THOMAS E. STUART, JOSE L. FELIX, and A.F., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, TARA CORONEL, TAMARA CORONEL, WARREN PAUL, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, Defendants Case No. 5:22-cv-00701-SPG-MAR United States District Court, C.D. California Filed June 14, 2024 Counsel Alexius Miller, May Jung LLP, Orange, CA, Je Yon Jung, May Jung LLP, Orange, CA, for Plaintiffs. Karen L. Capasso, Douglas C. Smith, Smith Law Offices LLP, Riverside, CA, for Defendants. Tara Coronel, San Jacinto, CA, Pro Se. Rocconi, Margo A., United States District Judge ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS IN LIMINE [ECF NOS. 164–66, 171, 210] *1 Before the Court are motions in limine brought by Plaintiffs Thomas E. Stuart, Jose L. Felix, and A.F. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), (ECF No. 171), and Defendant County of Riverside (the “County”), (ECF Nos. 164–66). Defendant Tara Coronel (“Coronel”), who is self-represented, did not submit any motions in limine or oppositions thereto, instead informing the parties: “I'm waiving my responses because, without an attorney, it's impossible to provide correct responses.” (ECF No. 190 at 1 n.1). On May 29, 2024, the Court held a final pretrial conference and heard oral argument on the parties' motions. The Court held a subsequent conference on June 5, 2024, to hear further argument on certain matters. Having carefully considered the parties' submissions, oral arguments, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court rules as follows. I. LEGAL STANDARD District courts possess inherent authority to consider motions in limine. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). Like other pretrial motions, motions in limine are “useful tools to resolve issues which would otherwise clutter up the trial.” City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). A court's rulings on motions in limine are inherently preliminary and “are not binding on the trial judge, and the judge may always change [her] mind during the course of trial.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 (2000). Because courts are generally better situated to assess the value and utility of evidence during trial, motions in limine that “seek exclusion of broad and unspecific categories of evidence” are disfavored. Jackson v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 194 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2016). Where a motion in limine lacks specificity, the better practice “is to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence as they arise [at trial] as opposed to tackling the matter in a vacuum on a motion in limine.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives courts another tool to manage trial practice: the ability to bifurcate trials. Under Rule 42(b), “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. See also Marks Food Corp. v. Barbara Ann Baking Co., 274 F.2d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding that “the trial court[,] in proper circumstances, has the right to order separate trials for separate issues in the same case”). “A district court's refusal to bifurcate a trial is accordingly reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004). II. DISCUSSION A. The County's Informal Request to Bifurcate Punitive Damages “The decision as to whether to bifurcate a trial rests with the sound discretion of the trial court.” Calmar, Inc. v. Emson Rsch., Inc., 850 F. Supp. 861, 865 (C.D. Cal. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that, because “the evidence usually overlaps substantially, the normal procedure is to try compensatory and punitive damage claims together with appropriate instructions to make clear to the jury the difference in the clear and convincing evidence required for the award of punitive damages.” Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1021 (citation omitted). Here, the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order states that “Defendant County believes punitive damages as to Defendant Tara Coronel should be bifurcated.” (ECF No. 191-1 at 17). Plaintiffs disagree with this approach. (Id.). This informal, one-sentence request for bifurcation is the only material the Court has before it on this topic; the County has not moved to bifurcate trial, and in its Memorandum of Contention of Fact and Law, the County represented that it would not seek bifurcation, (ECF No. 162 (“County Mem.”) at 8). *2 The Court cannot, based on a single sentence devoid of legal argument or analysis, conclude that bifurcation is proper here. Indeed, the evidence before the Court indicates that this is an ordinary case where “correct jury instructions regarding the different burdens of proof” will cure any potential jury confusion. Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1021. Additionally, although courts may choose to bifurcate trials to “defer[ ] costly and possibly unnecessary proceedings pending resolution of potentially dispositive preliminary issues,” Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002), the circumstances of this case do not indicate that bifurcation would serve such a purpose here. Cf. Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 54 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming trial court's decision to bifurcate discrete issue of causation as “expeditious and appropriate in light of the circumstances” where determination of issue could have fully precluded recovery), aff'd sub nom. Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996). B. Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine[1] 1. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 2 Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 2 seeks an issue sanction precluding the County from presenting evidence and argument that Coronel accessed Plaintiffs' information during her day off and that, as a result, her conduct occurred outside the scope of her employment. (ECF No. 171 at 10–12). Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to exclude the portion of the Declaration of Christopher Rosselli in which Mr. Rosselli states that June 11, 2021, was a scheduled day off for Coronel, as well as any testimony from Coronel on this topic. (Id. at 10). Plaintiffs' request is based on two instances of purported discovery conduct committed by the County. First, Plaintiffs emphasize that Mr. Rosselli's conclusion relies on “DPSS records” that the County never produced in discovery. (Id.). Second, Plaintiffs contest the County's decision to wipe Coronel's laptop following her termination. (Id. at 11). Plaintiffs also attack the merits of any testimony suggesting that Coronel had a fixed work schedule. (Id. at 10). In opposition, the County does not dispute that it failed to produce the records underlying Mr. Rosselli's declaration. The County does, however, dispute that it reasonably anticipated litigation at the time it reimaged Coronel's laptop and also contends that Plaintiffs' arguments go to the weight rather than the admissibility of this evidence. (ECF No. 181 at 2–3). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) imposes upon litigants a duty to supplement their responses to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission under certain circumstances. Under Rule 37, “[i]f a party fails to provide information” as required by Rule 26(e), “the party is not allowed to use that information,” including at trial, “unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). See also Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining Rule 37(c)(1) “gives teeth” to the requirements of Rule 26). “Substantial justification implicates the reason for the delay, while harmlessness requires inquiry into resulting prejudice.” Fisher & Paykel Healthcare Ltd. v. Flexicare Inc., No. SACV 19-835 JVS (DFMx), 2021 WL 5994996, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2021) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The Court has “particularly wide latitude ... to issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).” Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1106. In addition to or in lieu of exclusion, a court may impose various other sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). “The party facing sanctions bears the burden of proving that its failure to disclose the required information was substantially justified or is harmless.” R & R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 673 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2012). *3 Here, the County does not dispute that it failed to produce the documents underlying Mr. Rosselli's declaration, or that those documents were discoverable and responsive to Plaintiffs' discovery requests. By so doing, the County concedes the validity of Plaintiffs' claims. Mariscal v. Graco, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 973, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Plaintiff failed to address these arguments in his opposition brief, and therefore conceded these claims.”); Rogers Enterprises, Inc. v. Hitachi Sols. Am., Ltd., No. SACV 21-913 PSG (JDEx), 2022 WL 1410000, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2022). As the County also did not make any argument to excuse its failure to produce these documents, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion to exclude the portion of Mr. Rosselli's declaration that is based on those materials. As for Plaintiffs' broader request for preclusion of any argument that Coronel accessed Plaintiffs' information during a scheduled day off, after oral argument and further briefing by the parties, the Court construes this portion of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 2 as a renewal of their prior Motion for Spoliation of Evidence by Defendants County and Tara Coronel and Request for Sanctions, (ECF No. 125-1). As the Court previously explained, see (ECF No. 158 at 12–13), once litigation is “pending or reasonably foreseeable,” parties must preserve evidence known or reasonably expected to be relevant to any party's claim or defense. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001). Failure to do so—spoliation of evidence—subjects parties to possible sanctions. Id. See also Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-6342 CBM(AJWx), 2013 WL 12122299, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013). Where the evidence spoliated is electronically stored information (“ESI”), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) sets forth factors a court should consider in evaluating the propriety of imposing sanctions and governs the sanctions available. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e). Rule 37 provides that sanctions may be appropriate if: (1) ESI was lost; (2) the ESI cannot be restored or replaced; (3) the ESI should have been preserved in “the anticipation or conduct of litigation”; and (4) the loss occurred because the party responsible failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the ESI. Id. If the court finds that a party was prejudiced by spoliation of ESI, Rule 37(e)(1) permits the court to “order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1). “[O]nly upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive” the other party of the use of the ESI in the litigation may a court “(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party; (B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party; or (C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2). Here, Plaintiffs' renewed request for sanctions brings into clearer light evidence demonstrating that the County more likely than not reimaged Coronel's laptop with the intent to deprive other parties of using that information over the course of the litigation. Specifically, Plaintiffs identify portions of the County's privilege log in which the County claimed work product protection for “[d]ocuments [p]repared in [a]nticipation of [l]itigation” as early as July 27, 2021, nearly a month before the County reimaged Coronel's County-issued laptop. Compare (ECF No. 199-1 at 1–2, 4–5) with (ECF No. 125-1 at 8). In supplemental briefing, the County concedes that it anticipated litigation about breaches, “including but not limited to the incident at issue in this case,” but asks the Court to distinguish between that anticipated litigation and “specific legal claims or anticipated lawsuits by the Plaintiffs.” (ECF No. 198 at 3). Even if such an exception could be conceived, however, the metadata contained on Coronel's computer would necessarily be relevant to litigation related to her access of Plaintiffs' information. Without engaging in speculation about the motives of any particular County employee, the Court concludes that the County's claim of the work product protection over a month before it permanently deleted the metadata on Coronel's computer supports an inference of the County's culpable state of mind. See Compass Bank v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, 104 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1056–57 (S.D. Cal. 2015). As a result, the Court will give an adverse inference instruction to the jury; the exact content of this instruction will be determined during the jury instruction conference. 2. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 3 *4 Plaintiffs' third Motion in Limine seeks to preclude any evidence regarding Coronel's personal motivations for accessing the CWS/CMS database, including whether Paul gave Coronel “permission” to search for his information. (ECF No. 171 at 13–14). Plaintiffs argue that this information is not relevant to resolving their § 1983 claims against Coronel or to determining the scope of Coronel's employment. (Id.). To the extent this evidence is relevant, Plaintiffs contend that it is prejudicial and so lacking in probative value as to be inadmissible. (Id. at 14–15). In opposition, the County argues that this motion is overbroad and that the evidence Plaintiffs seek to exclude is in fact relevant. (ECF No. 182 at 2–4). At hearing, Plaintiffs clarified that they brought Motion in Limine No. 3 at least in part to prevent the County from arguing that there was no dispute that Coronel's motivations in accessing the CWS/CMS database were purely personal. Counsel for the County confirmed that they would make no such claims. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' third Motion in Limine. Defendants correctly observe that the Court did not previously conclude that Coronel's personal motivations were irrelevant to determining whether her conduct arose in the scope of her employment. (Id. at 3). Indeed, an employee's motivations are relevant—though not dispositive—in this fact-intensive analysis. See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 220 Cal. App. 4th 87, 103 (2013). As for Plaintiffs' various arguments against the probative value of any of this evidence, Plaintiffs may explore these issues during cross-examination, but they pertain to the evidence's weight rather than its admissibility. 3. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 4 Plaintiffs' fourth Motion in Limine seeks to preclude Coronel or the County from offering into evidence hearsay testimony concerning Coronel's conversations with Paul and her sister, including information Paul purportedly received from other individuals. (ECF No. 171 at 15–19). The County opposes. (ECF No. 183). The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' fourth Motion in Limine as premature. Although all evidence must be properly presented in an admissible form, it is not apparent on the facts before the Court that the evidence Plaintiffs seek to exclude will necessarily come before the Court as hearsay. If, during trial, evidence concerning Coronel's conversations is elicited in a form that Plaintiff believes is not admissible, Plaintiff may make an appropriate objection, and the Court will issue its ruling on the objection at that time. 4. Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 5 Plaintiffs' fifth Motion in Limine seeks, under Federal Rule of Evidence 615, to physically exclude any of Coronel's witnesses from the proceedings when not being examined. (Pls.' MILs at 19–20). Plaintiffs also request the Court admonish Coronel to inform her witnesses that they may not discuss their or any other witness's testimony with other witnesses in this case. (Id. at 20–21). The County does not oppose. (ECF No. 184). Federal Rule of Evidence 615 provides that, “[a]t a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded from the courtroom so that they cannot hear other witnesses' testimony,” unless certain conditions apply. Fed. R. Evid. 615(a). It further permits a court to “prohibit disclosure of trial testimony to witnesses who are excluded from the courtroom” and to “prohibit excluded witnesses from accessing trial testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 615(b). This rule functions to decrease the risk that witnesses' testimony “will be influenced by hearing what other witnesses have to say, and to increase the likelihood that they will confine themselves to truthful statements based on their own recollections.” Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281–82 (1989). Here, no party opposes Plaintiffs' requests, and none of the exceptions set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 615(a) appear to apply. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' fifth Motion in Limine. C. The County's Motions in Limine 1. The County's Motion in Limine No. 1 *5 The County seeks to exclude evidence of potential or actual data breaches other than Coronel's access of Plaintiffs' information. (ECF No. 164 at 1–2). The County contends that this evidence is irrelevant to any issue remaining for trial and that its admission would be unduly prejudicial. (Id. at 2). The County also asserts that this evidence is hearsay. (Id.). Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that this evidence is relevant to its tort and California constitutional privacy claims. (ECF No. 185 at 3–5). Plaintiffs also contend that this evidence is not hearsay or, in the alternative, falls under various hearsay exceptions. (Id. at 5–9). Here, as an initial matter and as discussed at length during the pretrial hearings, the parties dispute what issues remain to be litigated. The County contends that Plaintiffs' tort and California constitutional privacy claims apply to it only through the doctrine of vicarious liability. (County Mem. at 2–3). Plaintiffs argue, correctly, that these claims seek to impose direct liability on the County. (ECF No. 170 at 2–3). Although the County asserts that Plaintiffs' claims for direct liability against the County are “brand new,” (ECF No. 191-1 at 3, 13), this is not true. Instead, Plaintiffs have sought to impose direct liability on the County for negligence and violations of the California Constitution's privacy guarantee since at least the time Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 92 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 120–29 (bringing claims against “All Defendants”)). Although the County argues that “[n]o case law ... supports the theory that the California Constitution gives rise to a direct liability claim against a public entity,” (ECF No. 196 at 2), this is inaccurate—as recognized by the California Supreme Court in Katzberg v. Regents of University of California, the California Court of Appeal “assumed that damages would be available” for a cause of action for damages under the California Constitution's privacy initiative as early as 1976, in Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825 (1976). 