NADIRA DELJANIN, CONSERVATRIX OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE OF SALMIR BASULJEVICH, ET AL. v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, ET AL Docket No. X10-UWY-CV-22-6069955 S Superior Court of Connecticut, COMPLEX LITIGATION. DOCKET AT WATERBURY Filed July 02, 2024 Pierson, W. Glen, Judge MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (Nos. 174 and 175) STATEMENT OF THE CASE *1 This is a products liability case arising out of an April 18, 2019 motor vehicle accident, in which Salmir Basuljevich allegedly sustained catastrophic personal injuries. The action is brought by Nadira Deljanin, as conservatrix of the person and estate of Basuljevich, as well as Matthew Reale, as guardian of the estate of Basuljevich's minor daughter, Ariela. According to the plaintiffs, at the time of the accident at issue, Basuljevich was operating a 2008 S550 4Matic that was designed, tested, manufactured, marketed, sold, and distributed by the defendants, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Mercedes-Benz AG, and Mercedes-Benz Group AG f/k/a Daimler AG (collectively, the “Mercedes defendants”). Further according to the plaintiffs, the Mercedes defendants represented that the motor vehicle operated by Basuljevich “was equipped with Mercedes-Benz's PRE-SAFE system, including but not limited to dual-stage front and rear side-impact air bags and full-length Window Curtain Air Bags that deploy along the front and rear windows on the affected side to help protect ... occupants from head injury.” Amended Complaint dated February 1, 2023 (Docket Entry No. 132), ¶ 21. The plaintiffs allege that, at the time of the subject incident, the vehicle's “driver's side air bag system and/or occupant protection system failed to deploy and/or properly protect Salmir Basuljevich, resulting in his traumatic brain injury and permanent disability.” Id., ¶ 24. In response to the amended complaint, the defendants, Mercedes-Benz AG and Mercedes-Benz Group AG, filed a motion to dismiss, based on lack of personal jurisdiction, which has not yet been submitted to the court for adjudication. See Docket Entry No 149. On February 20, 2024, the Mercedes defendants filed a motion for protective order, pursuant to Practice Book § 13-5,[1] asking the court to enter a protective order to govern the production in discovery of proprietary, trade secret, and otherwise confidential information. Docket Entry No. 174. Among other provisions, the Mercedes defendants’ proposed order allows any party or third party producing documents to designate as “Confidential” any document or information “that they believe in good faith contains or consists of nonpublic information that would reasonably be subject to protection as a trade secret or as material concerning of containing confidential or proprietary information.” Def. Mot. for Protective Order dated February 20, 2024 (Docket Entry No. 174), Exhibit 2, ¶ 1. The proposed order provides that discovery material designated as “Confidential” will be “used or disseminated only for the purpose of prosecuting or defending this action ... and not for any other litigation or any other purpose.” (Emphasis added.) Id., ¶ 4. This may be fairly characterized as a nonsharing provision. Furthermore, the order proposed by the Mercedes defendants limits the disclosure of discovery materials designated as “Confidential” to such categories of persons as the court and court personnel, counsel, consultants and experts, translators retained by the parties for the trial of this case, the parties—including the defendants’ present and past officers, directors, and employees of the defendants involved in discovery proceedings or preparation for trial—deponents or trial witnesses during the course of their testimony or in immediate preparation therefor, mediators or presiding officers at alternative dispute resolution proceedings, and persons authorized in writing by the producing party. Id., ¶ 8.a.-j. The Mercedes defendants’ proposed order also contains the following language: “Prior to any disclosure by counsel to any person in paragraph 8 ... of this Order, a copy of this Order shall be presented to that person, who shall review it and who shall signify that he or she has received and reviewed the contents of this Order and consents to be bound by its terms.... [P]rior to any disclosure by counsel to any persons listed in paragraph 8 ... each person shall have executed a certification ... a true copy of which shall be maintained by counsel disclosing the designated material.” Id., ¶ 11. The order proposed by the Mercedes defendants “covers all documents produced by the parties in discovery in this case”; Def. Mot. for Protective Order dated February 20, 2024 (Docket Entry No. 174), p. 1; and is not limited to jurisdictional discovery relating to the pending motion to dismiss. *2 In response to the Mercedes defendants’ motion, the plaintiffs filed a cross motion (Docket Entry No. 175), in which they propose their own competing protective order to govern “information produced in connection with the pending Motion to Dismiss based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction over [Mercedes-Benz AG and Mercedes-Benz Group AG ....” PL Mot. for Entry of Reasonable Sharing Order filed February 20, 2024 (Docket Entry No. 175), Exhibit A, p.1. While the plaintiffs’ order contains many of same terms that appear in the order submitted by the Mercedes defendants, the plaintiffs’ order includes a limited sharing provision that would allow for the disclosure of information to “[o]ther counsel whose litigation against [the Mercedes defendants] has been challenged based upon personal jurisdiction ....” Id., ¶ 8.j. According to the plaintiffs, their protective order “preserves the confidentiality of materials produced by Mercedes-Benz relating to the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and allows for reasonable sharing of relevant information with other attorneys who are opposing the same arguments to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction made by Mercedes-Benz in cases pending in other jurisdictions.