Oscar Corona v. City of Fontana et. a Case No. 5:22-cv-00034-JGB-SP United States District Court, C.D. California Filed April 27, 2023 Counsel Brian D. Olney, Dan Stormer, Hadsell Stormer Renick and Dai LLP, Pasadena, CA, for Plaintiff. Angela Marie Powell, Marina Samson, Rebecca Renee Brown, Rickey Ivie, Ivie McNeill Wyatt Purcell and Diggs APLC, Los Angeles, CA, Eric Gamboa, H Mae G Alberto, Atkinson, Andelson Loya, Ruud and Romo, Pasadena, CA, Michael R Watts, Atkinson Andelson Loya Ruud and Romo PLC, Cerritos, CA, for Defendant. Pym, Sheri, United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Granting in Large Part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel [81] I. INTRODUCTION On February 7, 2023, plaintiff Oscar Corona filed a motion to compel defendants City of Fontana and Fontana Police Department Officers Gonzalez, Gregg, Kraut, Rodriguez, and Slusser to supplement their discovery responses. Docket no. 81. The parties' positions are set forth in a joint stipulation (“JS”). Docket no. 82. Plaintiff's arguments are supported by the declaration of his counsel Brian Olney (“Olney Decl.”) and exhibits thereto. Defendants' arguments are supported by the declaration of their counsel Angela Powell and exhibits thereto. On February 14, 2023, the parties supplemented their briefing (docket nos. 83, 84), with plaintiff also submitting a supplemental declaration of Brian Olney and exhibits. On February 22, 2023, the court ordered the parties to engage in additional meet and confer efforts and submit supplemental briefing should any issues remain. Docket no. 90. On March 14, 2023, the parties filed further supplemental memoranda (“P. 2d Supp. Mem.” and “D. 2d Supp. Mem.”). Docket nos. 97, 98. Plaintiff's position is further supported by another declaration of his counsel Brian Olney (“Olney 2d Supp. Decl.”) and exhibits. After reviewing the parties' submissions, it is apparent that the additional time granted to further meet and confer did little to resolve the disputes. The court accordingly now rules on the motion, granting plaintiff's motion to compel in large part as follows. II. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed the present action on January 7, 2022, and amended his complaint twice. Plaintiff's operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional rights when Fontana Police Officers pulled plaintiff over under the suspicion he was driving a stolen vehicle, held him at gunpoint, forced him onto his knees, handcuffed him, searched his vehicle, and locked him inside a police car where he suffered a panic attack. See SAC. Plaintiff also alleges a Monell claim against defendant City of Fontana challenging its policy, custom, or practice of conducting high risk traffic stops based only on suspicion of a stolen vehicle. SAC at ¶¶ 1, 33-39, 55-57, 65-67, 75-77, 85-87. On April 27, 2022, plaintiff served his first sets of Requests for Production (“RFPs”), Interrogatories, and Requests for Admission (“RFAs”) on defendant City. Olney Decl. ¶ 2; Exs. 1-3. Defendant City served responses on June 15, 2022. Id. ¶ 2; Exs. 4-7. On July 11, 2022, plaintiff sent a letter identifying deficiencies in these responses. Id., Ex. 8. Between August 2022 and January 2023 the parties engaged in several meet and confer efforts to resolve the deficiencies. Id. Exs. 9-15. On August 12 and November 14, 2022, defendant City served amended discovery responses to plaintiff's first set of discovery requests. Id., Exs. 16-18. On November 4, 2022, plaintiff served his second set of RFPs on defendant City. Olney Decl. Ex. 19. Plaintiff also served his first set of Interrogatories on defendant Officers Gregg and Kraut on November 4, and his first set of Interrogatories on defendant Officers Gonzalez, Rodriguez, and Slusser on November 16, 2022. Id. ¶ 4; Exs. 20-24. Defendants responded to all this discovery on January 3, 2023. Id. Exs. 25-30. Plaintiff sent defendants a meet and confer letter on January 4, 2023, and the parties conferred on January 13, 2023, and exchanged further correspondence on January 20, 2023. Id. ¶ 4; Exs. 14, 31. The City defendant served further supplemental responses between February 24 and 28, 2023. Olney 2d Supp. Decl., Exs. A-C. Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter identifying the deficiencies in these responses on March 8 and the parties conferred telephonically on March 13 and 14, 2023. Id., Ex. F, G. Plaintiff now seeks to compel defendants to further supplement their discovery responses and document production. III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff moves to compel supplemental responses to RFP Nos. 2, 5, 7, 47-49, 51-54, 59-73, 85, and 98 to defendant City; RFA Nos. 1-2 to defendant City; Interrogatory Nos. 6-9 to defendant City; and Interrogatory No. 1 to the individual officer defendants. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, the information sought “need not be admissible in evidence”; however, it must be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. In determining the needs of the case, the court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. A “relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978). Relevancy should be “construed ‘liberally and with common sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992)). A. Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 48, 59-73, and 85 to Defendant City Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 48, 59-73, and 85 generally seek policy records and training materials on the following subjects: (1) traffic stops or vehicle pullovers, (2) traffic stops of suspected stolen vehicles, (3) forcing suspects to kneel and/or proning suspects, (4) drawing of weapons, (5) holding weapons in a low ready position, (6) aiming weapons at suspects, (7) handcuffing suspects, (8) vehicle searches, (9) the Stolen Vehicle System (“SVS”), (10) mobile data computers/terminals (“MDC” or “MDT”), (11) interpreting data and/or codes from the SVS, MDC, MDT, or elsewhere identifying vehicles reported as stolen, (12) investigating and/or verifying whether vehicles identified in the SVS as potentially stolen are actually stolen, (13) arrest and control techniques, and (14) use of force. Olney Decl., Ex. 1. Defendant City does not dispute that records predating the January 29, 2021 incident are relevant and responsive, and has produced such materials. See P. 2d Supp. Mem. at 1; D. 2d Supp. Mem. at 2. At issue in this motion are records created after the incident. Plaintiff also contends defendant improperly redacted responsive documents and failed to provide adequate descriptions of the redacted material in the privilege log. P. 2d Supp. Mem. at 2-3; Olney 2d Supp. Decl., Ex. H. 1. Post-Incident Policy and Training Materials Plaintiff contends policy and training materials created after the January 29, 2021 incident in question are relevant to his Monell claim. P. 2d Supp. Mem. at 1-2. Defendant opposes this request, indicating it already produced all responsive documents from five years prior to the incident, and any policy and training materials created after the incident are irrelevant to the issues in this case. D. 2d Supp. Mem. at 2-4. Plaintiff's Monell claim is based on a theory that defendant City of Fontana had unconstitutional policies or training that allowed law enforcement officers to conduct high risk traffic stops based only on a suspicion of a stolen vehicle. SAC at ¶¶ 1, 33-39, 55-57, 65-67, 75-77, 85-87. Plaintiff contends that such conduct is unconstitutional under the Ninth Circuit's decision in Green v. City and County of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014), holding that the use of “high risk” traffic stop tactics based solely on the suspicion of a stolen vehicle violates the Fourth Amendment. JS at 1-2. The court finds post-incident policy and training materials are relevant to plaintiff's Monell claim. Such records alone may not be sufficient to establish Monell liability. See Casey v. City of Santa Rosa, 2019 WL 2548140, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2019) (“[A]llegations that the County's subsequent failure to discipline or re-train is not sufficient to show that a policy was the driving force behind the incident that is the subject of [the] case. Rather, [plaintiff] must identify the deficiency in a training program, which must be closely related to the ultimate injury sustained.”). Nonetheless, “[p]ost-event evidence is not only admissible for purposes of proving the existence of a municipal defendant's policy or custom, but is highly probative with respect to that inquiry.” Henry v. Cty of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 519 (9th Cir. 1997). For example, a “[p]olicy or custom may be inferred if ... officials took no steps to reprimand or discharge the [officers involved], or if they otherwise failed to admit the [officers'] conduct was in error.” McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1986). Post-incident policy and training records may indicate whether defendant City took any actions in the wake of the incident to address the purportedly unconstitutional policy or training. See Henry v. Cty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 518 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended on denial of reh'g, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1998) (“When a county continues to turn a blind eye to severe violations of ... constitutional rights – despite having received notice of such violations – a rational fact finder may properly infer the existence of a previous policy or custom of deliberate indifference.”). As such, post-incident policy and training records are relevant to plaintiff's Monell claim and must be disclosed. 2. Redactions Plaintiff also contends defendant improperly redacted responsive documents Bates stamped COF 237, 238, 242-46, 251-63, and failed to provide adequate descriptions of the redacted information in the privilege log. P. 2d Supp. Br. at 2-3; Olney 2d Supp. Decl., Ex. H. Defendant does not address this issue. Documents COF 237-38 do not appear on the privilege log, and therefore should not be redacted. As for the other documents at issue, defendant's privilege log contains entries indicating these records were redacted solely because defendant determined they presented scenarios irrelevant to plaintiff's traffic stop. Olney 2d Supp. Decl., Ex. H. Without more, “a party ‘may not redact otherwise responsive documents because those documents contain irrelevant material.’ ” Laub v. Horbaczewski, 331 F.R.D. 516, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citation omitted). Particularly given that there is a protective order in this case that may address sensitive information, the redactions appear to be wholly unnecessary. Accordingly, defendant must produce unredacted copies of those documents which were redacted for relevancy, or without explanation. B. Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 2, 5, and 7 to Defendant City Plaintiff next argues that defendant improperly redacted records responsive to RFP Nos. 2, 5, and 7. P. 2d Supp. Mem. at 3. Specifically, plaintiff contends the redactions were incorrectly applied to records of call logs summarizing the activities of defendant officers on or around the time of the incident, which defendant produced as COF 68-69, 78, 93, 146-48, and 198-222. Id. Defendant states it already produced unredacted versions of COF 68-69. JS at 32. Since the further meet and confer, defendant does not address these requests except to say it supplemented its production on February 24 and 27, 2023. D. 2d Supp. Mem. at 4. Not all of these redacted documents appear on the privilege logs, but COF 93, 146, 147, 198-209, 211-14, and 216-18 are shown as having been redacted for privacy, specifically the privacy rights of third parties, some of whom are claimed to be unrelated to plaintiff's traffic stop. Olney Decl., Exs. 34, 35; Olney 2d Supp. Decl., Ex. H. Defendant also claims COF 218 was redacted based on official information privilege and peace officer related privileges. Olney 2d Supp. Decl., Ex. H. Plaintiff states that at the March 14, 2023 meet and confer, defendant confirmed that some of the redacted information, such as the vehicle's registration details, is related to the incident. Olney 2d Supp. Decl. ¶ 2. “Federal courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citation omitted). “In determining whether privacy is subject to invasion, the court must balance [the] asserted right to privacy against the relevance and necessity of the information sought ....” Edwards v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2009 WL 4707996, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2009) (citing cases). The privilege log fails to include sufficient information to adequately assess defendant's privacy claims. Given that defendant largely fails to address this issue, and given the protective order in place, the court is tempted to simply order defendant to remove redactions based on privacy. But in light of the somewhat disjointed nature of this briefing process, and given that privacy rights of individuals unrelated to this case may be at issue, the court instead orders that defendant must produce an amended privilege log sufficiently detailed to allow counsel or the court to determine whether defendant properly redacted records for privacy and privilege reasons. Defendant must produce the privilege log as soon as possible, and no later than May 5, 2023, unless otherwise agreed by plaintiff. Plaintiff also seeks to discover the hyperlinked information contained in the records responsive to RFP Nos. 2, 5, and 7. P. 2d Supp. Mem. at 3. Defendant initially stated it had not had an opportunity to meet and confer about the issue (JS at 33-34), and since the further meet and confer, defendant City does not address this issue in its further supplemental briefing. Since defendant fails to challenge plaintiff's request for the information contained in the hyperlinks, and since the information appears relevant and otherwise discoverable, defendants must produce the hyperlinked materials. C. Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 47, 49, and 51-54 to Defendant City 1. RFP No. 47 RFP No. 47 seeks defendant officers' employment applications with the Fontana Police Department. JS at 34. Plaintiff contends that the officers' job applications are “relevant to establishing their training, experience, and potential dishonesty, and is critical to Plaintiff's Monell claims insofar as the job application helps establish the background information known to the City at the time that it hired each Defendant Officer.” JS at 40-41. The court agrees that information related to officers' training is relevant to plaintiff's Monell claim. To the extent that the requested officer job applications contain any information regarding their training, this information is discoverable and could be used to support plaintiff's allegations that the officers were improperly trained to conduct high risk traffic stops based only on a suspicion of a stolen vehicle. See SAC at ¶¶ 1, 33-39, 55-57, 65-67, 75-77, 85-87. On the other hand, on the facts of this case, exactly how the officers' job applications impact their credibility except peripherally is unclear. As such, defendant must produce the officers' job applications, but only those portions that contain information about their training. 2. RFP Nos. 49 and 51-53 RFPs Nos. 49, 51, 52, and 53 seek records of: (1) complaints against the individual officers, (2) their “performance evaluations, awards, commendations promotions, and/or disciplinary history,” and (3) the resulting investigations and any internal affairs documents related to “claims of excessive force, unlawful stop or false arrest, traffic stops, unlawful searches, or dishonesty since January 29, 2016.” JS at 35-39. Defendant agreed to produce only “sustained complaints” within five years prior to the incident, and later produced employment evaluations from prior to the incident. JS at 39; P. 2d Supp. Mem. at 4. Plaintiff argues that all complaints must be produced because those are relevant to his allegations of excessive force, his Monell claim, and to the determination of punitive damages. JS at 39-40. Defendant provides no explanation as to why it limited its production to only sustained complaints, and fails to explain why the requests should be narrowly construed. Defendant also does not explains its temporal scope limitation. On the other hand, plaintiff does not explain why he needs records of