29 Cal. 4th 300, 313 n.13 (2002). Indeed, the California Supreme Court criticized Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School District, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (1990), the case upon which the County relies for the proposition that the privacy clause of California Constitution Article 1, § 1 supports a claim only for injunctive relief, for having “overlooked Porten.” Katzberg, 29 Cal. 4th 300, 315 n.16. The County also appears to misapprehend the basis for Plaintiffs' claim against it, focusing instead on Plaintiffs' constitutional claim against Coronel. See (ECF No. 164 at 4–5). The claims are not, however, identical; while Plaintiffs' now-resolved claim against Coronel focused on Coronel's access of Plaintiffs' private information, see (ECF No. 158 at 32–35), their claim against the County concerns the County's handling of their private information, see (ECF No. 170 at 10). The County, having failed to address (or, apparently, notice) Plaintiffs' direct liability California constitutional claims before trial, must now defend against those claims at trial. Although Plaintiffs have long sought to bring a directly liability negligence claim against the County, however, they may not do so under the theory of mandatory duty advanced through their pretrial filings. Generally, Ninth Circuit precedent “disallows the assertion of new claims after the close of discovery where such claims would place the defendant under different burdens and call for different defenses.” Grayum v. Greene, 203 F. App'x 103, 104–05 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000) (barring plaintiffs from advancing new theory of liability where “lack of notice on this issue central to the cause of action makes it difficult, if not impossible, for [defendant] to know how to defend itself”). Although Plaintiffs argue that the County should have been on notice of the mandatory duty theory of liability, including, among other reasons, that a direct-liability negligence theory against the County could only have been brought under a mandatory duty theory, (ECF No. 202), the Court disagrees that the FAC met Rule 8's standard for stating a mandatory duty claim. *6 Mandatory duty claims are, generally speaking, a type of negligence claim. See, e.g., Guzman v. Cnty. of Monterey, 178 Cal. App. 4th 983, 991 (2009) (for mandatory duty claim, “[a]s in any negligence action, causation is usually a question of fact for the jury”). The elements of a mandatory duty claim are not, however, identical those required to prove a negligence claim. “The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pac., LLC, 228 Cal. App. 4th 664, 671 (2014). For a mandatory duty claim, in contrast, the plaintiff must “show[ ] that: (1) an ‘enactment’ imposes a mandatory duty upon the defendant entity; (2) performance of the duty was intended to protect against the kind of injury suffered by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant public entity's failure to use reasonable diligence to discharge the mandatory duty proximately caused plaintiff's injury.” Cnty. of San Bernardino v. Superior Ct., 77 Cal. App. 5th 1100, 1111 (2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, as counsel for Plaintiffs conceded at the hearing, the words “mandatory duty” do not appear in the FAC, nor does the FAC reference the statutory provisions under which Plaintiffs seek to hold the County liable. See generally (FAC). Although Plaintiffs may be correct that a mandatory duty claim is the only avenue through which they may seek to impose direct negligence liability, this doctrinal fact cannot put a defendant on notice that a plaintiff's garden-variety negligence claim might later transform into a mandatory duty claim under specific statutory or regulatory provisions not cited in the complaint. Plaintiffs also request leave to amend the FAC to bring their mandatory duty claim. (ECF No. 202 at 5–6). When considering whether to grant leave to amend, district courts are to balance “the strong policy in favor of allowing amendment” with “four factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and the futility of amendment.” Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, although Plaintiffs may be correct that amendment would not be futile, allowing Plaintiffs to advance a new theory of liability on the eve of trial would be highly prejudicial to the County. Among other problems, Plaintiffs' proposed mandatory duty claim “requires that the defendant develop entirely different defenses” that are not “necessary to defend” against a claim sounding in ordinary negligence. Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1292. The Court accordingly DENIES leave to amend. As to the substance of the County's first Motion in Limine, in light of the new, narrower evidence proposed by Plaintiffs, the Court in large part DENIES Motion in Limine No. 1. Evidence of other County employees' alleged misuse of their access to County databases containing confidential third-party information is relevant to Plaintiffs' California constitutional privacy claims, which seek to establish “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” McDonald v. Kiloo ApS, 385 F.Supp.3d 1022, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 39–40 (1994)). Plaintiffs argue, and this Court agrees, that evidence of other breaches is relevant to evaluating whether the County's conduct rises to a “serious invasion of privacy,” which is generally “a mixed question[ ] of law and fact.” Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 40. The Court is sensitive, however, to the argument that this evidence may become cumulative, unduly prejudicial, or confusing, especially if the parties begin to engage in mini-trials concerning the details of each instance of alleged access. For this reason, the Court GRANTS the County's motion to the extent it seeks to exclude evidence concerning the incidents identified with “PI Breach” numbers 2015-01 and 2017-42. See (ECF No. 205-1 at 2–3). Although these instances of access have some relevance to Plaintiffs' privacy claim, they concern County employees accessing their own information rather than third-party information and as a result have diminished probative value in this case. The Court also notes that its denial of the County's first Motion in Limine is without prejudice to the County's ability to raise objections, including for cumulative evidence, at a later time.[2] 2. The County's Motion in Limine No. 2 *7 The County seeks to preclude Plaintiffs' expert witness Michael Ciaramitaro from testifying regarding the CWS/CMS system, including Coronel's use of that system and what information she might have been able to obtain from that system. (ECF No. 165 at 1–2). The County contends that Mr. Ciaramitaro lacks qualifications to opine on the CWS/CMS system, (id. at 3–4); that his testimony is unhelpful because Defendants concede that Coronel accessed the system without authorization and in violation of County policy, (id. at 5); and that his testimony on this topic would be unduly prejudicial, (id. at 6). Plaintiffs argue that the Court should deny the County's second Motion in Limine as procedurally improper because the deadline for Daubert motions has long since passed. (ECF No. 186 at 1–2). On the merits, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Ciaramitaro is qualified to opine on the CWS/CMS system, (id. at 4–5), and that his testimony is relevant, (id. at 5–8). The County's second Motion in Limine is, indeed, a thinly-disguised—and untimely—Daubert motion. The deadline for filing Daubert motions was January 17, 2024, and as the County took Mr. Ciaramitaro's deposition on December 5, 2023, (ECF No. 165-1), the County had ample time to comply with this deadline. Given, however, the Court's “basic gatekeeping obligation” to ensure that all expert “testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline,’ ” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 149 (1999) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)), the Court briefly examines the County's arguments. The Ninth Circuit has explained that Rule 702 “contemplates a broad conception of expert qualifications.” Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1018 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Rule 702 explicitly provides that an expert may be qualified through his “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” See Fed. R. Evid. 702. Consequently, “an expert need not be officially credentialed in the specific matter under dispute.” Massok v. Keller Indus., Inc., 147 F. App'x 651, 656 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 889–90 (9th Cir. 1993)). Mr. Ciaramitaro is qualified under Rule 702: he has over twenty years of experience in computer forensics, is an EnCase Certified Examiner, and has undergone hundreds of hours in training in computer forensics over his career. (ECF No. 165-1 at 31, 34). Although the County emphasizes Mr. Ciaramitaro's lack of familiarity with the CWS/CMS system, this matter is not dispositive. Instead, “the ‘lack of particularized expertise goes to the weight accorded [an expert's] testimony, not to the admissibility of her opinion as an expert.’ ” Ramirez v. ITW Food Equip. Grp., LLC, 686 F. App'x 435, 441 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, to the extent the County challenges the material Mr. Ciaramitaro did or did not review in forming his opinions, an expert's purported failure to “address (or review)” material “that purportedly undermine[s] some of his opinions or assumptions does not make his testimony excludable” but instead provides “grounds for cross-examination.” In re Korean Ramen Antitrust Litig., 281 F. Supp. 3d 892, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Although the County states in conclusory fashion that Mr. Ciaramitaro's testimony would be unhelpful because it would be either cumulative or irrelevant, (ECF No. 165 at 5–6), without meaningful argument, the Court simply cannot evaluate the merits of this suggestion. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the County's motion to prevent Mr. Ciaramitaro from testifying regarding the CWS/CMS system. 3. The County's Motion in Limine No. 3 The County seeks to exclude evidence and argument concerning Coronel's prior employment with the County on the grounds that this evidence is irrelevant to any remaining claim, is a form of hearsay, and is unduly prejudicial to the County. (ECF No. 166 at 2). Plaintiffs oppose, contending that this evidence is relevant to various claims and is, for many reasons, not hearsay. (ECF No. 187 at 2). The Court DENIES the County's motion to the extent it seeks to prevent Plaintiffs from making any mention of Coronel's prior employment with the County. The fact of Coronel's prior employment, the fact of her termination from that employment, and the specific bases of her termination are relevant to Plaintiffs' case, including Plaintiffs' California