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 1. In support of the limited sharing provision advanced by the plaintiffs, they contend that “[t]he jurisdictional arguments raised by [the Mercedes defendants] in this case are the same raised by the defendants in every case challenging jurisdiction over [the Mercedes defendants]”; “[t]he need for plaintiffs’ counsel to talk, compare notes, and share information about the defendants’ corporate ownership and control of its U.S. agents is vital to the fair representation of the victims of [these] defendants’ neglect and product defects”; and that if plaintiffs’ counsel are prevented “from learning of documents that prove control and establish a court's jurisdiction over the German entities, then the [Mercedes defendants] have a better chance [to] avoid liability for defects that lead to injury and death.” Id., ¶¶ 11, 14, 15.[2] DISCUSSION I A The parties’ dispute turns on whether the court should allow counsel to share with attorneys in other cases involving the Mercedes defendants information developed in discovery in this case. This requires an analysis of the law pertaining to the disclosure of information developed in discovery. Certainly, full public disclosure has never been the rule, nor is such disclosure requested by the plaintiffs. “Discovery proceedings never were open to the public at common law .... Parties are obligated to disclose a wide range of information in the course of discovery to support the disposition of their underlying claims.... The principles underlying public access, therefore, are inapplicable to such material, and consequently, unfettered access to discovered material not filed with the court has never been the norm.” (Citations omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 292 Conn. 1, 36, 970 A.2d 656 (2009); see also Welch v. Welch, 48 Conn. Supp. 19, 23, 828 A.2d 707 (2003) (discovery proceedings “were not open to the public at common law ... and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of common practice” [internal quotation marks omitted]), citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). “The materials produced in discovery, although produced in a regimen of court rules in a dispute that will be tried in a public courtroom[,] are nonetheless private.” Welch v. Welch, supra, 48 Conn. Supp. 27 (citing 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice [3d Ed. 2003] § 26.101 [1] [a]); see also Citizens First National Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, 178 F.3d 943, 944 (7th Cir. 1999) (“pretrial discovery, unlike the trial itself, is usually conducted in private”). “[O]ur justice system recognizes a variety of situations in which confidentiality is not only acceptable, but essential. Discovery, grand jury proceedings, settlement negotiations, and jury deliberations are conducted far from public view. Classified government information, communications between attorney and client, the identity of news sources or police informants, and proprietary data traditionally have been treated as confidential.” A. Miller, “Confidentiality: Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,” 105 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 429 (1991). *3 Although discovery does not typically take place in public, parties are free to share information and documentation developed in discovery unless a court order or other binding legal obligation, such as a valid contract, prohibits them from doing so. “Absent a court order or private agreement, litigants may disclose materials to collateral litigants.” HDT Bio Corp. v. Emcure Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., United States District Court, Docket No. C22-0334 (JLR) (W.D. Wash. September 9, 2022). In fact, “[g]enerally speaking, when a party obtains documents or information through the discovery process, he can use that information in any way which the law permits.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation, 90 F.R.D. 421, 426 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing In Re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 188 [D.C. Cir. 1979)]); see also D. Benham, “Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery Sharing,” 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2181, 2198 (2014) (“litigants may freely distribute discovery information unless a valid court order forbids them from doing so”). Given that parties may disclose information to others, including collateral litigants, absent court order (or other binding legal obligation), the court turns to the appropriate legal standard to apply to the issuance of an order prohibiting the disclosure of information provided in discovery, in the form of a protective order issued under Practice Book § 13-5. B “[T]he [trial] court's inherent authority to issue protective orders is embodied in Practice Book § 13-5 ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association v. Lakner, 347 Conn. 476, 491, 298 A.3d 249 (2023). “The use of protective orders and the extent of discovery is within the discretion of the trial judge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CIT Bank, N.A. v. Francis, 214 