GEORGE BLOOMER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE WORD NETWORK OPERATING COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants Civil Action No. 22-12433 United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division Filed December 08, 2023 Counsel Joseph Corey Asay, Hkm Employment Attorneys LLP, Cincinnati, OH, Michael N. Hanna, Morgan and Morgan, P.A., Southfield, MI, for Plaintiffs. Amanda McSween Empey, Rebecca C. Seguin-Skrabucha, Bodman PLC, Detroit, MI, John T. Below, Bodman PLC, Troy, MI, for Defendant The Word Network Operating Company, Inc. John T. Below, Bodman PLC, Troy, MI, Rebecca C. Seguin-Skrabucha, Bodman PLC, Detroit, MI, for Defendant Kevin Adell. John T. Below, Bodman PLC, Troy, MI, for Defendant Church of the Word. Grand, David R., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (ECF No. 40) Background *1 This is a race discrimination case brought by Plaintiffs George Bloomer (“Bloomer”) and GG Bloomer Ministries against Defendants The Word Network (“TWN”) Operating Company, Church of the Word, and Kevin Adell (“Adell”). Bloomer is an African American televangelist, pastor, and author. Adell is a Caucasian owner of TWN, a large African American religious network. Plaintiffs allege that “Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a valid written and/or oral contract, both express and implied-in-fact,” pursuant to which Bloomer would “host[ ] various programs for Defendants” and “Defendants [would] compensate Plaintiffs a certain amount for the sale and/or promotion of inter alia, books, Bibles, audio Bibles, and oils ...” (ECF No. 17, PageID.291). Plaintiffs allege that Bloomer worked for Defendants as a preacher/television program host from approximately 2011 to September 2019. Plaintiffs claim that in September 2019, Adell sent Bloomer multiple text messages and made oral statements to Bloomer that violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as “race discrimination” (Count I), “race harassment” (Count II), and “race retaliation” (Count III), resulting in the termination of the working relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants. (Id., PageID.277-91). Plaintiffs also bring state-law claims for breach of contract (Count IV), quantum meruit (Count V), and unjust enrichment (Count VI). (Id., PageID.291-94). Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery, which was filed on September 1, 2023.[1] (ECF No. 40). Counsel for the parties met and conferred in an attempt to resolve the issues presented in Plaintiffs' motion; however, when they were unable to fully do so, Defendants filed a response (ECF No. 49), and Plaintiffs filed a reply (ECF No. 52). Oral argument was held on November 20, 2023. Following the parties' meet-and-confers, much of Plaintiffs' motion to compel has been resolved.[2] However, Plaintiffs' Requests for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 5-10, as well as Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 3, remain in dispute. For the reasons stated on the record and detailed more fully below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs' motion to compel with respect to these specific discovery requests. Applicable Standards Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. *2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Although Rule 26 was amended in 2015 to emphasize the importance of the “proportionality” requirement, the “basic tenet that Rule 26 is to be liberally construed to permit broad discovery” remains unaltered. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Warren Chiropractic & Rehab Clinic, P.C., 315 F.R.D. 220, 222 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (internal quotations omitted); Martin v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distrib., LLC, 313 F.R.D. 1, 5 (E.D.N.C. 2016) (“The rules of discovery, including Rule 26, are to be given broad and liberal construction.”). Relevance, in turn, “has been broadly construed to encompass any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” Martin, 313 F.R.D. at 5 (internal quotations and citations omitted). When ruling on discovery-related motions, the district court has broad discretion to determine the proper scope of discovery, including whether a discovery request is too broad and oppressive. See Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998). In doing so, the district court must balance the “right to discovery with the need to prevent ‘fishing expeditions.’ ” Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998). Thus, whether to grant or deny a motion to compel is generally left within a district court's broad discretion. See Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting district court's substantial discretion in resolving motions to compel and reviewing such decisions on appeal for abuse of discretion). Discussion RFP Nos. 5-8 Broadly speaking, RFP Nos. 5-8 are requests for email correspondence containing a few specific search terms sent to or received by several custodians from 2016 to the present. Plaintiffs argue that the search terms are narrowly tailored to their discrimination and unpaid wage claims, and the searches are limited to those custodians most likely to have relevant responsive information. (ECF No. 40, PageID.661). Generally speaking, Defendants object to each request as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. (ECF No. 40-2, PageID.677-79). RFP No. 5 RFP No. 5 seeks: All email correspondence sent to or received by Quenton Ross, Malea Howard, Denise Johnson, Rich Mazuri, Ralph Lameti, Robin Manoogian, Yolathia Garner, and/or Michael Williams that contains any of the following search terms: “Bloomer”; “GGB Ministries”; “nigg!”; “slave”; “pimp”; “investig!”; “remed!”; “negro!”; “race”; “racial”; “discrim!”; “harass!”; “retal!”; “hostil!”; “Title VII”; “Equal Employment Opportunity Commission”; “EEOC”; “discrimination”; and/or “inappropriate” at any time from 2016 to present. (Id., PageID.677). Defendants object to this RFP as: overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case because it seeks all email correspondence that include many and generalized keywords without limitation as to the individuals with whom the named persons may have exchanged email correspondence and with little limitation as to timing. Defendants further object because the named persons have no relation to Plaintiffs or their claims, and the keywords are not sufficiently tailored. (Id.).[3] *3 In their motion, Plaintiffs argue that this request – which contains a limited number of narrowly tailored search terms relevant to their discrimination/harassment and unpaid wage claims, for only eight custodians, during the relevant time period – is proportional to the needs of this case, in which they seek hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of dollars in damages. (ECF No. 40, PageID.661). Plaintiffs further assert that RFP No. 5 is intended to uncover evidence of Defendants' allegedly “racist work environment, racist discriminatory animus, and past instances of discrimination and harassment complaints.” (ECF No. 52, PageID.889). In response, Defendants take issue with three aspects of this request: (1) the fact that it is not limited to emails that include Plaintiffs' names and the other search terms; (2) the eight custodians listed; and (3) the temporal limitation (2016 to the present). (ECF No. 49, PageID.801-04). Each of these issues is addressed below. First, Defendants argue that, in this case, where Plaintiffs are alleging that Defendants intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of race, a request that is not limited to include Plaintiffs' names and the other search terms is overly broad and nothing more than a fishing expedition designed to unearth “some sort of pattern-or-practice evidence,” which they argue is “not relevant because the pattern-or-practice method ‘is available only in class actions or suits by the government.’ ”[4] (Id., PageID.801-02 (quoting Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004))). Defendants also note that the Bacon court held that “because [pattern-or-practice evidence] does not address individual hiring decisions, it is inappropriate as a vehicle for proving discrimination in an individual case.” (Id., quoting Bacon, 370 F.3d at 575). Essentially, then, Defendants argue that RFP No. 5 is inappropriate because performing the requested search could yield racially discriminatory comments about individuals other than Plaintiffs, which comments Defendants maintain are not relevant in this case. The Court disagrees. While the Bacon court did conclude, “because [pattern-or-practice evidence] does not address individual hiring decisions, it is inappropriate as a vehicle for proving discrimination in an individual case,” a mere two sentences later the court wrote, “[h]owever, pattern-or-practice evidence may be relevant to proving an otherwise-viable individual claim for disparate treatment ...” Bacon, 370 F.3d at 575. This premise has been reiterated over the years, including recently. See e.g., Williams v. Dearborn Motors 1, LLC, No. 20-1351, 2021 WL 3854805, at *6 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2021) (“evidence showing that an employer has a practice of treating members of a protected class in a discriminatory fashion ... may be presented in federal court” to “support an [individual plaintiff's] employment discrimination claim”); Hannah v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 331940, 2017 WL 3642656, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2017) (“under