STEPHANIE NETTER v. DONALD NETTER DOCKET NO. FST-FA-17-6031365-S Superior Court of Connecticut, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF STAMFORD/NORWALK. AT STAMFORD January 23, 2023 Heller, Donna N., Judge MEMORANDUM OF DECISION UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. *1 On March 1, 2017, the plaintiff Stephanie Netter commenced this action, returnable March 14, 2017, to dissolve her marriage to the defendant Donald Netter. The plaintiff also sought joint legal custody of the parties’ two minor children, alimony, child support, reasonable attorney's fees, post-majority educational support orders pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c, and an equitable distribution of the marital estate in her original complaint. The defendant filed an answer and cross-complaint on May 25, 2017 (#135.00). The defendant sought sole legal custody of the children, a parenting plan, child support, post-majority educational support orders, and an equitable division and assignment of the parties’ property in his cross-complaint. The plaintiff filed an amended dissolution complaint on February 2, 2018 (#223.00). In her amended complaint, the plaintiff seeks sole legal custody of the children. The defendant has not amended his answer and cross-complaint. The dissolution trial lasted fifty-seven days. The plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel. The defendant appeared and represented himself. The trial commenced on May 5, 2021 and concluded with the closing argument of the plaintiff's counsel on September 12, 2022. The defendant submitted his final corrected trial brief, prepared with the assistance of counsel, on September 23, 2022 (#722.00). All trial proceedings prior to September 12, 2022 were conducted remotely via Microsoft Teams. The court heard testimony from sixteen witnesses, including the guardian ad litem Paul T. Tusch, Esq. (Attorney Tusch); the court-appointed evaluator Arnold Shienvold, Ph.D. (Dr. Shienvold); the court-appointed custody evaluator Jessica Biren Caverly, Ph.D. (Dr. Biren Caverly);[1] the plaintiff's expert Elizabeth Ciccone (Ms. Ciccone) of Marcum LLP (Marcum); the plaintiff; and the defendant. The transcripts of several pendente lite hearings and depositions were also included in the trial record. The court reviewed the exhibits that were admitted into evidence, considered the arguments of the plaintiff's counsel and the defendant, and took judicial notice of the contents of the court file, including the parties’ proposed orders and the defendant's final corrected trial brief. The court reserved decision at the conclusion of the trial.[2] There were more than 700 separate entries in the court file of this dissolution action before the trial was completed. Forty-seven pendente lite motions and objections were ultimately reserved for decision until the time of trial. These motions are also addressed below. FINDINGS Both parties testified for several days during the lengthy dissolution trial and at many pendente lite hearings during the nearly six years that this case has been pending. The court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and consider the credibility of each party as he or she testified. “[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to their testimony . ... The trier has the witnesses before it and is in the position to analyze all the evidence. The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981). “The determination of the credibility of the witnesses is a function of the trial court ....” Welsch v. Groat, 95 Conn. App. 658, 664, 897 A.2d 710 (2006). “The [fact-finding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn. App. 619, 642, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924, 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005). *2 After carefully considering the relevant and credible evidence admitted at trial, and having had the opportunity to observe the parties and the other witnesses, the court makes the following findings of fact. The court has jurisdiction. All statutory stays have expired. The parties resided continuously in the State of Connecticut for at least the twelve months preceding the commencement of this action. The plaintiff and the defendant were married on July 9, 2005 at New York, New York. The plaintiff's birth name was Stephanie Senatore. The marriage was the first for the plaintiff and the second for the defendant. The defendant's first marriage ended in 2001 upon the death of his wife Kimberly Netter. Two children were born of this marriage: Arianna Nell Netter, born on XX/XX/2006, and Samantha Charlie Netter, born on XX/XX/2009. Neither the State of Connecticut nor any municipality thereof has contributed any financial assistance for the support or maintenance of the parties or the minor children. The allegations of the complaint are found to be true. The marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably, with no reasonable prospect of reconciliation. The plaintiff wife: The plaintiff is fifty-five years old. She attended Syracuse University and graduated in 1990 from New York University. After she graduated from New York University, she took some classes locally from Ramapo College. The plaintiff received a master's degree in physical therapy in 1998 from The Institute for Physical Therapy, which is now part of the University of St. Augustine for Health Sciences. She worked in Mississippi and Alabama as a contract physical therapist after graduation. The plaintiff became a licensed physical therapist in New Jersey. She worked as a physical therapist at the Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation and at Twin Boro Physical Therapy. She was working at Twin Boro when she and the defendant were married in July 2005. Her annual income was approximately $65,000 in 2005, when she last worked outside of the home. The plaintiff is in good health. She was treated for an unspecified eating disorder when she was a freshman at Syracuse. With the encouragement of the defendant and his parents, she saw a counselor at the Wilkins Center[3] in Greenwich before the marriage. The defendant husband: The defendant is sixty-one years old. He is in good health. He received a bachelor of science degree in economics from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1983. The defendant has over thirty years of professional investment experience, according to his curriculum vitae, or CV.[4] He has served on the boards of four public companies. As described in his CV, the defendant was a founder of Dolphin Limited Partnerships. He served as a senior managing director of Dolphin Holdings Corp.,[5] a co-senior managing director of Dolphin Holdings Corp. II,[6] and senior managing director of Dolphin Holdings Corp. III,[7] all entities under the Dolphin umbrella. The three Dolphin Limited partnerships – Dolphin Limited Partnership, LP (DLP I), Dolphin Domestic Fund II, LP and Dolphin Master Fund II, LP (collectively, DLP II), and Dolphin Limited Partnership III, LP – and Dolphin Financial Partners, LLC (DFP) were described as sizable investors in over twenty public companies on the defendant's CV. *3 The defendant was employed by Geneve Corporation (Geneve) at the time of the marriage. Geneve is a subsidiary of Geneve Holdings, Inc. (Geneve Holdings), a private financial holding company controlled by his family. Geneve Holdings's assets are comprised primarily of insurance companies. The defendant's father Edward Netter was the head of Geneve. The defendant earned compensation of approximately $50,000 in 2005 from Geneve. The defendant also managed the various Dolphin entities from his Geneve office. Edward Netter died from cancer on February 16, 2011. The defendant's mother Barbara Netter became the majority shareholder of Geneve Holdings. The defendant's relationship with Geneve deteriorated. In early 2013, he was either terminated or he resigned from his position with Geneve. He relocated the business operations of the Dolphin entities to the marital residence, located at 623 Round Hill Road, Greenwich, Connecticut (the Round Hill Road property). The defendant has managed his business interests from the pool house at the Round Hill Road property since that time. The marriage: The parties met on a blind date in February 2002, approximately a year after Kimberly Netter's death.[8] The plaintiff described the defendant as kind, funny, sensitive, and thoughtful. She said she “just adored him.” The parties were married in July 2005 in New York City. Their wedding ceremony was at Christ Church and the reception was at the Mandarin Oriental. About 150 guests attended the wedding. The defendant paid for most of the wedding. The defendant was residing at the Round Hill Road property when the parties were married. The plaintiff testified that the defendant purchased a condominium apartment located at 25 Columbus Circle, New York, New York3 (the Columbus Circle apartment) prior to the wedding.[9] The parties’ first child, Arianna, was born in October 2006. Her sister Samantha was born in May 2009. Both children were conceived through in vitro fertilization. The plaintiff testified that she and the defendant lived with the children in New York City when Arianna was in kindergarten and Samantha was in preschool. Although they owned the Columbus Circle apartment, they lived during the week at various luxury hotels on the East Side of Manhattan and returned to the Round Hill Road property on weekends. The plaintiff explained that the defendant did not want to take the children across town from the West Side, where the Columbus Circle apartment was located, to their school on the East Side. The parties eventually decided to live full time in Greenwich. The parties enjoyed an affluent lifestyle during the marriage. The plaintiff testified that the defendant was generous and paid for everything. They traveled extensively to Florida, California, Aspen, Sun Valley, Paris, London, Switzerland, Bermuda, and the Bahamas. They stayed at luxury hotels and flew by private plane or first class. In January 2011 they lived for a month at the Four Seasons Hotel in Florence. The plaintiff testified that there were six main reasons for the breakdown of the marriage: the defendant's paranoia and suspicious behavior; his controlling and abusive conduct; his sexually coercive behavior; his inability to get along with others; his conviction that she was anorexic; and his gaslighting her and telling her she was crazy. *4 According to the plaintiff, the defendant became progressively more paranoid following his investment in Info USA, an Internet search engine, through one of the Dolphin entities. Dolphin was one of three top investors in the company. The defendant had concerns about the company's management. He successfully installed his own people on the Info USA board. The plaintiff testified that Info USA's chief executive officer and his sons retaliated. In or about 2011, they created a “Dead Netter Society” website. The plaintiff said that the defendant became fixated on this website. The plaintiff testified that the defendant's family was very concerned about the defendant. They believed that he had a breakdown at this point. His parents told him to get out of Info USA. They wanted him to get help. The plaintiff said that the defendant thought that someone was constantly watching him. He was sure that the airplanes flying over the Round Hill Road property[10] and his Geneve office in Stamford were targeting him and sending messages in the contrails. He asked his father to investigate the flight patterns from the Westchester County Airport. He had a safe room built in the basement of the Round Hill Road property. The plaintiff testified that the defendant was certain that the Round Hill Road property was bugged. He brought in professionals to search for devices. He stopped using his computer and email. He refused to use a cordless telephone or a cell phone. The defendant bought a red corded telephone instead and installed it in his home office. He would only use the red phone. He insisted that anything with his name on it be shredded, including catalogues. In the evening, while the plaintiff was putting the children to bed, the defendant would go into the closet where the security system, the cable modem, and the telephone lines were located and unplug everything. In the morning the plaintiff would have to go into the closet and try to figure out what he had disconnected. She eventually had a lock installed on the closet door with a keypad and a code. She told the defendant that this would keep the wires more secure and protected. The defendant would not provide information to the plaintiff regarding their finances. He refused to discuss any financial matters with her. Without the plaintiff's knowledge, the defendant transferred most of the marital assets into irrevocable South Dakota trusts, discussed in detail below. The defendant constantly accused the plaintiff of being after his money. He left her notes with a large “0” on them. He would wake her up while she was sleeping and whisper in her ear, “How much do you want?” He told her that she would get nothing. In late January 2017, the plaintiff recorded three conversations with the defendant.