Conn. App. 332, 340, 280 A.3d 485 (2022). “Discretion should be left with the court to evaluate the competing considerations in light of the facts of individual cases. By focusing on the particular circumstances in the cases before them, courts are in the best position to prevent both the overly broad use of protective and sealing orders and the unnecessary denial of confidentiality for information that deserves it ....” (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) A. Miller, supra, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 492. “[I]t is undeniable that pretrial confidentiality is a feature of modern litigation.... Before trial, courts and attorneys working on behalf of litigants liberally employ confidentiality orders to closet pretrial discovery from anyone outside of each particular case.” (Footnotes omitted.) D. Benham, supra, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2188–89. “[S]tipulated ‘blanket’ protective orders are becoming standard practice in complex cases.... They allow the parties to make full disclosure in discovery without fear of public access to sensitive information and without the expense and delay of protracted disputes over every item of sensitive information ....” (Citation omitted.) United Nuclear Corporation v. Cranford Insurance Company, 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990). “In many complex pieces of litigation, particularly those involving large corporate parties, the parties agree to the issuance of a protective order at the outset for their mutual protection, both from their competitors and waiting predatory third parties.” United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation, supra, 90 F.R.D. 425. Thus, “[f]ederal courts have widely utilized umbrella or blanket protective orders, particularly in complex cases or cases involving large-scale discovery, upon a threshold showing of good cause by the party seeking protection.” Armour of America v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 597, 599 (2006). However, the fact that protective orders, including so-called “blanket” ones, are routinely entered, does not mean that such orders should issue in every case. As discussed further below, the court is obligated to undertake a case-by-case analysis to determine if good cause for issuance of a particular protective order has been shown. *4 “Under Practice Book § 13-5, the party seeking the [protective order] is required to show good cause. The courts have defined good cause as a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action.... Good cause must be based upon a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.... Whether or not good cause exists for entry of a protective order must depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hyman v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X08-CV-08-6001098-S (June 28, 2012, Brazzel-Massaro, J.); accord Irizarry v. M.L. Moskowitz & Co., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-08-5007501-S (August 12, 2011, Jennings, J.T.R.); see also United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation, supra, 90 F.R.D. 425 (“[T]here is a burden on the party seeking a protective order. The burden on the moving party constitutes a requirement for a threshold showing that there is ‘good cause’ that the order issue.”). “To determine whether good cause exists, courts balance the need for the information against the injury that might result if uncontrolled disclosure is compelled.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Farnoli v. Tine, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV-18-6083715-S (July 18, 2019, Wilson, J.) (citing In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F.Supp.2d 385, 413-16 [E.D.N.Y. 2007]); accord Lucia v. Lucia, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. FA-21-6021623-S (March 4, 2022, Green, J.); see also Barbierri v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-12-6014221-S (January 15, 2013, Jennings, J.T.R.) (55 Conn. L. Rptr. 363, 365) (“[t]he court has balanced the competing concerns of the parties and concludes that the ‘Attorney's Eyes Only’ restriction would be an undue limitation of plaintiff's right to obtain meaningful use of the discovery process, and to receive meaningful representation from his counsel” [emphasis added]); Hyman v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X08-CV-08-6001098-S (“the court balances ... the claim of secrecy ... [against] the need of the plaintiff for relevant information”). In engaging in this balancing process, the court “must guard against any notion that the issuance of protective orders is routine, let alone automatic, even when the application is supported by all parties.” A. Miller, supra, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 492. Thus, a trial court “must review requests for ... protective orders for good cause without acting as a rubber stamp”; Elder v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. 3:21-CV-00637 (DWD) (S.D. Ill. August 17, 2022); and a trial court “may not merely ‘rubber stamp’ an agreed protective order because the parties seek such an order.” Taylor v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Company, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:06-CV-1028-MJR (DGW) (S.D. Ill. December 12, 2007). “Because Practice Book § 13-5 and its federal counterpart, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, provide courts with the same authority to issue protective orders for good cause shown, the [Superior Court] may turn to federal case law in determining motions for protective orders pursuant to Practice Book § 13-5.” Thomson v. Thomson, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FA-13-4024747-S (February 10, 2015, Heller, J.) (59 Conn. L. Rptr. 767, 768 n.1); see also Pavlo v. Slattery, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-03-0083541-S (February 20, 2004, Bear, J.