VICTORIA GUSTER-HINES and DOMINECA NEAL, Plaintiffs, v. McDONALD'S USA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, McDONALD'S CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, STEVEN EASTERBROOK, CHRISTOPHER KEMPCZINSKI, and CHARLES STRONG, Defendants No. 20 C 117 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division, EASTERN DIVISIONa Filed: July 11, 2024 Counsel Daniel Moore Twetten, Loevy & Loevy, Boulder, CO, Jonathan I. Loevy, Annie Davey Prossnitz, Gayle M. Horn, Heather Lewis Donnell, Margaret Gould, Quinn Rallins, Roshna Bala Keen, Steven Edwards Art, Megan Porter, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs. Atoyia S. Harris, Pro Hac Vice, Proskauer Rose LLP, New Orleans, LA, Edward Chester Young, Nigel F. Telman, Proskauer Rose LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants McDonald's USA, LLC, McDonald's Corporation. Desiree F. Moore, Daniel J. Hayes, Venable LLP, Chicago, IL, Ewa Anna Wojciechowska, Marvis Anthony Barnes, Nelson Hua, K&L Gates LLP, Chicago, IL, Allison Brooke Gotfried, Pro Hac Vice, Venable LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant Steven Easterbrook. Atoyia S. Harris, Pro Hac Vice, Proskauer Rose LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants Christopher Kempczinski, Charles Strong. Finnegan, Sheila, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Plaintiffs Victoria Guster-Hines and Domineca Neal are former employees of McDonald's USA, LLC (“McDonald's USA”), a subsidiary of parent company McDonald's Corporation. In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs charge McDonald's Corporation, McDonald's USA, and three current and former McDonald's executives (Steven Easterbrook, Christopher Kempczinski, and Charles Strong) with race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to compel the additional depositions of Plaintiffs and the production of documents (Doc. 428). For reasons set forth here, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. BACKGROUND[1] A. Initial Written Discovery and Depositions Plaintiffs retained the Carmen D. Caruso Law Firm on August 26, 2019 to evaluate potential claims they might have against McDonald's. They filed suit on January 7, 2020 and discovery commenced in August 2021. On September 3, 2021, Defendants served their first set of discovery requests seeking, among other things, all communications between Plaintiffs “predating the initiation of the Lawsuit which concern or relate to the allegations in the Complaint,” and “[a]ll diaries, journals, daily planners, personal records, and calendars, electronic or otherwise that evidence or relate to the allegations in the Complaint.” (Doc. 428-1, at 3, 4). In her November 5, 2021 responses to that discovery, Guster-Hines represented that she “has collected [her] texts from years 2012 through July 2020” and “will produce all relevant, non-privileged communications between Neal and Guster-Hines.” (Doc. 428-2, at 4).[2] On February 18, 2022, Neal provided her First Supplement to Defendants’ first set of interrogatories. (Doc. 430). Both Plaintiffs responded to Defendants’ second set of discovery requests in April 2022 and sat for their depositions in July 2022. During Neal's July 13, 2022 deposition, she testified that her responses to the second set of interrogatories were incomplete, necessitating a 23-page supplementation on July 29, 2022. (Doc. 431). A few months later, on September 2, 2022, Plaintiffs produced two privilege logs: one was for Neal and had 36 entries dating from August 26 to September 11, 2019 (Doc. 515-1), and the other was for Guster-Hines and had a single entry dated September 10, 2019. (Doc. 516-2). There are no bates numbers on the logs but several entries are described as “Attachments” to emails. B. Additional Supplementations and Depositions On January 22, 2023, Loevy & Loevy appeared in the case as new counsel for Plaintiffs. A few months later, on April 14, 2023, Neal provided a Second Supplement to her responses to Defendants’ first set of interrogatories. Both Plaintiffs then sat for second depositions, Neal on May 23, 2023 and Guster-Hines on June 12, 2023. Neal testified at her deposition that her discovery responses were now complete. (Doc. 428-7, at 5-6, Neal Dep., at 379-80). As it turns out, that was not accurate because Plaintiffs had never produced a large number of her text messages. Defendants discovered this during the July 18, 2023 deposition of William Lowery, when Plaintiffs asked him questions about those text messages. (Doc. 432). Plaintiffs’ counsel explained that Neal had given the text messages to prior counsel, and since they had been bates-stamped, current counsel did not realize they had not been produced. C. The Neal “Tracker” and Auto-Deletion of Guster-Hines’ Text Messages *2 On July 24, 2023, Plaintiffs produced to Defendants more than 800 pages of Neal's text messages with more than 400 separate text chains.