777 PARTNERS LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LEADENHALL CAPITAL PARTNERS LLP, et al., Defendants Case No. 24-cv-81143-MIDDLEBROOKS/MATTHEWMAN United States District Court, S.D. Florida Entered on FLSD Docket March 28, 2025 Matthewman, William, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL [DE 140; 145] *1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiffs 777 Partners LLC and Suttonpark Capital LLC's (“Plaintiffs”) Motion to Compel Supplemental Document Discovery from Defendants Leadenhall Capital Partners LLP and Leadenhall Life Insurance Linked Investment Fund PLC (“Motion”) [DE 140].[1] The Motion is ripe for review. See DEs 143, 144. For the reasons explained in this Order, the Motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND This case was filed on September 17, 2024. [DE 1]. Although Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges eight counts [DE 68], this is a relatively simple and straightforward case. Plaintiffs allege computer intrusions wherein Defendants Leadenhall Capital Partners LLP and Leadenhall Life Insurance Linked Investment Fund PLC (the “Leadenhall Defendants”) used Plaintiffs’ former employees to illegally access Plaintiffs’ data for use in New York litigation and other purposes. See DE 68. Defendants have answered, denied the allegations, and asserted affirmative defenses. See DEs 90, 91, 92. There are no counterclaims. Despite the relative simplicity of this action, discovery has been anything but simple. On December 4, 2024, the Court held a Scheduling Conference with all the parties’ counsel present. [DE 73]. At that Scheduling Conference, the Court carefully advised the parties’ counsel of the Court's discovery expectations and requirements, including the requirement of good faith cooperation and conferral by the parties and their counsel. The Court did this so the discovery process could proceed expeditiously and fairly for all the parties. Thereafter, the Court entered its Order Setting Discovery Procedure [DE 101] which further specified what the Court required of the parties and their counsel during the discovery process. The parties involved in this present dispute and their counsel either did not listen or chose to cavalierly disregard the Court's directives. The parties’ and counsels’ actions have consequences. Also, on December 4, 2024, the Court entered its Pretrial Scheduling Order [DE 74], which set the discovery cutoff date for March 20, 2025, the dispositive motion cutoff date for April 3, 2025, and the trial date for the two-week period beginning on June 2, 2025. The June 2, 2025 trial period is a firm trial date as the parties were advised at the Scheduling Conference. The parties were also so advised at multiple Court hearings. See, e.g., DE 120 at 41–42. Rather than cooperate in good faith to move the discovery process forward fairly and expeditiously, as ethically and legally required, the parties involved in this present dispute and their counsel have seemingly taken every opportunity to delay, frustrate, and impede the orderly discovery process. For example, at the February 27, 2025 hearing, the Court advised the parties that it was not pleased that the parties were more involved in fighting about discovery than cooperating and producing discovery. Id. at 6–7. The Court does not understand why these parties and counsel have taken this tack, but it is wholly unproductive and does nothing to advance their respective positions or standing before this Court. *2 The parties have seemingly sat on their hands during discovery, refused to try in good faith to work out their numerous discovery disputes, and then have brought repeated last-minute discovery disputes. Plaintiffs are especially problematic in this regard. Despite a March 20, 2025 discovery cutoff date then in effect in this case, the very first discovery motion was filed by the Leadenhall Defendants on February 14, 2025 [DE 95], a little over four weeks before the discovery cutoff date. The Leadenhall Defendants’ motion [DE 95] sought to compel numerous depositions and document production from Plaintiffs. The Leadenhall Defendants’ motion [DE 95] was followed by Plaintiffs’ motion for extension of time to complete the deposition of Defendants Saiph Consulting LLC and Paul Kosinski's (the “Saiph Defendants”) expert [DE 97] due to a purported document production issue, Plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order [DE 107] to prevent numerous depositions sought by Defendants, Defendant Noah Davis's expedited motion for stay or limitation of discovery [DE 121], Defendants’ motion for discovery sanctions against Plaintiffs [DE 123], and, most recently, on March 20, 2025, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel supplemental document discovery from the Leadenhall Defendants [DE 140]. While this was all being briefed, the parties filed numerous responses, replies, affidavits, declarations, documents, and Court-ordered joint notices in which they continued to bicker about every possible aspect of discovery in this case. All of this last-minute motion practice has required the Court to issue numerous expedited discovery related Orders [DE 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 108, 115, 117, 122, 124, 133, 138, 141, 142], some of them lengthy written Orders [DE 117, 139, 142], in a very short timeframe from February 20, 2025 to the present—not including