constitutional privacy and vicarious liability claims against the County. The Court, however, GRANTS the County's motion to the extent it seeks to preclude extrinsic evidence regarding Coronel's 2018 employment with the County. Even in the narrower form proposed by Plaintiffs in supplemental briefing, see (ECF No. 207-1), this evidence risks bogging down the proceedings in minutiae with minimal probative value to Plaintiffs' current claims. The allegation, for example, that Coronel wore “inappropriate slippers” and did her hair and makeup at her desk at some point in time in 2018, (id. at 6), has no conceivable connection to Plaintiffs' lawsuit, which concerns entirely different misconduct. Given the risk of unfair prejudice to Coronel,[3] as well as “confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,” the Court rules that extrinsic evidence regarding Coronel's prior County role may not be presented at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 403. D. Plaintiffs' Request for Monetary Sanctions *8 Finally, Plaintiffs seek monetary sanctions against the County for filing objections to Plaintiffs' Stipulation to Dismiss Thirteenth Cause of Action Against Defendant Coronel, (ECF No. 201 (“Stipulation”)). (ECF No. 210 (“Pl.'s Resp.”)). “District courts have the inherent power to sanction a lawyer for a ‘full range of litigation abuses.’ ” Evon v. L. Offs. of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991)). For example, as acknowledged by the Supreme Court, federal courts have “inherent power” to assess attorney's fees “when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court has carefully reviewed the Stipulation, the County's objections thereto, (ECF No. 209 (“Objs.”)), and Plaintiffs' Response to the Objections, and concludes that de minimis sanctions are warranted here. As demonstrated in the attachments, both the County and Coronel previously assented to Plaintiffs' dismissal of this claim. (ECF No. 210-5 at 2 (County); ECF No. 210-4 at 2 (Coronel)). The Stipulation, which is signed only by Plaintiffs' counsel, does not strictly comply with Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), which requires “a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” Any clarification the County believed it needed regarding the Stipulation, however, could (and should) have been obtained through the meet and confer process, not through needless, vexatious, and dilatory motion practice. See, e.g., Michaels v. M/Y No Bad Days, No. CV 06-1185 ODW (FMOx), 2007 WL 9735013, at *4 n.5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2007) (concluding that “monetary sanctions are appropriate here because of defense counsel's unnecessary, deficient and frivolous filings”), aff'd sub nom. Pray v. M/Y NO BAD DAYS, 303 F. App'x 563 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' request for sanctions in an amount to be determined after the close of trial. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules as follows: The County's informal request to bifurcate is DENIED. The Court accepts Plaintiffs' withdrawal of Plaintiffs' MIL No. 1. Plaintiffs' MIL No. 2 is GRANTED, in part. Plaintiffs' MIL No. 3 is DENIED. Plaintiffs' MIL No. 4 is DENIED as premature. Plaintiffs' MIL No. 5 is GRANTED. The County's MIL No. 1 is DENIED, in part. The County's MIL No. 2 is DENIED. The County's MIL No. 3 is GRANTED, in part. Plaintiffs' request for monetary sanctions against the County is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] At hearing, Plaintiffs confirmed their intent to withdraw Motion in Limine No. 1 in light of their pending dismissal of claims against Defendants Warren Paul and Tamara Coronel. Given this representation and Plaintiffs' subsequent Notice of Dismissal of Defaulted Defendants Warren Paul and Tamara Coronel, (ECF No. 200), the Court accepts Plaintiffs' withdrawal of Motion in Limine No. 1. [2] The County's claim that this evidence is inadmissible hearsay, however, is not well taken. It is well-established that statements of an opposing party, such as emails written by a party or its agents, are not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2); In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 781 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that “emails written by a party are admissions of a party opponent and admissible as non-hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)”). See also Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 777 n.20 (9th Cir. 2002) (documents produced by a party in discovery were properly deemed authentic when offered by the party-opponent). [3] The Court is aware that Coronel responded to Plaintiffs' attempt to contact her regarding pretrial filings by stating, “I'm waiving my responses, because, without an attorney, it's impossible to provide correct responses.” (ECF No. 190 at 1 n.1). However, although Coronel waived her opportunity to be heard regarding Motion in Limine No. 3, this statement applies only to the parties' pretrial filings and would not prevent Coronel from presenting evidence in her own defense at trial.