[3] The text messages reference a “tracker” document that Neal prepared detailing her alleged experiences with discrimination, harassment, and retaliation at McDonald's (the “Neal Tracker”). (Doc. 428-10, at 2, Neal Text dated 12/13/2019). Defendants requested a copy of the Neal Tracker but Plaintiffs refused on the grounds of privilege. They also produced another privilege log consisting of two entries: (1) an Excel spreadsheet setting forth Neal's damages; and (2) the Neal Tracker. The log indicated the “Date” for the Neal Tracker was “N/A – multiple dates,” and identified Neal and Guster-Hines as “Author/Sender” with attorney Carmen Caruso as the Recipient. (Doc. 465-1, 9/22/2023 Privilege Log). The parties raised the dispute about the Neal Tracker in status reports and the Court conducted an in camera review of the document. Based on Plaintiffs’ representations that Neal did not create the Tracker until after she retained counsel on August 26, 2019, and that she prepared it specifically for counsel “in anticipation of litigation” (Doc. 370, at 22; Doc. 380, at 3), the Court declined to order Plaintiffs to produce the document to Defendants. (Doc. 382). In the meantime, in September 2023, Plaintiffs stated that Guster-Hines did not have access to her text messages because she failed to turn off the “auto-delete” feature on her phone. (Doc. 428-9, at 1-2). During a hearing on June 5, 2024, Plaintiffs’ current counsel further clarified that though Guster-Hines and her prior counsel represented that she had “collected” her texts back in November 2021 and would be producing them to Defendants, she apparently never collected anything because she claims to have had no access to any texts as a result of the auto-delete feature. D. Further Supplementation and Production of the Neal Tracker On October 16, 2023, the day written discovery closed, Guster-Hines provided a 9-page First Supplement to her responses to Defendants’ first set of interrogatories. (Doc. 434). The same day, Neal produced a 14-page Third Supplement to her responses to Defendants’ first set of interrogatories. (Doc. 433). Plaintiffs’ counsel expressly represented to defense counsel that Neal did not rely on the Neal Tracker in preparing the supplement. This representation proved to be inaccurate because Neal later acknowledged that she did rely on the Tracker. (Doc. 436). As a result, Plaintiffs withdrew the assertions of privilege over the Neal Tracker and produced it to Defendants on November 22, 2023. The Neal Tracker is a 15-page, single-spaced document with a detailed recitation of dates and factual events that occurred from mid-2015 through September 11, 2019. (Doc. 435). The document is written in 8.5-point font, and most of the pages have some 58 lines of text. The Neal Tracker references another tracking document prepared by Guster-Hines, stating “(see Vicki summary for date but it was pre the ReOrg).” (Doc. 435, at 2). E. The Motion to Compel and Fourth Privilege Log Defendants filed a motion seeking to compel Plaintiffs to produce a copy of the Vicki summary referenced in the Neal Tracker, arguing that it is not privileged, any privilege has been waived, and to the extent it is protected solely by the work product doctrine, they have a substantial need for the document. Defendants also seek to re-depose Neal and Guster-Hines about discovery that was produced after they sat for their previous depositions. (Doc. 428). When Plaintiffs responded to the motion on January 10, 2024, they submitted a fourth privilege log that included three entries related to the Vicki summary: one is for a “memorandum to legal counsel referred to as summary,” and two reflect additions to that memorandum. (Doc. 465-2, 1/10/2024 Privilege Log). The log identified Guster-Hines as the sole author of these documents with counsel as recipients, and gave the “Date” as “N/A – multiple dates.” (Id.). F. Plaintiffs’ Affidavits and Updated Privilege Log During a May 17, 2024 hearing on the motion, the Court raised concerns about the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ privilege logs that had been provided to the Court, which did not sufficiently identify the dates, authors, and recipients of the Neal Tracker and the Vicki summary, and about a lack of clarity as to the circumstances surrounding the creation and modification of those documents. The Court ordered Plaintiffs to amend the log and provide sworn affidavits explaining the history of the Tracker and Vicki summary. (Doc. 504). Plaintiffs submitted declarations and a fifth privilege log on May 30, 2024. (Doc. 512). The Court heard additional argument on June 5, 2024, and the next day Plaintiffs submitted another revised privilege log (the sixth) (Doc. 515-3) and amended declarations (Docs. 515-4, 515-5), clarifying that the Vicki summary consists of the following documents: (1) a memorandum to counsel created between September 7 and 10, 2019 titled “Privilege and Confidential Attorneys Caruso