PRODOX, LLC, Plaintiff, v. PROFESSIONAL DOCUMENT SERVICES, INC., Defendant Case No. 2:20-cv-02035-JAD-NJK United States District Court, D. Nevada Filed November 21, 2022 Koppe, Nancy J., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER [Docket No. 96] *1 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to calculate expenses. Docket No. 96; Docket No. 110 (corrected image). Defendant filed a response in opposition. Docket No. 111. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 116; Docket No. 119 (corrected image). A hearing on the motion is not necessary. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons discussed more fully below, the motion to calculate expenses is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. I. BACKGROUND On January 12, 2022, Defendant failed to appear for its Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. See Docket No. 76-6 at 5. On April 28, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for sanctions arising out of that misconduct. Docket No. 81. The Court ordered Defendant to pay 80% of the expenses incurred by Plaintiff that were caused by the failure to appear for deposition. Id. at 9-10. The sanctions were prorated because Plaintiff's counsel was partly to blame for the issues raised. Id. at 9; see also Hadley v. United States, 45 F.3d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff now seeks to recover for $52,739.42 in fees and costs, for which it seeks an award of $42,191.54 in light of the order requiring proration. Docket No. 119 at 12. Defendant responds that the motion should be denied as untimely, that certain expenses are beyond the allowable scope to be awarded, and that the expenses are otherwise unreasonable. Docket No. 111. II. TIMELINESS The Court begins by addressing the untimely nature of Plaintiff's current motion. The Court ordered unambiguously that, “[t]o the extent the parties cannot agree amongst themselves on an amount of expenses to award, Plaintiff must file a ‘Motion to Calculate Expenses’ by May 12, 2022.” Id. at 10. No such motion was filed by that deadline. Instead, the instant motion was filed more than two months late on July 13, 2022. See Docket No. 96. Defendant argues that the motion should be denied in its entirety as untimely. Docket No. 111 at 7. Plaintiff counters that the deadline set by the Court was ineffectual and that it otherwise filed its motion with appropriate haste. See Docket No. 119 at 4-7. Once again, the situation will result in a mixed bag of remedies. With respect to Defendant's request to deny the instant motion outright as untimely, the Court disagrees. It is certainly true that Plaintiff's filing is quite untimely and that sufficient justification has not been presented for the delay.[1] In appropriate circumstances, the Court may in its discretion deny a motion for attorneys’ fees on timeliness grounds alone. See Port of Stockton v. W. Bulk Carrier KS, 371 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004).[2] Absent a jurisdictional bar or the like, however, courts are not required in all instances to reject outright an untimely fee request because relief from the expired deadline may be sought through a showing of excusable neglect. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B); see also Taybron v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 218 Fed. Appx. 690, 691-93 (9th Cir. 2007).[3] Courts are particularly likely to allow an untimely motion for attorneys’ fees when there is no prejudice resulting from the delay and the interests of justice favor resolving the untimely request on its merits. See, e.g., Nat. Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, No. 1:96-cv-01740-NHL, 1999 WL 33740260, at *7-8 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1999). *2 Although a close question, the untimeliness of Plaintiff's motion here does not warrant its outright denial. As discussed above, the reason for the delay is not compelling in any way, but Defendant has not established any prejudice stemming from the timing of the motion. There is little likelihood of disruption of proceedings because calculating the amount of fees to be awarded has no impact on summary judgment or trial. Moreover, the sanctions at issue were imposed for serious misconduct by Defendant and its counsel, which should not go unaddressed based on opposing counsel's later failure to comply with a deadline. Given the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the motion to calculate attorneys’ fees should not be denied outright as untimely. While the Court will resolve the motion to calculate expenses on its merits, the repeated failure of Plaintiff's counsel to comply with deadlines must be addressed. This is at least the third deadline in this case that Plaintiff's counsel has disregarded.[4] The Court has already been crystal clear that such conduct is inappropriate. See, e.g., Docket No. 81 at 7. Indeed, Plaintiff's counsel's similar misconduct has already resulted in repercussions in the form of a reduction in the fees Plaintiff will recover on this matter. Id. at 9.