[11] During a conversation on January 27, 2017, the defendant repeatedly accused the plaintiff of sabotaging him for ten years. He said she was not a well person. He said she had been screaming at him for ten years. He accused her of manipulating him. He said she was an infection. In the same conversation, he told her that, “No, we are staying married forever.” The defendant told the plaintiff that she was not capable of taking care of the children. He said his judgment was “superior ... But when it comes to decision making, my judgment is far superior as has been proved, it's that simple. I will not allow 1 millimeter of deviance from anything.... I'm clearly the superior parent, it's not even close.” He told the plaintiff that “anyone that has interfered with this marriage and these children I will have in court for the next thousand years.” *5 The plaintiff testified that defendant was sexually aggressive. He would keep her awake all night, pursuing her from the bedroom to the guest room and back to force her to be intimate with him. The plaintiff said that she submitted to sexual relations with the defendant on the last three nights that she resided in the Round Hill Road property just so she could get some sleep. The plaintiff testified that the defendant had a strained relationship with his parents, his sister, and the neighbors. She said it was difficult to keep housekeepers, landscapers, and other vendors because he was rude and unpleasant to everyone. She could not have friends come to the house. He would not allow anyone in the house if he was not there, except the housekeeper. He banned his mother from the Round Hill Road property. He would not allow the plaintiff's family to visit. On January 27, 2017,[12] the defendant told the plaintiff, “By the way, nobody's staying in this house again. Ever. ... I'm telling you that nobody's staying in this house.” When the plaintiff protested that her parents could come to the house, the defendant said, No, they are not allowed ... in this house again.” The plaintiff said that defendant's obsession with her alleged “eating disorder” was also a cause for the breakdown of the marriage. The defendant was and remains convinced that the plaintiff suffers from anorexia. The plaintiff testified that the defendant purchased a book titled “Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia: How to Help.”[13] He carried the book with him, underlining numerous passages. On January 24, 2017, the defendant told her that she was incapable of telling the truth because she was anorexic.[14] The plaintiff testified that the defendant gaslighted her by, for example, moving items in the kitchen from where she had left them, taking her jewelry out of its boxes, putting a tricycle on her desk, and leaving odd notes for her around the house. Even after this action was commenced, the defendant deposited the plaintiff's alimony payment in her UBS account rather than in her First Republic account without telling her. He directed the guardian ad litem not to mention it, even though the plaintiff thought that her alimony payment had not been made. The defendant blamed the plaintiff for the breakdown of the marriage. He was and remains convinced that the plaintiff suffers from anorexia. This was a constant theme from the beginning of this case. He repeatedly cited the plaintiff's alleged transgressions, including her “abduction” of the children on March 1, 2017 when she left the Round Hill Road property,[15] her attempting to give Arianna a Lupron injection while she was sleeping, her alleged bathing with Arianna, her sleeping with the children, and her delaying orthodontia for the children by investigating alternative treatments. The plaintiff demonstrated unusual behavior and poor judgment, according to the defendant. The court credits the plaintiff's testimony. The court finds that the defendant is responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. Custody and visitation: This court entered a pendente lite parenting plan on October 25, 2018 (the October 2018 parenting plan) (#307.00). Under the October 2018 parenting plan, the children live primarily with the plaintiff and spend every other weekend with the defendant. The defendant has dinner with the children every Monday evening prior to his weekend parenting time and every Thursday evening following his weekend parenting time. The October 2018 parenting plan also provides for the children to have substantially equal holiday and vacation time with each party during the year. *6 The parties have generally followed the October 2018 parenting plan since it was entered. Some issues arose in March 2020 when the children attended school virtually, as a result of the pandemic. The parties also disagreed in August 2020 regarding the defendant's summer vacation time with the children and their return to school. Private school: The children have always attended private school. They attended the Cadman School when the family lived in New York. The parties enrolled the children at Whitby School (Whitby) in Greenwich when they decided to live full time at the Round Hill Road property. Arianna is currently in her first year at Greenwich Country Day School. Samantha is still at Whitby. The defendant has historically paid the children's private school tuition from the Netter children's trust. The plaintiff's expert: The plaintiff engaged Marcum “to provide valuation and forensic accounting services as required.”[16] As Ms. Ciccone testified, “[f]rom a more specific standpoint, our attention was for the purpose of first identifying the defendant's assets and then providing values for those assets in addition to any, as I said earlier, ancillary services related to those.”[17] The ancillary services that Marcum provided included any tracing of assets, particularly assets that were not disclosed. Ms. Ciccone is a director in the Valuation and Litigation Support Services group at Marcum. On October 20, 2021, this court found that Ms. Ciccone was qualified as an expert in the fields of asset identification, analysis and valuation of business interests and trust interests, asset tracing, and cash flow analysis, investigation of marital dissipation, forensic accounting, and general accounting.[18] Ms. Ciccone testified that Marcum employed the asset valuation approach to determine the fair market value of the defendant's closely-held business interests and the trust assets. The court credits Ms. Ciccone's testimony over twelve days of trial and the two Marcum expert reports, including the exhibits to the reports, that were admitted into evidence: the Marcum Valuation Report of Donald Netter's Closely Held Business Interests (the Marcum Business Interests Valuation Report)[19] and the Marcum report of the Value of the Underlying Assets Held by Trusts for the Benefit of Donald Netter (the Marcum Trust Assets Valuation Report).[20] The defendant did not engage an expert witness regarding any of the asset valuation issues in this dissolution case. The parties’ assets: The plaintiff owned a condominium in New Jersey (the New Jersey condominium) at the time of the marriage.[21] The plaintiff also had a checking account and a 401(k) account. The defendant brought significant assets to the marriage. The defendant was the primary beneficiary and trustee of The Donald Netter Family Trust. He owned the Round Hill Road property, with an estimated fair market value of approximately $5,000,000. The Round Hill Road property was encumbered by a mortgage of approximately $1,000,000 at the time of the marriage. *7 Marcum identified additional assets that were owned by the defendant at the time of the marriage: a 1.12 percent interest in Trefoil-Garnet Capital Partners, LP, with a value of $1,000,000; a 100 percent interest in KAL Associates, LLC, of unknown value; a 24.26 percent interest in Dolphin Associates, LLC, of unknown value; and a 97 percent interest in DLP I of unknown value. According to Marcum, although the defendant asserted that he held the Columbus Circle apartment through the entity Cricket, LLC prior to the marriage, Cricket, LLC acquired the apartment nineteen days after the wedding, for $4,725,000.[22] As set forth below, the following property is included in the marital estate pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-81: (a) Bank and brokerage accounts: The plaintiff reports a First Republic Bank checking account on her current financial affidavit (#701.00),[23] dated September 6, 2022, with a balance of $19,427 as of August 29, 2022. The plaintiff's financial affidavit also reflects a UBS Resource Management account, with a balance of $92,452 as of August 29, 2022. The defendant reports a First Republic Bank checking account on his financial affidavit (#692.00), dated July 25, 2022, with a balance of $84,425 as of June 10, 2021, more than a year earlier. The defendant's financial affidavit also reflects a Morgan Stanley account with a net balance of $39,112 as of June 30, 2021. (b) Retirement accounts: The plaintiff has two UBS Roth IRAs, with balances of $33,113 and $48,562, respectively, as of August 29, 2022, according to her financial affidavit. The defendant reports a JPMorgan rollover IRA with a balance of $1,438,442, a JPMorgan IRA, with a value of $205,417, and a Geneve Holdings 401(k), with a value of $11,139 on his financial affidavit. All account balances are as of June 30, 2021, while the defendant's financial affidavit is dated July 25, 2022. (c) Closely-held business interests: As set forth in the Marcum Business Interests Valuation Report,[24] the defendant has an ownership interest in the following four entities, with a total fair market value of $2,230,200 as of the valuation date: • Scann2 Partners, LP (Scann2 Partners), a 63.52 percent interest with a fair market value of $591,800; • DLP III, a 13.61 percent interest with a fair market value of $1,459,100; • DLP I, a 1.28 percent interest with a fair market value of $179,300; and • SCN International SARL, the ownership interest and fair market value to be determined.[25] The defendant reports three of these entities on his financial affidavit, with a total value of $1,407,138 as of June 30, 2021. According to the defendant, his 65.44 percent interest in Scann2 Partners and Scann2, LLC has a value of $808,138, his 2.5 percent interest in DLP I has a value of $25,000, and his interest in DLP III, of an undisclosed percentage, has a value of $574,000. The defendant's financial affidavit also reflects post-closing adjustments of indeterminate value from the December 2019 sale of Rose Associates, Inc. (Rose Associates), an Ohio corporation, formed by the defendant as a wholly-owned entity in June 2011. *8 (d) Trust assets: The defendant identifies four South Dakota trusts[26] as assets on his financial affidavit: The Six Cataracts Trust, The DASSA Trust, The Scout Resources Trust, and The Ann Holdings Trust. Other than The Six Cataracts Trust, the trusts are self-settled trusts, formed by the defendant after the date of the marriage with marital assets. Each trust owns a South Dakota limited liability company, which in turn owns various assets.