Amber Philhower, et al. v. Herman N. Philhower, et al Case No. 8:24-cv-00074-MRA (JDEx) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed October 15, 2024 Early, John D., United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order re Motions to Quash (Dkt. 79, 81, 83) I. INTRODUCTION *1 Amber Philhower (“A. Philhower”), Medical Air Care, Inc. (“MAC”), and HNP Associates, LLC (“Plaintiffs”) initiated this action on December 7, 2023, by filing a Complaint in Orange County Superior Court against Herman N. Philhower (“H. Philhower”), Penn Air Control, Inc. (“PAC”), Rachel G. Medel, Andrew J. Shaginaw, and Marco A. Galvez (collectively, “Defendants”) asserting, among other claims, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. (“RICO”). Dkt. 1-1 (“Complaint”). Defendant H. Philhower removed the action to this Court on January 21, 2024, arguing the Complaint arises under federal law due to the RICO claims. Dkt. 1. On March 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 26, “FAC”) asserting claims for declaratory relief, fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, identity theft, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, conversion, unjust enrichment, money had and received, RICO conspiracy, and a substantive RICO claim. On March 22, 2024, Defendants, in three motions, moved to dismiss the FAC. Dkt. 30, 32, 34. On May 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Errata, identifying an erroneous date in the FAC and removing two attorneys from the FAC, with a “Corrected Amended Complaint.” Dkt. 56, 56-1. On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs separately filed the “Corrected Amended Complaint,” for which a deficiency notice was issued. Dkt. 58, 62. On September 19, 2024, Defendant PAC filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena served by Plaintiffs on non-party Automatic Data Processing, Inc. (“ADP”) (Dkt. 79, “ADP Motion”) and Defendant H. Philhower filed two Motions to Quash Subpoenas served by Plaintiffs upon non-parties J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A. (“Chase”) (Dkt. 81, “Chase Motion”) and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“WFB”) (Dkt. 83, “WFB Motion”) (collectively, all three motions, “Motions”), with three Local Rule 37-2.2 Joint Stipulations (Dkt. 80, 82, 84), supporting and opposing declarations and exhibits (Dkt. 79-1, 80-1, 80-2, 81-1, 82-1, 82,-2, 83-1, 84-1, 84-2. Per the Court's briefing order (Dkt. 85), PAC and H. Philhower (“Moving Defendants”) filed a Local Rule 37-2.3 Supplemental Memorandum relating to the Motions. Dkt. 86. Plaintiffs did not timely file a supplemental memorandum. The Motions are now fully briefed. The Court finds the Motions may be appropriately decided without oral argument, vacates the hearing, and rules as follows. II. RELEVANT LAW “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). Relevance under Rule 26(b)(1) is defined broadly. See Snipes v. United States, 334 F.R.D. 548, 550 (N.D. Cal. 2020); V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 309 (D. Nev. 2019), aff'd sub nom. V5 Techs., LLC v. Switch, LTD., 2020 WL 1042515 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2020) (noting that relevance for discovery purposes remains broad even after the 2015 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Moreover, “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Rule 26(b)(1). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted). *2 Although relevance for discovery purposes is defined very broadly, it is not without boundaries. See Rule 26(b)(2); see, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“District courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in fishing expeditions.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)). “[I]nformation is ‘relevant’ if it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or any other party, or to the credibility of any witness.” Cable & Computer Tech., Inc. v. Lockheed Saunders, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 646, 650 (C.D. Cal. 1997)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 401 (evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence in determining the action more or less probable then it would be without the evidence). District courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Mfg. Automation & Software Sys., Inc. v. Hughes, 2017 WL 5641120, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)). Rule 45(d) provides various bases upon which a person subject to or affected by a federal subpoena may move to quash or limit such subpoena. Generally, “a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.” Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 638, 643 (E.D. Cal. 2014); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Ordinarily a party has no standing to seek to quash a subpoena issued to someone who is not a party to the action, unless the objecting party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought.” (quoting Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, 9A Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2459 (3d ed. 2008))); Lee v. Lee, 2020 WL 7890868, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020) (“[O]nly the party to which the subpoena is directed has standing to object to the requests on the grounds that they are irrelevant, vague, overbroad, duplicative, unduly burdensome, etc.”). A party therefore generally lacks standing to object a subpoena served on a third party on grounds of relevance or undue burden. See Krenitsky v. Kirsch, 2020 WL 5017270, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020); Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC, 2020 WL 1181491, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2020). But party who claims a privilege, including a claim of privacy rights, covering the items sought, does have standing to challenge a subpoena served upon a third party. See, e.g., Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74; Doe v. City of San Diego, 2013 WL 2338713, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2013) (concluding a party has standing to quash a third-party subpoena because the party “asserted a privacy interest in the records sought by the ... subpoena”). On a timely motion, a court must quash or modify a subpoena that “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception ore waiver applies.” Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iii). Separately, a person from whom discovery is sought may move for an order limiting or forbidding discovery “for good cause” to protect the moving party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense. Rule 26(c)(1). A party seeking to limit discovery has a “heavy burden” of showing why discovery should be limited. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 436, 437 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992)). A party resisting discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429); see La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence”). “[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper—especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.” A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996)). III. DISCUSSION A. The ADP Motion *3 In the ADP Motion, PAC seeks to quash a subpoena directed to ADP as to Request for Documents Nos. 3 and 6, which seek “All DOCUMENTS from January 1, 2010, to the present related to PAC personnel files, including but not limited to employees' hiring, employment history, payroll records, disciplinary actions, and termination” (No. 3) and “All COMMUNICATIONS from January 1, 2010 to the present between YOU and anyone acting on behalf of PAC” (No. 6). PAC submitted a declaration of its Chief Financial Officer attesting that PAC has 70 employees, over the past 14 years has had from 70-100 employees, and the records maintained by ADP for PAC include employee personally identifying information, tax forms and records, marital status, number of dependents, spousal support orders, if any, immigration status, and bank and retirement account information. Dkt. 79-1. To start, although Plaintiffs are correct to note that ADP is not challenging the subpoena (see Dkt. 80 at 18, 26) and assert that PAC lacks standing to quash a subpoena directed to ADP based on overbreadth or undue burden (see Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All., 299 F.R.D. at 643; see also Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74; Lee, 2020 WL 7890868, at *5; Krenitsky, 2020 WL 5017270, at *1; Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC, 2020 WL 1181491, at *1), PAC does not base the ADP Motion on overbreadth or undue burden alone; rather, PAC argues that Request Nos. 3 and 6 improperly seek private information of its current and former employees. See, e.g. Dkt. 80 at 16 (concluding, “[a]ccordingly, the records sought by [Request No. 3] fall squarely within PAC and its employees' right to privacy, and in balancing disclosure should not be permitted”); 24 (same except as to Request No. 6). PAC's reference to the scope of the records sought, covering a period of nearly 15 years, for each of the 70-100 employees who worked for PAC during that period, and every document “related to” such employees' personnel files, including hiring, termination, employment history, pay, and discipline, relate to the vast swath of private information sought. See, e.g., Dkt. 80 at 15-16. Next, to the extent Plaintiffs assert PAC violated Local Rule 37-1 by scheduling and holding an in-person meet and confer session on the issues raised by the Motion 14 days, rather than within the required 10 days, of sending a Local Rule 37-1 letter, the Court excuses such alleged non-compliance in this instance as the information sought by Plaintiffs implicates the privacy rights of third parties who are not otherwise before the Court. Finally, the Court turns to the primary basis for the ADP Motion, the argument that Requests Nos. 3 and 6 set forth above directed to ADP violate the privacy rights of PAC and PAC's current and former employees. Under federal law, discovery may be restricted when privacy rights are implicated in the information sought by the propounding party. See Curtis Conyers v. Marisa Cano, 2020 WL 7084546, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2020) (citing Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Federal Courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.”)). This privacy right is not absolute; rather it is subject to a balancing of needs. A. Farber & Partners, Inc., 234 F.R.D. at 191 (citing Keith H. v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.R.D. 652, 657 (C.D. Cal. 2005)); see also Marshall v. Galvanoni, 2019 WL 2491524, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2019) (“To evaluate whether privacy interests should prevail over the interest in fully discovering a case, the court must balance the party's need for the information against the individual's privacy rights.”). In conducting this balancing test, courts consider the following factors: “(1) the type of information requested, (2) the potential for harm in any subsequent non-consensual disclosure, (3) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, (4) the degree of need for access, and (5) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy,” or other public interest favoring access. Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 539 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, even where “objections are raised regarding confidential, private or personal information, ... confidential information may be required to be disclosed after” weighing “the right to discover relevant information ... against the right to privacy” Peck v. Cty. of Orange, 2020 WL 4353687, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020). *4 Employees have “personal privacy right[s]” in “employment records.” Jerozal v. Stryker Corp., 2023 WL 3431264, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2023) (citing Belling v. DDP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 12140986, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2013) (quashing subpoena for employment records based on employee's right to privacy); Rowland v. Strayer Univ. Corp., 2015 WL 164761, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 9, 2015) (quashing subpoenas for employment records); Lewin v. Nackard Bottling Co., 2010 WL 4607402, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010) (same). Stripped of conclusory assertions and name-calling against Defendants, Plaintiffs' substantive position with respect to the purported relevance of the 14 years of all records “related to” the employment of 70-100 current and former PAC employees is the claim that PAC has used its own employees to perform work in the names of other entities as part of a scheme to wrongfully take advantage of benefits rightfully belonging to women-owned businesses. Dkt. 80 at 11-12; 19-20. Based on that assertion, Plaintiffs assert “PAC cannot credibly argue that PAC's payroll records are not discoverable in light of these allegations.” Id. at 12, 19. Yet Plaintiff does not offer any nonspeculative explanation as to why 14-years of every piece of paper or electronically stored information “related to” each and every one of PAC's 70-100 employees, over a 14-year period is relevant to Plaintiffs' claims. This is not an overtime or wage and hour case. Instead, Plaintiff speculates that some PAC employees were used to perform work on MAC jobs, and further speculates that the ADP records would reveal such activities. But on the current record, nothing supports a fishing expedition into 14 years of private employment records of 100 non-parties. Of note, during the meet and confer process, Defendants assert that they proposed various limitations on the scope of the ADP subpoena, but Plaintiff declined to limit the subpoena in any respect. Id. at 9. Moreover, even were such information marginally relevant considering the broad definition of relevance of discovery purposes, the Court on its own motion may limit discovery where, as here, the discovery sought falls outside that permitted under Rule 26(b)(1), that is, that is not proportional to the needs of the case. See Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Here, the significance of the information sought by the ADT subpoena, even assuming some non-speculative relevance, is substantially outweighed by the imposition on non-party privacy rights. Lastly, reaching the substance of the privacy objections, the Court, after conducting a careful balancing, finds that Plaintiffs' at-best speculative claim of relevance is substantially outweighed by the employees' privacy rights, considering the nature of the information sought, the potential for harm in authorized disclosure of such far-reaching information, the adequacy of potential safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure of such information, and the weak proffered need for the information, and the absence of any policy outside of the discovery context favoring disclosure of third party employment records. As to the adequacy of potential safeguards, the Court notes that there is a Protective Order in place in this action, but finds that such Protective Order does not, with respect to the records at issue in the ADT Motion, sufficiently counterbalance the other factors against disclosure. The Court notes Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs violated the Protective Order in allegedly improperly disclosing information protected under the Protective Order. Regardless of whether the Protective Order was intentionally violated, a Protective Order does not provide sufficient protection here. *5 For the foregoing reasons, the ADT Motion (Dkt. 79) is GRANTED. B. The Chase Motion and the WFB Motion In the Chase Motion and in the WFB Motion, PAC seeks to quash subpoenas directed to Chase and WFB, in each instance, only as to