Chatman Letter of Complaint” (“Letter of Complaint”); (2) a supplement to the Letter of Complaint titled “Caruso & Chatman Letter of Complaint – Additions” created on September 21, 2019; and (3) a separate “example and memorandum” also created on September 21, 2019 and titled “Juan Marcos (1)[2926].” (Doc. 515-5, Guster-Hines 6/6/2024 Decl. ¶¶ 3, 18, 19, 23, 24). For ease of reference, this opinion will refer to the three documents collectively as the “Guster-Hines Tracker.” Plaintiffs also represented in the June 6, 2024 submission that the Letter of Complaint appears on the September 2, 2022 Neal privilege log as entry 8, “Attachment to Email 7.” (Doc. 515 ¶ 2). DISCUSSION *3 “A party may file a motion to compel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 whenever another party fails to respond to a discovery request or when its response is insufficient.” Gebka v. Allstate Corp., No. 19 C 6662, 2021 WL 825612, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2021) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)). A “district court exercises significant discretion in ruling on a motion to compel and it is not limited to either compelling or not compelling a discovery request.” Id. (quoting Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1996)). In considering a motion to compel, the court “should independently determine the proper course of discovery based upon the arguments of the parties and fashion a ruling appropriate for the circumstances of the case.” Id. I. The Guster-Hines Tracker Defendants argue that the Guster-Hines Tracker should be produced because it is not protected by the attorney-client or work product privileges, and any privilege has been waived. (Doc. 428, at 11-16; Doc. 465, at 10-12). The attorney-client privilege protects “communications made in confidence by a client and a client's employees to an attorney, acting as an attorney, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.” Sandra T.E. v. South Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2010). To determine if a communication falls within the protection of the attorney-client privilege, we ask: (1) whether “legal advice of any kind [was] sought ... from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such”; and (2) whether the communication was “relat[ed] to that purpose” and “made in confidence ... by the client.” Id. (citing United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir. 1997)). “The party seeking to invoke the privilege bears the burden of establishing that the privilege applies,” Green v. Meeks, No. 20-CV-463-SPM, 2023 WL 1447817, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2023), and must show that “the confidential nature of the communication was not compromised by disclosure to individuals outside the attorney-client relationship.” Acosta v. Target Corp., 281 F.R.D. 314, 321 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 490-91 (7th Cir. 2007)). Rule 26(b)(3)(A), which codifies the work product doctrine, provides that “a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). See also Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. AXA Versicherung, 320 F.R.D. 158, 163 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (quoting Sandra T.E., 600 F.3d at 618) (the work product doctrine protects “documents prepared ‘in anticipation of litigation for the purpose of analyzing and preparing a client's case.’ ”). The work product doctrine provides only a qualified immunity from discovery and material that constitutes ordinary or fact work product may be discovered upon a showing of substantial need and an inability to obtain substantially equivalent information without undue hardship. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). A. The Tracker is Privileged Plaintiffs argue that, like Neal, Guster-Hines prepared her Tracker at the behest of prior counsel, after she retained them on August 26, 2019, for the purposes of obtaining legal advice “in anticipation of filing the complaint.” (Doc. 453, at 9). Guster-Hines confirmed this in her June 6, 2024 declaration, attesting that no version of the Tracker (including its three components) existed before she retained counsel, and she alone created the document for counsel at their request to assist in evaluating her legal case. (Doc. 515-5, Guster-Hines 6/6/2024 Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 7, 10, 18, 20, 23, 30). Defendants have not provided any persuasive reason to dispute these representations and based on the Court's in camera review of the document, it is protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. In light of this conclusion, the Court need not address whether the Guster-Hines Tracker is also protected by the work product doctrine, or whether Defendants have a substantial need for the document sufficient to overcome that privilege. B. Waiver *4 Defendants argue that production is still warranted because Guster-Hines waived the privilege by (1) failing to include her tracker on a privilege log for more than two years, and (2) voluntarily producing the Neal Tracker. Neither argument is persuasive. 