[27] The defendant is the sole member and the manager of each limited liability company. The Marcum Trust Assets Valuation Report details the salient provisions of the trust agreements and the assets held by each trust. (1) The Six Cataracts Trust: The Six Cataracts Trust, formerly The Donald Netter Family Trust,[28] was created by Edward Netter in 1992 for the benefit of the defendant and his descendants. The defendant was named the Family Trustee of The Donald Netter Family Trust. Under The Donald Netter Family Trust agreement, the trustees, other than the defendant, have the power to pay or apply so much of the net income of the trust or the principal of the trust fund to or for the use of the defendant and his issue as they in their sole discretion determine to be advisable for the comfort, support and maintenance of the defendant and his issue. The defendant, as the Family Trustee, has the power to appoint additional trustees, to designate successor trustees, and to revoke the designation of any successor trustee. The defendant also has the power to remove any acting trustee, provided that he may not exercise such power more than three times in any ten-year period, and that at least one half of the trustees shall be disinterested trustees immediately after he has exercised such power. The defendant exercised this power on March 18, 2013, when he appointed the South Dakota Trust Company LLC (South Dakota Trust) as Disinterested Trustee, as defined in the trust agreement. The defendant and South Dakota Trust created a new entity, SDAS, LLC, into which all of the assets of The Donald Netter Family Trust were transferred. The Donald Netter Family Trust was renamed The Six Cataracts Trust on May 13, 2018. The Six Cataracts Trust owns SDAS, LLC. The defendant is the sole manager of SDAS, LLC. He is also the Investment Trust Advisor of the trust. Marcum reported that, based on its review of documents produced by or on behalf of the defendant in discovery, the defendant is the sole signatory for SDAS, LLC when making investments. As manager of SDAS, LLC, the defendant can unilaterally vote the shares of Geneve Holdings that The Six Cataracts Trust holds through its ownership of SDAS, LLC. Marcum determined that The Six Cataracts Trust, through its ownership of SDAS, LLC, held assets with a total fair market value of $122,678,483, comprised of two brokerage accounts and investments in Trefoil, Hawkes Bay, Geneve Holdings, and The Ann Holdings, LLC, as of the valuation dates.[29] *9 (2) The DASSA Trust: The defendant formed DASSA, LLC, a South Dakota limited liability company, on July 19, 2013. The defendant, as the sole member of DASSA, LLC, reserved the right to assign his interest in DASSA, LLC to a South Dakota trust, which would then be admitted as a successor member. The defendant is the sole manager of DASSA, LLC. The defendant transferred a 6 percent interest in Geneve Holdings from himself, individually, to DASSA, LLC in 2013. He subsequently transferred the following assets to DASSA, LLC: his interest in Trefoil-Garnet Capital Partners, LP; his interest in Scann2 Partners; and Rose Associates. On September 19, 2013, the defendant, as the sole member of DASSA, LLC, entered into an agreement, as grantor, with South Dakota Trust, as trustee, to form an irrevocable trust known as The DASSA Trust.[30] The DASSA Trust is one of the three self-settled trusts that the defendant formed during the marriage with marital assets and without the plaintiff's knowledge. The defendant is the Family Trustee and South Dakota Trust is the Disinterested Trustee of The DASSA Trust. The defendant contributed his entire interest in DASSA, LLC to The DASSA Trust. The defendant is the sole beneficiary of The DASSA Trust. Under the trust agreement, the trustees, other than the defendant, have the power to pay or apply so much of the net income of the trust or the principal of the trust fund to or for the use of the defendant as they in their sole discretion determine to be advisable for the health, education, comfort, support, and maintenance of the defendant. The trust agreement provides that distributions may only be made to the defendant with the unanimous written approval of (i) the Disinterested Trustee(s), (ii) each Family Trustee, if any; and (iii) each Current Adult Beneficiary, if any.[31] The defendant, as the Current Adult Beneficiary of The DASSA Trust, has the power to appoint additional Family and Disinterested Trustees (which may include himself), to designate successor trustees, and to revoke the designation of any successor trustee. The Current Adult Beneficiary also has the power to remove any current trustee, provided that he may not exercise such power more than three times in any ten-year period, and that at least one half of the trustees shall be Disinterested Trustees immediately after he has exercised such power. As the sole beneficiary of The DASSA Trust, the defendant has the right to appoint additional beneficiaries in the event of his death from and among charities, his Current Spouse, and his issue. A Current Spouse is defined in Section 5.B. of the trust agreement as “a spouse that, as applicable, (i) has been married to Donald T. Netter, or married to an issue of his, for no less than 12 years, (ii) has been generally living with Donald T. Netter at the time of his death and, with respect to an issue of his, a spouse that has been generally living with the issue at the time of death, and (iii) shall not have been estranged from him, with respect to an issue of his, the spouse of such issue shall not of been estranged from the issue at the time of death.” The plaintiff did not qualify as a Current Spouse under Section 5.B. of the trust agreement at the time The DASSA Trust was created. *10 The defendant is the Investment Trust Advisor of The DASSA Trust. Marcum concluded that, based on its review of documents produced by or on behalf of the defendant in discovery, the defendant is the sole signatory on investment and redemption requests for The DASSA Trust. Marcum determined that The DASSA Trust, through its ownership of DASSA, LLC, held assets with a total fair market value of $34,660,977 as of the valuation dates, comprised of a brokerage account and investments in Rose Associates, Scann2 Partners, Geneve Holdings, and Trefoil-Garnet Capital Partners, LP.[32] (3) The Scout Resources Trust: Scout Resources, LLC was formed on January 7, 2011 as a Delaware limited liability company. Scout Resources, LLC was converted to an Ohio limited liability company on April 11, 2012. It became a South Dakota limited liability company eighteen months later, on October 30, 2013. The defendant is the sole member of Scout Resources, LLC. He is also the manager of Scout Resources, LLC. Scout Resources, LLC holds the Round Hill Road property as its primary asset. On December 14, 2013, the defendant, as the sole member of Scout Resources, LLC, entered into an agreement, as grantor, with South Dakota Trust, as trustee, to form an irrevocable trust known as The Scout Resources Trust.[33] The defendant contributed his entire interest in Scout Resources, LLC to The Scout Resources Trust. The Scout Resources Trust is the second of the three self-settled trusts that the defendant formed during the marriage with marital assets and without the plaintiff's knowledge. The Scout Resources Trust agreement is substantially similar to The DASSA Trust agreement. The defendant is the sole beneficiary of The Scout Resources Trust. Under the trust agreement, the trustees, other than the defendant, have the power to pay or apply so much of the net income of the trust or the principal of the trust fund to or for the use of the defendant as they in their sole discretion determine to be advisable for the health, education, comfort, support, and maintenance of the defendant. Distributions may only be made to the defendant with the unanimous written approval of (i) the Disinterested Trustee(s), (ii) each Family Trustee, if any; and (iii) each Current Adult Beneficiary.[34] The defendant, as the Current Adult Beneficiary of The Scout Resources Trust, has the power to appoint additional Family and Disinterested Trustees (which may include himself), to designate successor trustees, and to revoke the designation of any successor trustee. The Current Adult Beneficiary also has the power to remove any current trustee, provided that he may not exercise such power more than three times in any ten-year period, and that at least one half of the trustees shall be Disinterested Trustees immediately after he has exercised such power. *11 As the sole beneficiary of The Scout Resources Trust, the defendant has the right to appoint additional beneficiaries in the event of his death from and among charities, his Current Spouse, and his issue. A Current Spouse is defined in Section 5.B. of the trust agreement as “a spouse that, as applicable, (i) has been married to Donald T. Netter, or married to an issue of his, for no less than 12 years, (ii) has been generally living with Donald T. Netter at the time of his death and, with respect to an issue of his, a spouse that has been generally living with the issue at the time of death, and (iii) shall not have been estranged from him, with respect to an issue of his, the spouse of such issue shall not of been estranged from the issue at the time of death.” The plaintiff did not qualify as a Current Spouse under Section 5.B. of the trust agreement at the time The Scout Resources Trust was created. The defendant is the Investment Trust Advisor of The Scout Resources Trust. On July 31, 2015, Scout Resources, LLC obtained a $2,000,000 mortgage from Bank of America, N.A. to refinance the existing mortgage on the Round Hill Road property. The defendant executed all loan documents on behalf of Scout Resources, LLC. In addition to the Round Hill Road property and the Bank of America mortgage loan account, Scout Resources, LLC maintains bank accounts at UBS and First Republic Bank. Scout Resources, LLC invests in publicly-traded securities held in the UBS account and pays the expenses related to the Round Hill Road property[35] primarily from the First Republic account. Scout Resources, LLC also has an American Express credit card. Marcum determined that The Scout Resources Trust, through its ownership of Scout Resources, LLC, held assets with a total fair market value of $2,727,548 as of the valuation dates, comprised of a brokerage account, cash, and the Round Hill Road property.[36] (4) The Ann Holdings Trust: The Ann Holdings, LLC was initially formed on September 8, 2009 as The Ann, LLC. On November 16, 2010, The Ann, LLC was merged with Cricket, LLC, the limited liability company that owned the Columbus Circle apartment. The Ann, LLC remained as the surviving Delaware limited liability company. The Ann, LLC changed its name to The Ann Holdings, LLC and was converted to an Ohio limited liability company on August 26, 2011. The Ann Holdings, LLC became a South Dakota limited liability company in 2015. The defendant is the sole member and the manager of The Ann Holdings, LLC. On June 2, 2015, prior to the sale of the Columbus Circle apartment, the defendant, as the member of The Ann Holdings, LLC, entered into an agreement, as grantor, with South Dakota Trust, as trustee, to form an irrevocable trust known as The Ann Holdings Trust. The defendant contributed his entire interest in The Ann Holdings, LLC to The Ann Holdings Trust. The Ann Holdings Trust is the third of the three self-settled trusts that the defendant formed during the marriage with marital assets and without the plaintiff's knowledge. The defendant is the sole beneficiary of The Ann Holdings Trust. South Dakota Trust is the Disinterested Trustee. The terms of The Ann Holdings Trust agreement are substantially similar to the terms of The DASSA Trust agreement and The Scout Resources Trust agreement. Under the trust agreement, the trustees, other than the defendant, have the power to pay or apply so much of the net income of the trust or the principal of the trust fund to or for the use of the defendant as they in their sole discretion determine to be advisable for the health, education, comfort, support, and maintenance of the defendant. Distributions may only be made to the defendant with the unanimous written approval of (i) the Disinterested Trustee(s), (ii) each Family Trustee, if any; and (iii) each Current Adult Beneficiary, if any.