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 557, 559) (“[b]ecause Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides the same authority to federal courts for the issuance of protective orders and for the same reasons, federal case law is appropriate authority for determining protective orders pursuant to Practice Book § 13-5”); accord Welch v. Welch, supra, 48 Conn. Supp. 20. II *5 Although the question presented by the parties’ motions—namely, whether to permit or prohibit the sharing of discovery under a protective order—has not received extensive judicial consideration in the Connecticut,[3] the issue has been addressed by both federal and state courts throughout the country, without a general consensus as to outcome. “Courts around the country enter pretrial confidentiality orders every day.... Courts are split on if, when, and how these orders should allow litigants to share pretrial discovery information. *** [C]ourts are ... [divided] on the propriety of protective-order provisions that allow information sharing between similar cases. Some courts have mandated discovery sharing, holding that courts abuse their discretion by issuing orders that prevent the practice. At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have recently held that discovery-sharing provisions are forbidden in many cases. Indeed, federal and state courts across the country, applying similar protective-order rules, are increasingly fractured on the issue.” (Footnotes omitted.) D. Benham, supra, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2182–85; see also Butler v. Daimler Trucks North America LLC, United States District Court, Docket No. 19-2377-JAR (JPO) (D. Kan. January 10, 2020) (“jurisdictions appear to be split on whether sharing provisions are appropriate or useful”). The division of opinion on the issue serves to demonstrate that cogent arguments may be made on both sides. “Discovery sharing is a particularly interesting problem.... Courts have not been consistent in their treatment of these situations; the nature of the problem probably makes that inconsistency inevitable.” (Footnote omitted.) A. Miller, supra, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 497. Sharing advocates argue that “[c]onfidentiality orders that prevent litigants in similar cases from sharing information make litigation less efficient and less effective,” and tout the benefits of sharing, including “increased litigation integrity through transparency along with, in at least some cases, increased accountability ....” D. Benham, supra, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2186. With respect to the issue of efficiency, one proponent has noted that “plaintiffs with identical discovery requests in two virtually identical cases might be forced to litigate their entitlement to the same information anew in both cases. If courts in similar cases ... allowed parties to share discovery, the twin lawsuits would consume fewer court and party resources. Multiplied over many cases and many document requests, court orders that prevent sharing create a significant drag on the system. Based on these efficiency concerns, most commentators that have considered the issue support some form of discovery sharing.” (Footnotes omitted.) “[A]llowing the sharing of discovery among related cases is an efficient and effective means of avoiding duplicative and costly discovery, as well as avoiding unnecessary delay in the adjudication of cases.” Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 130, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); see also United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation, supra, 90 F.R.D. 426 (“Use of the discovery fruits disclosed in one lawsuit in connection with other litigation, and even in collaboration among plaintiffs’ attorneys, comes squarely within the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.... Such cooperation among litigants promotes the speedy and inexpensive determination of every action as well as conservation of judicial resources.” [Citations omitted.]); D. Benham, supra, 2199 (“[p]laintiff's attorneys typically contend that sharing information between similar cases allows them to avoid wastefully reinventing the wheel by repeatedly conducting virtually identical discovery”). Echoing this view, one state court has endorsed “the efficiencies, in terms of time and cost, that are created when two similarly situated litigants share discovery ....” Koval v. General Motors Corporation, 62 Ohio Misc. 2d 694, 699, 610 N.E.2d 1199 (1990); accord Wolhar v. General Motors Corporation, 712 A.2d 464, 467 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (“As a general proposition, the goal of sharing or using discovery materials developed in one case with the litigants of another is appropriate under our rules of civil procedure .... The great weight of authority in other jurisdictions holds that such sharing is not only theoretically sound but also justified as an efficient use of the resources of the courts and the parties.” [Footnote omitted.]). “Even those who have strenuously opposed widespread public disclosure of discovery information have conceded that an appropriate nonparty use of discovery is to prepare for related cases distinct from the case in which the discovery materials are first obtained.” (Emphasis in original.) D. Benham, supra, 