this Order. The Court has had to hold two recent expedited discovery hearings, first on February 27, 2025, for 1 hour and 13 minutes [DE 116], and next on March 13, 2025, for 1 hour and 55 minutes [DE 133]. Because of the parties’ relentless discovery disputes, the Court extended the discovery cutoff date from March 20, 2025 to March 28, 2025, solely to allow the parties to take and complete depositions and produce documents. [DE 139 at 9]. No further extensions of the discovery cutoff date are warranted. The Court repeatedly warned the parties and their counsel that it would impose sanctions and/or cost-shifting as deemed necessary against dilatory or obstructionist parties and counsel and if discovery obligations and orders were not timely and fully met. Further, on March 19, 2025, after a hearing on a motion to compel brought by Defendants, the Court ordered Plaintiffs and their counsel to pay Defendants’ attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in seeking to compel the production of documents which Plaintiffs were dilatory in searching for and producing. Id. at 7. This all leads to Plaintiffs’ pending Motion [DE 140], filed on March 20, 2025—eight days before the limited extended discovery cutoff date of March 28, 2025. The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ Motion [DE 140], the Leadenhall Defendants’ Response [DE 143], and Plaintiffs’ Reply [DE 144]. The Court will not hold another hearing in this case as the parties do not deserve one. They have wasted enough of the Court's time with their discovery shenanigans. Moreover, a further hearing in this case is unnecessary as the Court can readily rule on the parties’ papers given the Court's familiarity with the parties’ incessant discovery disputes. And, it is crystal clear that a further hearing would be wholly unproductive as it would simply give the parties a further opportunity to bicker and cast aspersions on one another. II. MOTION, RESPONSE, AND REPLY Plaintiffs’ last-minute Motion [DE 140] seeks supplemental document discovery from the Leadenhall Defendants. The fact that Plaintiffs label their Motion as one for supplemental document discovery necessarily admits that they have received prior document discovery from the Leadenhall Defendants. That point aside, Plaintiffs demand that by March 28, 2025, the Leadenhall Defendants produce the following documents and perform the following searches: 1. that Leadenhall search the files of all its relevant custodians, Craig Gillespie, Luca Albertini, John Wells, Tom Spreutels, Tom Foot, and Phil Kane, as well as relevant personnel at King & Spalding LLP and Paul Hastings LLP and produce all responsive documents to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production Nos. 1–5, 7–8, 11, 13–17, 21–25, 27–28, 30, 32, 36, 41, 44–45, 49–52, without limitation; *3 2. that Leadenhall apply the modest set of search terms proposed in Plaintiffs’ March 3, 2025 letter and the time period adopted by this Court in its March 4, 2025 Order; and 3. that Leadenhall search all available document and data repositories (including, but not limited to, text messages) and certify that it has produced all responsive documents. Id. at 1. As to paragraph 1 above, Plaintiffs’ request for production dates back to December 31, 2024, when Plaintiffs admit they served their First Request for Production of Documents. Id. What followed were constant arguments, bickering, and disputes over discovery, which have caused the parties, especially Plaintiffs, to be in their current predicament, i.e., still fighting over discovery mere days before the limited extended discovery cutoff date and approximately eight weeks before trial. As to paragraphs 2 and 3 above, Plaintiffs demand more search terms, text message searches, and production. See id. The Leadenhall Defendants’ Response asserts that Plaintiffs’ Motion is untimely under the 28-day period set forth in Southern District of Florida Local Rule 26.1(g)(2)(A)(i). [DE 143 at 1]. Further, the Leadenhall Defendants assert that even if the Motion were timely, the Leadenhall Defendants have produced all the responsive documents from all the custodians Plaintiffs reference. Id. at 4. The Leadenhall Defendants assert that they have done a fulsome search and production. Id. at 3–5. Lastly, the Leadenhall Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Motion is completely meritless. See id. Plaintiffs’ Reply argues that the timeliness of its Motion should not be based on the 28-day period set forth in Southern District of Florida Local Rule 26.1(g)(2)(A)(i), but instead should be based on Local Rule 26.1(g)(2)(A)(iii). [DE 144 at 2]. In support, Plaintiffs argue that because the Leadenhall Defendants never served a Notice of Completion of Production, Local Rule 26.1(g)(2)(A)(iii) applies. Id. Plaintiffs state that their Motion is timely because they have 28 days from the service of the Leadenhall Defendants’ Notice of Completion, and because such a notice was never served, the 28-day period has not run. Id. Plaintiffs also argue that even if their Motion is untimely, this Court should nonetheless allow the Motion to proceed as they have made a showing of good cause. Id. at 4. III. ANALYSIS AND RULING The Court finds it interesting to note at the outset that the parties agreed to the entry of an ESI Protocol Order [DE 118]. Yet both sides claim the other parties violated the Order.