1. Privilege Log Courts have found that “[a] timely and adequate privilege log is required by the federal rules, and the failure to serve an adequate and timely privilege log may result in a waiver of any protection from discovery.” Rao v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., No. 14 C 0066, 2016 WL 6124436, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2016) (citing Babych v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 603, 608 (N.D. Ill. 2010)). “A court must make a ‘case-by-case determination’ of whether privilege should be waived.” Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Hytera Communications Corp, No. 17 C 1973, 2018 WL 1281393, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2018). In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not list the Guster-Hines Tracker on a privilege log until they responded to the instant motion in January 2024. Plaintiffs initially conceded the point but insisted that the delay was insufficient to find waiver because they were not required to “log all communications or attorney work product with their counsel during the course of litigating this matter.” (Doc. 453, at 11). During the June 5, 2024 hearing, the parties’ argument focused on pre-litigation communications. Defense counsel denied there was any understanding or agreement with Plaintiffs’ prior attorneys that pre-litigation communications they had with their clients did not need to be logged. This is borne out by the fact that Plaintiffs’ September 2, 2022 privilege logs consist entirely of pre-litigation communications between Plaintiffs and their counsel from August 26 to September 11, 2019. (Doc. 515-1, Neal 9/2/2022 Privilege Log; Doc. 516-1, Guster-Hines 9/2/2022 Privilege Log). Defendants represented at the hearing that the McDonald's privilege log similarly includes 218 entries for pre-litigation communications with attorneys. Unlike Plaintiffs’ log, moreover, the McDonald's log expressly stated that it “excludes attorney-client and/or work product communications and documents prepared by counsel of Proskauer and/or McDonald's that came into existence subsequent to the commencement of the action on January 7, 2020,” but that McDonald's maintained privilege over such communications. Regardless, the day after the hearing, on June 6, 2024, Plaintiffs newly reported that at least a portion of the Guster-Hines Tracker in fact had been logged back in 2022, albeit on the so-called Neal log. More specifically, entry 8 on the September 2, 2022 Neal log described as “Attachment to Email 7” is said to be the Letter of Complaint (i.e., the “Privilege and Confidential Attorneys Caruso Chatman Letter of Complaint”). (Doc. 515 ¶ 2) (“[A] prior version [of the Letter of Complaint] is already logged as Entry No. 8 on the September [2], 2022 privilege log.”).[4] It is surprising that Plaintiffs’ current counsel did not report this fact earlier in the briefing of this motion. After all, the motion asserted waiver of the privilege based on the failure to log the Guster-Hines tracker until January 2024. That said, Defendants did not raise concerns with this Court about the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ earlier logs until they filed this motion in December 2023. As it stands, Defendants have not provided any basis for doubting Plaintiffs’ representation that the Letter of Complaint was included in the log provided in September 2022, so the waiver argument premised on the failure to identify this document on a log until January 2024 is unfounded. *5 With respect to the other two documents comprising the Guster-Hines Tracker (“Caruso & Chatman Letter of Complaint – Additions” and “Juan Marcos (1)[2926]”), Plaintiffs did not log them until January 10, 2024, but both were prepared around the same time as the Letter of Complaint and both are supplements to that document. In such circumstances, and given the timely logging of the Letter of Complaint in 2022, the Court is not convinced that the delay in logging the supplements supports a finding of waiver. Compare Surgery Ctr. at 900 N. Michigan Ave., LLC v. American Physicians Ass. Corp., Inc., 317 F.R.D. 620, 631-33 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (finding waiver where the defendants failed to produce any privilege log for more than four months after the discovery responses were due and “worst of all, two weeks after counsel for the defendants had assured the court that a log had already been produced,” and once produced the log descriptions were inadequate to establish privilege); Rao, 2016 WL 6124436, at *7-8 (finding waiver where the defendants claimed privilege over the entire contents of two investigative files but did not log either the files or the specific documents within them, then produced inadequate logs without taking steps to review the files themselves in order to determine which portions were protected and which were not).