plaintiff's trademarked term[.]” ECF No. 71, RFPs Reply at 6. Further, Plaintiff cites to Section 6(g) of the POL to argue that “Target plainly has control over [Shengda's] documents” related to the Accused Product. Id. at 8. 2. RFP Nos. 12, 13, and 18 a. Plaintiff's Motion *8 Defendant failed to produce documents and communications responsive to RFP Nos. 12, 13, and 18, but such responses must be incomplete because Defendant “did not include any reference to MJ Entertainment, nor did it indicate that Defendant would produce any documents related to MJ Entertainment[,]” whom Plaintiff knows is selling the Accused Product. ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs at 16. Thus, Plaintiff requests that the Court compel Defendant “to produce documents related to its salvage vendor, MJ Entertainment, including the contract that was in effect from January 1, 2023 through December 31, 2023, and all purchase orders placed from February 23, 2023 through December 31, 2023.” Id. at 17 b. Defendant's Opposition Defendant “simply does not have non-privileged responsive communications between Target and third-vendors or entities (like MJ Entertainment) concerning the Accused Product.” ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 19. The documents Plaintiff now specifically requests—the salvage contract and any purchase orders—are not responsive to RFP Nos. 12, 13, or 18 because they are not “communications ... concerning [the Accused Product].” Id. c. Plaintiff's Reply Contracts and purchase orders between Defendant and MJ Entertainment are communications concerning the Accused Product and therefore should be produced. ECF No. 71, RFPs Reply at 9. 3. RFP Nos. 30 and 31 a. Plaintiff's Motion Contrary to what Defendant claims in its responses, RFP Nos. 30 and 31 are relevant because “communications regarding the decision not to carry Plaintiff's [Product go to] Defendant's knowing, willful and intentional trademark infringement.” ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs at 20. “Plaintiff therefore requests the Court compel Defendant to produce all documents and communications related to its repeated decisions not to carry Plaintiff's [Product], beginning with Mr. Kroll's initial rejection email dated February 12, 2019 through February 22, 2023.” Id. b. Defendant's Opposition Defendant has “substantially completed its production of non-privileged documents responsive to these requests, subject to the parties' ongoing discussions on ESI.” ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 20. “At most, it appears that Vera Mona's complaint is, again, that it believes that there should be more responsive documents[,]” but Defendant “is not withholding any non-privileged documents responsive to [RFP] Nos. 30 and 31.” Id. at 20–21. c. Plaintiff's Reply “Defendant must possess documents by and between Target personnel discussing Plaintiff's application to become a vendor and Defendant's repeated decisions to reject Plaintiff's application [to carry Plaintiff's Product].” ECF No. 71, RFPs Reply at 10. The Court should compel Defendant to produce those documents. Id. at 13. 4. RFP No. 45 a. Plaintiff's Motion Defendant's production of “a single email by Michael Kroll, Defendant's in-house counsel, to Plaintiff on February 12, 2019 wherein he informed Plaintiff of Defendant's business decision not to carry Plaintiff's product” is an incomplete response and therefore, the Court should “compel Defendant to produce documents from Mr. Kroll as a custodian, given the restricted date range of January 30, 2019 to February 23, 2023 and Defendant identify according to Rule 26(a) requirements and ESI Order obligations where these documents reside and how they are searched.” ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs at 21–22 (citation omitted). b. Defendant's Opposition Documents and communications concerning Defendant's decision not to carry Plaintiff's Product are not relevant to any of Plaintiff's claims and Plaintiff cites no authority to suggest otherwise. ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 21–22. Plaintiff's “blatant and unsupported speculation” about why Defendant declines to carry Plaintiff's product is “insufficient to establish the relevance of this request.” Id. at 22 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). c. Plaintiff's Reply *9 “Target's false characterization of Plaintiff's Requests as blatant and unsupported speculation does not overcome its heavy burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” ECF No. 71, RFPs Reply at 11 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 5. ESI Data a. Plaintiff's Motion Defendant is failing to follow the ESI Agreement in three ways. ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs at 22–25. First, Defendant failed to produce the attachments referenced in the produced emails. Id. at 22. Second, “Defendant has been resistant to participate in the exchange and modification of search terms as contemplated in the ESI Agreement.” Id. Finally, Defendant has failed to “produce responsive documents located within all of its document repositories, including but not limited to servers, databases, and applications such as Slack and the others listed in its Collaborative Tools Sweep Schedule.” Id. at 23. Thus, Plaintiff requests the Court compel Defendant to: (1) “produce all documents identified in this section (e), with their associated attachments, using the parent/child relationship as described in the ESI Agreement;” and (2) “compel Defendant to disclose its data storage repositories where potentially responsive documents may be stored, including but not limited to servers, databases, applications such as Slack, Jira, Sharepoint, etc., and produce all responsive documents located within each from January 30, 2019 through March 31, 2022.” Id. at 25. b. Defendant's Opposition Plaintiff's “requests for relief related to the ESI Agreement should be denied because it is not yet ripe for resolution.” ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 26. First, the Court ordered briefing on Defendant's responses to the ROGs and RFPs to which Plaintiff seeks to compel responses, not compliance with the ESI Agreement, and second, “[t]he parties have not met-and-conferred on these issues.” Id. at 27. Regardless, Target has abided by the ESI Agreement and “[p]roduced what it has in the form that it has it.” Id. c. Plaintiff's Reply “Defendant has refused to provide Vera Mona with any useful information necessary in progressing the ESI process whatsoever. Target misrepresents the requirements of the ESI Agreement, provides no evidence, and ignores the industry standard practice of ESI discovery procedures.” ECF No. 71, RFPs Reply at 13. II. DISCUSSION A. General Legal Standards Regarding Discovery Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(b)(1) governs the scope of permissible discovery and provides: Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevancy, for purposes of discovery, “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Nguyen v. Lotus by Johnny Dung Inc., No. 8:17-cv-01317-JVS-JDE, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). *10 Because discovery must be both relevant and proportional, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Nguyen, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1. Discovery may be denied where: “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). “The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). The party opposing discovery then has the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. Ochoa, No. 07-cv-200 JM (PCL), 2009 WL 1390794 at * 1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009). “The party opposing discovery is ‘required to carry a heavy burden of showing’ why discovery should be denied.” Reece v. Basi, No. 2:11-cv-2712 TLN AC P, 2014 WL 2565986, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2014), aff'd, 704 F. App'x 685 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.1975)). “The district court enjoys broad discretion when resolving discovery disputes, which should be exercised by determining the relevance of discovery requests, assessing oppressiveness, and weighing these factors in deciding whether discovery should be compelled.” United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., No. CV 10-3165 GHK (SS), 2015 WL 12731923, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). B. Interrogatories Under Rule 33, “a party may serve any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including discrete subparts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1). Interrogatories “may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). The responding party “must serve its answers and any objections within 30 days after being served with the interrogatories.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2). “Each interrogatory must, to the extent not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). “An interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2). Instead, “[t]he grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity. Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). A party who has responded to an interrogatory “must supplement or correct its disclosure or response:” (A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing; or (B) as ordered by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). C. Requests for Production “Pursuant to ... Rule ... 34(a), a party may request documents ‘in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.’ ” Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 570 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)). Rule 34(b) requires the requesting party to “describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A). “The test for reasonable particularity is whether the request places a party upon reasonable notice of what is called for and what is not.” Mailhoit, 285 F.R.D. at 570 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “All-encompassing demands that do not allow a reasonable person to ascertain which documents are required do not meet the particularity standard of Rule 34(b)(1)(A).” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). *11 “A party may request the production of any document within the scope of Rule 26(b).” Meyer v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 21-cv-341-RSH-BLM, 2024 WL 505193, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2024) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)). “For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state an objection to the request, including the reasons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). The responding party is responsible for all items in their “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). “[A]ctual possession of the requested document is not required.