[37] *12 The defendant, as the Current Adult Beneficiary of The Ann Holdings Trust, has the power to appoint additional Family and Disinterested Trustees (which may include himself), to designate successor trustees, and to revoke the designation of any successor trustee. The Current Adult Beneficiary also has the power to remove any current trustee, provided that he may not exercise such power more than three times in any ten-year period, and that at least one half of the trustees shall be Disinterested Trustees immediately after he has exercised such power. As the sole beneficiary of The Ann Holdings Trust, the defendant has the right to appoint additional beneficiaries in the event of his death from and among charities, his Current Spouse, and his issue. A Current Spouse is defined in Section 5.B. of the trust agreement as “a spouse that, as applicable, (i) has been married to Donald T. Netter, or married to a Child of his, for no less than 15 years, (ii) has been generally living with Donald T. Netter at the time of his death and, with respect to a Child of his, a spouse that has been generally living with the Child at the time of death, and (iii) shall not have been estranged from him, with respect to a Child of his, the spouse of such issue shall not of been estranged from the Child at the time of death.” The plaintiff did not qualify as a Current Spouse under Section 5.B. of the trust agreement at the time The Ann Holdings Trust was created. On November 12, 2015, upon the closing of the sale of the Columbus Circle apartment, Ann Holdings, LLC received three wire transfers of $5,192,357.75, $740,000.00 and $537,583.61 into its UBS account. Marcum determined that the only other deposits of significance into Ann Holdings, LLC's account were for $3,704 and $102,915.70, each of which it presumed was a return of escrow in connection with the transaction. The defendant is the Investment Trust Advisor of The Ann Holdings Trust. Based on its review of the documents produced by or on behalf of the defendant, Marcum reported that the defendant, as manager of The Ann Holdings, LLC, unilaterally instructed UBS Financial Services where to wire certain funds, including to his personal account, and directed that he must orally confirm any transfer of funds. Similarly, the defendant has signed unilaterally, as manager of The Ann Holdings, LLC, when entering into margin lending agreements with UBS Financial. Marcum determined that The Ann Holdings Trust, through its ownership of Ann Holdings, LLC, holds only a UBS brokerage account, which contains the remaining proceeds from the November 2015 sale of the Columbus Circle apartment, and no other assets. The value of that brokerage account, equally divided between the defendant's Class A and Class B interests in Ann Holdings, LLC, was $7,589,211, net of its margin loan, as of December 31, 2020, the latest date for which Marcum received financial information. (5) The fair market value of the trust assets: As set forth in the Marcum Trust Assets Valuation Report, the collective fair market value of the holdings of The Six Cataracts Trust, The DASSA Trust, The Scout Resources Trust and The Ann Holdings Trust was $167,656,219. The defendant's most recent financial affidavit, dated July 25, 2022, identified assets with a value as of June 30, 2021. Updating Marcum's conclusions with the June 30, 2021 asset values, the collective fair market value of the assets held by the trusts is $173,551,753. Although the defendant challenges Marcum's conclusions regarding the value of the trust assets, he did not retain an expert to testify regarding the value of any assets.[38] This court granted the defendant permission to make a written submission and testify as to his own opinion of value. “It is well settled that an owner of property is competent to testify as to its market value.” Misisco v. La Maita, 150 Conn. 680, 684, 192 A.2d 891 (1963). *13 The defendant prepared a document, styled “Key Valuation Differences, Implications for Partnerships & Non-Party Trusts, Geneve Holdings Inc. (“GHI”), Private 1992 Stock” as a rebuttal to Ms. Ciccone's testimony and the Marcum reports. In the defendant's opinion, the Marcum reports have approximately $188,000,000 of clear errors, including double-counting the Hawkes Bay investment, incorrectly valuing an entity known as PBSOQ, improperly valuing the Geneve Holdings shares, failing to consider the tax effect, and failing to discount the Geneve Holdings for “shareholder dynamics” – the strained relationship between the defendant, his mother Barbara Netter, and his sister Vicki Netter Fitzgerald. According to the defendant, Marcum over-valued the Geneve Holdings stock and failed to consider the tax effect of a sale of Geneve Holdings stock in reaching its conclusions. On rebuttal[39], Ms. Ciccone testified that the defendant did not use the correct methodology to the value minority interests in Geneve Holdings held by DASSA, LLC and SDAS, LLC. She said that he also discounted the value for top management severance and change of control costs, which was not appropriate. The relationship between the defendant and his mother and sister was also immaterial to valuation. In response to the defendant, Ms. Ciccone testified it would be inappropriate under the asset approach and utilizing the fair market value standard of value to include a reduction for taxes. The court credits Ms. Ciccone's testimony and the Marcum reports. (6) The trust assets are part of the marital estate: “Nothing in the legislative history of § 46b-81 indicates an intent to narrow the plain meaning of property from its ordinarily broad and comprehensive scope. ... Interpreting the term property broadly is also consistent with the purpose of equitable distribution statutes generally. It is widely recognized that the primary aim of property distribution is to recognize that marriage is, among other things, a shared enterprise or joint undertaking in the nature of a partnership to which both spouses contribute – directly and indirectly, financially and nonfinancially – the fruits of which are distributable at divorce.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 795, 663 A.2d 365 (1995). “Whether the interest of a party to a dissolution is subject to distribution pursuant to § 46b-81, depends on whether that interest is: (1) a “presently existing property [interest]” or (2) a “mere expectanc[y]. ... [Section] 46b-81 applies only to presently existing property interests, not mere expectancies. ... [T]he former interest is subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution, while the latter is not.” Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 165, 708 A.2d 949 (1998). The defendant is the sole beneficiary of the three self-settled trusts that he secretly created with marital assets as the marriage deteriorated. He is the primary beneficiary of The Six Cataracts Trust. With respect to each of the trusts, he has the power to appoint additional trustees, to designate successor trustees, and to revoke the designation of any successor trustee. He also has the power to remove the current trustee up to three times in a ten-year period – a power he exercised in 2013 in connection with The Six Cataracts Trust.[40] The defendant is the investment trust advisor for each trust. As the investment trust advisor, he has sole authority and discretion to direct the trustees to take any action with respect to trust assets that the trustees are authorized to take under the trust agreement. The trustees are mandated to follow the defendant's written directions with respect to the retention, purchase, sale or encumbrance of the trust property, the voting of any stock held by the trust, and the investment and reinvestment of principal and income of the trust. *14 The defendant is the sole manager of the limited liability company owned by each trust. He is the sole member of each limited liability company. The assets held by each limited liability company are assets that were transferred by the defendant to the limited liability company following the marriage. The defendant contributed each limited liability company to the corresponding trust. No one other than the defendant has the power to control the trusts and direct the disposition of the trust assets. The court find that the defendant has a presently existing property interest in the trusts and not a “mere expectancy.” See Krafick, supra, 234 Conn. at 797 (“An expectancy is only the bare hope of succession to the property of another, such as may be entertained by an heir apparent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted)). The trust assets are properly included in the marital estate and subject to equitable distribution pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-81. (e) Children's accounts and trust: As set forth on her financial affidavit, the plaintiff is the custodian of four accounts for the benefit of the children with a combined value of $74,685 as of August 29, 2022. The defendant reports an irrevocable trust for the benefit of the children on his financial affidavit. The Netter children's trust had a value of $236,025 as of June 30, 2021. (f) Motor vehicles: The plaintiff leases an Audi at a cost of $779 per month, according to her financial affidavit. The defendant reports a 2007 Land Rover on his financial affidavit, with a value of $7,000. (g) Personal property: The plaintiff reports jewelry with an estimated value of $76,500 on her financial affidavit. The defendant's financial affidavit reflects “valuables” with a value of $25,000. The parties’ liabilities: Both parties report significant liabilities on their respective financial affidavits. The plaintiff's financial affidavit reflects total liabilities of $3,277,384, comprised of $3,269,551 due to her mother-in-law for her loans to the plaintiff to pay her legal and expert fees in this dissolution action. The plaintiff also owes $4,624 to her attorneys and $3,210 to the guardian ad litem, according to her financial affidavit. The defendant's financial affidavit reflects total estimated liabilities of $719,731, including an estimated $300,000 for federal and state income taxes for 2017, 2018, and 2019, and $277,500 due to Scann2 Partners. The parties’ income: The plaintiff's financial affidavit reflects no income from employment at this time. She reports $279 in gross monthly interest and dividends. Her net monthly income is $136. The defendant's financial affidavit reflects net monthly income of $3,599. The defendant's monthly income is comprised of the following: $4,200 in gross monthly salary from Geneve; $48 from Dolphin Management Company III, LLC (DMC III); $7,200 from a charitable remainder unit trust; $1,000 in net dividends and interest; and $900 as a net draw from Dolphin Management Company, LLC and DMC III. The defendant's earning capacity: The court may consider the defendant's earning capacity in fashioning the financial orders. “It is well established that the trial court may under appropriate circumstances in a marital dissolution proceeding base financial awards ... on the earning capacity of the parties rather than on actual earned income.... Earning capacity, in this context, is not an amount which a person can theoretically earn, nor is it confined to actual income, but rather it is an amount which a person can realistically be expected to earn considering such things as his vocational skills, employability, age and health.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tanzman v. Meurer, 309 Conn. 105, 113-14, 70 A.3d 13 (2013). *15 The plaintiff's expert Ms. Ciccone testified that the defendant had an annual earning capacity of $2,500,000, which is what he would earn if he were employed as a hedge fund manager. Considering the defendant's years of experience in finance and as a fund manager, his professional credentials, and his prior earnings, the court finds that the defendant has a present earning capacity of at least $2,500,000 annually. The court will enter financial orders accordingly. The parties’ expenses: The plaintiff reports total monthly expenses of $17,153, including rent and other shelter expenses totaling $7,091, medical and dental expenses of $2,000, and children's expenses of $1,114. The defendant's financial affidavit reflects total monthly expenses of $25,970, including the Round Hill Road property expenses paid by Scout Resources, LLC. Alimony: On December 6, 2017, following a five-day hearing, the court (Shay, J.T.R.) ordered the defendant to pay periodic alimony pendente lite to the plaintiff in the amount of $11,980 per month (the December 2017 order) (#207.00). The defendant paid alimony to the plaintiff pursuant to the December 2017 order through the conclusion of the dissolution trial. Child support: Judge Shay also ordered the defendant to pay child support to the plaintiff in the amount of $3,020 per month, substantially in accordance with the child support guidelines, in the December 2017 order.