CARMEN ENCISO, Plaintiff, v. JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant Case No. CV 21-9205 DMG (PVCx) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed November 30, 2023 Castillo, Pedro V., United States Magistrate Judge MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Re: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL (Dkt. No. 56) and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (Dkt. No. 57) I. INTRODUCTION *1 At the parties' request, the Court conducted an informal telephonic discovery conference on August 17, 2023, to address the parties' disputes regarding the proper scope of discovery in this life insurance policy cancellation matter. (Dkt. No. 53). The Court encouraged the parties to continue their discussions regarding the discovery disputes and attempt to reach a resolution. (Id.). On September 28, 2023, after the parties failed to resolve their discovery disputes, Carmen Enciso filed a Motion to Compel Discovery (Requests for Production and Depositions of 30(b)(6) Witnesses) (“Pl. Motion,” Dkt. No. 56), which was supported by the Declaration of Joseph M. Kar (“Kar Decl.,” Dkt. No. 56 at 18–19) and accompanying exhibits (Dkt. No. 56-2 through 56–7). Enciso's Motion seeks to compel Jackson Life Insurance Company to produce documents and for witnesses to testify at a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (Pl. Motion at 2–3).[1] The parties submitted a joint stipulation pursuant to Local Rule 37-2, setting forth each side's position on the disputes. (“Pl. Joint Stip.,” Dkt. No. 56-1). On the same day, Jackson National filed a Motion for Protective Order (“Def. Motion,” Dkt. No. 57), which was supported by the Declaration of David A. Belcher (“Belcher Decl.,” Dkt No. 57-1 at 1–2) and accompanying exhibits. Jackson National's Motion seeks a protective order concerning the same discovery at issue in Enciso's Motion. (Def. Motion at 2; see also Pl. Joint Stip. at 6 (“Jackson National seeks a Motion for Protective Order, and Plaintiff seeks a Motion to Compel on the same discovery.”)). The parties also submitted a joint stipulation pursuant to Local Rule 37-2, setting forth each side's position on the Jackson National Motion. (“Def. Joint Stip.,” Dkt. No. 58). On October 24, 2023, Enciso filed a supplemental memorandum in support of her positions (“Pl. Supp.,” Dkt. No. 68 at 1–6), along with the Declaration of Joseph M. Kar (“Kar Supp. Decl.,” Dkt. No. 68 at 7–8) and accompanying exhibits (Dkt. Nos. 68-1 through 68-5). On the same day, Jackson National also filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its positions. (“Def. Supp.,” Dkt. No. 69). On November 27, 2023, the Court held an in-person hearing. For the reasons stated below and on the record at the hearing, Enciso's Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and Jackson National's Motion for Protective Order is DENIED IN PART. II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT On March 17, 2021, Enciso sued Jackson National in San Luis Obispo County Superior Court. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8–18). On November 24, 2021, Jackson National removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1). On January 22, 2022, Enciso filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging (1) financial elder abuse, (2) breach of life insurance contract, (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) negligence per se, (5) negligence, and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress—bystander. (“FAC,” Dkt. No. 19).[2] *2 In 1995, Jackson National executed a life insurance policy (“the Policy”) with Donald Regan, listing his wife (Plaintiff Carmen Enciso) as the beneficiary. (FAC ¶ 14). In February 2018, Regan was diagnosed with terminal cancer and told he had nine months to live. (Id. ¶ 20). By June 2020, when the events giving rise to this lawsuit began, Regan's physical and mental condition had deteriorated. (Id. ¶ 23). In or about June 2020, after paying Policy premiums for 20 years, Regan received a letter from Jackson National notifying him that his premiums would increase from $273.63 to $4,150.34, but the notice was unclear as to whether the increased amount was for a monthly or annual premium. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22). The notice warned Regan that failure to pay the increased premium would result in termination of the Policy. (Id. ¶ 21). Regan called Jackson National on June 26, 2020, and an employee informed Regan that the $4,150.34 premium was an annual amount, with a new monthly premium of $347.04. (Id. ¶ 26). Confusingly, however, Jackson National then debited both a $273.65 and a $4,150.34 payment from Regan's bank account for the same August 2020 period. (Id. ¶ 27). Thereafter, Jackson National sent Regan a letter, which he received on August 13, 2020, stating that he had requested to cancel the Policy, instructing him to return a Term Cancellation Request form, and advising him that the Policy would remain in force until he returned the form or failed to pay the premiums due. (Id. ¶ 30). Regan immediately called