Bacon, pattern-or-practice evidence, standing alone, is not sufficient to demonstrate that an employer's decision with respect to an individual employee was motivated by unlawful discrimination” but it “may constitute additional, relevant evidence” to the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim); Palmer v. CSC Covansys Corp., No. 17-10309, 2018 WL 4608474, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2018) (evidence of a pattern-or-practice of discrimination can be offered to prove pretext). See also Mays v. United Ass'n Local 290 Apprenticeship and Journeyman Training Trust Fund, 407 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1144 (D. Or. 2019) (holding that “[e]vidence of racist statements that are not directed toward a plaintiff can still be deemed direct evidence of discriminatory animus.”); Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep't, 424 F.3d 1027, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005) (sexist remarks were probative of discriminatory intent, even if directed to women or about women other than the plaintiff); Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 868-69 (6th Cir. 2003) (evidence of biased remarks and racial jokes in workplace are relevant to plaintiff's intentional discrimination claim). For all of the foregoing reasons, the information sought in RFP No. 5 is relevant.[5] *4 Next, Defendants argue that the list of custodians is overly broad, and Plaintiffs have not articulated any connection between these eight individuals and Plaintiffs' race discrimination claims. (ECF No. 49, PageID.802-03). This is simply not the case. In their reply brief, Plaintiffs provided specific information as to why they believe the eight custodians listed in RFP No. 5 have information relevant to their race discrimination/harassment claims. (ECF No. 52, PageID.891-92). For example, Plaintiffs provided declarations from Denise Johnson and Malea Howard attesting that they witnessed Adell make racist remarks about African Americans. (ECF Nos. 52-2, 52-3). Similarly, Plaintiffs explained that Rich Mazuri and Quenton Ross had close access to Adell and communicated with him regularly, thus making it likely that they have knowledge of racist statements made by Adell. (ECF No. 52, PageID.892). At this stage – where Plaintiffs are merely seeking discovery – their showings with respect to the custodians at issue are sufficient to establish the relevance of the information sought in RFP No. 5, and the proportionality factors favor allowing the discovery.[6] Moreover, Defendants have made no showing that performing the requested search on the eight identified custodians would be burdensome, let alone that the burden would outweigh the information's likely benefit. Finally, Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs' allegations of race discrimination/harassment are limited to events that transpired in September 2019, the proposed time frame “from 2016 to present” is overbroad. (ECF No. 49, PageID.803). In their reply brief, Plaintiffs agreed that – to the extent Defendants have actually preserved emails from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2019, they will agree to limit their request to that period of time. (ECF No. 52, PageID.893). Thus, at least at this juncture, Plaintiffs' RFP No. 5 shall be so modified, and Defendants shall be required to produce all non-privileged responsive documents. RFP No. 6 RFP No. 6 seeks: All email correspondence sent to or received by Arcenia Finley, Johnny Matterlo, Ralph Lameti, Robin Manoogian, Yolathia Garner and/or Jeff Thurman that contains the terms “Bloomer” and/or “GG Bloomer Ministries” AND at least one of the following search terms: “book”; “sell”; “sold”; “sale”; “gift”; “promotion!”; “bible!”; “promot!”; “purchase”; “order”; “oil”; “money”; “audio”; “commission”; “pamphlet”; “spiritual warfare”; “setting the captives free”; “spirit filled”; “DVD”; “CD”; “card”; “cloth!”; “pay!”; “invoice”; from 2016 to present. (ECF No. 40-2, PageID.678). Defendants objected to this RFP as: overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case because it seeks all email correspondence that include many and generalized keywords without limitation as to the individuals with whom the named persons may have exchanged email correspondence and with little limitation as to timing. Defendants further object because the named persons have no relation to Plaintiffs or their claims, and the keywords are not sufficiently tailored. (Id.).