[41] The court found that the plaintiff's net weekly income was $41 per week, based upon her November 17, 2017 financial affidavit (#200.00), and defendant's net weekly income was $3,927 per week, based upon his August 4, 2017 financial affidavit (#166.00). The defendant paid child support to the plaintiff pursuant to the December 2017 order through the conclusion of the dissolution trial. Educational costs, tutoring, and extracurricular activities: The December 2017 order made no specific reference to the parties’ expenses relating to the children's private school education and their extracurricular and other activities. On April 30, 2020, the court (Shay J.T.R.) granted the plaintiff's motion for clarification, pendente lite (the April 2020 order) and clarified the December 2017 order as follows: “(1) The court made no specific order regarding the payment of the children's expenses for ‘educational costs, activities, tutors, and camp/ballet/ballroom dance,’ nor did intend to do so at that time; (2) made a finding that such expenses were being paid by a family trust; and (3) that said payments were a factor at arriving at its financial order (See Finding #5).” (#432.01). The plaintiff testified that the defendant paid all expenses for the children, including their private school tuition and the cost of their extracurricular activities, including their ballet classes, until the summer of 2022. The defendant believed that the plaintiff should contribute as well. The defendant represented in his financial affidavit that the expenses of the children's private school education were funded by the Netter children's trust. He testified that he stopped paying certain expenses from the Netter children's trust because he was concerned that the trust would not be sufficient to pay for their education. Life insurance: The plaintiff does not have life insurance. The defendant reports that he has a life insurance policy with MassMutual with a face value of $600,000 on his financial affidavit. He identifies the policyholder/beneficiary as an irrevocable trust styled the “Children's Life Insurance Trust.” Post-majority educational support order: *16 The court finds that had the family remained intact, the parties would have financially supported Arianna and Samantha in their post-secondary educational efforts. The court also finds that Arianna and Samantha are likely to pursue post-secondary education. Health insurance and unreimbursed medical expenses: The defendant was required to maintain and pay for health insurance for the children under the December 2017 order. At the time of the dissolution trial, the parties and the minor children were covered under the defendant's Anthem BlueCross BlueShield health insurance policy. The December 2017 order also provided that the parties were to share the children's unreimbursed medical expenses,[42] with the plaintiff paying 20 percent and the defendant paying 80 percent of such expenses in accordance with the child support guidelines. The defendant repeatedly failed to comply with the December 2017 order. The plaintiff's eight motions for contempt for the defendant's failure to pay his share of the children's unreimbursed medical expenses were reserved for decision until the dissolution trial and are addressed below. Work-related child care expenses: The plaintiff has no work-related child care expenses at this time. Discovery noncompliance and sanctions: On May 16, 2019, the court (Shay J.T.R.) found the defendant in breach of a clear and unambiguous order to produce documents (the May 16, 2019 order) (#331.01). The court ordered the defendant to comply fully with all of the plaintiff's outstanding requests for production, and specifically to produce documents regarding the “South Dakota Trust” and the related entities. In addition, as a sanction for the defendant's breach, the court ordered that, commencing May 16, 2019, the defendant was liable for the sum of $1,000 for each and every day that he has failed to comply with discovery. The court further ordered that “in the event the defendant fully complied with the order on or before the seventh day hereafter, the court will remit the sanction in full; in the event he fully complies on or before the 30th day hereafter, the court shall remit one half of the cumulative sanction; thereafter if the defendant fails to comply, the court shall consider an increase in the sanction.” On May 31, 2019, the court (Shay, J.T.R.) clarified the May 16, 2019 order for sanctions (the May 31, 2019 order) (#354.01). The court stated that “(1) It was the intention of the court that the sanction be paid to counsel for the plaintiff as an offset for fees and costs incurred by plaintiff in her effort to secure discovery from the defendant; (2) Since the Order contains the possibility that all or a portion of the sanctions might be mitigated in whole or in part based upon the defendant's compliance or lack thereof during the 30-day period following the Order, any payment due from the defendant not be payable until the earlier of the date of full compliance by the defendant or the 31st day, at which time the then net amount would be due and payable in full; and (3) that in the absence of compliance by the defendant on or before the 30th day that said sanction would continue, and that the court would consider the imposition of further sanctions.” *17 On July 2, 2019, the parties and the plaintiff's counsel appeared before Judge Shay to address the defendant's discovery compliance. The court modified the May 16, 2019 order and the May 31, 2019 order and reduced the discovery sanction to $500 for each day that the defendant failed to comply with the discovery orders, from and after May 16, 2019. The defendant was ordered to produce whatever discovery remained outstanding within two weeks of the plaintiff's counsel's providing him with a list of the outstanding discovery. The plaintiff's counsel subsequently sent a list of outstanding discovery to the defendant. The defendant failed to comply. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiff filed an amended motion for order, pendente lite (#374.00) in which she represented that five weeks had elapsed since her counsel sent the defendant a list of outstanding discovery, and the defendant had failed to produce any documents in response to the list. The plaintiff claimed in her motion that the defendant owed a total of $53,000 in sanctions for his failure to comply with discovery in accordance with the court's prior orders. The plaintiff asked the court to order the defendant to pay $53,000 to the plaintiff's counsel, for the sanctions owed from May 16, 2019 through August 30, 2019, and to increase the sanction to $1,000 per day for each day that the defendant failed to comply with his discovery obligations, from August 30, 2019 forward. On September 4, 2019, Judge Shay granted the plaintiff's amended motion for order, pendente lite (the September 2019 order) (#374.01). The court ordered the defendant to pay $53,000 to the plaintiff's counsel on or before September 11, 2019 and to fully comply with the production of the remaining discovery by October 1, 2019. The court increased the discovery sanction to $1,000 per day, from and including August 31, 2019. The court indicated that it would consider relief from the sanctions if compliance was made in full on or before October 1, 2019. The defendant failed to comply with discovery by the October 1, 2019 deadline. Discovery in this case took an unprecedented five and a half years. Ms. Ciccone testified that it took more than two years to receive any significant discovery from the defendant. She said that what he produced was disorganized and the information was stale. The plaintiff's attorney Aiden Welsh, Esq. also testified that defendant's document productions were late, disorganized, and duplicative, and often contained irrelevant information. The defendant delayed until five days before the trial began, after Marcum had already issued its reports, to identify on a sworn financial affidavit all of the assets held in the four trusts for which he is the sole or primary beneficiary (despite being the manager of the underlying limited liability companies, the investment trust advisor for the trusts, and the sole individual authorized to disclose such information); an interest in Dolphin I; and his actual ownership interest in Dolphin III. The defendant never disclosed a value for the interests in Geneve Holdings held by DASSA, LLC and SDAS, LLC, the limited liability companies owed by The DASSA Trust and The Six Cataracts Trust, respectively, until evidence was about to close – seventeen months after the first day of trial. The defendant produced documents up to the end of the trial. His South Dakota attorneys delivered a year's worth of discovery the night before evidence closed.[43] Additional discovery related to the trusts was produced after evidence closed. The court finds that the defendant failed to comply with discovery for 1,241 days, from August 31, 2019 to the date of this memorandum of decision. Pursuant to the September 2019 order, the defendant owes $1,241,000 as a discovery sanction. Further orders are entered below. Litigation misconduct: *18 The defendant suggested on more than one occasion during the trial that he was saving marital funds by representing himself in this action. The court does not agree. The defendant abused his right to appear without counsel. “[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pre se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party .... Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Zoning Board of Appeals of City of Stamford, 86 Conn. App. 147, 157 n.7, 860 A.2d 764 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 910, 870 A.2d 1080 (2005). Like any other litigant, the defendant was required to comply with the Superior Court for Family Matters standing orders for trial management, the Practice Book rules, and the orders of the court. His repeated failure to do so delayed discovery for years, caused a trial that should have taken two weeks to last fifty-seven days, imposed an undue financial burden on the plaintiff, and wasted the court's time and the Judicial Branch's resources. Despite the court's frequent reminders, the defendant failed to comply with the standing trial management orders. He did not make his initial proposed trial exhibits available to the plaintiff's counsel and upload them for the trial when they were due. He pursued repetitive and irrelevant questioning of the plaintiff, the guardian ad litem, Dr. Sheinvold, and Ms. Ciccone, disregarding the court's repeated instructions. The defendant failed to schedule his appointments with Dr. Shienvold, delaying the parties’ psychological evaluations by months. He sabotaged the custody evaluation, which the court had ordered on his motion to address his claim that the plaintiff was anorexic, by refusing to sign Dr. Biren Caverly's intake forms. Eventually, the court vacated the order appointing Dr. Biren Caverly because the case could not proceed while the custody evaluation was not completed. Most egregiously, the defendant stonewalled for two years on providing discovery in this dissolution action, and then he produced documents that were late, disorganized, and stale. Directly as a result of the defendant's discovery and litigation misconduct, the plaintiff incurred legal and expert fees in excess of $3,500,000 over the almost six years that this case has been pending. As discussed above, he is under a $1,000 per day sanction for his discovery misconduct. The plaintiff has established that the defendant engaged in litigation misconduct for which he should be held accountable under our Supreme Court's ruling in Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 915 A.2d790 (2007). Further orders are entered below. Attorney's fees: The plaintiff has been represented by Schoonmaker, George, Blomberg, Bryniczka & Welsh, PC and its predecessor firms since the commencement of this dissolution action. In the almost six years of litigation, the plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees and expert fees totaling approximately $3.5 million.[44] Approximately $65,000 of these fees were incurred in prosecuting motions for contempt.[45] The court (Tindill, J.) ordered the defendant to pay $150,000 toward the plaintiff's attorney's fees on May 20, 2017 (103.01). The defendant has not paid any portion of the plaintiff's legal fees since that time. The plaintiff has borrowed more than $3,200,000 since 2017 to pay her legal fees. *19 Attorney Welsh testified on September 12, 2022 regarding the legal fees that the plaintiff had incurred since the commencement of this action. The court finds the billing rates charged by the Schoonmaker firm and its predecessor firms for the professional services of its attorneys and paralegals to be reasonable. The court also finds that the attorney's fees charged to the plaintiff in this dissolution action are reasonable in view of the circumstances of this case, particularly because the defendant's litigation and discovery misconduct contributed to the case taking more than four years to come to trial and the trial itself lasting for fifty-seven days over seventeen months. General Statutes § 46b-62 provides in pertinent part that “the court may order either spouse ... to pay the reasonable attorney's fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in section 46b-82.” General Statutes § 46b-62.