Mari Ann SARTOR, et al. v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, et al Case No. 5:22-cv-1410-MRA (SPx) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed June 12, 2024 Counsel Brett A. Greenfield, 818 Law Group LLP, Falamak Farnad Abromson, Abromson and Sedaghati Law Group, Woodland Hills, CA, Donald Norris, Donald Norris, a Law Corporation, Los Angeles, CA, for Mari Ann Sartor, et al. Tori Lyn Noelani Bakken, Anthony M. Sain, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Abigail McLaughlin, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for County of Riverside, et al. Pym, Sheri, United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel [61] I. INTRODUCTION *1 On May 14, 2024, plaintiffs Mari Ann Sartor and Roy Eugene Jackson filed a motion to compel defendant County of Riverside (“County”) to produce the unredacted deposition transcript of defendant Robert Carrasco from his workers' compensation case no. ADJ16875242 (the “WC claim”) and the results of any psychiatric evaluation of Carrasco performed after the July 22, 2022 shooting incident (the “2022 shooting”). Docket No. 61. The parties' positions are set forth in a Joint Stipulation (“JS”). Docket no. 62. Plaintiffs' arguments are supported by the declaration of Donald Norris (“Norris Decl.”).[1] Docket No. 61-1. County's arguments are supported by the declaration of Abigail J.R. McLaughlin (“McLaughlin Decl.”) and exhibits. Docket no. 65. Plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum on May 28, 2024. Docket no. 66. The court found a hearing on the Motion would not be of assistance and so vacated the hearing noticed for June 11, 2024. After considering the parties' written and oral arguments, the court now grants the motion for the reasons discussed below. II. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background This civil rights case arises from a fatal officer involved shooting on July 22, 2022. Plaintiffs, individually and as successors in interest to decedent Jay J. Jackson, allege that Carrasco, a deputy sheriff employed by the County of Riverside Sheriff's Department, shot and killed unarmed decedent Jackson without provocation, necessity, or justification. Complaint ¶¶ 7, 12. On December 15, 2022, plaintiffs served their Request for Production, Set One (“RFP”) on County. McLaughlin Decl., Ex. A. Included in the RFP were requests for production of all documents that refer or relate to the 2022 shooting (RFP No. 3); all documents that refer or relate to audio or video recordings or transcripts of any interview of any person, including officers, that refer or relate to the 2022 shooting (RFP No. 9); all documents that reflect any communication between Carrasco and any person other than his attorneys that refer or relate to the shooting (RFP No. 33); and all documents showing the results of any psychological evaluation of Carrasco following the 2022 shooting (RFP No. 37). See id. On January 17, 2023, County served its objections and responses and produced 66 documents. Id. ¶ 3, Ex. B. On December 18, 2023, plaintiffs deposed Carrasco. Id., Ex. C. During the deposition, Carrasco testified he filed two workers' compensation cases, the WC Claim with a date of injury of July 22, 2022 and another with a date of injury of January 4, 2007 through July 22, 2022 (case no. ADJ18313749). Id. at 74:22-75:15. Carrasco also testified that he experienced psychological symptoms prior to the 2022 shooting. See docket no. 50, Declaration of Brett Greenfield (“Greenfield Decl.”), Ex. 2 at 86:10-87:11. *2 On February 15, 2024, County produced to plaintiffs a redacted version of the February 22, 2023 deposition of Carrasco in the WC claim. JS at 5-6; McLaughlin Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. F. On February 27, 2024, the parties met and conferred about County's responses to RFP No. 3, 9, 33, and 37. McLaughlin Decl., Ex. H. County represented that it produced all responsive documents, and maintained any discovery motion would be untimely. Id. ¶ 9, Ex. H. B. Scheduling Background This case was originally assigned to Judge Jesus Bernal. In the December 1, 2022 Civil Trial Scheduling Order, the court set a deadline to complete all discovery, including hearings on discovery motions, of August 7, 2023. Docket no. 25. On June 28, 2023, the court extended the discovery cut-off to November 6, 2023. Docket no. 30. On September 14, 2023, the court extended the fact discovery cut-off to January 8, 2024, expert discovery cut-off to February 12, 2024, and the discovery motion hearing cut-off to February 12, 2024. Docket no. 37. On January 18, 2024, the court further extended the fact discovery cut-off to February 12, 2024, the expert discovery cut-off to April 12, 2024, and the discovery motion hearing cut-off to April 12, 2024 (the “January 18 Scheduling Order”). Docket no. 48. On February 23, 2024, the case was transferred from Judge Bernal to Judge Monica Ramirez Almadani. Docket no. 55. The March 1, 2024 Reassignment Order kept all discovery cut-off dates in effect. Docket no. 56. On March 26, 2024, the court extended the discovery motion hearing cut-off, as well as the expert discovery cut-off, to June 17, 2024 (the “March 26 Scheduling Order”). Docket no. 59. On April 4, 2024, Judge Almadani issued a Civil Trial Order (the “April 4 Civil Trial Order”), which did not set for any specific deadline. Among other things, the April 4 Civil Trial Order stated, with respect to fact and expert discovery cut-offs, that “[t]he cut-off date for discovery is not the date by which discovery requests must be served; it is the date by which all discovery, including all hearings on any related motions, must be completed.” Docket no. 60. III. DISCUSSION A. The Motion to Compel Is Timely County argues plaintiffs' motion is untimely because the cut-off date for fact discovery was February 12, 2024. See JS at 2-8. County contends Judge Bernal's January 18 Scheduling Order set a fact discovery cut-off date of February 12, 2024, Judge Almadani's March 1, 2024 Reassignment Order stated all discovery deadlines remained in effect, and Judge Almadani's April 4 Civil Trial Order stated that the discovery cut-off date is also the discovery motion hearing cut-off date. JS at 5-7. County contends plaintiffs erroneously rely on the June 17, 2024 as the applicable cut-off here because that date only applies to expert discovery. JS at 8. The plain language of the scheduling orders indicates the Motion is timely. The March 26 Scheduling Order clearly extended the discovery motion hearing cut-off date to June 17, 2024.