[7] *5 In their motion, Plaintiffs argue that this request – which is limited to six custodians involved in Defendants' sales efforts, during the relevant time period, for key search terms coupled with Plaintiffs' names – is highly relevant to their unpaid wage claims. (ECF No. 40, PageID.662). In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently explained why the custodians at issue would have relevant information in their emails. (ECF No. 49, PageID.804-05). But, in their reply brief, Plaintiffs explained exactly why they believe each of the individuals at issue are likely to have relevant information. (ECF No. 52, PageID.894-95). For example, Plaintiffs asserted that (1) Yolathia Garner “directly handled the products that [Bloomer] sold”; (2) Jeff Thurman was present at times when Adell paid Bloomer for products sold; and (3) Johnny Matterlo is believed to have information regarding the financial arrangement between the parties. (Id.). These types of assertions show that Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that the listed custodians likely have relevant information regarding their unpaid wage claims, and the request at issue is proportional to the needs of this case. Again, Defendants made no showing that complying with the request would be burdensome. Thus, Defendants shall produce all non-privileged documents responsive to RFP No. 6. RFP No. 7 RFP No. 7 seeks: All email correspondence sent to or received by Arcenia Finely, Johnny Matterlo, Jeff Thurman, Dave Sheffield, Dody Johnson, Malea (last name unknown), Sandra Riley, Teresa Cox, Ralph Lameti, Robin Manoogian, Yolathia Garner and/or Paul Croutch that contains the terms: “book”; “sell”; “sold”; “sale”; “gift”; “promotion!”; “purchase”; “order”; “bible!”; “promot!”; “oil”; “money”; “audio”; “commission”; “pamphlet”; “spiritual warfare”; “setting the captives free”; “spirit filled”; “DVD”; “CD”; “card”; “cloth!”; “pay!”; “invoice”; “Prayer Shawl”; from 2016 to present. (ECF No. 40-2, PageID.678). Defendants objected to this RFP as: overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case because it seeks all email correspondence that include many and generalized keywords without limitation as to the individuals with whom the named persons may have exchanged email correspondence and with little limitation as to timing. Defendants further object because the named persons have no relation to Plaintiffs or their claims, and the keywords are not sufficiently tailored. (Id., PageID.679).[8] In their reply, Plaintiffs indicate that they have agreed to add the qualifiers “Bloomer” or “GG Bloomer Ministries” to the search to limit the number of responsive documents. (ECF No. 52, PageID.895). Moreover, six of the twelve custodians at issue in RFP No. 7 were also at issue in RFP No. 6 (Finley, Matterlo, Lameti, Manoogian, Garner, and Thurman) and, the Court has explained why their email accounts should be subject to search, as they are likely to have information relevant to Plaintiffs' claims in this case. See supra at 9-10. In addition, Defendants have agreed to perform the search (as modified) of the account of Dave Sheffield. (ECF No. 49, PageID.805). With respect to the five remaining custodians (Cox, Croutch, Johnson, Riley, and “Malea”), the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently explained why they believe these individuals might possess relevant information. (ECF No. 40, PageID.662-63; ECF No. 52, PageID.895). For example, (1) Dody Johnson submitted a declaration attesting to her knowledge of this matter; (2) Teresa Cox is a pastor who, like Bloomer, “reached a deal with Defendants for the sale of bibles” and, thus, might have evidence relevant to Plaintiffs' assertions about Defendants' business practices; and (3) Paul Croutch is a former director and producer of shows on Defendants' networks who is likely to have information about Defendants' “habit” of refusing to pay parties with whom they have contracted. (Id.). Again, given the amount at stake in this case and the other Rule 26(b)(1) considerations, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that the request at issue is proportional to the needs of this case, and Defendants have not shown any undue burden associated with complying with the request. Accordingly, Defendants shall produce all non-privileged documents responsive to RFP No. 7 (as modified). RFP No. 8 *6 RFP No. 8 seeks: All emails received from Jack Countryman or Roger Johnson or Gaddy “The Bible Man” from 2016 to present. (ECF No. 40-2, PageID.679). Defendants objected to this RFP as: overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case because it seeks all email correspondence that include many and generalized keywords without limitation as to keywords, topics, and/or the individuals with whom the named persons may have exchanged email correspondence and with little limitation as to timing. Defendants further object because the named persons have no relation to Plaintiffs or their claims. (Id.). As an initial