[2] Seemingly, both Plaintiffs and the Leadenhall Defendants failed at various points to fully comply with the letter and spirit of the ESI Protocol and their discovery obligations. Both parties failed at various times to confer on discovery issues in good faith, played games with or delayed discussing search terms and custodians, tried to prevent numerous valid depositions, and generally made the discovery process as difficult, time-consuming, and protracted as possible. On balance, however, the Court finds that Plaintiffs were certainly more dilatory, obstructionist, and evasive than the Leadenhall Defendants during the discovery process.[3] The Court finds it hard to understand why Plaintiffs would file a lawsuit in this district, proceed to ignore this Court's instructions and orders as to discovery expectations and requirements, and then take steps to delay and frustrate discovery. Unfortunately, that is what occurred in this case. To the extent Plaintiffs claim that they have not received fulsome discovery, they have themselves to blame for this predicament. *4 The meet and confers engaged in by the parties’ counsel are textbook examples of how not to conduct a meet and confer. For example, the Leadenhall Defendants’ Response asserts that during the February 10, 2025 meet and confer, they asked Plaintiffs’ counsel to provide search terms but Plaintiffs’ counsel declined and further refused to engage in discussions about data depositories. [DE 143 at 3–4]. In Plaintiffs’ Reply, they admit that “Plaintiffs were in the process of developing their production parameters” and therefore “were not prepared to share their terms.” [DE 144 at 3]. This is a mere 40 days or so until the then-rapidly approaching discovery cutoff date of March 20, 2025. According to Plaintiffs, they did not share their search terms with the Leadenhall Defendants until March 4, 2025, shortly before the discovery cutoff date. Id. Unfortunately, this type of conduct and lack of cooperation by the parties has caused an excessive number of discovery disputes and issues in this case. In light of the conduct of Plaintiffs and their counsel, and considering the arguments of the parties, Plaintiffs’ Motion [DE 140; 145] is due to be denied in its entirety for several reasons. First, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Motion is untimely. Plaintiffs sat on their hands and delayed bringing the pending motion until the very last moment. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Motion fails under the 28-day period under Local Rule 26.1(g)(2)(A)(i). While Plaintiffs attempt to frame the issue as challenging the “sufficiency” of the Leadenhall Defendant's production, Plaintiffs, in reality, challenge the Leadenhall Defendant's responses and objections to discovery. Plaintiffs’ effort to try and get around their delay and dilatory conduct by parsing the local rules and altering the applicable facts fails. Plaintiffs’ own request for relief undermines their argument. As just one example, Plaintiffs ask the Court to compel the Leadenhall Defendants to produce documents to requests to which the Leadenhall Defendants objected. See DE 140 at 1; DE 143 at 2. Plaintiffs should have brought any issue on the objections to the Court much earlier. In sum, Plaintiffs waited far too long to raise the issues in their pending Motion with the Court, frustrated conferral, attempted to prevent their own discovery production, attempted to evade and delay numerous depositions, and then after being sanctioned for their discovery transgressions, brought this last-minute motion. Second, Plaintiffs argue that even if they violated the 28-day challenge period, the Court should still hear the Motion because they have made a “showing of good cause.” [DE 144 at 3]. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs have not come close to establishing good cause. Further, they have not established that they exercised due diligence as to the pending Motion. Third, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have received the discovery to which they are entitled in this case, and that any lack of receipt of discovery is due to the conduct of Plaintiffs and their counsel. On the facts and law, Plaintiffs’ Motion is meritless. Therefore, the Motion [DE 140; 145] is hereby DENIED. As of today, discovery in this case is now CLOSED. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach in the Southern District of Florida, this 28th day of March 2025. Footnotes [1] Plaintiffs initially filed a redacted version of the Motion [DE 140]. However, an unredacted version has also been filed. [DE 145]. [2] An ESI Protocol Order is supposed to streamline the production of Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”) in litigation. See, e.g., The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1, Cmt. 3.c, 79 (2018) (discussing how an agreed-upon protocol governing the production of ESI can avoid downstream misunderstandings or disputes). Ironically, in this case, the ESI Protocol Order has had the opposite effect—it has not resulted in any significant cooperation and has simply given the parties and their counsel one more thing to fight about during the discovery process. [3] The Court has previously ruled that sanctions in the form of cost-shifting are appropriately imposed against Plaintiffs and their counsel for their document search and production delays. [DE 139 at 5–8].