[2] Docket no. 59. Although County argues this extension applies only to expert discovery, the language of the order does not impose such a limitation. See id. *3 County correctly notes that Judge Almadani's April 4 Civil Trial Order states the discovery cut-off date is also the motion hearing cut-off date. See docket no. 60. But County's reliance on the general civil trial order is misplaced. Normally, a civil trial order is issued at the inception of the case to inform the parties of the judge's procedures and deadlines. Judge Almadani issued her standard civil trial order after the case was transferred to her, 18 months after the case was filed. Although Judge Almadani may typically set the discovery cut-off date as also the motion hearing cut-off date, there is no indication that Judge Almadani intended for her general civil trial order to override her March 26 Scheduling Order extending the discovery motion hearing deadline to June 17, 2024. See docket no. 59. Such an interpretation would effectively deny plaintiffs' rights under the court's prior order. Further, since the expert discovery cut-off and the discovery motion hearing cut-off both remain June 17, there is no clear inconsistency with the April 4 Civil Trial Order. Plaintiffs' motion is therefore timely. B. The Motion to Compel Is Granted Plaintiffs contend Carrasco's deposition testimony in the WC Claim is responsive to RFP Nos. 3, 9, and 33, and any documents showing the results of any psychological evaluation are responsive to RFP No. 37. Plaintiffs move to compel County to produce the unredacted transcript and any documents showing the results of any psychological evaluations after the 2022 shooting. JS at 1-2. County contends the redacted portions of the deposition are irrelevant and any documents showing the results of any psychological evaluations after the 2022 shooting are irrelevant, highly private, and privileged. See JS at 3-4, 8-24. Rule 26(b) allows a party to obtain discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, the information sought “need not be admissible in evidence”; however, it must be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. In determining the needs of the case, the court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. A “relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978). “Discovery is not limited to the issues raised only in the pleadings, but rather it is designed to define and clarify the issues.” Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (citing Oppenheimer Fund, 437 at 351). “The requirement of relevancy should be construed liberally and with common sense, rather than in terms of narrow legalisms.” Id. 1. RFP Nos. 3, 9, and 33 Plaintiffs contend Carrasco's deposition testimony in the WC Claim is responsive to RFP Nos. 3, 9, and 33 and it should have been produced unredacted. JS at 1-2, 13, 16-17, 20. Plaintiffs assert that given the 2022 shooting incident was the basis for the WC Claim, “it stands to reason” that Carrasco was asked about what he perceived about the incident and its effect on him. JS at 13. County maintains that the redacted portions are irrelevant because Carrasco recounted his prior employment and lack of injury from it, confirmed he had no psychological injuries prior to the 2022 shooting, and discussed his injuries after the 2022 shooting, but did not describe what happened during the incident. JS at 14. County asserts that any information about Carrasco's psychological status after the incident is irrelevant since it does not bear upon his state of mind during the shooting. See JS at 9-10. County also maintains the information is private and privileged. See JS at 11. Assuming the redactions only concerned Carrasco's post-2022 shooting psychological symptoms, such information is relevant. As the court discussed in a previous order, at his deposition in this case, Carrasco both testified that he did not have any psychological symptoms on July 22, 2022, and that he experienced anxiety, depression, violent nightmares, and racing thoughts prior to the July 22, 2022 shooting incident. See docket no. 54; see also docket no. 50, Greenfield Decl., Ex. 2 at 87:8-11. Plaintiffs contend that given Carrasco's testimony, his mental state after the shooting “necessarily was a continuation of his mental state of his prior mental state” and was therefore relevant because “it would reflect on his mental state at the time of the shooting.” JS at 2. While the court does not agree with the definitiveness of plaintiffs' argument, the court agrees that given Carrasco's testimony, the information is relevant because there may be a cumulative effect of Carrasco's psychological symptoms pre and post-2022 shooting. See Hutton v. City of Martinez, 219 F.R.D. 164, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (court ordered defendant to produce officer's workers' compensation file for a case