2200. *6 With respect to transparency and increased accountability, “allowing parties to compare current discovery responses with previously produced material may allow detection of discovery misconduct ... [such as] perjury in a deposition or omitted documents in response to a request for production.” Id., 2207. “[S]haring imposes on the producing party ... the duty to provide full, fair and consistent disclosure of documents to each similarly situated plaintiff.” Koval v. General Motors Corporation, supra, 62 Ohio Misc. 2d 699. According to its supporters, another advantage of sharing is that it levels the playing field for the parties. “[S]haring proponents contend that exchanging information allows isolated plaintiffs to prepare cases collaboratively, leveling the playing field with large law firms and national collaboration on the other side of the docket.” D. Benham, supra, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2199. As observed by one court, “[defense] counsel already has the ability to share confidential information and confer with every other lawyer representing [the defendant] in similar cases across the country. Thus, the sharing clause would serve to put the parties on more equal footing.” Sweet v. Polaris Industries, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. 3:21-CV-40076-MGM (KAR) (D. Mass. March 31, 2022); see also United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation, supra, 90 F.R.D. 426 (“[C]ooperation among litigants promotes the speedy and inexpensive determination of every action as well as conservation of judicial resources.... This is particularly the case where the resources available to the parties are uneven.” [Citation omitted; emphasis added.]); D. Benham, supra, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2206 (nonsharing orders “isolate litigants in similar cases from one another, stifling collaboration among, and decreasing the efficacy of, plaintiffs’ counsel”); but see R. Campbell, “The Protective Order in Products Liability Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer,” 31 B.C. L. Rev. 771, 773 (1990) (arguing against sharing and contending that “defendants find themselves pitted against syndicates of contingency fee lawyers who have joined together to exchange information in proceedings then pending or later initiated”). By contrast with these arguments, opponents of sharing focus on the increased risk sharing poses to maintaining the privacy of confidential information, including trade secrets and business data. In Connecticut, as in other jurisdictions, protective orders serve the important purpose of shielding proprietary and confidential information from being disseminated to business competitors and the public at large. A. Miller, supra, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 446 (“[t]he dissemination of private or valuable information generated during discovery may produce serious harm, both to society and to litigants”). Under Practice Book § 13-5 (7), a protective order may provide “that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way ....”[4] “Competitively sensitive information can be the basis of a protective order of confidentiality.” Irizarry v. M.L. Moskowitz & Co., Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-08-5007501-S. *7 “[C]ourts have recognized that the risk of disclosure of confidential information subject to a protective order increases as more individuals gain access to the material.” SRH Holdings, LLC v. Government Employees Insurance Company, United States District Court, Docket No. 23-10325-DJC (JCB) (D. Mass. January 4, 2024). “Of course, protective orders can be violated and, as a matter of simple probability, each additional person who receives the information under the sharing order makes it marginally more likely that the information makes its way to a competitor.” D. Benham, supra, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2204. Furthermore, sharing opponents argue that nonsharing protective orders make “the discovery process in a particular case operate more efficiently ... [because] the assurance of confidentiality may encourage disclosures that would otherwise be resisted.” United Nuclear Corporation v. Cranford Insurance Company, supra, 905 F.2d 1427. Thus, entering a sharing order that accounts for the interests of and benefits collateral litigants “tends to undermine the [protective] order's potential for more efficient discovery.” Id., 1427-28 (but also noting the “countervailing efficiency consideration—saving time and effort in the collateral case by avoiding duplicative discovery”). Opponents of sharing also point out that sharing clauses are disfavored in the federal courts. “[W]hile some courts allow sharing amongst similarly situated litigants, the trend appears to be away from including ... sharing in protective orders and ... courts, particularly in the federal system, have been hostile to upfront sharing provisions.” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Associated Terminals, LLC v. Entergy Corporation, United States District Court, Docket No. 22-3118 (DPC) (E.D. La. August 25, 2023); accord Rosas v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, United States District Court, Docket No. 5:18-CV-101 (JAK) (S.D. Tex. June 3, 2019); see also D. Benham, supra, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2208 (noting that “other courts, particularly in the federal system, have been hostile to upfront sharing provisions”). In addition to these concerns, many courts hostile to sharing focus more narrowly on the relevance—or rather, the irrelevance—of sharing to the particular case at hand. For example, in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to include a sharing provision in a protective order, in a case involving an alleged vehicular design defect, one district court noted that the “[p]laintiffs have provided the [c]ourt with no concrete benefit that will result for them due to the including of a sharing provision.” (Emphasis added.) Su Min Kim v. Honda Canada, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. 