matter, Plaintiffs have agreed to limit the time period for this request to 2016 to 2019. (ECF No. 40, PageID.663). Moreover, Plaintiffs have explained that Mr. Countryman and Mr. Johnson were salesmen at Harper Collins, which published certain books (e.g., “The Bible Experience”) that Defendants purchased as a result of Plaintiffs' sales efforts. (ECF No. 52, PageID.896). Defendants – somewhat inconsistently – assert both that the request is unduly burdensome (because Plaintiffs are asking them to search each and every WNC email account for the three-year period at issue) and that “the only communications with Jack Countryman, Roger Johnson, and Gaddy ‘The Bible Man’ were telephone conversations between them and Adell.” (Compare ECF No. 49, PageID.807 with ECF No. 49-3, PageID.841). It is unclear how Defendants could represent that no responsive emails exist without actually conducting the search at issue; and, if such a search has been conducted, and no emails were found, Defendants should simply state that this is the case. In short, the Court is not persuaded that RFP No. 8 is unduly burdensome. However, the Court agrees with Defendants that this request, as written, is overly broad as it seeks “[a]ll emails received from Jack Countryman or Roger Johnson or Gaddy ‘The Bible Man,’ ” when many such e-mails may have nothing whatsoever to do with the claims or defenses in this case. (ECF No. 49-3, PageID.841) (emphasis added). To be reasonable, Plaintiffs must narrow the request so that it seeks only those emails Defendants received from Jack Countryman or Roger Johnson or Gaddy “The Bible Man” from 2016 to 2019 that are related to the claims and defenses in this case. RFP No. 9 RFP No. 9 seeks: “All text messages between Bishop Bloomer and Kevin Adell.” (ECF No. 40-2, PageID.679). In response, Defendants stated that they would produce these text messages “once forensically recovered from the phones of both Adell and Bloomer at an agreed-upon date and through an agreed-upon qualified third party.” (Id.). The hold-up, then, is Defendants' insistence that “the parties agree upon a qualified third party (a licensed Michigan forensic computer examiner) to extract the information from both Adell and Bloomer's phones at the same time.” (ECF No. 49, PageID.808). However, Plaintiffs represent in their reply brief that they have conducted a search of Bloomer's phone and “produced all text messages he exchanged with Kevin Adell in his possession.” (ECF No. 52, PageID.897). *7 As the Court indicated on the record, at this juncture, it will not condition Adell's production of his text messages with Bloomer on the requirement that Bloomer turn over his cell phone to a “licensed Michigan forensic computer examiner” for examination, as Defendants request. (ECF No. 49, PageID.808; see also ECF No. 54, PageID.928-29 (denying Defendants' motion to compel Plaintiffs to use a Michigan licensed forensic ESI professional)). Defendants have come forward with no evidence – even when pressed at oral argument – that Plaintiffs' search of Bloomer's cell phone for text messages with Adell was inadequate; thus, ordering a forensic search of Bloomer's phone is inappropriate at this stage. See, e.g., Lipian v. Univ. of Mich., No. 18-13321, 2019 WL 6339646, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2019) (permitting forensic examination of plaintiff's cell phone only after finding “gaps in the text message records” produced). With that in mind, Defendants must simply conduct a good-faith search of Adell's cell phone and produce any documents responsive to RFP No. 9. Should Defendants choose to perform this search by retaining a forensic computer examiner – whether one licensed in Michigan or not – they may certainly do so. RFP No. 10 RFP No. 10 seeks: All text messages sent to or received by Kevin Adell that contains at least one of the following terms: “Bloomer”; “pimp”; “noose”; “nigg!”; “slave”; “pimp”; “racism”; “racist”; “negro!”; “black ass”' “race”; “racial”; “blackface”; “black face”; “discrim!”; “harass!”; “retal!”; “hostil!”; “EEOC”; “inappropriate”; “fir!” from 2016 to present. (ECF No. 40-2, PageID.679).