[5] 2. Voluntary Waiver Defendants next argue that the voluntary disclosure of the Neal Tracker resulted in waiver of any privilege over the Guster-Hines Tracker. Defendants once again note that the Neal Tracker directly references the Guster-Hines Tracker in one place, and say they believe Neal relied on that document in supplementing her interrogatory responses. (Doc. 428, at 13). As Defendants explain, the Neal Tracker mentions a statement Charlie Strong made during an NBMOA meeting in Houston and states “see Vicki summary for date.” (Doc. 435). Then Neal's Third Supplement to Defendants’ first set of interrogatories clarifies that the alleged statement was made on or about March 21 and 22, 2018. (Doc. 433, at 7). Defendants assume from this that Neal relied on the Guster-Hines Tracker in supplying the updated information. (Doc. 428, at 13). This argument is unavailing because Plaintiffs represent that neither Neal nor Guster-Hines relied on the Guster-Hines Tracker in preparing their interrogatory answers. (Doc. 453, at 11, 12; Doc. 515-5, Guster-Hines 6/6/2024 Decl. ¶ 33). Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs should produce the Guster-Hines Tracker under the theory of subject matter waiver. (Doc. 428, at 14). “Subject matter waiver is reserved for those situations where ‘fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected information, in order to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the adversary.’ ” RTC Indus., Inc. v. Fasteners for Retail, Inc., No. 17 C 3595, 2020 WL 1148813, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2020) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 502 Explanatory Note, subdivision (a)). “Determining whether the undisclosed material ought to be considered with the disclosed material requires a case-specific analysis of the subject matter and adversaries.” Id. (quoting Appleton Papers, Inc. v. E.P.A., 702 F.3d 1018, 1026 (7th Cir. 2012)). See also Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup, Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“There is no bright line test for determining what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver.”). *6 Defendants note that Plaintiffs submitted a privilege log identifying both Neal and Guster-Hines as the “Author/Sender” of the Neal Tracker document (Doc. 465-1), and made a comment about “our tracker” in text messages to each other. (Doc. 428-10, at 2, Neal Text dated 12/13/2019) (“Add another win to our tracker.”). That joint designation, Defendants contend, demonstrates that both Plaintiffs waived privilege not only over the Neal Tracker but also over “the shared subject matter of both trackers.” (Doc. 428, at 13, 14) (stating that the trackers consist of “a record of the alleged factual underpinnings of both Plaintiffs’ claims.”). In Defendants’ view, the trackers “ought to be considered together” because “Plaintiffs’ contemporaneous recollections of the same events in their respective trackers clearly constitute the same subject matter.” (Doc. 465, at 14) (emphasis in original). To begin, Plaintiffs have made clear that Guster-Hines had no involvement in the preparation of the Neal Tracker. In her June 6, 2024 declaration, Neal stated that “[n]o other person, including Ms. Guster-Hines, created, assisted with, modified, or was otherwise involved in, the creation or drafting of” the Neal Tracker. (Doc. 515-4, Neal 6/6/2024 Decl. ¶¶ 7, 32). Neal did send Guster-Hines a prior version of the Neal Tracker on September 8, 2019, but “[Neal] did not ask [Guster-Hines] to edit or modify the document and [Guster-Hines] did not edit or modify its contents.” (Doc. 515-5, Guster-Hines 6/6/2024 Decl. ¶ 12; Doc. 515-4, Neal 6/6/2024 Decl. ¶ 13). It is unclear why the September 22, 2023 privilege log identified Guster-Hines as an “Author/Sender” of the Neal Tracker, or what Plaintiffs meant when they referred to “our tracker.” In any event, Plaintiffs’ declarations demonstrate that Neal alone waived the privilege over the Neal Tracker, a document that she alone created, by relying on it in preparing her third supplemental interrogatory responses. Since there is no evidence that either Plaintiff relied on the Guster-Hines Tracker (or that Guster-Hines relied on the Neal Tracker) to answer discovery, and Guster-Hines is identified on Plaintiffs’ privilege logs as the sole author of the Guster-Hines Tracker (Docs. 465-2, 512-3, 515-3), Neal's waiver as to the Neal Tracker does not reasonably extend to Guster-Hines’ entirely separate tracker. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, moreover, fairness does not dictate that they be allowed to “test the assertions in the Neal Tracker with the full context of Guster-Hines’ experiences with the same events or individuals.” (Doc. 465, at 15). Though both trackers broadly address Plaintiffs’ experiences with discrimination, harassment, and retaliation at McDonald's, the Court's in camera review confirmed that the contents are not so similar that the Neal Tracker creates a “selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of [Defendants].” RTC Indus., 2020 WL 1148813, at *10 (finding waiver where the plaintiff gained a “tactical advantage” by using certain privileged emails to advance its claims while withholding other privileged documents that could provide “an important context for proper understanding of the” emails). Finally, given Plaintiffs’ affirmation that they did not create the trackers until after retaining counsel on August 26, 2019, neither document can be said to provide Plaintiffs’ contemporaneous recollections of events occurring prior to that date. Compare Santelli v. Electro-Motive, No. 97 C 5702, 1999 WL 717824, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1999) (defendant had a substantial need for the “compilation of daily calendars on which plaintiff made entries relating to both personal and work matters as they were “likely the only contemporaneous record that plaintiff has of events involving her work at Electro-Motive.”). And Plaintiffs represent that they have produced any underlying materials they consulted in drafting the trackers. (Doc. 515-4, Neal 6/6/2024 Decl. ¶ 10; Doc. 515-5, Guster-Hines 6/6/2024 Decl. ¶ 9). Defendants may inquire at the upcoming depositions into the circumstances surrounding when and how the trackers came to exist, including any statements made in Plaintiffs’ declarations, but on the current record, the Guster-Hines Tracker itself is privileged and not subject to disclosure. II. Plaintiffs’ Additional Depositions *7 Defendants also seek to compel Plaintiffs to sit for additional depositions. Rule 30(d)(1) limits the length of depositions to one day of seven hours, but a court must “allow additional time consistent with Rule 26(b)(1) and (2) if needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, another person, or any other circumstance impedes or delays the examination.” Apollo v. Stasinopoulos, No. 18 C 6475, 2021 WL 1414090, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2021) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1)). The party requesting additional time must show “good cause” to reopen a deposition. Id. (quoting Mother and Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 2003)). It is within this court's broad discretion to determine whether circumstances warrant additional deposition time. Id. As noted, Plaintiffs have produced a substantial amount of new discovery since they were deposed in July 2022 and again in May/June 2023. Specifically, Plaintiffs: (1) produced 830 pages containing more than 400 text message chains from Neal; (2) confirmed that there are no texts available from Guster-Hines even though she said she would collect and produce them back in 2021; (3) produced 10 pages of supplemental interrogatory responses; (4) produced the 15-page single-spaced Neal Tracker; and (5) produced declarations related to the Neal and Guster-Hines Trackers. Plaintiffs concede that this new production establishes good cause to reopen their depositions. (Doc. 453, at 2). The only dispute concerns the length and scope of the questioning. A. Neal Defendants initially asked to re-depose Neal on three topics: (1) her belatedly-produced text messages, (2) her Third Supplement to her responses to Defendants’ first set of interrogatories, and (3) the Neal Tracker. (Doc. 428, at 9). At the June 5, 2024 hearing, Defendants indicated they were also seeking to ask Neal about her May 30, 2024 declaration, which she amended on June 6, 2024. (Docs. 512-1, 515-4). Plaintiffs do not object to these categories but want to preclude Defendants from inquiring about any matters or topics on which Neal has already been deposed. (Doc. 453, at 3, 7). This Court agrees with Defendants that such a restriction is unworkable. First, newly-produced documents and information may bear on a topic explored during a prior deposition. Second, it is unlikely that the parties will agree on which matters or topics were covered in previous depositions, as both terms can be construed either very narrowly (e.g., a specific incident that occurred), or extremely broadly (e.g., discrimination at the workplace). (Doc. 465, at 7). Finally, the Court is not in a position to preemptively conclude that entire deposition topics are off limits without knowing the full extent of the previous testimony and the newly-produced materials. And attempting to fashion limits would inevitably lead to disputes during the deposition followed by more litigation, expense and delay. For all of these reasons, the Court declines to impose the suggested limits on the deposition topics. As for the appropriate time limit, Defendants are asking for seven hours to re-depose Neal, while Plaintiffs argue that three and a half