officer performance evaluations, awards, and commendation promotions sought with RFP No. 51, leaving it unclear whether defendant's production to date in response to that request is sufficient. See Johnson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 2009 WL 839044, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (“Although the burden on parties requesting discovery is low, they must meet a threshold of relevance that is beyond speculation; litigants seeking to compel discovery must describe with a reasonable degree of specificity the information they hope to obtain and its importance to their case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant's boilerplate objections without further argument are insufficient to prevent plaintiff's discovery of at least some of the information sought. Courts regularly grant plaintiffs in excessive force cases leave to obtain the defendant officers' disciplinary files. See, e.g., Lawrence v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 2016 WL 3254232, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2016); Nehad v. Browder, 2016 WL 2745411, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 2016); Henderson v. Peterson, No., 2011 WL 441206, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011); Zackery v. Stockton Police Dep't, 2007 WL 1655634, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2007); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 615 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Records of complaints against defendant officers relating to their use of excessive force has been found to be relevant to a plaintiff's civil rights claim.”). Similarly, prior complaints of bad conduct and investigations may be relevant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and discoverable in federal civil rights cases alleging municipal liability. See Ramirez v. Cnty of Los Angeles, 231 F.R.D. 407, 412 (C.D. 2005) (finding police records relevant to systemic failures or a pattern or practice or prove the City's notice of an officer's previous alleged misconduct or City's response to such misconduct). Accordingly, the court finds that complaints against the individual officers and any related discipline records, including any investigations related to claims of “excessive force, unlawful stop or false arrest, traffic stops, unlawful searches, or dishonesty since January 29, 2016” are relevant to plaintiff's claims and must be produced in response to RFP Nos. 49, 52, and 53. To the extent that these records contain private or otherwise sensitive information, they may be produced under the protective order in place. 3. RFP No. 54 RFP No. 54 seeks “performance, behavioral management, and/or early warning or early intervention system” documents for the defendant officers from January 29, 2016, through the present. JS at 39. Plaintiff contends that defendant limited this request to records related only to the Guardian Tracking system up to January 29, 2021, and after doing so responded that no documents exist. P. 2d Supp. Mem. at 5. Defendant again provides no explanation or support as to why the court should limit the scope of this request. Accordingly, defendant must conduct a thorough search for records responsive to RFP No. 54 without narrowing its scope, and supplement its document production with responsive documents located. D. Plaintiff's RFA Nos. 1 and 2 to Defendant City Plaintiff seeks to compel responses to his RFA Nos. 1 and 2 asking defendant to admit that the policy and training “in effect on January 29, 2021, was to conduct a high risk traffic stop based only on suspicion of a stolen vehicle.” JS at 42. Defendant objects primarily on the basis that the phrases “high risk traffic stop” and “based only on suspicion” are vague and ambiguous. JS at 45-46. The court rejects the contention that “based only on suspicion” is vague, but “high risk traffic stop” is another matter. “High risk traffic stop” is used frequently in the discovery requests at issue here, and generally appropriately so, particularly given that defendant has used the term itself. See Olney Decl., Ex. 41. But in the context of the RFAs at issue here, where plaintiff is asking defendant to make an admission going one of the central disputes in this case, more precision is needed. Because “high risk traffic stop” is undefined, defendant reasonably responded it was unable to admit or deny the requests. The court notes that defendant also objects that the requests call for a legal conclusion, although did not elaborate on this point in argument. “[R]equests for admission should not be used to establish ‘facts which are obviously in dispute,’or to ‘demand that the other party admit the truth of a legal conclusion,’ even if the conclusion is ‘attached to operative facts,’ or to ask the party to admit facts of which he or she has no special knowledge.” Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 177 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn. 1997); see Tuvalu v. Woodford, 2006 WL 3201096 at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006) (quoting Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Area, 234 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Since, as noted, these requests go to a central dispute, they are not properly made. Plaintiff's motion as to these RFAs is therefore denied. E. Plaintiff's Interrogatory Nos. 6-9 to Defendant City Plaintiff next seeks to compel responses to Interrogatories Nos. 6-9. JS at 46-71. These interrogatories call for defendant to provide various information and data regarding traffic stops conducted since January 2017, including those based on suspicion of a stolen vehicle and that were and were not conducted as high risk traffic stops. Defendant objects that these Interrogatories exceed the maximum number permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 because Interrogatory Nos. 1-5 each count as multiple Interrogatories. JS at 70. “Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts. Leave to serve additional interrogatories may be granted to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(2).