[9] Defendants objected to this RFP as: overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case because it seeks all text messages that include many and generalized keywords without limitation as to the individuals with whom Adell may have exchanged text messages and with little limitation as to timing. Defendants further object because the keywords are not sufficiently tailored. (Id., PageID.680). In their motion, Plaintiffs argue that this request – which contains a limited number of narrowly tailored search terms relevant to their discrimination/harassment claims – is proportional to the needs of this case. (ECF No. 40, PageID.664). Plaintiffs further assert that RFP No. 10 is intended to uncover evidence of “Adell's discriminatory intent, where Mr. Adell denied possessing any discriminatory animus in his actions.” (Id.). In their response brief, Defendants claim that the information sought is “not relevant to Plaintiffs' claims and is unduly burdensome as it is highly invasive into Adell's personal communications.” (ECF No. 49, PageID.810). However, Defendants offered no evidence in support of their conclusory assertion about the request's burdensomeness. And, while the Court recognizes Adell's privacy concerns regarding producing his text messages with others, Defendants have not shown that such concerns outweigh other relevant considerations, as set forth below. To begin with, contrary to Defendants' conclusory assertion that RFP No. 10 would not “lead to relevant evidence in this case” (Id., PageID.811), the Court finds that the search terms at issue are narrowly tailored to search for communications that would support Plaintiffs' contention that Adell holds racial animus against African Americans. And, as more thoroughly explained above, see supra at 5-7, such evidence would in fact be relevant to Adell's race discrimination/harassment claims. Plaintiffs are not – as Defendants seem to suggest – demanding that Adell produce every text he sent to or received from anyone over a three-year period; rather, Plaintiffs are seeking only text messages that evidence whether Adell used or condoned or encouraged the use of certain racially derogatory terms about Bloomer specifically – or African Americans generally – which is a relevant inquiry in a race discrimination/harassment case. See Mays, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 1144 (“[e]vidence of racist statements that are not directed toward a plaintiff can still be deemed direct evidence of discriminatory animus”); Johnson, 319 F.3d at 868-69 (evidence of biased remarks and racial jokes in workplace are relevant to plaintiff's intentional discrimination claim). Similarly, to the extent Adell texted others about discrimination, harassment, or retaliation claims or allegations, such texts certainly could be relevant to Plaintiffs' claims in this case. *8 Despite the relevance of the information sought in RFP No. 10, however, the Court has the discretion to limit the scope of discovery when the information sought is overbroad or unduly burdensome. See Craft v. Billingslea, No. 17-12752, 2021 WL 3660845, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2021) (citing cases). “While ‘a plaintiff should not be denied access to information necessary to establish [his] claim, neither may a plaintiff be permitted to go fishing and a trial court retains discretion to determine that a discovery request is too broad and oppressive.’ ” Id. (quoting Surles, 474 F.3d at 305). Thus, pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1), the court may, for good cause, “issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” which may include “forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(D).[10] Here, Defendants argue that permitting the discovery sought in RFP No. 10 would unduly infringe on Adell's right to privacy,[11] ostensibly causing him annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, and/or undue burden. There are several reasons why the Court is not persuaded by Defendants' arguments in this respect. First, at least at the present time, any argument Defendants make about “undue burden” is meritless, as they admit they have not even attempted to conduct the search at issue to determine how many responsive documents actually exist. See Cain v. City of Detroit, No. 20-11099, 2022 WL 3337135, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2022) (a party asserting undue burden may not rest on its assertion but must submit affidavits and other evidence to substantiate its objections, rather than relying on bald generalizations or conclusory assertions); Fauteux v. Walmart Inc., No. CV 20-00925-DSF (RAOx), 2022 WL 1716002, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2022) (defendant failed to support its contention of undue burden with estimates of time and resources it would take to conduct search for responsive information). It is certainly conceivable, then – particularly given the search terms at issue – that very few (or no) responsive documents exist and, thus, the request would be far from unduly burdensome. Moreover, Plaintiffs have indicated a willingness to work with Defendants to revise their request if, for some legitimate reason, it produces numerous mishits. (ECF No. 52, PageID.888-89). *9 Second, while the Court is sensitive to Defendants' concerns about Adell's privacy interests in his personal text messages, the fact that