[46] Our Supreme Court has articulated “three broad principles by which these statutory criteria are to be applied. First, such awards should not be made merely because the obligor has demonstrated an ability to pay. Second, where both parties are financially able to pay their own fees and expenses, they should be permitted to do so. Third, where, because of other orders, the potential obligee has ample liquid funds, an allowance of [attorney's] fees is not justified.” Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 280, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983). “A determination of what constitutes ample liquid funds ... requires ... an examination of the total assets of the parties at the time the award is made.... [T]he availability of sufficient cash to pay one's attorney's fees is not an absolute litmus test .... [A] trial court's discretion should be guided so that its decision regarding attorney's fees does not undermine its purpose in making any other financial award.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hornung v. Hornung, 323 Conn. 144, 170, 146 A.3d 912 (2016). The court finds that the plaintiff does not have ample liquid funds to pay her attorneys. She has had to borrow almost $3,300,000 to pay her legal fees in this action, while the defendant controls assets worth in excess of $175,000,000. Further orders are entered below. The guardian ad litem: Paul Tusch, Esq. was appointed by this court to serve as the guardian ad litem for the children on November 16, 2017 (#198.00). The defendant filed a motion to remove Attorney Tusch as the guardian ad litem and replace him with an attorney for the minor children on March 3, 2022, the forty-second day of trial and five years after this case was commenced (#652.00; #654.00). The court may remove a guardian ad litem in dissolution matters pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-132(f), which provides in pertinent part that “[t]he guardian ad litem may be removed by the judge or magistrate which appointed the guardian ad litem, without notice, whenever it appears to the judge or magistrate to be in the best interests of the ward or wards of the guardian.” General Statutes § 45a-132(f). As our Appellate Court observed in Keenan v. Casillo, 149 Conn. App. 642, 656-57, 89 A.3d 912, 922–23 (2014), cert. denied, 93 A.3d 594, 312 Conn. 910 (2014), “[m]ultiple decisions of our Superior Court have interpreted this statute to mean that “it is the burden of the [moving party] ... to allege and prove that the [guardian ad litem] should be disqualified from representing the interests of the minor child because her continued representation prejudices the [moving party] from prosecuting his case.” Id. at 656 (citing Petrone v. Connolly, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. FA-09-4111149-S, 2013 WL 2350775 (May 8, 2013) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 600); Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. FA-96-0537581-S, 2004 WL 574531 (March 5, 2004) (moving party needs to prove prejudice in prosecuting claim for custody based on prior or present positions taken by guardian ad litem on behalf of minor child)). *20 Having reviewed the defendant's contentions regarding the guardian ad litem's allegedly improper actions, the court finds that Attorney Tusch has not manifested any bias or prejudice that would affect the outcome of the case. “The standard set forth in § 45a-132 focuses on the best interests of the children.” Keenan v. Casillo, supra, 149 Conn. App. at 647. As the guardian ad litem, Attorney Tusch ensured that the best interests of the children were protected throughout the pendency of this action. Further orders are entered below. II ORDERS The court has fully considered the criteria set forth in General Statutes §§ 46b-56, 46b-56a, 46b-56c, 46b-62, 46b-81, 46b-82, 46b-84, 46b-215a, including the child support guidelines issued thereunder, and § 46b-215b, as well as the applicable case law, the evidence, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the parties’ proposed orders, the closing argument of the plaintiff's counsel, the defendant's final corrected trial brief, and the contents of the court file judicially noticed in making the findings set forth above and in reaching the decisions that are reflected in the orders that issue below. Dissolution of the marriage: The marriage is hereby dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. Alimony: The court “may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other .... In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall ... consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties, and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81 ....” General Statutes § 46b-82(a). In her proposed orders, the plaintiff seeks an award of lifetime alimony in the amount of $40,000 per month, based on the defendant's annual earning capacity of $2,500,000, until the death of either party or the plaintiff's remarriage, whichever first occurs. The plaintiff asks that the term be nonmodifiable, and the amount of alimony shall not be modifiable for a period of ten years. The defendant proposes an award of alimony to the plaintiff of $11,980 per month (the same amount as the pendente lite alimony award) until the death of either party, the plaintiff's remarriage, the plaintiff's cohabitation with another person, or June 1, 2028, whichever shall first occur. The court has considered all the factors set forth in § 46b-82(a); the court's findings with respect to some of these factors are particularly relevant here. The parties have been married for seventeen and a half years, nearly a third of which have been spent litigating this dissolution action. The plaintiff has not worked outside of the home since 2005. The defendant is responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. He subjected the plaintiff to years of psychological, emotional, financial, and sexual abuse before she finally left the Round Hill Road property with the children on March 1, 2017. Taking into consideration the findings set forth above, the court finds that an award of lifetime alimony to the plaintiff, with a second look upon the defendant's reaching the age of seventy-two, is appropriate here. Commencing February 1, 2023 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $40,000 per month, as periodic alimony, until the earliest of the death of either party, the plaintiff's remarriage, or the plaintiff's cohabitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 46b-86(b). Each monthly alimony payment shall be made by direct deposit or wire transfer into the plaintiff's First Republic Bank account or to such other account as the plaintiff may designate in writing. The plaintiff shall designate such account within ten days of the date of entry of the dissolution judgment. Any and all related wire transfer fees or bank charges for payment by direct deposit shall be paid by the defendant. *21 The defendant shall be responsible for initiating the second look by filing an appropriate motion when he reaches the age of seventy-two. The defendant shall pay alimony to the plaintiff in accordance with these orders unless and until the court enters an order modifying his alimony obligation following such second look or pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86. This alimony award may be modified pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86, except that the amount of the alimony award shall be non-modifiable by the defendant where the sole basis for the modification is that the plaintiff has annual gross earnings from employment of $75,000 or less. The plaintiff shall notify the defendant within thirty days if her annual gross earnings from employment have exceeded $75,000 in any calendar year. The defendant does not seek an award of alimony from the plaintiff. Alimony is not awarded to the defendant. Child support: Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56(a), “[i]n any controversy before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of minor children, and at any time after the return day of any complaint ..., the court may make or modify any proper order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and support of the children ....” General Statutes § 46b-56(a). The guidelines were revised in 2015 in part to codify decisions of our Supreme Court and our Appellate Court[47] regarding child support awards when the parties’ combined net weekly income, as in this case, exceeds $4,000. See Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2015), preamble, §(e)(5), p. ix. “[W]hen a family's combined net weekly income exceeds $4000, the court should treat the percentage set forth in the schedule at the highest income level as the presumptive ceiling on the child support obligation, subject to rebuttal by application of the deviation criteria enumerated in the guidelines, as well as the statutory factors described in § 46b–84(d).... In other words, as long as the child support award is derived from a total support obligation within this range – between the presumptive minimum dollar amount and the presumptive maximum percentage of net income – a finding in support of a deviation is not necessary.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Szymczak, 309 Conn. 390, 401-02, 72 A.3d 1 (2013). “Pursuant to the applicable guidelines codified subsequent to Maturo and its progeny, the court [can] ‘exercise [its] discretion consistent with the income scope as set forth in [§] 46b–215c (a) (2) [of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies] on a case by case basis where the combined income exceeds the range of the schedule. When the combined net weekly income exceeds $4,000, the presumptive support amount shall range from the dollar amount at the $4,000 level to the percentage amount at that level applied to the combined net weekly income consistent with statutory criteria, including ... § 46b-84(d) .... In exercising discretion in any given case, the ... trial judge should consider evidence submitted by the parties regarding actual past and projected child support expenditures to determine the appropriate order.’ ” Ray v. Ray, 177 Conn. App. 544, 567, 173 A.3d 464 (2017) (citing and quoting Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2015), preamble, §(e)(5), p. ix).[48] *22 Earning capacity may be a deviation criterion under the guidelines but should not be used to determine the presumptive support amount itself. Keusch v. Keusch, 184 Conn. App. 822, 830, 195 A.3d 1136 (2018). “Under the guidelines, the child support obligation first is determined without reference to earning capacity, and earning capacity becomes relevant only if a deviation from the guidelines is sought under § 46b-215a-5c(b)(1)(B) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fox v. Fox, 152 Conn. App. 611, 635, 99 A.3d 1206, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 945, 103 A.3d 977 (2014). “[T]he amount of support determined without reference to the deviation criteria is presumed to be the correct amount of support, and that presumption may only be rebutted by a specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate under the circumstances of a particular case. When the latter is true, § 46b-215a-3 (b) (1) (B) [of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, now § 46b-215a-5c(b)(1)(B)] allows deviation from the guidelines on the basis of a parent's earning capacity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 632. The plaintiff provided three child support guidelines worksheets (#709.00; #710.00; #711.00). The first child support guidelines worksheet (#709.00) is based on the parties’ income, as reported on their respective financial affidavits. According to the first child support guidelines worksheet, the parties’ presumptive weekly child support obligation is $490, of which the defendant is responsible for 97.08 percent or $476 per week. The second child support guidelines worksheet (#710.00) is based on the plaintiff's actual income and the defendant's earning capacity of $2,500,000 annually ($48,077 weekly). This worksheet reflects the parties’ minimum presumptive support obligation of $708 per week, of which the defendant is responsible for 99.77 percent, or $706. The third child support guidelines worksheet (#711.00) is also based on the plaintiff's actual income and the defendant's earning capacity. This worksheet reflects the parties’ maximum presumptive support obligation of $4,683 per week, of which the defendant is responsible for 99.77 percent, or $4,672. In her proposed orders, the plaintiff asks that the court deviate from the child support guidelines and enter a child support award of $15,000 per month, based on the defendant's earning capacity of $2,500,000. The court finds that the application of the child support guidelines would be inappropriate or inequitable under all of the facts and circumstances