[5] And, yet, here we are again in another situation in which Plaintiff's counsel disregarded a court-imposed deadline because they did not believe it should apply to them. This is a troubling pattern. “Orders are not suggestions or recommendations, they are directives with which compliance is mandatory.” Gfeller v. Doyne Med. Clinic, Inc., Case No. 2:14-cv-01940-JCM-VCF, 2015 WL 5210392, at *8 (D. Nev. Sept. 3, 2015) (citing Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1979) and Weddell v. Stewart, 261 P.3d 1080, 1085 & n.9 (Nev. 2011)). Such reasoning applies with equal force to orders setting deadlines: “Calendars are simply too crowded for parties to treat scheduling orders as optional and to submit required court filings at their own convenience.” Martin Family Trust v. Heco/Nostalgia Enterps. Co., 186 F.R.D. 601, 603 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (imposing sanctions on attorney for failing to file status report by ordered deadline). Litigants have an “unflagging duty to comply with clearly communicated case-management orders,” id. at 604, or to seek appropriate relief from the deadlines set therein, SFR Investments Pool 1, 2018 WL 701816, at *4. Litigants violate deadlines at their own peril. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610. Indeed, when a party or attorney “fails to obey a scheduling order or other pretrial order,” the Court may issue “any just orders” and impose sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1). *3 Given the pattern of non-compliance with clear deadlines and the absence of a good reason for violating the deadline at bar, the Court hereby orders attorneys Lance C. Venable and F. Christopher Austin[6] to attend four hours of continuing legal education regarding federal practice and procedure within the next six months. Cf. Christiana Trust v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-01603-JAD-NJK, 2019 WL 4934190, at *4 (D. Nev. Oct. 7, 2019). The continuing legal education must meet the following criteria: (1) it must be approved by state CLE authorities, (2) it must be in a live setting (i.e., not pre-recorded), and (3) it must not be counted toward, and will be in excess of, these attorneys’ CLE requirements for the Nevada Bar or any other state bar to which these attorneys belong. Cf. Petrish v. JP Morgan Chase, 789 F. Supp. 2d 437, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). No later than June 15, 2023, each of these attorneys must file a separate declaration attesting to the completion of the required courses and attaching copies of the certificate of attendance for each course. III. LODESTAR FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES The Court determines a fee award by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).[7] The lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable. Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 488 (9th Cir. 1988).[8] A. REASONABLE HOURS The Court “has a great deal of discretion in determining the reasonableness of the fee and, as a general rule, [an appellate court] will defer to its determination ... regarding the reasonableness of the hours claimed by the [movant].” Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gates, 987 F.2d at 1398). The reasonableness of hours expended depends on the specific circumstances of each case. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978. In reviewing the hours claimed, the Court may exclude hours related to overstaffing, duplication, and excessiveness, or that are otherwise unnecessary. See, e.g., Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Before turning to the reasonableness of the hours claimed, the Court addresses the parties’ divergent views on the time that is within the scope of the sanctions order. Compare Docket No. 111 at 14-19 with Docket No. 119 at 9-11. The order imposing sanctions explained that fees awarded would be “80% of the expenses incurred by Plaintiff that were caused by the failure to appear for deposition.” Docket No. 81 at 9-10; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3) (providing for expenses “caused by the failure” to appear at the deposition). The sanctions award logically includes the expenses that were before the Court at that juncture, those related to Plaintiff's counsel appearing at the failed deposition itself and briefing the motion for sanctions. See, e.g., RG Abrams Ins. v. Law Offices of C.R. Abrams, No. 2:21-cv-00194-FLA-MAAx, 2021 WL 4974049, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2021).[9] The Court has not been provided a sufficient showing that additional expenses are warranted. As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has withdrawn its request to recover for time expended earlier in the case, Docket No. 119 at 12, so such time will not be included in the lodestar. In addition, Plaintiff seeks fees for additional work after the sanctions order issued, including with respect to responding to the Rule 72 objection to that order, see Docket No. 110 at 3, 7 (motion); see also Docket No. 119 at 10 (reply), and for fees related to the motion to calculate fees, see Docket No. 110 at 10 (motion); see also Docket No. 119 at 12 (reply). Plaintiff fails to include any legal authority or meaningfully developed argument to show an entitlement to recover such expenses, however, so the Court declines to award them. See, e.g., Kor Media Grp., LLC v. Green, 294 F.R.D. 579, 582 n.3 (D. Nev. 2013) (courts only address meaningfully developed