Request for Documents Nos. 5-6 and 27-28, which seek H. Philhower's personal bank records and credit information at each bank. In support of the Chase and WFB Motions, H. Philhower submitted a declaration attesting that he has had a personal bank account at Chase since 2024 and a personal investment account at WFB “for many years,” with no other account at either bank, and with A. Philhower not being an owner or authorized user of either account. Dkt. 81-1, 83-1. Defendants assert that it does not move to quash the subpoenas directed to the banks as to other accounts of other entities or as to joint accounts of H. Philhower and A. Philhower; rather, they challenge only the requests at issue as they seek only personal bank records of H. Philhower that have no, or minimal, relevance to this case and are disproportionate to the needs of the case. Dkt. 82 at 4, 6, 8-9; Dkt. 84 at 4, 6, 8-9. Defendants argue that, at best, the FAC alleges improper diversion of assets: (1) to a joint account held by A. Philhower and H. Philhower; (2) to repay a home equity line of credit owed by H. Philhower; (3) to purchase a home in Florida from a joint account of A. Philhower's; and (4) generally, from MAC to PAC and Woody, for Woody's sole benefit. Dkt. 82 at 6 (citing FAC ¶¶ 65, 67, 84, 142); Dkt. 84 (same). Defendants assert A. Philhower, H. Philhower's daughter, seeks her father's private financial information to further her claims in a separate probate court action pending in state court seeking to invalidate his estate plan that altered her inheritance. Dkt. 82 at 4, 6-7; Dkt. 84 at 4, 6-7. Defendants further claim that A. Philhower violated this Court's Protective Order in filing and producing information in the state case that was marked “Confidential” under the Protective Order without authorization. See Dkt. 82 at 4-10; Dkt. 84 at 4-10. Plaintiffs counter that Defendants are engaging in “obstructionist discovery conduct,” “obstructing discovery,” by “putting up roadblocks” against discovery, issuing months of “empty promises” and serving “woefully deficient responses” to Rule 34 requests for production, making it clear “they are not going to comply with their discovery obligations.” Dkt. 82 at 10-11; Dkt. 84 at 10-11. Substantively, Plaintiffs claim the FAC alleges a “decades-long scheme” by Defendants to enrich themselves at A. Philhower's expense by wrongfully contracting jobs through MAC, a woman-owned business, for jobs that PAC completed and profited from, with Defendants keeping money that belonged to Plaintiffs. Dkt. 82 at 11; Dkt. 84 at 11. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants “cannot credibly argue that H. Philhower's financial records are not discoverable and relevant in light of” Plaintiffs' allegations. Dkt. 82 at 13; Dkt. 84 at 13. As to privacy, Plaintiffs argue that a balancing of factors favors disclosure in this case. Dkt. 82 at 21-23; Dkt. 84 at 21-22. As to Defendants' claim that Plaintiffs violated the Protective Order, Plaintiffs argue that they had “an obligation” to produce documents in the state court action, an obligation that is not “change[d]” by the Protective Order in this case. Dkt. 82 at 24; Dkt. 84 at 24. Plaintiffs further discount Defendants' claim that discovery of H. Philhower's personal bank accounts exceeds the scope of the FAC allegations about the alleged movement of funds, arguing that the scope of relevance is far broader that Defendants claim, stating Plaintiffs should be able to be able to discover all of H. Philhower's “bank records” to determine “whether money that belonged to [Plaintiffs] ended up in” his accounts. Dkt. 82 at 23-24; Dkt. 84 at 23. *6 As noted, the Court may sua sponte review discovery requests for proportionality. Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Proportionality involves consideration of, among other interests, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Rule 26(b)(1). Further, for Rule 45 subpoenas, the Court has an independent obligation to “avoid imposing an undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Rule 45(d)(1). Lastly, as noted, the courts, in considering discovery requests that implicate privacy rights, consider the following factors: “(1) the type of information requested, (2) the potential for harm in any subsequent non-consensual disclosure, (3) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, (4) the degree of need for access, and (5) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy,” or other public interest favoring access. Seaton, 610 F.3d at 539. Having carefully considered the parties' arguments and each of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds, on balance, that the information sought by the Chase and WFB subpoenas, at this stage of the case and based on the current showing, is disproportionate to the needs of the case under Rule 26(b)(1) and is outweighed by H. Philhower's right to privacy, without prejudice to Plaintiffs seeking narrowed information directly from Defendants and without prejudice to Plaintiffs serving a new subpoena upon Chase and WFB based on additional information learned during discovery. In so finding, the Court notes the following. First, Plaintiffs are currently undertaking substantial on-going discovery in the action. Since the filing of the instant motions, Defendants' counsel