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 619. Instead, “[a] party may be ordered to produce a document in the possession of a non-party entity if that party has a legal right to obtain the document or has control over the entity who is in possession of the document.” Id. (citation omitted). D. Work Product Doctrine The “work product doctrine is a qualified protection limiting discovery of ‘documents and tangible things’ prepared by a party or his or her representative in anticipation of litigation or trial.” Jones v. Hernandez, 322 F.R.D. 411, 412 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. Of Ariz., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989)). The party claiming work product protection bears the burden of establishing that the work product doctrine applies. United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2011). “A party may obtain discovery of work product only on a showing of ‘substantial need’ and an inability to obtain equivalent information from other sources.” Hernandez, 322 F.R.D. at 412 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii)). “Even when a court orders disclosure of work product, ‘it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusion, opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.’ ” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B)). These materials—otherwise known as “opinion” work product—represent the “core types of work product” that the doctrine was designed to protect. Id. (citing Republic of Ecuador v. Mackav, 742 F.3d 860, 870 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014)). E. Analysis After careful review of the briefing and relevant law, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's Motions and orders Defendant to produce materials responsive to the portions of Plaintiff's Motions which are granted as discussed below. Before turning to each discovery request or group of discovery requests, the Court first addresses two arguments that Defendant makes repeatedly in its Oppositions. First, Defendant claims that several of Plaintiff's discovery requests are overly broad and unduly burdensome because Defendant is required to respond as to all of “Target's 400,000+ team members or former team members[.]” See ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n at 18, 21, 22, 28; ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 24. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. If extrapolated to every discovery dispute involving a corporation, Defendant's argument would grind civil discovery to a halt. When Plaintiff seeks information about the design of the Accused Product or Defendant's knowledge of Plaintiff's Product, for example, Plaintiff is clearly not asking, and the Court would not order, Defendant to interview every employee of its corporation, down to the warehouse workers and delivery drivers. Instead, Plaintiff is asking Defendant to identify employees reasonably likely to have information responsive to specific discovery requests and then respond with the information it gathers. The limited scope of such a request is not necessarily unduly burdensome. Thus, the Court rejects Defendant's burdensome argument regarding the number of employees subject to ROG Nos. 2, 3-8, 12, 13, and 18 and RFP No. 45. *12 Second, Defendant argues that many of Plaintiff's discovery requests are not proportional to the needs of the case because the amount in controversy is so small—at most, $[redacted].See ECF No. 69. ROGs Opp'n at 13-14 (claiming that Defendant sold approximately [redacted] units of the Accused Product resulting in approximately $[redacted] in gross margin and $[redacted] in net profit). However, Plaintiff contends that its damages will exceed $[redacted] in part because [redacted] units of the Accused Product are unaccounted for according to Defendant's own numbers. ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 9, 11. If Defendant is profiting off those unaccounted for units somehow, Plaintiff may be entitled to greater damages than Defendant is acknowledging. Regardless, a discovery order is not the proper place to settle that dispute, as Defendant seems to acknowledge. See ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n at 22 (“Vera Mona's assertion regarding units of the Accused Product is a factual dispute, which is not properly resolved by way of a motion to compel[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the Court rejects Defendant's proportionality argument regarding the amount in controversy raised in response to Plaintiff's ROGs and RFP No. 45 because the amount in controversy is disputed and Plaintiff is entitled to discovery relevant to its claims, including what its damages may be. The Court turns now to each discovery request or group of discovery requests. 1. Plaintiff's Motion as to ROG No. 1 Is Denied Because the Information Sought Is Protected by the Work-Product Doctrine. In ROG No. 1, Plaintiff seeks the identities of people who participated in the preparation of Defendant's responses to the ROGs. ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 5. Such information is protected by the work-product doctrine. See Becker, 2022 WL 13925733, at *1 (“The identities of all those who aided in drafting [defendant's interrogatory] responses would appear protected from disclosure under the work-product doctrine.”); see also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying a motion to compel “because [the subject interrogatory] seeks information regarding individuals who assisted plaintiffs' counsel with the preparation of their interrogatory responses, which is protected work product.”). “A party may obtain discovery of work product only on a showing of ‘substantial need’ and an inability to obtain equivalent information from other sources.” Hernandez, 322 F.R.D. at 412 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii)). Here, Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show either substantial need or the inability to obtain equivalent information elsewhere because Plaintiff claims it is seeking “only individuals with relevant knowledge of the action[,]” ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 5, and Defendant already identified such individuals in its initial disclosures, see ECF No. 55-8 at 2-4. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion as to ROG No. 1 is DENIED. 2. Plaintiff's Motion as to ROG No. 2 Is Denied Because the Court Cannot Compel Defendant to Provide Information It Claims Does Not Exist. The Court cannot compel a party to provide information it claims does not exist. Garcia v. Blahnik, No. 14cv875-LAB-BGS, 2016 WL 3854584, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2016); see also Clean Safety, Inc. v. Ruby Trucking LLC, No. 5:21-cv-00225-JWH (SPx), 2021 WL 11716496, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2021) (“[A]bsent any evidence to the contrary, the court may not compel defendant to provide information that does not exist.”). Here, the Court finds the information sought in ROG 2 to be relevant, proportional, and not unduly burdensome. However, Defendant claims it already “fully responded” to ROG No. 2, ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n at 17, and the Court has no basis on which to find that Defendant is withholding responsive information, especially because Defendant denies, and Plaintiff provides no evidence for, Plaintiff's short-listing allegation. Id. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion as to ROG No. 2 is DENIED IN PART. However, in its response to ROG No. 2, Defendant fails to name the two employees who became aware of Plaintiff's Product “at least as early as January 30, 2019 based on the [ ] January 30, 2019 email from Ms. Cabrera-Calvo.” ECF No. 54-2 at 7. Those employees' identities are responsive to Plaintiff's inquiry into how Defendant became aware of Plaintiff's Product. Thus, Defendant is ordered to identify the two employees referenced in its response to ROG No. 2 and Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART. 3. Plaintiff's Motion as to ROG Nos. 3–8 Is Granted Because Defendant's Responses Do Not Match the Scope of Plaintiff's Requests. *13 Defendant's responses to ROG Nos. 3–8 fail to identify any of Defendant's employees who were involved in the conceptualization, development, design, marketing, and approval of the Accused Product and instead focus solely on the purchase of the Accused Product from Shengda. See ECF No. 54-2 at 7-16. However, ROG Nos. 3–8 are not limited to Defendant's purchase of the Accused Product. See id. As Plaintiff states, ROG Nos. 3–8 seek, in sum, information regarding “the initial stages of Defendant's decision to create its [Accused Product].” ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 6. This is a relevant area of inquiry to which Plaintiff deserves better responses. Further, the Court finds that the two-year window offered by Plaintiff—March 1, 2020 through March 9, 2022—is a reasonable temporal scope for these ROGs. Thus, the Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART and the Court orders Defendant to identify all individuals who were involved in the conceptualization, development, design, marketing, and approval of the Accused Product or in communication with Shengda regarding the same. The Court reminds Defendant that this Order is not limited to the purchase of a completed product unless Defendant was not involved in the design or production of the Accused Product. 4. Plaintiff's Motion as to ROG Nos. 12 and 13 Is Granted Because Defendant's Salvage Contracts During the Relevant Period Concern the Accused Product. Even though “MJ Entertainment was at times relevant to this lawsuit registered with Target as a salvage vendor[,]” ECF No. 55-14 at 1, Defendant failed to identify any of its employees who communicated with MJ Entertainment or any person from MJ Entertainment who communicated with Defendant concerning the Accused Product, see ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n at 22. This failure appears to be based on Defendant's mistaken belief that its general salvage contract with MJ Entertainment during the relevant period does not concern the Accused Product. See ECF No. 55-14 at 1. However, to the extent a salvage contract covered the period where the “pallets or truckloads of undifferentiated goods” subject to that contract may have included the Accused Product, communications about that contract concern the Accused Product. Id. Thus, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED and the Court orders Defendant to supplement its responses to ROG Nos. 12 and 13 with the identity of any persons who communicated with or on behalf of Defendant concerning salvage contracts that covered the period from February 23, 2023 through December 31, 2023 and may have included the Accused Product among the “undifferentiated goods” exchanged. 