Jackson National and employee Ally Ferris advised him that he should ignore the letter. (Id. ¶ 31). Regan continued to receive notices of unpaid premiums from Defendant. (Id. ¶ 32). On August 13, 2020, Regan received a payment notice stating $4,150.34 as the premium due by September 2, 2020. (Id.). On August 14, Regan received a payment notice stating $8,300.68 was due as of August 2, 2020. (Id.). On August 17, Regan received two “Notices of Past Due Premium,” listing different amounts due ($4,150.34 and $273.62) and advising him that his Policy had entered its Grace Period and would terminate effective September 2, 2020, or August 2, 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 28–29). On August 17, he also received a “Payment Notice” listing $8,574.30 as the Monthly Premium Due by July 2, 2020. (Id. ¶ 32). On August 21, he received a “Payment Notice” with a due date of August 2, 2020, listing $8,300.68 as the amount for two months of premiums due. (Id.). And on August 24, he received a “Second Notice” warning him that $4,150.34 was the “Monthly Premium Due” as of August 2, 2020. (Id.). These notices warned him that if payment was not received by the due date(s) shown, his Policy would enter its grace period and terminate. (Id.). On August 24, 2020, Regan also received another notice that he had requested to cancel the Policy and directing him to return the Term Cancellation Request form. (Id. ¶ 38). Regan called Jackson National on August 25, and an employee advised him to “complete the forms he received and ... ‘payment notices will stop now.’ ” (Id.). That day, Regan signed and returned the cancellation request form, although he did not check the box to request cancellation. (Id.). The very same day that Regan signed and returned the cancellation form, Jackson National sent a letter to Regan stating that as of August 24, 2020—the day before he allegedly spoke to Jackson National and returned an incomplete cancellation form—he had requested to cancel the Policy, and that the cancellation was effective August 2, 2020. (Id. ¶ 40). *3 Enciso learned by September 30, 2020, that Defendant had cancelled the Policy and requested that it be reinstated. (Id. ¶ 42). Jackson National, however, required Enciso and Regan to apply to reinstate the Policy, even though Jackson National knew that reinstatement would be futile due to Regan's terminal cancer diagnosis. (Id. ¶ 43). Regan died on October 2, 2020. (Id. ¶ 47). Four days later, Jackson National advised Enciso that the Policy would not be reinstated. (Id. ¶¶ 47–48). III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In November 2022, Enciso propounded a first set of requests for production of documents and things and a notice of deposition for FRCP § 30(b)(6) witnesses. (Pl. Supp. at 2). Jackson National served responses and objections to the discovery requests in January 2023 and amended responses in August 2023. (See generally Pl. Joint Stip. at 7–32). Between January and August 2023, the parties conferred regarding Jackson National's discovery responses. (Kar Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 4–10 & Exs. 1–5). In June 2023, Jackson National attempted to avoid unnecessary discovery by offering Enciso the following stipulations: Jackson National did not notify Dr. Regan by mail of his ability to designate one person, in addition to himself, to receive notice of lapse or termination of a policy for nonpayment of premium in connection with the Policy. Dr. Regan did not designate another person to receive notice of lapse or termination of a policy for nonpayment of premium in connection with the Policy. Jackson National did not send a notice of lapse of termination of a policy to any third-party in connection with the Policy. (Kar Decl. Ex. 3 at 2; see Def. Joint Stip. at 24). After Enciso refused to accept the stipulations, Jackson National filed an Amended Answer “and the stipulations are now admitted facts.” (Kar Decl. Ex. 3 at 3; see Def. Joint Stip. at 24; Dkt. No. 50 (Amended Answer) at ¶¶ 19, 24, 34, 46). On September 29, 2023, Enciso filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second Cause of Action for Breach of Life Insurance Contract. (Dkt. No. 59). The Motion is set for hearing on January 26, 2024. (Dkt. No. 70). The non-expert discovery cutoff date is December 19, 2023. (Dkt. No. 48-1). This is “the date by which all discovery, including all hearings on any related motions, is to be completed.” (Dkt. No. 48 (Scheduling and Case Management Order) at § II.A) (emphasis omitted). IV. SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE DISCOVERY Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), as amended on December 1, 2015, provides: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “The relevance standard is commonly recognized as one that is necessarily broad in scope in order to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Raya v. Barka, 2022 WL 686460, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2022) (citation omitted); see Sci. Games Corp. v. AGS LLC, 2017 WL 3013251, at *2 (D. Nev. July 13, 2017) (“Even