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1). Although the term “discrete subparts” does not have a precise meaning, courts have construed it to mean that “interrogatory subparts are to be counted as one interrogatory ... if they are logically or factually subsumed within and necessarily related to the primary question.” Safeco of Am. v. Rawstron, 181 F.R.D. 441, 445 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citation omitted); see also 8A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2168.1, at 39-40 (3d ed. 2010) (“it would appear that an interrogatory containing subparts directed at eliciting details concerning a common theme should be considered a single question, although the breadth of the area inquired about may be disputable. On the other hand, an interrogatory with subparts inquiring into discrete areas is likely to be counted as more than one for purposes of the limitation.”). Here, in its portion of the joint stipulation defendant does not explain how exactly plaintiff exceeded the interrogatory limit imposed by Rule 33. See JS at 70-71. Defendant also fails to advance any arguments regarding this issue in its supplemental briefing, and fails to reassert any of the other objections raised in response to this discovery. See Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Rossi, 2022 WL 19355, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2022) (courts generally deem objections initially raised but not relied upon in response to the motion as abandoned). Even so, the court has reviewed plaintiff's Interrogatory Nos. 1-5, and finds (absent any explanation from defendant) it is not plain that they should be counted as multiple interrogatories under Fed. R. Civ. P. 33. Although these interrogatories contain subparts, the subparts for each are related to the primary question, rather than inquiring into discrete areas. For example, Interrogatory No. 1 calls for defendant to identify its employees or agents present during the incident, what they did, and documents related to the foregoing responses. Plaintiff contends defendant's refusal to answer the interrogatories is also based in part on its construction of the term “incident” to mean three separate events: (1) “events leading up to the stop,” (2) “the traffic stop itself,” and (3) “the post-traffic stop escort of Plaintiff to U-Haul and officer actions at U-Haul.” See JS at 66; Olney Decl., Ex. 18 at 13. Defendant again fails to address this issue in its portion of the briefing. Plaintiff defines “INCIDENT” as “the events of January 29, 2021,” which include the specific events “leading up to and including YOUR traffic stop, seizure, arrest, and/or use of force against PLAINTIFF at the intersection of San Bernardino Avenue and Live Oak Avenue, Fontana, CA 90028, YOUR escort of PLAINTIFF to U-Haul Moving & Storage at Foothill Blvd. (716066) at 16823 Foothill Blvd. in Fontana, California 92335 and YOUR actions and interactions at the U-Haul Center that day.” JS at 66; Olney Decl. Ex. 2 at 3. But as plaintiff points out, “[d]efendants use nearly the same definition in their own Interrogatories, which define ‘INCIDENT’ even more broadly to mean ‘the alleged traffic stop and all surrounding circumstances and related acts and/or omissions attributed to January 29, 2021, as alleged in Plaintiffs COMPLAINT.’ ” JS at 66; Olney Decl. Ex. 36 at 3. Accordingly, to the extent that defendant objects to the interrogatories on this basis, this objection is overruled. The court finds that defendant has abandoned all of the objections it raised in boilerplate fashion in response to plaintiff's interrogatories, but that were not presented and developed in response to plaintiff's motion to compel, or in the subsequent supplemental briefing the court permitted. See Dep't of Toxic Substances Control, 2022 WL 19355, at *2. In fact, the further supplemental briefing from both parties merely states that “the parties remain at an impasse.” P. 2d Supp. Mem. at 5; D. 2d Supp. Mem. at 5. In any event, the few objections defendant did present in response to plaintiff's interrogatories are entirely conclusory, undeveloped, and lack any support or argument. Plaintiff's motion as to Interrogatory Nos. 6-9 is therefore granted. Defendant must provide responses to plaintiff's interrogatories in full and without objection. F. Plaintiff's RFP No. 98 to Defendant City RFP No. 98 seeks records of “all felony/high risk traffic stops” from January 29, 2016. JS at 71. Plaintiff argues that these records are relevant to his Monell claim challenging defendant's custom, policy, or practice. JS at 74. Specifically, plaintiff argues “[d]ocuments describing the tactics used by FPD during such stops will help establish the existence of the policy. Documents describing the City's experience conducting such stops, such as the frequency with which any suspect was armed, will help establish the unreasonableness of this policy