of this case. The court shall deviate from the child support guidelines in entering the child support order, based upon the following deviation criteria: a parent's earning capacity; substantial assets; coordination of total family support; extraordinary disparity in parental income; and the best interests of the children. Accordingly, commencing February 1, 2023 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter, the defendant shall pay child support to the plaintiff in the amount of $15,000 per month, which is a deviation from the child support guidelines. Each monthly child support payment shall be made by direct deposit or wire transfer into the plaintiff's First Republic Bank account or to such other account as the plaintiff may designate in writing. The plaintiff shall designate such account within ten days of the date of entry of the dissolution judgment. Any and all related wire transfer fees or bank charges for payment by direct deposit shall be paid by the defendant. Contingent income withholding order: The alimony and child support ordered herein shall be subject to a contingent, rather than immediate, income withholding order. Children's Account: The plaintiff shall open a new account for the benefit of the children (the Children's Account) no later than February 2, 2023. The plaintiff shall use the Children's Account solely to pay the children's medical and dental expenses and the cost of their extracurricular activities. The plaintiff shall be the sole signatory on the Children's Account. No one other than the plaintiff shall withdraw funds from the Children's Account. *23 The plaintiff shall provide the following information to the defendant by email within twenty-four hours of opening the Children's Account: the bank name, the account type, the account number, and the routing number. The defendant shall fund the Children's Account within twenty-four hours of receiving the plaintiff's email by transferring $20,000 into the Children's Account. The plaintiff shall notify the defendant by email whenever the balance of the Children's Account falls to or below $5,000. The defendant shall deposit funds into the Children's Account to increase the balance to $20,000 within twenty-four hours of receiving the plaintiff's email. Private school tuition: “[C]ourts have the power to direct one or both parents to pay for private schooling, if the circumstances warrant. It is a matter to be determined in the sound discretion of the court on consideration of the totality of the circumstances including the financial ability of the parties, the availability of public schools, the schools attended by the children prior to the divorce and the special needs and general welfare of the children.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hardisty v. Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253, 262, 439 A.2d 307 (1981). In view of the findings above regarding the children's attending private school, the defendant shall pay each child's private school tuition, fees, and related expenses through her high school graduation. Custody and visitation: General Statutes § 46b-56(a) provides in pertinent part that “[i]n any controversy before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of minor children ... the court may make or modify any proper order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and support of the children .... [T]he court may assign parental responsibility for raising the child to the parents jointly, or may award custody to either parent or to a third party, according to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable.” General Statutes § 46b-56(a). Under General Statutes § 46b-56(b), the court shall consider “the rights and responsibilities of both parents” and “enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests. Such orders may include, but shall not be limited to: (1) Approval of a parental responsibility plan agreed to by the parents ... (2) the award of joint parental responsibility of a minor child to both parents ... (3) the award of sole custody to one parent with appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial parent where sole custody is in the best interests of the child; or (4) any other custody arrangements as the court may determine to be in the best interests of the child.” General Statutes § 46b-56(b). Each party seeks an award of sole legal custody in his or her proposed orders. “The difference between a sole custodian and a joint legal custodian is that the sole custodian has the ultimate authority to make all decisions regarding a child's welfare, such as education, religious instruction and medical care whereas a joint legal custodian shares the responsibility for those decisions.” Emerick v. Emerick, 5 Conn. App. 649, 657 n.9, 502 A.2d 933 (1985), cert. dismissed, 200 Conn. 804, 510 A.2d 192 (1986). This is not a case in which the court will enter an order of joint legal custody. “[A] joint custody award requires agreement of the parents or a motion made by one of them.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 658. *24 “[I]n deciding custody or visitation issues, a court must always be guided by what is in the best interests of the child.” (Citations omitted.) Ireland v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413, 419, 717 A.2d 676 (1998). “[T]he best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [the child's] environment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ryan R., 102 Conn. App. 608, 625-26, 926 A.2d 690, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 923, 924, 933 A.2d 724 (2007). In addition to the best interests of the child, General Statutes § 46b-56(c) sets forth seventeen factors that the court may consider in making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of § 46b-56: “the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so, may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The physical and emotional safety of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental needs of the child; (3) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (5) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody; (6) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (7) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (8) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (9) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (10) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (11) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (12) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both; (13) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (14) the child's cultural background; (15) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence, as defined in section 46b-1, has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (16) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (17) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers, but shall articulate the basis for its decision.” General Statutes § 46b-56(c). Of the seventeen factors included in General Statutes § 46b-56(c), the court finds the seventh factor – “the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders” – particularly compelling. As the guardian ad litem testified, the plaintiff has consistently supported the relationship between the children and the defendant, including purchasing cards and gifts for him from the children. *25 The defendant, on the other hand, has done nothing to “facilitate and encourage” the children's relationship with the plaintiff. He has made clear in his testimony, in his discussions with Dr. Shienvold and Attorney Tusch, and in his trial brief and proposed orders that he believes that the plaintiff is not a capable parent, that she is mentally ill, suffers from anorexia, and lacks judgment, and that she engages in unusual conduct.[49] He told the children that “Mommy once said that she should be institutionalized.” While “compliance with any court orders” is part of the seventh factor listed in General Statutes § 46b-56(c), this topic warrants separate discussion. During the almost six years that this dissolution action has been pending, the defendant has repeatedly failed to comply with court orders. He was often late for court appearances, whether the proceeding was held in person or virtually via Microsoft Teams. His cell phone rang at least once during many court sessions. He failed to comply with the Practice Book rules and court orders regarding discovery. He did not keep his voicemail box empty in order to receive messages from the guardian ad litem or the plaintiff, despite the court's orders that he do so. He continued to send the plaintiff derogatory messages on Our Family Wizard. He did not schedule his appointments with Dr. Shienvold until after Dr. Shienvold had completed his evaluation of the plaintiff. He delayed in paying Dr. Shienvold. He failed to pay the guardian ad litem's fees for months, requiring a multi-day hearing. Even after the court ordered him to pay the guardian ad litem, the defendant still failed to pay the balance due on time. The defendant did not follow the court's order regarding selecting a therapist for Samantha. He did not pay his share of the children's unreimbursed medical expenses. He did not comply with the standing trial management orders. He filed a trial brief that substantially exceed the page limit without the court's permission. The first, second, and third factors are also relevant here. While the plaintiff demonstrated throughout this litigation that she has the capacity and disposition to understand and meet the temperament and developmental needs of the children and to protect their physical and emotional safety, the defendant regularly disregarded their interests by failing to respond to the plaintiff on a timely basis regarding dates for medical and orthodontic appointments, even appointments that were time sensitive. The guardian ad litem testified that the defendant suffered from “paralysis by analysis.” He described the year-long delay in obtaining essential medical treatment for Arianna that was caused by the defendant. It took twenty-five court appearances and many months to engage a therapist for Samantha. More recently, months passed before the parties agreed on a psychiatrist for Arianna. The plaintiff testified that the defendant would become overly involved in the children's health matters. She said they would see one specialist, then the defendant would not like that specialist and demand a second opinion. After the defendant became involved, he would insist on finding a specialist that he liked. According to the plaintiff, it was absolutely the defendant's way or the highway. The guardian ad litem raised a concern regarding the defendant's ability to be actively involved in the children's lives (the ninth factor) before the court entered the October 2018 parenting plan. This also remains a concern today. *26 Each party submitted proposed orders regarding custody and parenting time. The guardian ad litem recommends that the court award the plaintiff sole legal custody of the children. In addition to the testimony and evidence admitted during the dissolution trial, the court has considered the parties’ proposed orders, the statutory criteria, the recommendations of the guardian ad litem, and the children's best interests in entering the orders set forth below. Custody and parental decision making: The plaintiff shall have sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Arianna and Samantha. The plaintiff shall have sole decision-making authority on all major decisions relating to the children, which shall include decisions about their mental, emotional, or physical health; education and course of study; tutoring; religious upbringing; camp or other organized summer activity; use of social media and other technology; significant non-emergency medical or dental treatment; psychotherapy or other mental health treatment or counseling; engaging in sports, entertainment, or other activities; and obtaining a driver's license. The plaintiff shall solicit the opinion of the defendant by email prior to making a major decision involving one or both of the children. To facilitate this communication, the defendant shall provide his preferred email address to the plaintiff no later than 5:00 p.m. on January 25, 2023. The plaintiff shall initiate the email exchange with the defendant regarding a major decision by describing the decision to be made, stating her views, and requesting the defendant's response. The defendant shall reply by email as promptly as possible, but in no event later than twenty-four hours after the plaintiff sends the email regarding a major decision to him. If the defendant fails