after the 2015 amendments, courts continue to recognize that discovery relevance remains ‘broad’ in scope.”). “The proportionality inquiry [in Rule 26(b)(1)] focuses, at bottom, on analyzing the marginal utility of the discovery being sought.” V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 314 (D. Nev. 2019) (citation omitted). *4 While the scope of permissible discovery may be broad, because discovery must be both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. The 2015 amendments to Rule 26 “were designed to protect against over-discovery and to emphasize judicial management of the discovery process, especially for those cases in which the parties do not themselves effectively manage discovery.” Noble Roman's, Inc. v. Hattenhauer Distrib. Co., 314 F.R.D. 304, 308 (S.D. Ind. 2016); see Davita HealthCare Partners, Inc. v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 394, 398 n.3 (2016) (the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules “contribute to the overall goal of regulating the time and expense of litigation”). “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (citations omitted); see DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.”). In responding to a request to produce documents, the responding party must affirmatively state whether any responsive materials are being withheld based on that objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C) (“An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”). Indeed, parties could avoid unnecessary expenses and disputes by strictly complying with Rule 34(b)(2)(C). “A proper written response should also provide sufficient information for the requesting party, and the court, to be satisfied that the responding party conducted an adequate investigation for responsive materials.” In re Rivera, No. CV 16-4676, 2017 WL 5163695, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2017); see Atcherley v. Clark, No. 12 CV 0225, 2014 WL 4660842, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (“In responding to discovery requests, a reasonable inquiry must be made, and if no responsive documents or tangible things exist, the responding party should so state with sufficient specificity to allow the Court to determine whether the party made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence.”) (citations omitted). V. DISCUSSION A. Discovery Objections 1. General or Boilerplate Objections “[B]oilerplate objections do not suffice and there is no ground upon which to reasonably argue otherwise.” Marti v. Baires, No. 08-CV-00653, 2012 WL 2029720, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2012); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (“For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection ... will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.”) (emphasis added); Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981) (“objections should be plain enough and specific enough so that the court can understand in what way the [discovery requests] are alleged to be objectionable”) (emphasis added). Indeed, boilerplate assertions of any type are improper in federal court. See, e.g., A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper—especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections. ... Similarly, boilerplate relevancy objections, without setting forth any explanation or argument why the requested documents are not relevant, are improper.”); Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 379 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[U]nexplained and unsupported boilerplate objections are improper.”); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 408 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (boilerplate privilege assertions are ineffective, and a failure to properly assert a privilege may “waive or otherwise abandon the privilege”). Moreover, it appears that Jackson National is incorporating by reference its General Objections into each specific response. (See, e.g., Pl. Joint Stip. at 8 (“Subject to and without waiving the General and Specific Objectives above ....”)). However, incorporating by reference “is entirely improper in federal court.” Clark v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 20-10768, 2021 WL 4731353, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2021). *5 Jackson National contends that many of the discovery requests are “unduly burdensome” and “oppressive.” (E.g, Pl. Joint Stip. at 11, 13, 14; see also Def. Supp. at 5–6). But Jackson National has not met its burden ”to demonstrate that production of nonprivileged, responsive documents ... would be disproportionately burdensome.” City of Seattle v. ZyLAB N. Am., LLC, No. C17-0790, 2017 WL 4418636, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2017); see N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins. v. Philpot, No. 08 CV 270, 2009 WL 10672468, at *4 & n.2 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2009) (overruling party's discovery objections because it did not quantify its asserted burden to producing the requested information). “It is