4:19-CV-00032 (ALM) (E.D. Tex. January 21, 2020); see also SRH Holdings, LLC v. Government Employees Insurance Company, supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 23-10325-DJC (JCB) (observing that the plaintiff “has not articulated specific ways in which the sharing of information could be useful to this case” [Emphasis added.]); Cohen v. Norcold, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. 5:20-CV-170-BO (RBJ) (E.D.N.C. May 8, 2023) (“[p]laintiffs have failed to demonstrate how ... goals [of efficiency, minimizing discovery costs, ensuring full and fair disclosure, and conserving judicial resources] would be served by the entry of a sharing protective order in this case” [emphasis added]); see also A. Miller, supra, 435 (“it is unclear to what extent courts should consider nonparty interests”). *8 Finally, the commercialization of shared information, and the institution or use of litigation for the sole purpose of sharing discovery information in other cases, have been widely condemned as improper. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation, supra, 90 F.R.D. 426 (“[w]e perceive no intention in the Federal Rules that incidental benefits of liberal federal discovery should not accrue to litigants in state courts who are pursuing ancillary lawsuits, provided there is no attempt to exploit the federal discovery process solely to assist litigation in a foreign forum” [emphasis altered]); see also American Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 1979) (observing that “several district courts have refused to enter protective orders which prevent disclosure to others litigating similar issues on the grounds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not foreclose collaboration in discovery, and, further, that there was no showing that the moving party was exploiting one case solely to assist in the litigation of another” [emphasis added]). III With the foregoing principles and ongoing legal debate in mind, the court turns to the cross motions at issue. This court agrees with the view that “[i]t is difficult, and indeed unwise, to have an absolute prohibition on discovery sharing, given the extraordinarily high cost of litigation and the reality that discovery accounts for the largest component of that expense in many cases. Barring sharing smacks too much of requiring each litigant to reinvent the wheel .... As Judge Wisdom has put it, there ‘is no reason to erect gratuitous roadblocks in the path of a litigant who finds a trail blazed by another.’ But always permitting sharing would be a mistake as well.” (Footnotes omitted.) A. Miller, supra, 497.[5] This undogmatic approach is consistent with the court's obligation, under Practice Book § 13-5, to “balance the need for the information against the injury that might result if ... disclosure is compelled.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Farnoli v. Tine, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-18-6083715-S. *9 In engaging in the balancing process, and deciding which of the parties’ competing protective orders to adopt—and modify, if appropriate—the court is mindful of the fact that this action sounds in products liability. “[I]n product liability cases involving the same alleged product defect, courts have frequently permitted the sharing of information among plaintiffs.” Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., supra, 287 F.R.D. 134. “Sharing of discovery materials is particularly appropriate where multiple individual plaintiffs assert essentially the same wrongs against a national manufacturer of a consumer product.” Wolhar v. General Motors Corporation, supra, 712 A.2d 467. “More important than any efficiency created ... is that the public will derive an indirect benefit from a practice permitting sharing. The court notes that products have been modified and even taken off the market as a whole following the public outcry that the products are dangerous. Such revelations of a product's dangerous propensity occur mainly through litigation.... If the sharing of discovery can possibly save lives and stop injuries ... then no protective order should prohibit it.” (Citation omitted.) Koval v. General Motors Corporation, supra, 62 Ohio Misc. 2d 699; see also D. Benham, supra, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2187 (“[a]ccording to pro-transparency advocates, keeping public health and safety hazards confidential costs lives”). Given that this action involves product safety, the court will allow the limited sharing of discovery information. In products cases involving the PRE-SAFE system in 2008 S550 4Matic model vehicles—the vehicle operated by Basuljevich at the time of the accident—sharing will promote efficiencies by avoiding duplication of discovery efforts, thereby conserving court and party resources, and reducing delays. In addition, allowing sharing will also provide increased transparency and accountability by encouraging full, fair, and consistent disclosure. In deciding to allow limited sharing here, the court rejects the Mercedes defendants’ concern that a sharing order requiring disclosure of confidential information “is likely to cause substantial harm to the Mercedes defendants’ competitive position,” and that the information sought by the plaintiffs, “if shared publicly, could negatively impact the Mercedes’ defendants’ business relationship[s], reputation, and image, and provide a competitive advantage to competitors ....” Def. Mot. for Protective Order dated February 20, 2024 (Docket Entry No. 174), 11, 12. It does so because the Mercedes defendants’ concerns and predictions are conclusory.