the Court is permitting the discovery at issue does not necessarily mean that such messages are subject to broad public disclosure. Indeed, given the sensitive nature of the text messages requested, it seems appropriate for all non-privileged documents responsive to RFP No. 10 to be produced subject to the terms of a mutually agreeable protective order. Third, Defendants have not cited a single case for the proposition that personal text messages need not be produced under circumstances similar to the ones here. The Court gave Defendants an opportunity at oral argument to identify such a case, and they were unable to do so. Finally, the Court notes that it is not ruling on the admissibility of any responsive text messages at trial; it simply concludes that the request at issue seeks relevant evidence, is proportional to the needs of the case given the amount in controversy and the other Rule 26(b)(1) considerations, and that any burden on Defendants (or Adell, personally) does not outweigh the likely benefit of this evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Thus, Defendants shall be required to produce all non-privileged documents responsive to RFP No. 10 (as modified). Interrogatory No. 3 Lastly, Interrogatory No. 3 states: “Identify all individuals by name, address, and telephone number who work/worked at the location where Bishop Bloomer worked for any of the Defendants at any time from 2016 to present.” (ECF No. 40-3, PageID.712). Defendants objected to this interrogatory as: ... vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case because it seeks information about any and all individuals who performed any work for Defendants both during and after the cessation of the arrangement between Bloomer and any Defendants in 2019. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Defendants state that Bloomer was the only preacher who served as the host of a program on the WNC between 2016 and 2019. (Id.). In their supplemental responses, Defendants further explained that “between 2016 and 2019, the only location where Bloomer served as the host of a program was 20733 W. 10 Mile Rd, Southfield, MI 48075 (the ‘Southfield Location’)” and it estimates that, during the relevant time period, “hundreds of individuals may have performed some type of work” at the Southfield Location. (ECF No. 49-2, PageID.824-25). Subsequently, Defendants indicated “that they are searching for an old employee list or lists and will produce as soon as responsive documents are found.” (Id., PageID.825). In their motion, Plaintiffs assert that the requested information will assist them in identifying individuals who might have direct knowledge of sales related to Plaintiffs' unpaid wage claims, as well as information relevant to Plaintiff's race discrimination/harassment and retaliation claims. (ECF No. 40, PageID.669). In response, Defendants simply assert, “Plaintiffs do not need a full employee or worker information to support their claims ....” (ECF No. 49, PageID.816). The Court agrees with Defendants that this interrogatory, as written, is overly broad. To be reasonable, Plaintiffs must narrow the request to seek the identities (and, unless they are controlled by Defendants, contact information) of specific individuals and/or categories of individuals (e.g., sales personnel who were involved with Defendants' transactions with Plaintiffs) who are likely to possess relevant information about the claims and defenses in this case. Conclusion *10 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF No. 40) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth above. IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] On September 4, 2023, an Order of Reference was entered referring this motion to the undersigned for hearing and determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). (ECF No. 41). [2] To the extent the parties have resolved the aspects of Plaintiffs' motion to compel not expressly discussed herein, those aspects of Plaintiffs' motion are DENIED AS MOOT. [3] Subsequently, Defendants supplemented their response to indicate that they would “produce email communications sent or received by [Ralph] Lameti during the Relevant Timeframe and identified as responsive pursuant to a proper forensic search of Lameti's WNC email account for the search terms ‘Bloomer’ and ‘GGB Ministries.’ ” (ECF No. 40-2, PageID.678). Plaintiffs maintain that this concession is “wholly inadequate.” (ECF No. 52, PageID.888). Regardless, Defendants have failed to produce even this subset of the requested documents. [4] Defendants slightly mis-quoted Bacon. The correct quote is: “All [of the referenced cases] interpret the Supreme Court's discussion of the pattern-or-practice method of proof as being limited to class actions or suits by the government.” Bacon, 370 F.3d at 575. [5] Moreover, as Plaintiffs point out, it is certainly possible that the custodians at issue could make racially discriminatory remarks about Plaintiffs without explicitly mentioning their names (for example, by using a nickname). (ECF No. 52, PageID.889-90). This is yet another reason not to limit RFP No. 5 to only those e-mails that specifically reference Plaintiffs' names. [6] Defendants claim that some of the custodians at issue in RFP No. 5 do not have WNC email addresses and, therefore, they cannot search for emails to or from those individuals. (ECF No. 49, PageID.802-03). If this is the case, then Defendants obviously cannot search the listed individual's WNC email address for documents responsive to RFP No. 5. However, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1), to the extent Defendants have possession, custody, or control of any email accounts for the listed individuals – whether with a WNC email address or otherwise – they must search such accounts for responsive documents. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Precious Physical Therapy, Inc., No. 19-10835, 2020 WL 7056039, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 2020) (“There is no dispute that Core Defendants did not provide its employees and independent contractors with email addresses. Since Core did not issue the employees and contractors email addresses, those emails are not in Core's actual possession, custody, or control. Hence, the Court could compel Core Defendants to produce emails from current and former employees and contractors only if the defendants have the legal right to obtain those emails on demand.”). [7] Subsequently, Defendants supplemented their response to indicate that they would “produce email communications sent or received by [Ralph] Lameti or Arcenia Finley during the Relevant Timeframe and identified as responsive pursuant to a proper forensic search of Lameti's and Finley's WNC email accounts for the search terms ‘Bloomer’ and ‘GGB Ministries.’ ” (ECF No. 40-2, PageID.678). Plaintiffs maintain that this concession is unacceptable and further state that Defendants have failed to produce even this subset of the requested documents. (ECF No. 52, PageID.894). [8] Subsequently, Defendants supplemented their response to indicate that they would “produce email communications sent or received by [Ralph] Lameti or [Arcenia] Finley during the Relevant Timeframe and identified as responsive pursuant to a proper forensic search of Lameti's and Finley's WNC email accounts for the search terms ‘Bloomer’ and ‘GGB Ministries.’ ” (ECF No. 40-2, PageID.679). Plaintiffs indicate, however, that to date, Defendants have failed to produce even this subset of the requested documents. (ECF No. 52, PageID.895). [9] Plaintiffs have since agreed to limit this request slightly, by modifying their request for messages with the search term “fir!” to include messages that also include the search term “Bloomer” (i.e., messages pertaining to firing Bloomer). (ECF No. 49, PageID.810). Additionally, in their reply brief, Plaintiffs seem to narrow the time period for this request to “2016 to 2019.” (ECF No. 52, PageID.898). Thus, the Court will consider the request as narrowed in these respects. [10] Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) contemplates issuance of a protective order upon a motion by the party “from whom discovery is sought ....” Here, Defendants have not moved for a protective order; however, in the interests of expeditiously resolving this issue, the Court will consider Defendants' objections to RFP No. 10, as well as Defendants' response brief and counsel's statements at oral argument, to constitute a request for a protective order forbidding inquiry into the matters at issue in RFP No. 10. [11] Defendants argue that federal courts “recognize a constitutional right to privacy encompassing a right to nondisclosure of one's personal information.” (ECF No. 49, PageID.810). Plaintiffs are correct, however, that the constitutional right to privacy only protects an individual from governmental intrusion. (ECF No. 52, PageID.898) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)). Thus, Defendants' argument that compelling Adell's compliance with Plaintiffs' discovery request in this case violates his constitutional rights is misplaced. However, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 34(a) explicitly recognize that “[i]nspection or testing of certain types of electronically stored information ... may raise issues of confidentiality or privacy” and “[c]ourts should guard against undue intrusiveness ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment. Thus, the Court will keep this caution in mind in evaluating RFP No. 10.