has represented that they are in the process of reviewing, with the assistance of an e-discovery vendor, roughly 36,000 documents for potential production in response to Plaintiffs' discovery requests, with Plaintiff having served 20 records subpoenas to third parties and total of 10 separate sets of request for production upon Defendants. See Dkt. 89, ¶¶ 29-30, 38. The results of that discovery may obviate the need for further third-party subpoenas directed to Chase or WFB—or it may provide a more specific, non-speculative basis for such discovery. Second, at least as to WFB, although it did refuse to produce responsive documents, it did object to the subpoena directed to it, asserting it “is overly broad and imposes an undue burden on” WFB. Dkt. 80-2 at 120 (CM/ECF pagination). As noted, the Court has an independent obligation under Rule 45(d)(1) to avoid imposing an undue burden on third parties, and it is apparent that the two subpoenas, balanced against the marginal relevance of the information sought and considering the current procedural posture of the case, imposes an undue burden on both WFB and Chase at this time. Third, in assessing the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, as required in conducting the privacy balancing, the Court has carefully considered the briefing regarding Plaintiffs' alleged actions “in contravention of” the Protective Order this Court entered by filing a declaration in the state court case summarizing information marked “Confidential” under the Protective Order and producing documents marked “Confidential” by others in discovery in the state court action. See Dkt. 82 at 8; Dkt. 84 at 8. In response, Plaintiffs assert that they had an obligation under the California Code of Civil Procedure to produce all responsive documents in discovery in state court. Dkt. 82 at 13-14, 33; Dkt. 84 at 13-14, 32-33. Plaintiffs do not appear to respond to Defendants' claim that they filed documents containing summarized confidential information, as opposed to simply produce such records in discovery. The Court will discuss this issue further below. As it relates to the privacy balancing, the Court merely notes that it is apparent based on Plaintiffs' actions that the Protective Order, of itself, is not a guarantee that private information producing under the Protective Order will be safeguarded from disclosure. On balance, after weighing all relevant factors, not just set forth in this paragraph, the Court reiterates that the information sought by the Chase and WFB subpoenas, at this stage of the case and based on the current showing, is disproportionate to the needs of the case under Rule 26(b)(1) and is outweighed by H. Philhower's right to privacy. C. The Protective Order *7 As noted, Defendants assert Plaintiffs filed a summary of information marked by third parties as “Confidential” under the Protective Order (Dkt. 44) in the state court action and separate produced documents so-marked by third parties in the state court litigation. Dkt. 82 at 8; Dkt. 84 at 8. As also noted, Plaintiffs responded by arguing they are required by state law to produce all responsive documents in their possession in the state action, but do not appear to have responded to the claim that they filed protected material. Dkt. 82 at 13-14, 33; Dkt. 84 at 13-14, 32-33. The Protective Order (Dkt. 44), to which the Plaintiffs stipulated (see Dkt. 42), provides, in relevant part, as follows. Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Protective Order, § I (Purposes and Limitations). N. Protected Material: Any Disclosure or Discovery Material that is designated in good faith as “CONFIDENTIAL.” Protective Order, § III (Definitions). The protections conferred by this Stipulated Protective Order cover not only Protected Material (as defined above), but also (1) any information copied or extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their Counsel that might reveal Protected Material. Protective Order, § IV (Scope). 1. A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with this Action only for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle this Action. Such Protected Material may be disclosed only to the categories of persons and under the conditions described in this Order.... Protective Order, § VIII (A) (Access to and Use of Protected Material). 1. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court or permitted in writing by the Designating Party, a Receiving Party may disclose any information or item designated “CONFIDENTIAL” only to: [listed permitted recipients]. Protective Order, § VIII (B) (Disclosure of “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items). A. If a Party is served with a subpoena or a court order issued in other litigation that compels disclosure of any information or items designated in this Action as “CONFIDENTIAL,” that Party must: 1. Promptly notify in writing the Designating Party. Such notification shall include a copy of the subpoena or court order; 2. Promptly notify in writing the party who caused the subpoena or order to issue in the other litigation that some or all of the material covered by the subpoena or order is subject to this Protective Order. Such notification shall include a copy of this Stipulated Protective Order; and 3. Cooperate with respect to all reasonable procedures