REFAEL AHARON, as an individual and as GUARDIAN on behalf of O.A. and I.A., minor children,1 Plaintiffs, v. SUSANY BABU and SONU ABRAHAM, Defendants No. 22 CV 4502 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division, EASTERN DIVISION Filed: September 13, 2023 Kim, Young B., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER Before the court is Defendants’ motion for protective order. In this diversity action, Plaintiff Rafael Aharon (“Aharon”) sues his former landlords alleging that he and his children suffer health problems because of exposure to undisclosed toxins at their rental house in Naperville, Illinois (the “Property”). According to Aharon, Defendants were aware of the presence of the alleged toxins at the Property but failed to disclose them to him or mitigate the issues after Aharon complained of their presence. Aharon and his family eventually moved out in October 2021—only months after moving into the Property in June 2021—allegedly because of Defendants’ inaction. Aharon filed his complaint in August 2022, (R. 1), and seven counts remain, (R. 38, Am. Compl.). Defendants filed the current motion for protective order in response to a cascade of written discovery requests and subpoenas Aharon issued. In the main, Defendants argue that many of Aharon's requests—consisting of three sets of interrogatories, four sets of document requests, a set of requests for admissions, a request for inspection, and a request for disclosures that Defendants say they already made—are duplicative and unduly burdensome, and that Aharon has harassed and threatened non-party individuals in an effort to obtain information he wants. (See generally R. 74, Defs.’ Mot.) Defendants ask the court to “limit or suspend” Aharon's “ability to issue discovery requests” and/or enter sanctions against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and the court's inherent authority. (Id. at 2.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part: Analysis Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 generally allows for broad discovery into matters that are or could be relevant, while permitting court intervention when discovery is too sweeping or unduly burdensome. In particular, Rule 26(c)(1) warns that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including by “forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(D). The party seeking a protective order must show “good cause,” which generally means a “sound basis or legitimate need” for judicial intervention. Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D. 226, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1997). As with all discovery matters, the court has broad discretion to determine if and to what extent a protective order is required. See Thermal Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Heating, Refrig. & Air-Cond. Engrs., Inc., 755 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2014). The court begins its analysis by addressing Defendants’ argument that a protective order is appropriate because Aharon's written discovery requests pose an undue burden and expense and are duplicative. The court is cautious about prematurely foreclosing legitimate avenues of discovery, particularly for a pro se litigant like Aharon. That said, the court has a duty to limit discovery that is cumulative, unnecessary, excessively expensive, only marginally important, or that is designed to annoy or harass. Mr. Frank, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. 80 CV 3498, 1983 WL 1859, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 1983); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). However, this court already ruled on August 18, 2023, that Defendants are not required to respond to any written discovery requests Aharon served on them after the April 15, 2023 deadline, unless Aharon seeks and obtains leave of court to serve them—which he has and the court ruled on the same. (See R. 97; R. 112.) As such, Defendants’ motion is moot to the extent it seeks to limit or suspend Aharon's ability to serve additional written discovery. (R. 74, Defs.’ Mot. at 2.) But the court cautions Aharon to review the guidelines set forth above before seeking leave to serve additional discovery and to keep in mind that (1) “[t]he discovery rules are not a ticket ... to an unlimited, never-ending exploration of every conceivable matter that captures [a litigant's] interest,” and (2) “[p]arties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to investigate the facts—and no more.” Robinson v. Stanley, No. 06 CV 5158, 2009 WL 3233909, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2009). *2 Next is Defendants’ request for a protective order preventing or limiting Aharon's ability to seek information from third parties. The court notes at the outset that Defendants’ motion in this regard resembles a motion to quash three non-party subpoenas Aharon has served thus far, but that “[t]he law is clear that generally, a party does not have standing” to do so. Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 291 F.R.D. 181, 187 (N.D. Ill. 2013). And while a party that lacks standing to challenge a subpoena under Rule 45 may yet “achieve a similar end under Rule 26” by requesting a protective order relating to third party discovery, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., No. 16 CV 4161, 2017 WL 5478297, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2017) (internal quotation and citations omitted) (collecting cases), this court has already denied Aharon's motions to compel documents from subpoena respondents Chicagoland Brokers, Inc. (“CBI”) and the Chicago Board of Education, (R. 96; R. 112). As for the third subpoena served on Defendants’ former tenants, Defendants do not meaningfully challenge its scope or attach a copy of the same to the motion. The remainder of Defendants’ third party discovery complaints relate to Aharon's tactics to obtain information. First, Defendants make much of the fact that Aharon initially contacted third parties directly and without a subpoena to obtain information in connection with his case. But there is nothing inherently wrong with seeking information from third parties on an informal basis, so the court declines to prevent him from doing so, provided he otherwise complies with the remainder of this and the court's other orders. Second, Defendants complain that Aharon subsequently sent subpoenas to some of these third parties. (See R. 74, Defs.’ Mot. at 12.) But this was appropriate from a procedural standpoint and Defendants themselves instructed him to do so in a cease and desist letter they attach to their motion. (Id. Ex. G.) However, certain of Aharon's statements and actions toward third parties are questionable, including to the extent he repeatedly attempted to contact certain former tenants and implied that the court commanded their appearance or participation in this lawsuit, and suggested to a representative at CBI that the Property could not be leased or sold during the pendency of this lawsuit. Notably, while Aharon represents in his brief that he “never stated that there is court order regarding the Property” to either the former tenants or CBI, (R. 87, Aharon's Resp. at 6 (emphasis in original)), Ewa Rak of CBI testified in an affidavit that Aharon represented to her that Defendants “were not permitted to lease or sell the Property due to the ongoing litigation and implied that there was a Court order prohibiting them from doing so,” and Defendants attach emails from Aharon to the former tenants advising them of the lawsuit and indicating that “[a] Federal judge recommended that I'll talk with you” and “the fact that you are not willing to talk with me might raise few questions,” (see R. 74, Defs.’ Mot. Exs. C & E). The court thus admonishes Aharon to take care in his interactions with those he contacts in connection with this case and orders him to file a motion seeking leave of court before serving any additional third party subpoenas. But Defendants’ motion for protective order with respect to third party discovery is otherwise denied. So too is their request for sanctions. The court's authority to sanction a party stems from Rule 37(b), which permits sanctions against a party that “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,” among other things, and a court's inherent power to “fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991). Available sanctions under Rule 37 range from a monetary award to dismissal of the case, Linda Dou v. Carillon Tower/Chicago LP, No. 18 CV 7865, 2020 WL 3036002, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2020), but whether invoking Rule 37 or exercising its inherent power, sanctions must be “proportionate to the circumstances,” Donelson v. Hardy, 931 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2019). *3 Defendants contend that sanctions are appropriate here because Aharon's discovery requests have been excessive, and in attempting to obtain information from third parties without a subpoena and then issuing subpoenas to the same third parties—as well as additional entities that lack information about the case—Aharon acted “solely” to “harass[ ] and embarrass[ ] Defendants in a brazen abuse of the discovery process.” (R. 74, Defs.’ Mot. at 12.) As discussed, the court agrees that certain of Aharon's discovery tactics at least appear untoward. But the court is not convinced at this stage that those tactics were intended to “harass and embarrass” Defendants as they allege, let alone that Aharon “willfully abused the judicial process or otherwise conducted litigation in bad faith” so as to justify sanctions pursuant to its inherent powers, particularly given Aharon's pro se status. Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 661-62 (7th Cir. 2012); see Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (noting that “[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion”). Defendants also fail to point to any order that Aharon violated that would make sanctions appropriate under Rule 37(b)(2). Accordingly, the request for sanctions is denied at this time, but the court cautions Aharon that Defendants may renew their request if later circumstances justify the imposition of sanctions. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for protective order is granted in part and denied in part. Footnotes [1] The court uses the description of “Plaintiffs” as it appears in the caption from the operative complaint. (R. 38, Am. Compl.)