well-established that the burden is on the objecting party to show grounds for failing to provide the requested discovery.” Baykeeper v. Kramer Metals, Inc., No. CV 07-3849, 2009 WL 10671577, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2009); see Bible v. Rio Properties, Inc., 246 F.R.D. 614, 618 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 233 F.R.D. 573, 575 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Defendant cannot simply invoke generalized objections without describing, in specific detail, how each request is overbroad and unduly burdensome by See Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296–97 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (The responding party ”must show specifically how, despite the broad and liberal construction afforded the federal discovery rules, each interrogatory is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden.”). Jackson National's “unduly burdensome” and “oppressive” objections are OVERRULED. 2. Confidential Objections Jackson National objects that some of the discovery requests seek “confidential” information. (E.g., Pl. Joint Stip. at 8, 12, 13, 16, 17). Under the federal rules, a “court may, for good cause, issue an order ... requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G). Nevertheless, “there is no absolute privilege for trade secrets and similar confidential information.” Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 (1979) (quoting 8A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2043 at 241 (3d ed. 2010)). “Thus asserting an objection to a discovery request that the documents sought contain trade secrets or proprietary information does not shield the documents from discovery.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Puccinelli, 224 F.R.D. 677, 690 (D. Kan. 2004); accord Herbalife Int'l of Am., Inc. v. Kamel, No. CV 21-6982, 2023 WL 6193006, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2023). Instead, “[t]o resist discovery ..., a person must first establish that the information sought is a trade secret and then demonstrate that its disclosure might be harmful.” Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted); accord Clymer v. Discover Bank, No. EDCV 10-1526, 2011 WL 13224625, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011). Demonstrating trade secret protection requires evidence that Jackson National has taken reasonable steps to “assure the confidentiality of this information and to prevent its disclosure to third parties.” Nat'l Acad. of Recording Arts & Scis., 256 F.R.D. at 683. But Jackson National has failed to provide any declarations or other evidence to support its contention that the information responsive to the discovery requests are confidential trade secrets and that their disclosure would be harmful. Jackson National's conclusory arguments are insufficient to establish that the requested information are trade secrets and meritorious of confidential status and protection. See Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 183 F.R.D. 568, 571 (D.N.M. 1998). Moreover, even if Jackson National could establish that the requested information is deserving of protection, it makes no effort to explain why a protective order would not provide sufficient protection. Indeed, Jackson National asserts that it “has already agreed, after an entry of a proper protective order, to produce all documentary and 30(b)(6) evidentiary testimony regarding the California Insurance Code §§ 10113.71 and 10113.72 (the “California Statutes”) as they relate to this Policy.”[3] (Pl. Joint Stip. at 6–7). Jackson National's confidential information objections are OVERRULED. B. It Is Not Clear Whether Jackson National Is Withholding Responsive Information. *6 In responding to the RFPs, Jackson National does not affirmatively state whether any responsive materials are being withheld based on an objection or privilege. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C) (“An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”). For example, in its amended response to RFP No. 6, Jackson National makes vague objections based on “documents that are protected by disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, or other doctrine, privilege or exemption from discovery.” (Pl. Joint Stip. at 8) (emphasis added). But Jackson National neither explains what these “other” doctrines, privileges, or exemptions consist of nor whether this information is being withheld. Instead, Jackson National vaguely asserts that it is producing non-privileged documents without waiving its objections. (Id.). And regarding documents that are properly protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, Jackson National must affirmatively state whether any are being withheld and if so, promptly provide a privilege log. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). C. Pattern and Practice Discovery Enciso seeks a motion to compel discovery and Jackson National a protective order precluding the same discovery: Plaintiff's Requests for Production Nos. 6–8, 10, 12, and 28–29, and Rule 30(b)(6) Category Nos. 1–6, 10, and 12–14. (Pl. Joint Stip. at 3, 6). According to Jackson National, the gravamen of their dispute is whether Enciso is entitled to discovery and testimony: (1) after the Policy was cancelled in August 2020 and even after Dr. Regan's death on October 2, 2020; (2) regarding policies and procedures that did not apply to the Policy, including information related to California's Lapse Statutes (Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10113.71 and 10113.72);[4] and (3) regarding other policyholders, policies, and claims that have nothing to do with Dr. Regan or the Policy. (Def. Joint Stip. at 4). Enciso argues that such discovery is “reasonably calculated to establishing [Jackson National's] policies and procedures, pattern and practice of other similarly terminated policies.” (Pl. Joint Stip. at 4). Enciso contends: the pattern and practice evidence would permit for a fair and proper inquiry to address (1) the ambiguity in the treatment of unmarked or incomplete cancellation forms as valid and complete; (2) why Dr. Regan and his life insurance policy were treated differently in respect to the California Right to Designate Laws on and after 2013; (3) disclosures of the guidelines for other policies and those used for Dr. Regan's policy; (4) and explain the corporate wide policies and practices (or decision making process) on and after 2013 for disparate treatment of life insurance policies when the California Right to Designate Laws required uniform application after California Insurance Code §§ 10113.72 and 10113.72 were enacted; (5) to establish recidivism or unfair system defects for punitive damages, among other things. (Pl. Supp. at 6). California law “implies in every contract, including insurance policies, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 42 Cal. 4th 713, 720 (2007), as modified (Dec. 19, 2007). “Therefore, when an insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment on a claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort.” Downey Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 1096 (1987). “An insurer may also breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it fails to properly investigate its insured's claim.” McCoy v. Progressive W. Ins. Co., 171 Cal. App. 4th 785, 792–93 (2009) (citation omitted). Under this implied promise, in determining whether to settle a claim, the insurer must give “at least as much consideration to the welfare of its insured as it gives to its own interests.” Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818 (1979). *7 Enciso relies on Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 785 (1982), to support her contention that discovery regarding other claims handled by Jackson National is relevant to her bad faith claim. (Pl. Motion at 2; Pl. Joint Stip. at 4, 17–18). Indeed, a bad faith claim may be established “by showing either that the acts that harmed [the plaintiff] were knowingly committed or were engaged in with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” Colonial Life, 31 Cal. 3d at 791 (emphasis added); accord Shenon v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 2:18 CV 00240, 2021 WL 4804053, at *3 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2021). Moreover, “[o]ther instances of alleged unfair settlement practices may also be highly relevant to [a] plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.” Colonial Life, 31 Cal. 3d at 791. Thus, “the elements of punitive damages may be suggested by a pattern of unfair practices.” Id. at 792. Accordingly, “[d]iscovery aimed at determining the frequency of alleged unfair settlement practices is ... likely to produce evidence directly relevant to the action.” Id. at 791. “Although Colonial Life is not binding in discovery disputes in federal court, it provides helpful guidance about relevance in connection with allegations of an insurer's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under California law.” Kahlenberg v. Bamboo IDE8 Ins. Servs., LLC, No. 2:20 CV 06805, 2021 WL 8693114, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2021). Indeed, “Colonial Life ... has been cited by California state and federal courts for the idea that an insurer's handling of other claims is relevant to punitive damages and common law ‘bad faith’ claims.” Van Duyn v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., No. CV 08-5748, 2009 WL 10672575, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2009); see, e.g., Moore v. American United Life Ins. Co., 150 Cal. App. 3d 610 (1984) (information regarding non-party insureds' settlement attempts is relevant to common law bad faith claim); Pollock v. Super. Ct., 93 Cal. App. 4th 817, 821 (2001) (affirming Colonial Life procedure and relevance of non-party insureds' claim information); J & M Assocs., Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. 