5. Plaintiff's Motion as to ROG No. 17 Is Denied Because Defendant's Response Is Complete. Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant's response to ROG No. 17 was “quite thorough with respect to the actions Defendant took ... in Defendant's stores and with ... Shengda” but argues that “Defendant nowhere addressed its actions with respect to third-party vendors.” ECF No. 54-1, MTC ROGs at 11–12. The Court agrees with Defendant that “[t]he fact that Target's response does not describe a specific action with respect to third-party vendors is itself an answer that Target did not take any specific actions with respect to third-party vendors.” ECF No. 69, ROGs Opp'n at 21. The Court cannot compel Defendant to give a different answer. See Clean Safety, Inc., 2021 WL 11716496, at *2. Thus, Defendant's response is complete, and Plaintiff's Motion as to ROG No. 17 is DENIED. 6. Plaintiff's Motion as to ROG No. 18 Is Granted Because Defendant Fails to Carry Its Burden. The Court acknowledges that the relevance of ROG No. 18 is more attenuated than the other discovery requests, but nevertheless, if Plaintiff's theory as stated in the SAC is correct, then internal discussions concerning Defendant's decision not to carry Plaintiff's Product “bears on, or reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on” the willfulness analysis of Plaintiff's Lanham Act claims or Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. Nguyen, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1. Defendant then has the “heavy burden of showing why discovery should be denied.” Reece, 2014 WL 2565986, at *2 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the Court rejects Defendant's 400,000+ employees burdensome argument for the reasons explained previously, and because Defendant failed to raise any other burdensome argument, Defendant failed to carry its burden as to ROG No. 18. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion as to ROG No. 18 is GRANTED and Defendant is ordered to provide responsive information. 7. Plaintiff's Motion as to RFP Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 38 Is Denied Because the Court Cannot Compel Defendant to Produce Documents It Claims Do Not Exist. *14 “[T]he Court cannot compel that which a party asserts it does not possess.” Acosta v. JY Harvesting, Inc., No. 17-CV-1225-CAB-WVG, 2017 WL 3437654, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017); see also Lee v. Dennison, No. 2:19-cv-1332-KJD-DJA, 2020 WL 4809430, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 18, 2020) (“[T]he Court cannot compel production of something Defendant [ ] contends does not exist.” aff'd, No. 2:19-CV-1332-KJD-DJA, 2020 WL 6324310 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2020)). Here, the Court finds that the above referenced RFPs are relevant, proportional, and not overly burdensome. However, Defendant claims that it has “substantially completed” its production of responsive documents, ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 12, and Plaintiff's speculation that other responsive documents “likely exist[,]” ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs at 13, is insufficient to support its Motion. See K.C.R., 2014 WL 12725470, at *8 (“[M]ere suspicion that additional documents exist is an insufficient basis to grant a motion to compel.”). Thus, Plaintiff's Motion as to RFP Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 31 is DENIED IN PART. However, in light of the Court's Order regarding ROG Nos. 3 through 8, Defendant is again reminded that these RFPs are not limited to the purchase of the Accused Product but extend to the conceptualization, development, design, marketing, and approval of the Accused Product. To the extent Defendant has any documents related to those stages of product development, it is ordered to produce them and Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART. Additionally, Plaintiff deserves surety that it is receiving all the documents responsive to these RFPs given their relevance to Plaintiff's claims. Thus, the Court orders Defendant to provide a declaration under oath that there are no further documents responsive to these RFPs and to explain how it determined that to be the case. Finally, Plaintiff argues in its MTC RFPs that Defendant should be compelled to produce documents from Shengda under POL Section 14. ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs at 14. The Court agrees with Defendant that Section 14 does not “mandate Shengda's cooperation” in this litigation and instead, only requires Shengda to indemnify Defendant. ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 17 (quoting ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs at 14). In its RFPs Reply, Plaintiff redirects the Court's attention to Section 6 of the POL, arguing that it provides Defendant with control over Shengda's documents. ECF No. 71, RFPs Reply at 8. However, the Court declines to consider this argument because Defendant did not have the opportunity to respond to it. Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.”); see also United States ex rel. Giles v. Sardie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“It is improper for a moving party to introduce new facts or different legal arguments in the reply brief than those presented in the moving papers.”). Plaintiff may re-raise this issue in a separate filing where Defendant has the opportunity to respond. 8. Plaintiff's Motion as to RFP Nos. 12, 13, and 18 Is Granted Because At Least Defendant's Salvage Contract with MJ Entertainment Is Responsive. Defendant claims not to possess documents responsive to RFP Nos. 12, 13, and 18 other than the already produced communications with Shengda. ECF No. 55-2 at 18-20, 25. However, as mentioned in the Court's Order regarding ROG Nos. 12 and 13, Defendant's response appears to be based on the belief that its salvage contracts with third-party vendors are not “communications ... concerning the Accused Product.” ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 19. The Court disagrees. Thus, Defendant is ordered to produce all salvage contracts and purchase orders with third-party vendors that covered the period from February 23, 2023 through December 31, 2023 and may have included the Accused Product among the “undifferentiated goods” subject to that contract, including but not limited to Defendant's salvage contract with MJ Entertainment, and communications about such contracts and Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. See ECF No. 55-14. 9. Plaintiff's Motion as to RFP Nos. 30 and 31 Is Denied Because the Court Cannot Compel Defendant to Produce Documents It Claims Do Not Exist. *15 “[T]he Court cannot compel that which a party asserts it does not possess.” Acosta, 2017 WL 3437654, at *3-4; see also Lee, 2020 WL 4809430, at *4 (“[T]he Court cannot compel production of something Defendant [ ] contends does not exist.”). Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the documents sought in RFP Nos. 30 and 31 are relevant, proportional, and not unduly burdensome. ECF No. 55-1, MTC RFPs at 20. However, Defendant claims that it “is not withholding any non-privileged documents responsive to [RFP] Nos. 30 and 31” and the Court has no basis on which to find that Defendant does, in fact, possess responsive documents. ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 20. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion as to RFP Nos. 30 and 31 is DENIED. 10. Plaintiff's Motion as to RFP No. 45 Is Granted Because Defendant Has Failed to Carry Its Burden in Opposing Discovery. The Court finds that under the Rule 26(b) standard, the information sought by RFP No. 45 “bears on, or reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on” the willfulness analysis of Plaintiff's Lanham Act claims and Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. Nguyen, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1. Because the Court rejected Defendant's 400,000+ employees burdensome argument for the reasons explained previously, and because Defendant failed to raise any other burdensome arguments, Defendant failed to carry its “heavy burden of showing why discovery should be denied.” Reece, 2014 WL 2565986, at *2 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Plaintiff's Motion as to RFP No. 45 is GRANTED, and Defendant is ordered to produce responsive documents “from Mr. Kroll as a custodian, given the restricted date range of January 30, 2019 to February 23, 2023[.]” ECF No. 55-2, MTC RFPs at 57. 11. Plaintiff's Motion as to the ESI Agreement Is Denied Because the Issue Is Not Ripe. Contrary to Plaintiff's argument in its MTC RFPs, Defendant claims that it is following the ESI Agreement and has “produced what it has in the form that it has it.” ECF No. 68, RFPs Opp'n at 27. At this time, the Court does not have enough information to determine whether Defendant is following the ESI Agreement. Further, the parties have not met and conferred about this issue and briefing on it was not ordered by the Court. Id. at 26-27; ECF No. 53. Thus, the issue is not ripe for resolution and Plaintiff's Motion as to the ESI Agreement is denied. Additionally, the Court orders the parties to meet and confer regarding compliance with the ESI Agreement within seven days of this Order and to inform the Court in writing within fourteen days of this order whether an informal discovery conference is necessary to resolve this issue. If necessary, the Court will then hold an informal discovery dispute conference via Zoom regarding any alleged noncompliance with the ESI Agreement. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED as to ROG Nos. 3–8, 12, 13, and 18 and RFP Nos. 12, 13, 18, and 45 and Defendant is ordered to produce responses to those discovery requests, to the extent detailed in this Order, by within 21 days of this Order or as otherwise agreed by the parties. Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED as to ROG Nos. 1, 2, and 17, RFP Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 30, 31, and 38, and the ESI Agreement. Further, the Court orders the parties to meet and confer regarding compliance with the ESI Agreement within seven days of this Order and to inform the Court in writing within fourteen days of this order whether an informal discovery conference is necessary to resolve this issue. IT IS SO ORDERED.