sought to be pursued by the Designating Party whose Protected Material may be affected. B. If the Designating Party timely seeks a protective order, the Party served with the subpoena or court order shall not produce any information designated in this action as “CONFIDENTIAL” before a determination by the Court from which the subpoena or order issued, unless the Party has obtained the Designating Party's permission. The Designating Party shall bear the burden and expense of seeking protection in that court of its confidential material and nothing in these provisions should be construed as authorizing or encouraging a Receiving Party in this Action to disobey a lawful directive from another court. *8 Protective Order, § IX (Protected Material Subpoenaed or Ordered Produced in Other Litigation). A. The terms of this Order are applicable to information produced by a Non-Party in this Action and designated as “CONFIDENTIAL.” Such information produced by Non-Parties in connection with this litigation is protected by the remedies and relief provided by this Order. Nothing in these provisions should be construed as prohibiting a Non-Party from seeking additional protections. B. In the event that a Party is required, by a valid discovery request, to produce a Non-Party's confidential information in its possession, and the Party is subject to an agreement with the Non-Party not to produce the Non-Party's confidential information, then the Party shall: Promptly notify in writing the Requesting Party and the Non-Party that some or all of the information requested is subject to a confidentiality agreement with a Non-Party; Promptly provide the Non-Party with a copy of the Stipulated Protective Order in this Action, the relevant discovery request(s), and a reasonably specific description of the information requested; and Make the information requested available for inspection by the Non-Party, if requested. C. If the Non-Party fails to seek a protective order from this court within 14 days of receiving the notice and accompanying information, the Receiving Party may produce the Non-Party's confidential information responsive to the discovery request. If the Non-Party timely seeks a protective order, the Receiving Party shall not produce any information in its possession or control that is subject to the confidentiality agreement with the Non-Party before a determination by the court. Absent a court order to the contrary, the Non-Party shall bear the burden and expense of seeking protection in this court of its Protected Material. Protective Order, § X (A Non-Party's Protected Material Sought to Be Produced in this Litigation). Any violation of this Order may be punished by any and all appropriate measures including, without limitation, contempt proceedings and/or monetary sanctions. Protective Order, § XIV(B) (Final Disposition). The foregoing language is taken from an Order of the Court. It is not a suggestion. It is not a recommendation. It is an Order. It is enforceable by, among other things, contempt proceedings. In the Motions, Defendants do not seek contempt or any other sanction against Plaintiffs. Defendants do not even expressly argue that Plaintiffs have violated a Court order. Rather, Defendants, rightfully, raised Plaintiff's alleged actions “in contravention” of the Protective Order for the Court's consideration in assessing whether the Protective Order provides sufficient protection against disclosure of private material, as discussed above. The Court makes no finding as to any alleged violation of the Protective Order as the issue is not before the Court. However, the Court is troubled by Plaintiffs' cavalier response to Defendants' assertion of acts by Plaintiffs in contravention of the Protective Order. First, as to Defendants' assertion that Plaintiffs filed material in the state court action that contained a summary of information designated as Confidential under the Protective Order, Plaintiffs offer no response at all. To reemphasize to Plaintiffs, as set forth above, non-parties who produce information in this action may designate material “Confidential” under the Protective Order and such information “is protected by the remedies and relief by this Order.” Protective Order, § X(A). To also reemphasize to Plaintiffs, the Protective Order applies not just to Confidential materials themselves, but also “any information copied or extracted from Protected Material.” Protective Order, § IV. *9 Second, with respect to Plaintiffs' dismissive response to Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' produced material marked “Confidential” in discovery in the state case, arguing that the Protective Order has no bearing on Plaintiffs' discovery obligations in the state case, the Court directs Plaintiffs to Section IX of the Protective Order, which provides detailed, mandatory requirements governing what happens when a party receives a request in other litigation for material designated as “Confidential” by another person in the case. Among other things, the receiving party is ORDERED to promptly notify the party that designated the material as Confidential, promptly notify the party requesting the material in the other case of the existence of the Protective Order, cooperate with all reasonable procedures pursued by the designating party. Again, as