arguments). In light of the above, the Court limits its analysis to expenses incurred by counsel appearing at the failed deposition itself and briefing the motion for sanctions. *4 Plaintiff seeks to recover for 6.9 hours for its lead counsel to travel to the subject deposition, as well as the time to take the non-appearance at that deposition. See Docket No. 110-5 at 3. Defendant argues that such time was not reasonably incurred because defense counsel had explained that Defendant would refuse to appear at the deposition. Docket No. 111 at 21. The Court disagrees. The law is clear that a party cannot avoid deposition or subsequent sanctions by simply alerting the opposing side that it will not appear. Nationstar Mtg., LLC v. Flamingo Trails No. 7 Landscape Maint. Ass'n, 316 F.R.D. 327, 337 n.8 (D. Nev. 2016). It is for the Court to decide whether to excuse attendance at a deposition, not for a party to grant itself that relief. Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 33 F.2d 257, 269 (9th Cir. 1964). Defendant's argument is particularly puzzling in this case given that it filed a last-minute motion for protective order that was denied before the deposition. See Docket Nos. 70-71. Because the deposition remained properly scheduled despite any communicated assertion that Defendant would not appear, it was reasonable for Plaintiff's counsel to expend the time traveling to the deposition and taking the non-appearance of Defendant. See Flamingo Trails, 316 F.R.D. at 337 n.8; see also England v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., No. 2:07-cv-01238-PMP-GWF, 2008 WL 11389178, at *1-2 (D. Nev. May 21, 2008) (awarding expenses for failure to appear at a deposition despite the fact that “Defendants received a phone call from Plaintiffs’ counsel informing them that Mr. England would not appear for his deposition”), aff'd, 473 Fed. Appx. 538, 540-41 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court will include these 6.9 hours of time in the lodestar calculation. Plaintiff seeks to recover 75.6 hours spent in briefing the motion for sanctions. See Docket No. 110-5 at 4-9. Defendant raises a number of objections to this time, which the Court finds persuasive. First, Plaintiff seeks to recover for the time expended by four law partners with decades of experience. Docket No. 110-1 at ¶¶ 2-3; Docket No. 110-2 at ¶ 2; Docket No. 110-3 at ¶¶ 2-3; Docket No. 110-4 at ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff has proffered no justification for having all of these experienced attorneys work on a single discovery-related motion, a staffing choice that led to inefficiencies and duplication. See, e.g., Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., No. 2:12-cv-00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 5324787, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2013) (citing Aevoe Corp. v. Shenzhen Membrane Precise Elec. Ltd., No. 2:12-cv-00054-GMN-PAL, 2012 WL 2244262, at *10 (D. Nev. June 15, 2012)). Second, and relatedly, the record shows excessive amounts of internal conferencing between Plaintiff's attorneys. Plaintiff has not advanced sufficient explanation for this conferencing and such time will be reduced. See, e.g., Cruz ex rel. Cruz v. Alhambra Sch. Dist., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1192-93 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Third, Plaintiff seeks to recover time for meeting-and-conferring with opposing counsel. Such time is generally not recoverable, see Aevoe, 2013 WL 5324787, at *6 (citing Alutiiq Int'l Sols., LLC v. Lyon, No. 2:11-cv-01104-GMN-PAL, 2012 WL 4182026, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2012)), and a meaningful explanation has not been advanced to chart a different course in this case. Fourth, the records reflect block billing and Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's argument that such practice should generally result in a reduction of the time identified, See Docket No. 111 at 26 (citing Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010)). The Court has reviewed the underlying motion practice at issue. It was not novel nor complex and it did not require extensive legal research. Nor was the motion practice of extensive length. The Court concludes that 18 hours were reasonably expended on the motion for sanctions and that 12 hours were reasonably expended on the reply.[10] B. REASONABLE HOURLY RATE Having determined the hours reasonably expended by counsel, the Court turns to the hourly rate with which to calculate the lodestar. The party seeking an award of attorneys’ fees bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the hourly rates requested. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980. “To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence–in addition to the attorneys’ own affidavits–that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). “Affidavits of the [movant's] attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the [movant's] attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court may also rely on its own familiarity with the rates in the community to analyze those sought in the pending case. Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). *5 The attorneys here are all law firm partners with decades of litigation experience. Docket No. 110-1 at ¶¶ 2-3; Docket No. 110-2 at ¶ 2; Docket No. 110-3 at ¶¶ 2-3; Docket No. 110-4 at ¶¶ 2-3. They seek hourly rates for 2022 of $380 or $385. See Docket No. 110-5. Such rates are in accordance with those prevailing in this community. E.g., Sinanyan v. Luxury Suites Int'l, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-00225-GMN-VCF, 2016 WL 4394484, at *4 & n.4 (D. Nev. Aug. 17, 2016). Accordingly, the Court will calculate the lodestar for Attorney Venable's time arising out of the deposition at $380, and will calculate the time for briefing the motion for sanctions at $382.50. C. CALCULATION In light of the above, the lodestar for attorneys’ fees for 6.9 hours at a rate of $380 and for 30 hours at a rate of $382.50, for a total of $14,097. Pursuant to the prior order, Plaintiff is awarded 80% of that amount, or $11,278. IV. CALCULATON OF COSTS Plaintiff also seeks to recover various costs. See, e.g., Docket No. 119-6 at 11. The Court finds the travel, parking, meal, legal research, court reporter, and courtesy copy costs are recoverable and reasonable. See, e.g., Cruz, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1201; Aevoe, 2013 WL 5324787, at *8.[11] In light of the above, the total costs recoverable are $1,449. Pursuant to the prior order, Plaintiff is awarded 80% of that amount, or $1,159. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed more fully above, Plaintiff's motion to calculate expenses is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court awards $11,278 in fees and $1,159 in costs to Plaintiff. Defendant must pay these fees and costs by December 5, 2022.[12] IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Plaintiff argues that the undersigned's order was not effective because there was a subsequent objection to the district judge filed after the deadline expired. See, e.g., Docket No. 119 at 4-5. Plaintiff derides the ordered deadline as “moot and irrational.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff is wrong. As a threshold matter, this argument is disingenuous because Plaintiff violated the subject deadline before Defendant objected to the sanctions order. See, e.g., Docket No. 111 at 8-9 (recounting communications between counsel). Plaintiff fails to advance a reasonable basis for contesting the viability of a deadline set by a magistrate judge based on the later filing of an objection after that deadline expired. Moreover and significantly, Plaintiff's argument is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of a magistrate judge's order. A magistrate judge is statutorily empowered to “determine” non-dispositive matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (a magistrate judge may “decide” non-dispositive matters). A magistrate judge's decision on a non-dispositive matter is a judicial ruling requiring compliance, it is not merely a recommendation. In addition, “[i]t is well-established law that the filing of an objection to a magistrate judge's order on a non-dispositive motion does not automatically stay that order's operation.” PlayUp, Inc. v. Mintas, F. Supp. 3d, 2022 WL 10967692, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2022) (collecting cases). Hence, the mere filing of an objection does not impact the requirement to comply with a magistrate judge's order. To the extent a party believes relief from an ordered deadline is warranted, it must file an appropriate request for an extension or otherwise seek relief from that order. See, e.g., U.S. Bank N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-00576-GMN-NJK, 2018 WL 701816, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2018) (“If a deadline cannot be met, the proper course is most assuredly not to simply ignore an order”). Unless and until the Court grants such relief, the party is required to comply with the deadline as set. E.g., OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. T. Wade Welch & Assocs., Civ. No. H-11-3061, 2015 WL 5098552, at *11 n.5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2015) (“in general, a deadline is a deadline, and parties should attempt to gather and request all fees incurred up to the date of the deadline or risk waiver”). Plaintiff also argues that its counsel was “occupied” during this period with other matters. See Docket No. 119 at 6. Such reasoning is insufficient justification for an untimely motion. Cf. Garcia v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, 332 F.R.D. 351, at 355 n.6 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2019) (quoting Burgos-Martinez v. City of Worcester, 345 F. Supp. 3d 105, 107 (D. Mass. 2018)). [2] These cases arise most frequently in the context of deadlines established by statute or rule, but the same analysis applies to fee application deadlines set by Court order. See, e.g., Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 628 Fed. Appx. 510 (9th Cir. 2016). [3] “[T]he determination of whether neglect is excusable is an equitable one that depends on at least four factors: (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). [4] Plaintiff's counsel engaged in discovery after the discovery cutoff without obtaining an order for relief from that deadline. Compare Docket No. 17 at 2 (setting discovery cutoff of June 29, 2021) with Docket No. 70-1 at 11 (noticing deposition for January 12, 2022). Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for summary judgment after the dispositive motion deadline without obtaining an order for relief from that deadline. Compare Docket No. 17 at 2 (setting dispositive motion deadline of July 30, 2021) with Docket No. 87 (motion for summary judgment filed on June 30, 2022). Plaintiff's counsel filed this motion to calculate fees after the deadline set without obtaining an order for relief from that deadline. Compare Docket No. 81 at 10 (setting deadline for motion to calculate expenses of May 12, 2022) with Docket No. 96 (motion to calculate expenses filed on July 13, 2022). [5] It is readily apparent that these attorneys know better not only because of the prior orders that have issued in this case, but also because Plaintiff's counsel have expressed an accurate understanding of the need to follow a magistrate judge's orders when it has suited their interest. In addressing Defendant's failure to appear for deposition despite an order denying its motion for protective order, for example, Plaintiff's counsel explained as follows: [Defendant] admits that the Court's Order, essentially, meant nothing to it. Apparently, [Defendant] believes that Court Orders can simply be disregarded, if [Defendant] itself decides that it does not agree with the reasoning cited in the Order, or if it decides the Order was based on procedural grounds. Unfortunately for [Defendant], that is not the way our legal system works. Docket No. 79 at 6. Of course, one could simply substitute the references to “[Defendant]” and replace them with “[Plaintiff]” or “[Plaintiff's counsel]” because the same rules of the game apply to all parties and attorneys. Plaintiff's attorneys are also not empowered to disregard an order. [6] The instant motion was docketed by Attorney Austin, see Docket No. 96 (notice of electronic filing), but was signed by Attorney Venable, Docket No. 96 at 9. Having different attorneys file and sign a motion is itself a violation of the local rules. See Local Rule IC 5-1(b) (“The signatory must be the attorney or pro se party who electronically files the document”). At any rate, filing a document through CMECF is the equivalent of signing it. Local Rule IC 2-1(i). Since both Attorney Austin and Attorney Venable have effectively signed the violating motion, the Court holds both attorneys responsible. [7] Plaintiff asserts that the calculation of its expenses is governed by Nevada state law. See Docket No. 110 at 4 & n.5 (citing Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (Nev. 1969)). While federal courts sitting in diversity apply state law in calculating fees, Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Com'n, 67 F. 3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995), this is not a diversity case because Plaintiff brings a federal cause of action, cf. Docket No. 64 at 6 n.4 (rejecting contention that state law applies to privilege issue given that this is not a diversity jurisdiction case). As such, expenses are calculated based on federal law. [8] Adjustments to the lodestar are proper in only “rare and exceptional cases.” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). A departure from the lodestar is not warranted in this case. [9] In appropriate circumstances, courts award expenses for the time preparing for the missed deposition. Id. Given that such preparation efforts should have still been useful to counsel with respect to the deposition that later took place, Docket No. 111-1 at ¶ 21, the Court declines to award such expenses in the circumstances of this case, see RG Abrams, 2021 WL 4974049, at *11; see also Martinez v. Lunes, No. 1:04-cv-6469 LJO DLB PC, 2008 WL 5045954, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008); UMG Recs., Inc. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., No. CV 07-3257-GAF (AGRx), 2008 WL 11343399, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2008). [10] Because this time was expended by four attorneys with similar hourly rates, the Court will apply a blended rate to these hours. [11] Plaintiff has withdrawn its request for costs incurred before the date of the deposition, see Docket No. 119 at 12, so those costs have been excluded. [12] Citing a number of different sources of sanctioning authority, Defendant's response seeks the imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel for factual assertions that Defendant contends are false. See Docket No. 111 at 10-12. Including a Rule 11 request within a responsive brief violates Rule 11 itself. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (“A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion”). Moreover, including a request for affirmative relief within a responsive brief violates the procedures of this District. See Local Rule IC 2-2(b); see also Underwood v. O'Reilly Auto Enterps., LLC, No. 2:21-cv-01766-GMN-NJK, 2022 WL 1184883, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 20, 2022) (addressing importance of this rule as discussed in Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00256-JCM-NJK, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 132101 (D. Nev. Aug. 18, 2017)). As such, the Court declines to address this request for sanctions.