[6] Sweet v. Polaris Industries, Inc., supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:21-CV-40076-MGM (KAR) (the defendant “has not identified an instance of actual harm from the sharing of its confidential documents in ... other litigation”); see also United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation, supra, 90 F.R.D. 425 (“In this case, [the] movant ... has alleged in a most conclusory fashion that it will suffer certain injuries. No specific instances are cited where trade secrets will be disclosed or where [the movant] will be put at a competitive disadvantage.”). “[D]ecades of experience with sharing protective orders shows that violations are relatively rare and violations involving a leak to a competitor are virtually nonexistent.” D. Benham, supra, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2204-205. Anyone receiving shared information under the protective order to be issued by this court will be subject to the confidentiality provisions of the order, as well as the court's enforcement authority. See Wolhar v. General Motors Corporation, supra, 712 A.2d 470 (“[a]ny prejudice to GM is diminished, if not eliminated, by the fact that documents produced ... would not be made public and would be subject to the confidentiality conditions articulated in the ... protective order”); see also Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., supra, 287 F.R.D. 134 (modifying protective order to allow sharing and observing, “[b]ecause the plaintiff in this action and any related action would be bound by the [p]rotective [o]rder, there will not be public dissemination,” and no prejudice will result from the modification). “Defendants’ desire to make it more burdensome for ... [certain parties] to pursue ... collateral litigation is not legitimate prejudice.... [A]ny legitimate interest the defendants have in continued secrecy as against the public at large can be accommodated by placing [the parties] under the restrictions on use and disclosure contained in the original protective order.” (Citation omitted.) United Nuclear Corporation v. Cranford Insurance Company, supra, 905 F.2d. 1428. *10 “The typical harm advanced by parties seeking protective orders is economic or proprietary injury flowing from dissemination of discovery to competitors. Protective orders that allow sharing prevent this harm in two ways. First, the orders typically include a provision that expressly forbids giving the information to the producing party's competitors, and violations are punishable by contempt. Second, the sharing provision itself [may] be narrowly tailored to allow for sharing only with cases involving a strong factual similarity to the case in which the order is entered. Excluding competitors from the sharing class obviates the most likely (and often only) cognizable source of harm flowing from the disclosure of discovery information.” (Footnotes omitted.) D. Benham, supra, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2227. As stated by the court in Sweet v. Polaris Industries, Inc., supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:21-CV-40076-MGM (KAR), “[t]he court acknowledges that [the defendant] has a legitimate interest in protecting its trade secrets and other confidential commercial information. [The sharing clause to be adopted by the court] does not allow for unfettered dissemination of such material. Access is limited to lawyers for other plaintiffs in similar cases, and those lawyers are required to sign certifications agreeing to be bound by the terms of the protective order, agreeing to return copies of any materials produced under the terms of the protective order to [the defendant] at the time a final dismissal or judgment is entered in the case, and consenting to the jurisdiction of this court for purposes enforcement of the protective order. Thus, [the defendant] fails to explain how their competitors would come into possession of their confidential information through the limited sharing clause [to be adopted by the court].” In this case, the court will enter “a protective order ... which accommodate[s] the public interest in allowing the sharing of information to litigants in similar cases and the interest of petitioners in protecting confidential information and trade secrets from disclosure to their competitors. The order ... allow[s] disclosure only to counsel in similar cases and only if counsel execute[s] a stipulation agreeing to be bound by the protective order.” Raymond Handling Concepts Corporation v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 584, 590, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885 (1995). Furthermore, while allowing the sharing of information with counsel in similar cases, the protective order will prohibit explicitly any sharing with the Mercedes defendants’ competitors. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the plaintiffs and defendants’ motions for protective order (Docket Entry Nos. 174 and 175), as follows: 1. The court will enter a protective order that will govern all information, documents, and materials produced by the parties in discovery in this case, not limited to jurisdictional discovery; 2. The protective order will allow for the limited sharing of information, documentation, and materials produced by the Mercedes defendants in discovery, allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to share the same: (1) with attorneys representing plaintiffs in other litigation against the Mercedes defendants, or any one or more of them, involving claims of products liability relating to and/or arising from the PRE-SAFE system in 2008 S550 4Matic model vehicles; (2) which attorneys shall be subject to the confidentiality and other provisions of the protective order; and (3) which attorneys shall be required to sign a certification acknowledging receipt of the protective order and agreeing to be bound by its terms; 3. The protective order will provide that in no event shall any information, documentation, or materials produced in discovery be shared with competitors of the Mercedes defendants; and 4. The court will make other alterations and modifications to the proposed protective orders submitted by the parties, as appropriate and in its discretion, in accordance with this decision. It is so ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Practice Book § 13-5, entitled, “—Protective Order,” reads: “Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the judicial authority; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the judicial authority; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the judicial authority; (9) specified terms and conditions relating to the discovery of electronically stored information including the allocation of expense of the discovery of electronically stored information, taking into account the amount in controversy, the resources of the parties, the importance of the issues, and the importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues.” [2] While the plaintiffs emphasize the need to share information in products cases such as this, the plaintiffs’ proposed protective order does not limit disclosure to other attorneys involved in products liability litigation; rather, the plaintiffs’ sharing provision extends to any case against the Mercedes defendants where personal jurisdiction has been challenged. [3] In support of their proposed protective order, which allows for limited sharing, the plaintiffs cite to an order of the trial court in the case of Patton v. Chrysler Group, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-12-6015513-S (October 15, 2013, Provodator, J.) (Docket Entry No. 134.87), in which the court modified a proposed protective order to permit sharing under certain conditions. The trial court's order, which is not in the form of a memorandum of decision, does not contain a discussion of applicable legal authorities. In opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion, the Mercedes defendants rely on Guardiola v. Kia Motors America, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-18-6073786-S (June 10, 2020, Arnold, J.T.R.), in which the court issued a protective order without a sharing provision, also without legal analysis. [4] Connecticut's Uniform Trade Secrets Act, General Statutes § 31-50 et seq. directs, in part, that “[i]n an action under this chapter, a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings ....” General Statutes § 35-55. [5] In his consideration of the issue, Professor Miller argues that “discovery sharing should not be left to the whims or private interests of individual parties. In analyzing a discovery request, the court's central inquiry should be whether granting the request will actually promote litigation efficiency and fairness. Thus, the court should be particularly hesitant when the sharing seems motivated by a desire to commercialize the data by selling it to other attorneys rather than by a desire to promote litigation efficiency or when the action itself was brought to gain access to discovery. The judge should consider whether the benefits of making the material available in other lawsuits and the economies achieved when lawyers collaborate in preparing their cases outweigh the likelihood of increasing discovery disputes in the original lawsuit and the other deleterious consequences of dissemination. For example, when a single event has given rise to complex or multidistrict litigation, the adjudicatory system will often be well-served by allowing the pooling of discovery materials in all the suits, particularly when some have been consolidated for pretrial or all purposes. The same occurs naturally when disputes are aggregated into a class action. The problem is somewhat more difficult when the cases in which the protected data would be used are not fused with the one in which it is originally produced and the relationship is somewhat attenuated or when the cases are dispersed in multiple judicial systems. Still, a collaborative approach in handling related litigation of this type may be best. The court must scrutinize these situations with extreme care, and it should communicate with the judges in the other pending actions when that seems desirable. Of course, if confidential information is to be shared among litigants, they all should be subject to the court's restrictions on further dissemination or any other limitations it might initially have ordered.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 498–99. [6] In addition, there has been no showing by the Mercedes defendants that the sharing requested by the plaintiffs is otherwise wrongful, for example, in that the plaintiffs have “exploit[ed] ... [this] case solely to assist in the litigation of another.” American Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Grady, supra, 594 F.2d 597.