06-CV-0903, 2008 WL 638137, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2008) (reasoning that the Colonial Life principle is undisturbed and ordering insurer to produce non-party insureds' contact information). Jackson National asserts that Enciso's reliance on Colonial Life is “misplaced.” (Def. Supp. at 3). First, Jackson National argues that the requested discovery is not relevant because Enciso never pled “pattern and practice.” (Id. at 3–4). Indeed, many courts preclude Colonial Life discovery where there are no allegations of a pattern and practice of unfair claims settlements and instead only general allegations of bad faith. See, e.g., Kahlenberg, 2021 WL 8693114, at *4 (“Unlike Colonial Life, the allegations in this case are primarily based not on a pattern of settlement practices, but on Catlin's denial of Plaintiff's insurance claim.”); Tilem v. Travelers Comm'l Ins. Co., 2018 WL 4963124, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“Plaintiff's reliance on Colonial Life is inapposite because here, Plaintiff's allegations involve only whether Defendant acted in bad faith in denying coverage, not a pattern and practice of unfair settlements.”); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, No. 15-CV-0022, 2016 WL 4496824, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2016) (finding that “this litigation is about whether [the insurer] acted in bad faith solely in denying [the plaintiff's] coverage,” not whether the insurer “engaged in a pattern and practice of denying in bad faith claims made under [the defendant's] policies”). While acknowledging at the hearing that the amended complaint does not include any specific “pattern and practice” language, Enciso's counsel argued that the amended complaint's bad faith claim (FAC ¶¶ 63–67) alleges that Jackson National engaged in a pattern and practice of deceptively selling illusory insurance policies, denying investigation and coverage, and failing to comply with the Lapse Statutes (id. ¶ 67). But even if this language is too vague to put Jackson National on notice of a specific pattern and practice allegation, Enciso clearly asserts punitive damages as part of her bad faith claim, alleging Jackson National “acted and intended on acting maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively so as to injure Plaintiffs knowing of such injury and so as to further benefit themselves therefrom. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages ....” (Id.). At the hearing, Enciso also asserted that her Financial Elder Abuse claim (FAC ¶¶ 51–56), which seeks punitive damages based on Jackson National's intentional and malicious conduct, entitles her to the pattern and practice discovery she is seeking. The Court finds that “pattern and practice” discovery is “highly relevant” to Enciso's punitive damages claims. See Colonial Life, 31 Cal. 3d at 791; Van Duyn, 2009 WL 10672575, at *3. *8 Second, Jackson National argues that even if Enciso had pled “pattern and practice,” the requested discovery is not relevant. (Def. Supp. at 4–5). Jackson National contends that “there is no conceivable basis why Jackson's policies, procedures, emails, and handling of issues related to the Lapse Statutes after Dr. Regan's policy was cancelled, let alone after he passed, has any relevancy.” (Id.). Jackson National asserts that “this case is not about whether Jackson National complied with those statutory provisions because they do not apply where a policyholder voluntarily cancelled the policy and did not fail to pay the premiums.” (Def. Joint Stip. at 3). To the contrary, in denying Jackson National's motion to dismiss, the Court found: The crux of the FAC is not that the Policy was ultimately terminated for nonpayment, but that at some point, Defendant intended to terminate the Policy for nonpayment and sent notices to this effect—notices that a designee (Plaintiff) would have received, had Defendant offered Regan the opportunity to designate such a person. ... The FAC clearly alleges multiple instances in which Defendant mailed Plaintiff notices stating that the Policy would lapse due to nonpayment. (Dkt. No. 42 at 4). Thus, Jackson National's pattern and practice related to the Lapse Statutes are relevant to Enciso's claims. See Van Duyn, 2009 WL 10672575, at *3 (“[T]he relevance of the non-party insureds' information turns on whether the non-party insureds' claims were similar to plaintiff's, and not whether plaintiff has sued under a particular legal theory.”) (citing State Farm v. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423–24 (2003)). Finally, Jackson National contends that even if Enciso has pled “pattern and practice” and established relevancy, the discovery is not proportional to the needs of this case. (Def. Supp. at 5–6). Jackson National vaguely contends that Enciso's “multiple unedited requests for all discovery regarding the Lapse Statutes that relate to all of Jackson's policy holders regarding its entire corporate structure for all the way up until present day ... is harassing and impossible.” (Id. at 6). But as discussed above, Jackson National has not met its obligation to demonstrate that the production of pattern and practice discovery would be disproportionately burdensome. It has not submitted affidavits or other evidence describing the nature of the burden. Indeed, at