and ... the use of highly aggressive tactics in the face of a very low risk.” JS at 74. In response, defendant City initially stated, “The City of Fontana cannot comply with this request, as the City of Fontana does not have a system in place which identifies all traffic stops in which an officer ‘participated in’ that were ‘initiated based only on suspicion of a stolen vehicle’ from January 29, 2016, through January 29, 2021.” JS at 75. In a supplemental response, defendant promised to “continue to conduct a diligent inquiry and reasonable search of the records within [its] possession, custody and control.” Id. The record before the court does not reflect whether defendant has located any responsive documents in its further search, since the parties' further supplemental briefing simply reports they remain at an impasse on this request. It is therefore unclear whether defendant has not taken seriously its discovery obligation to reasonably and diligently search for and produce responsive documents. “A party must make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether responsive documents exists, and if they do not, the party should so state with sufficient specificity to allow the Court to determine whether the party made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence.” Coppola v. Smith, 2016 WL 726903, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Subject to the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant is obligated to provide all relevant and non-privileged discovery to the extent possible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A), (b)(1). In order to fulfill its discovery obligations, defendant must confirm it has conducted a thorough search and produce responsive documents located. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion as to RFP No. 98 is granted. Defendant must conduct a diligent search, produce all responsive records that exist, and provide a verified supplemental response confirming it has done so. G. Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 1 to Defendant Officers Interrogatory No. 1 seeks information related to defendant officers' participation “in all traffic stops ... from January 29, 2016, to the present that were initiated based only on suspicion of a stolen vehicle.” JS at 75-76. Defendants responded: Apart from the subject incident at issue in this lawsuit, for which I have had my recollection refreshed in the course of the instant litigation, I cannot provide reasonable and accurate information as to all traffic stops in which I “participated in” that were “initiated based only on suspicion of a stolen vehicle” from January 29, 2016, through January 29, 2021. Further, I am not aware of any system in place which identifies all traffic stops in which an officer “participated in” that were “initiated based only on suspicion of a stolen vehicle” from January 29, 2016, through January 29, 2021.” JS at 77. A responding party must respond to interrogatories under oath and to the fullest extent possible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). “The answers to interrogatories must be responsive, full, complete and unevasive.” Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Caton, 136 F.R.D. 682, 684 (D. Kan. 1991) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A party answering interrogatories cannot limit its answers to matters within its own knowledge and ignore information reasonably available to it or under its control. Essex Builders Grp., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 230 F.R.D. 682, 685 (M.D. Fla. 2005). While a responding party is not generally required to conduct extensive research to answer an interrogatory, a reasonable effort to respond must be made. Gorrell v. Sneath, 292 F.R.D. 629, 632 (E.D. Cal. 2013). “If a party is unable to supply the requested information, the party may not simply refuse to answer, but must state under oath that he is unable to provide the information and set forth the efforts he used to obtain the information.” Hansel v. Shell Oil Corp., 169 F.R.D. 303, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, defendants have not met their discovery obligation in answering Interrogatory No. 1. Although it is undoubtedly correct that they are unable to recall all such traffic stops they have participated in, that does not excuse their obligation to try to refresh their recollections with reasonably available information, and to answer as to those stops they can recall. Their failure to take these steps is particularly unwarranted given their apparent refusal to stipulate they will not rely on their experiences from such stops at trial. See JS at 78; Olney Decl., Ex. 14 at 2. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion as to Interrogatory No. 1 is granted. Defendants must amend and supplement their responses after reviewing information reasonably available. If, after making a reasonable effort, defendants are unable to provide all responsive information, they must provide the information they are able to provide, state under oath they are unable to provide the remaining information, and set forth the efforts used to obtain it. IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the court grants in large part plaintiff's motion to compel (docket no. 81). Defendants must produce an amended privilege log no later than May 5, 2023, and must provide responses to plaintiff's discovery requests to the extent ordered herein no later than May 12, 2023, unless otherwise agreed by plaintiff.