no party (or non-party) has filed a motion for sanctions or contempt for any alleged violation of the Protective Order, the Court makes no finding as to whether any such a violation has, or has not, occurred. However, all parties are reminded that, under Section XI of the Protective Order, a Receiving Party has certain obligations if it has disclosed Protected Material to any person “In any circumstance not authorized under” the Order, and the parties are ORDERED to comply with Section XI and all provision of the Protective Order. D. Discovery Disputes, Generally On July 8, 2024, the Court denied three prior motions to quash filed by Defendants. Dkt. 76. The combined briefing by all parties on those three motions totaled 1,616 pages. See Dkt. 64, 64-1, 64-2, 65, 66, 66-1, 66-2, 67, 68, 68-1, 68-2, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75. The combined briefing relating to the instant Motions, each granted in its entirety, totaled 817 pages in briefing. See 79, 79-1, 79-2, 80, 80-1, 80-2, 81, 81-1, 81-2, 82, 82-1, 82-2, 83, 83-1, 83-2, 83-3,84, 84-1, 84-2, 86. Three other joint stipulations filed by Plaintiffs relating to discovery disputes, subsequently stricken for violating the Local Rules, had a combined total briefing of 2,155 pages. The parties have therefore filed a total of nine discovery motions between them with a combined briefing of 4,588 pages, in roughly four months, in an action where the pleadings are not even set yet. The assigned magistrate judge handling discovery in this matters has, at any given time, roughly 500 hundred other cases for which he handles discovery disputes, in additional to handling criminal duty matters and new arrests, full consent cases and trials, habeas corpus petitions and pro se civil rights matters, and regular settlement conferences for civil cases, including this one. If in each of those 500 civil cases, the Court were to receive discovery motions and the pace and volume of this case, that is, nine motions with 4,588 pages of briefing in four months, or 27 motions at 13,764 pages total per year, it would mean the Court would be ruling on 13,500 discovery motions, with 6,882,000 pages of briefing, each year, every year. The foregoing does not reflect well on counsel here. Counsel are reminded of the following: The discovery system depends absolutely on good faith and common sense from counsel. The courts, sorely pressed by demands to try cases promptly and to rule thoughtfully on potentially case dispositive motions, simply do not have the resources to police closely the operation of the discovery process. The whole system of Civil adjudication would be ground to a virtual halt if the courts were forced to intervene in even a modest percentage of discovery transactions. That fact should impose on counsel an acute sense of responsibility about how they handle discovery matters. They should strive to be cooperative, practical and sensible, and should turn to the courts (or take positions that force others to turn to the courts) only in extraordinary situations that implicate truly significant interests. *10 In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D.Cal.1985). The foregoing language was written nearly forty years ago, at a time when federal caseloads were far lower than they are today, rending the language even more applicable today. The pace and volume at which counsel are submitting discovery motions to the Court here cannot continue. Counsel are directed to the language of In re Convergent, Rule 26(g), and the Civility and Professionalism Guidelines of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, available on the Court's website. The parties are further advised that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Civil Rules will be assiduously applied and enforced in connection with any future discovery motions. If any further discovery motions are contemplated, as part of the meet and confer process and briefing on any such contemplated motion, counsel for the parties are ORDERED to discuss whether an appointment of a Special Master for purposes of discovery in this case is warranted, including any matters material to such a potential appointment under Rule 53, including the names of potential special masters. The parties are ORDERED to include their respective positions on the appointment of a Special Master for discovery in their portion of any Joint Stipulation or other briefing papers in connection with any future discovery-related motion, including the party's position regarding all matters material to such an appointment under Rule 53 and each party is ORDERED to identify at least two potential special master candidates in such briefing regardless of the party's position regarding the appropriateness of such an appointment. The moving party in the notice of any such motion is ORDERED to identify the date, time, and length of the discussions between the parties on the issue of the appointment of a discovery Special Master and identify any agreements reached. IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the Motions (Dkt. 79, 81, and 83) are GRANTED. The subpoenas directed to ADT, Chase, and WFB are QUASHED in their entirety. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to serve this Order upon counsel for ADT, Chase, and WFB immediately. IT IS SO ORDERED.