filed after the incident at issue). Plaintiffs are not required to simply accept defendant's argument that there is no evidence of psychological issues prior to the July 22, 2022 shooting; they are entitled to review the unredacted deposition testimony to determine whether the testimony assists their case. Whether the redacted deposition testimony is ultimately admissible at trial is another matter, and both parties may raise their arguments on that issue at that time. *4 As for County's privacy and privilege claims, there is a privacy interest in medical records (Anderson v. Clawson, 2014 WL 3725856, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 25, 2014) (“A party enjoys privacy rights in his medical records in general.”)), and “a psychotherapist-privilege covers confidential communications made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists.” Jafee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996); see also Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 618 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“The patient-physician privilege does not exist at federal common law.”). But here, the redacted deposition testimony presumably does not include plaintiff's medical records. And as the court previously noted, plaintiffs' need for information outweigh defendants' privacy concerns, particularly in light of the fact that Carrasco raised his medical claims in his worker' compensation case. See Anderson, 2014 WL 3725856, at *2 (the right to privacy may be waived “if the party puts their contents at issue in a case”). Moreover, the deposition testimony is not covered by the psychotherapist-patient privilege since it does not concern communications. County therefore may not redact the deposition transcript on those grounds. County may redact sensitive personal identifying information such as Carrasco's social security number. The court therefore orders County to produce the transcript of Carrasco's WC Claim deposition subject to the protective order and without any redactions apart from sensitive personal identifying information. 2. RFP No. 37 RFP No. 37 seeks “[a]ll DOCUMENTS showing the results of any psychological evaluation of defendant Robert Carrasco following the INCIDENT.” JS at 21. In addition to its objections on privacy and privilege grounds, County responded that there were no responsive documents.[3] JS at 21-22; McLaughlin Decl., Ex. B. Although County responded that it did not have any responsive documents, it is not entirely clear to the court that County is asserting there are no documents reflecting results of psychological evaluations of Carrasco after the 2022 shooting. Instead, County appears to argue that there are no responsive documents because the ones showing the results of any post-2022 shooting psychological evaluations are irrelevant for the reasons cited above. JS at 24-25. To the extent County is asserting there are no documents showing the results of any psychological evaluation of Carrasco after July 22, 2022, the court cannot order it to produce such documents if none exist. If none exist, the court orders County to provide a signed declaration that no such documents exist. See Bennett v. 38604 10th Street East, LLC, 2021 WL 5038757, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 30, 2021) (ordering defendants to provide a signed declaration that it produced all responsive documents). However, it is difficult for the court to believe that, given the basis of the WC Claim and Carrasco's deposition testimony, there are no records, medical or otherwise, that reflect a psychological evaluation of Carrasco. See Greenfield Decl, Ex. 2 at 135:2-17. If responsive documents exist, County may not withhold them on relevancy or privacy grounds as discussed above. To the extent any of the documents reflect communications with psychotherapists, courts have generally found that a litigant waives privilege where, as here, he places the medical condition into issue in litigation. See, e.g., Hutton, 219 F.R.D. at 167 (HIPAA does not preclude production of medical records and workers' compensation files in response to a discovery request or court order under an adequate protective order); Menefee v. Tacoma Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 2018 WL 2095858 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 2018) (plaintiff waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege when she filed for workers' compensation). As such, County may not without documents based on the psychotherapist-patient privilege either. *5 Accordingly, the court orders County to either provide a declaration that there are no documents showing the results of any psychological evaluation of Carrasco following the 2022 shooting or to produce all documents responsive to RFP No. 37 subject to the protective order. IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of Carrasco's unredacted deposition testimony in the WC Claim and documents reflecting psychological evaluations after the 2022 shooting is granted as set forth above. Footnotes [1] Plaintiff's references to the Norris declaration do not correspond with the filed declaration. For example, plaintiff cites to Exhibit 1 of the Norris declaration (JS at 2), but the declaration neither references nor attaches any exhibits. [2] At the time the court granted this extension, the discovery motion hearing cut-off was April 12, 2024. See docket nos. 48, 58. [3] County asserts the parties did not meet and confer on RFP No. 37. JS at 23. This assertion is inconsistent with its earlier statement that plaintiffs' counsel contacted it about this motion (JS at 6) and with the McLaughlin Declaration (McLaughlin Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. H).