the hearing, Jackson National's counsel could not specifically describe the nature of the burden, including the hours or costs necessary to produce the requested information. For all these reasons, the Court finds that Enciso is entitled to discovery not only related to her claims but also pattern and practice discovery with respect to other similarly situated policy holders. See Van Duyn, 2009 WL 10672575, at *3 (“Plaintiff has adequately established that discovery relating to the non-party insureds is relevant to her claims in this action, insofar as the requests seek information pertaining to similarly situated insureds.”). Nevertheless, the Court agrees that the pattern and practice discovery as propounded is overbroad. Accordingly, the Court will limit the pattern and practice discovery to the claims made in this case (see generally Dkt. No. 42 at 4): Life insurance policies issued before 2013 which were terminated prior to August 2021 where notices of nonpayment were sent without making the policy holder aware that he or she could designate a third party to receive such notices.[5] See Dobro v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 16CV1197, 2016 WL 4595149, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) (“[P]ursuant to Colonial Life, discovery regarding other claims, when properly limited to the facts, insurance policy, and claims at issue in this case, is relevant to the Plaintiffs' claims in this case.”).[6] VI. CONCLUSION *9 As discussed above, Enciso's Motion to Compel (Dkt. No. 56) is GRANTED IN PART (Dkt. No. 56) and Jackson National's Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. No. 57) is DENIED IN PART. Jackson National's unduly burdensome and oppressive objections and confidential information objections are OVERRULED. The “pattern and practice” discovery requests in Plaintiff's Requests for Production Nos. 6–8, 10, 12, and 28–29, and Rule 30(b)(6) Category Nos. 1–6, 10, and 12–14 are LIMITED to “Life insurance policies issued before 2013 which were terminated prior to August 2021 where notices of nonpayment were sent without making the policy holder aware that he or she could designate a third party to receive such notices.” No later than December 19, 2023, Jackson National SHALL (1) amend its discovery responses, removing all overruled objections and clearly describing whether it is withholding any responsive information pursuant to Rule 34(b)(2)(C); (2) provide a privilege log, if applicable, that substantially meets the requirements of Rule 26(b)(5); and (3) produce all non-privileged responsive information. The parties are expected to promptly meet and confer in good faith to submit a proposed protective order no later than December 4, 2023. If the parties are unable to agree on a proposed protective order, the Court will file its standard protective order on December 5, 2023. Footnotes [1] Enciso's Motion also included a memorandum of points and authorities, which the Court struck as inappropriate under the Local Rules. (Dkt. No. 63, citing Local Rules 37-2.1 and 37-2.3). [2] In March 2023, the Court denied in part and granted in part Jackson National's motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 42 at 9) (“[T]he Court dismisses the negligence, negligence per se, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims to the extent that they are premised solely on denial of a claim for benefits under the Policy following Regan's death.... Otherwise, however, the claims survive and the motion to dismiss the negligence claims (claims four, five, and six) is DENIED.”). [3] The parties shall promptly submit a proposed protective order to protect confidential information. If they are unable to agree on the protective order's provisions, the Court will enter its standard protective order. [4] The Lapse Statutes—which extended grace periods in life insurance policies to 60 days and mandated annual notice of the new right for policyholders to designate a person to receive notice of lapse or termination of the policy for failure to pay premiums—went into effect on January 1, 2013. See McHugh v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 12 Cal. 5th 213, 220, 225 (2021). In August 2021, the McHugh court determined that the Lapse Statutes “apply to all life insurance policies in force when these two sections went into effect, regardless of when the policies were originally issued.” Id. at 220. Thus, the Lapse Statutes applied to Dr. Regan's policy. [5] To the extent that the responsive information includes any personal or privileged information about a policy holder, Jackson National shall redact such information in compliance with California law. [6] The Court recognizes that the District Judge has set a fact discovery cutoff date of December 19, 2023. The Court expects Jackson National to make a good faith effort to meet this cutoff date. Nevertheless, if more time is needed, the parties shall submit a joint stipulation to the District Judge, requesting a modest extension of the discovery order for the limited purpose of producing the “pattern and practice” discovery.