hours is more than sufficient. (Doc. 428, at 10; Doc. 453, at 7-8). Given the volume of new materials produced and Neal's changing representations about her reliance on the Neal Tracker in answering discovery, the Court will allow seven hours for the deposition. Compare Colon v. Town of Cicero, No. 12 C 5481, 2017 WL 164377, at *2, 3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2017) (allowing three hours to question a deponent about 18 pages of belatedly produced materials). B. Guster-Hines *8 Turning to Guster-Hines, Defendants initially argued that they should be allowed to re-depose her concerning four topics: (1) her October 16, 2023 First Supplement to Defendant's first set of interrogatories; (2) how her text messages came to be deleted without being collected and produced; (3) Neal's text messages; and (4) the Neal Tracker and Neal's Third Supplement to her responses to Defendants’ first set of interrogatories. At the June 5, 2024 hearing, Defendants indicated they were also seeking to ask Guster-Hines about her May 30, 2024 declaration, which she amended on June 6, 2024. (Docs. 512-2, 515-5). Plaintiffs agree to inquiries about the first three categories and the declarations, but once again want to stop Defendants from asking questions on matters or topics about which Guster-Hines has already been deposed. (Doc. 453, at 2, 3). For reasons stated, the Court rejects that restriction. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants should not be allowed to question Guster-Hines about the Neal Tracker. In support, they note that Guster-Hines says that she did not rely on the Neal Tracker to draft any of her supplemental interrogatory responses or to prepare for her deposition. (Doc. 453, at 5; Doc. 512-2, Guster-Hines 5/30/2024 Decl. ¶ 34; Doc. 515-5, Guster-Hines 6/6/2024 Decl. ¶ 35) (“I did not ... rely on [the Neal Tracker] when I was supplementing my interrogatory responses in the fall of 2023.”). It may turn out that Guster-Hines has little to say about the Neal Tracker, but Defendants are entitled to ask her questions about all documents produced in discovery. With respect to Neal's updated discovery responses, Plaintiffs offer no reason why Defendants should be prohibited from asking Guster-Hines questions about that document and any objection is therefore overruled. Defendants initially asked to re-depose Guster-Hines for at least four hours. (Doc. 428, at 16). At the June 5, 2024 hearing, Defendants increased the request to five hours, arguing that additional time is necessary to question Guster-Hines about her new declaration(s). Plaintiffs agree to a re-deposition of no more than two hours. Given the volume of new materials produced, including 138 pages of text messages from Neal that concern Guster-Hines, as well as the spoliation of Guster-Hines’ own text messages, the Court will allow four hours for Guster-Hines’ deposition. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Compel the Additional Depositions of Plaintiffs and the Production of Documents [428] is granted in part and denied in part. Footnotes [1] This opinion assumes the reader's familiarity with the allegations in the case and addresses relevant facts only as necessary to resolve the instant motion. See, e.g., Guster-Hines v. McDonald's USA, LLC, No. 20 C 117, 2021 WL 2633303 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2021). [2] The Court does not have a copy of Neal's responses but surmises that she similarly agreed to collect and produce her text messages. [3] Plaintiffs supplemented the text message production on September 18, 2023 after current counsel “reviewed them to ensure all responsive communications were produced.” (Doc. 453, at 4). [4] Plaintiffs do not indicate whether the Neal Tracker also appears on the September 2, 2022 log but since the document has been produced the timing of that disclosure does not affect the analysis here. [5] In light of this conclusion, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ assertion that waiver is only appropriate if the party authoring the privilege log has displayed willfulness, bad faith, or fault. (Doc. 453, at 11). The Court notes, however, that the cases Plaintiffs rely on all considered the appropriateness of finding a blanket waiver of privilege over all documents on a privilege log as a discovery sanction, as opposed to the discrete document at issue here. See Am. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc'y of U.S., 406 F.3d 867, 873, 877-80 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing “global-disclosure sanction” where court struck entire privilege log based on an “arbitrary” in camera sampling of documents to determine the percentage that had been wrongly designated as privileged); Muro v. Target Corp., 250 F.R.D. 350 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (declining to find waiver as to every document listed on a privilege log as a sanction for the log being inadequate).