James C. HILL, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. AETC II PRIVATIZED HOUSING, LLC, et al., Defendants 5-20-CV-01473-RBF United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division Signed October 16, 2023 Counsel Francisco Guerra, IV, Jennifer Arlene Neal, Mikal C. Watts, Robert E. Brzezinski, Alexis Renae Garcia, Watts Guerra LLP, San Antonio, TX, Randall A. Pulman, Ryan C. Reed, Pulman, Cappuccio, Pullen, Benson & Jones, LLP, San Antonio, TX, Matthew J. McGowan, Santoyo Wehmeyer, P.C., San Antonio, TX, James R. Moriarty, Law Offices of James R. Moriarty, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs James C. Hill, Jr., Kari D. Hill, Michael English, Stephen English, Sean Skillingstad, Ressia Skillingstad, Rodolfo Castillo, Latasha Castillo, Bradley Oliver, Deborah Oliver, Jaqueline Oliver. Erica Benites Giese, Julia Wommack Mann, Jackson Walker LLP, San Antonio, TX, Jennifer J. Skipper, Kye C. Handy, Walter H. Boone, Balch & Bingham, LLP, Jackson, MS, for Defendants. Farrer, Richard B., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Before the Court is the status of this case. At this juncture, five ripe motions on non-dispositive matters are pending. Defendants have filed four Daubert motions, which seek to exclude or limit the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. See Dkt. Nos. 105, 110, 116, 120. And Plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel, seeking responses to several interrogatories and requests for production. See Dkt. No. 108. The Court also observes that the related litigation of Daniels v. AETC II Privatized Housing, LLC, 5-19-cv-01280-RBF, has recently been stayed and administratively closed pending appeal of the Vinales family's judgment. The Court briefly addresses each matter below. A. Three Pending Daubert Motions Are Denied without Prejudice; One Is Taken Under Advisement. Plaintiffs designated Kristy Beck-Miller and Mike Krismer as expert witnesses to provide testimony on mold damage and other housing conditions. See Dkt. No. 93. Plaintiffs have also designated Richard Summerbell and Robin Bernhoft as expert witnesses on causation for the personal injury claims of Caleb Thompson and Deborah Oliver. See id. Defendants attack the proposed testimony of all four expert witnesses as unreliable. See Dkt. Nos. 105, 110, 116, 120. Indeed, the motions to exclude the testimony of the mold experts, Beck-Miller and Krismer, are nearly identical to those the Court previously denied in Daniels, 5-19-cv-01280-RBF, Dkt. No. 351. And as for the medical experts, as Plaintiffs point out in their responses, Defendants do not actually take issue with the proposed experts’ qualifications or overall methodologies. See Dkt. Nos. 122, 125. Instead, Defendants primarily argue that certain deposition responses undercut whether the experts’ testimony can establish causation with the requisite degree of certainty. But these are arguments to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, not necessarily the admissibility of expert testimony. Such arguments are often better raised in a motion in limine or during cross-examination at trial. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993) (reasoning that a court's Rule 702 inquiry is “flexible” and must focus “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate”). If Plaintiffs fail to support their claims with sufficient evidence, provided where necessary by qualified expert witnesses, then the Court will grant judgment as a matter of law accordingly. IT IS ORDERED that three of the pending Daubert motions, Dkt. Nos. 105, 110, 120, are DENIED without prejudice to reraising at an appropriate time via motion in limine or at trial. The fourth Daubert motion, Dkt. No. 116, addressing the proposed testimony of expert Robert Berhoft, presents a closer call for the Court. Accordingly, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Exclude Opinions of Robin Bernhoft M.D., Dkt. No. 116, is TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. The parties should expect a ruling once the case is unstayed. B. The Parties Must Confer and Resolve the Motion to Compel. *2 Next, Plaintiffs ask the Court to compel Defendants to respond to certain interrogatories and requests for production. See Dkt. No. 108. In response, Defendants explain that they properly responded to discovery requests and previously offered to confer in good faith to resolve the matter without involving the Court. See Dkt. No. 121. Plaintiffs’ reply then drudges up a litany of past discovery disputes, presumably from this case and all related litigation. See Dkt. No. 124. But Plaintiffs do not attempt to refute any of Defendants’ arguments. Indeed, the Court is left with the impression that involvement in this dispute by the Court would be premature. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Compel, Dkt. No. 108, is DENIED without prejudice. The parties are ORDERED to meaningfully confer in an effort to resolve the issues raised in the motion. The parties shall file a joint notice no later than October 27, 2023, highlighting any remaining discovery disputes between the parties. The parties are reminded that the Court may award expenses against any party that is uncooperative in discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). C. This Case Will Be Stayed and Administratively Closed. The Court observes that all deadlines in the governing Scheduling Order, as well as any subsequent extensions, have passed. The only open issue appears to be the discovery dispute above. But according to the parties’ representations to the Court on multiple occasions, no trial in this action is contemplated until after the Fifth Circuit resolves an appeal of the jury verdict and judgment in Daniels, 5-19-cv-01280-RBF. Indeed, the Court has already stayed all matters pending appeal in the related Daniels litigation. As a matter of judicial efficiency, the Court believes that a similar stay should be imposed in this case, excepting any further proceedings related to the discovery dispute noted above. IT IS ORDERED that this case is hereby STAYED pending resolution of the appeal in Daniels, 5-19-cv-01280-RBF. Given the anticipated length of the stay, the Court concludes that this case is appropriate for administrative closure. See CitiFinancial Corp. v. Harrison, 453 F.3d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2006); Mire v. Full Spectrum Lending, Inc., 389 F.3d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining how courts use this device to remove inactive cases from their pending dockets and “[t]he effect of an administrative closure is no different from a simple stay”). The Clerk's office is therefore DIRECTED to administratively close this case pending further order of the Court. Though administratively closed, this case will still exist on the docket of this Court and may be reopened upon request by any party or on the Court's own motion. See Mire, 389 F.3d at 167. In addition, the parties may file documents and motions in the case despite the administrative closure. IT IS SO ORDERED.