to respond within twenty-four hours, the plaintiff may make the decision without the defendant's input. If the plaintiff advises the defendant in her email that the decision is time sensitive, the defendant shall respond immediately upon receipt of the email. The plaintiff may make the decision without the defendant's input if he fails to respond within one hour after she sends him an email regarding a time sensitive decision. (a) Routine appointments with treatment providers and specialists: The plaintiff may schedule all of the children's routine appointments with their current treatment providers and specialists, including but not limited to pediatric well visits, annual dental cleanings, regular orthodontic appointments, and other recurring appointments, without prior consultation with the defendant. Unless the appointment is time sensitive, the plaintiff shall provide the defendant with at least two weeks’ notice by email of each appointment, including the office location and the date and time of the appointment. The defendant may attend the appointment if he advises the plaintiff by email at least one week prior to the appointment that he plans to attend. The defendant shall include the following in the subject line of his email: the name of the child for whom the appointment is scheduled; the name of the treatment provider or specialist; and the date and time of the appointment. If the defendant does not send a timely email to the plaintiff, he shall not attend the appointment. If the defendant arrives at an appointment anyway, without sending a timely email to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall not be required to provide him with advance notice of any appointments with treatment providers and specialists in the future. *27 The defendant shall not contact any of the children's treatment providers and specialists to change an appointment scheduled by the plaintiff without her express written consent. A report from a child's treatment provider or specialist shall be shared by both parties regardless of which party first receives the report and whether he or she receives the report in person, during a telephone call, or in a voicemail, text message, email, or other written communication. The party who receives the results of a child's medical test, including but not limited to a COVID test, shall provide the results to the other party by email immediately upon receipt. With respect to all other reports, the receiving party shall provide the report to the other party by email within one hour of receipt by forwarding an email, emailing a copy of a text message or other written communication, or recounting the substance of a telephone conversation or voicemail in an email. (b) Selection of and appointments with new treatment providers or specialists: The plaintiff shall have final decision-making authority to select a new treatment provider or specialist for either or both of the children. The plaintiff may schedule all appointments with such new treatment provider or specialist without prior consultation with the defendant. Unless the appointment is time sensitive, the plaintiff shall provide the defendant with at least two weeks’ notice by email of a newly scheduled appointment, including the name of the new treatment provider or specialist, the office location, and the date and time of the appointment. The defendant may attend the appointment if he advises the plaintiff by email at least one week prior to the appointment that he plans to attend. The defendant shall include the following in the subject line of his email: the name of the child for whom the appointment is scheduled; the name of the new treatment provider or specialist; and the date and time of the appointment. If the defendant does not send a timely email to the plaintiff, he shall not attend the appointment. If the defendant arrives at an appointment anyway, without sending a timely email to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall not be required to provide him with advance notice of any appointments with new treatment providers or specialists in the future. The defendant shall not contact any new treatment provider or specialist to change an appointment scheduled by the plaintiff without her express written consent. A report from a child's new treatment provider or specialist shall be shared by both parties regardless of which party first receives the report and whether he or she receives the report in person, during a telephone call, or in a voicemail, text message, email, or other written communication. The party who receives the results of a child's medical test, including but not limited to a COVID test, shall provide the results to the other party by email immediately upon receipt. With respect to all other reports, the receiving party shall provide the report to the other party by email within one hour of receipt by forwarding an email, emailing a copy of a text message or other written communication, or recounting the substance of a telephone conversation or voicemail in an email. *28 (c) Appointments with teachers, school counselors, tutors, and other educational professionals: The plaintiff may schedule all appointments with the children's teachers, school counselors, tutors, and other educational professionals without prior consultation with the defendant. Unless the appointment is time sensitive, the plaintiff shall provide the defendant with at least two weeks’ notice by email of each appointment, including the office location and the date and time of the appointment. The defendant may attend the appointment if he advises the plaintiff by email at least one week prior to the appointment that he plans to attend. The defendant shall include the following in the subject line of his email: the name of the child for whom the appointment is scheduled; the name of the teacher, school counselor, tutor, or other educational professional; and the date and time of the appointment. If the defendant does not send a timely email to the plaintiff, he shall not attend the appointment. If the defendant arrives at an appointment anyway, without sending a timely email to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall not be required to provide him with advance notice of any appointments with teachers, school counselors, tutors, and other school professionals in the future. The defendant shall not contact any of the children's teachers, school counselors, tutors, or other educational professionals to change an appointment scheduled by the plaintiff without her express written consent. A report from a child's teacher, school counselor, tutor, or other educational professional shall be shared by both parties regardless of which party first receives the report and whether he or she receives the report in person, during a telephone call, or in a voicemail, text message, email, or other written communication. The receiving party shall provide the report to the other party by email within one hour of receipt by forwarding an email, emailing a copy of a text message or other written communication, or recounting the substance of a telephone conversation or voicemail in an email. (d) Time sensitive appointments with treatment providers and specialists: The plaintiff may schedule all of the children's time sensitive appointments with their current treatment providers and specialists, and with any new treatment providers and specialists, without prior consultation with the defendant. The plaintiff shall provide the defendant with as much advance notice as is reasonably possible of each time sensitive appointment. The plaintiff shall provide such notice to the defendant by email and shall include the office location and the date and time of the appointment. The defendant may attend the time sensitive appointment if he advises the plaintiff by email within one hour after she sends him notice of a time sensitive appointment that he plans to attend. The defendant shall include the following in the subject line of his email: the name of the child for whom the appointment is scheduled; the name of the treatment provider or specialist; and the date and time of the appointment. If the defendant does not send a timely email to the plaintiff, he shall not attend the appointment. If the defendant arrives at an appointment anyway, without sending a timely email to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall not be required to provide him with advance notice of any time sensitive appointments with treatment providers and specialists in the future. *29 The defendant shall not contact any of the children's current treatment providers and specialists, and any new treatment providers and specialists, to change a time sensitive appointment scheduled by the plaintiff without her express written consent. A report from a child's current treatment provider or specialist or from a new treatment provider or specialist shall be shared by both parties regardless of which party first receives the report and whether he or she receives the report in person, during a telephone call, or in a voicemail, text message, email, or other written communication. The party who receives the results of a child's medical test, including but not limited to a COVID test, shall provide the results to the other party by email immediately upon receipt. With respect to all other reports, the receiving party shall provide the report to the other party by email within one hour of receipt by forwarding an email, emailing a copy of a text message or other written communication, or recounting the substance of a telephone conversation or voicemail in an email. (e) Time sensitive appointments with teachers, school counselors, tutors, and other educational professionals: The plaintiff may schedule all time sensitive appointments with the children's teachers, school counselors, tutors, and other educational professionals without prior consultation with the defendant. The plaintiff shall provide the defendant with as much advance notice as is reasonably possible of each time sensitive appointment. The plaintiff shall provide such notice to the defendant by email and shall include the office location and the date and time of the appointment. The defendant may attend the time sensitive appointment if he advises the plaintiff by email within one hour after she sends him notice of a time sensitive appointment that he plans to attend. The defendant shall include the following in the subject line of his email: the name of the child for whom the appointment is scheduled; the name of the treatment provider or specialist; and the date and time of the appointment. If the defendant does not send a timely email to the plaintiff, he shall not attend the appointment. If the defendant arrives at an appointment without sending a timely email to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall not be required to provide him with advance notice of any time sensitive appointments with the children's teachers, school counselors, tutors, and other educational professionals in the future. The defendant shall not contact any of the children's teachers, school counselors, tutors, and other educational professionals to change a time sensitive appointment scheduled by the plaintiff without her express written consent. A report from a child's teacher, school counselor, tutor, or other educational professional shall be shared by both parties regardless of which party first receives the report and whether he or she receives the report in person, during a telephone call, or in a voicemail, text message, email, or other written communication. The receiving party shall provide the report to the other party by email within one hour of receipt by forwarding an email, emailing a copy of a text message or other written communication, or recounting the substance of a telephone conversation or voicemail in an email. Emergencies: *30 If an emergency of any kind occurs during a party's parenting time, the party who has the children with him or her shall immediately call or text the other party and provide all information regarding the emergency, including but not limited to the following: the name of the child who is affected by the emergency; a description of the emergency; whether the child is being treated by a doctor, and, if so, the name of the doctor (if known); whether the child has been taken to the emergency room, and, if so, which emergency room; and the location and status of the other child. The plaintiff shall have immediate sole decision-making authority regarding emergency care for the children in all medical emergencies. A report regarding a child's emergency medical care, including any emergency medical tests, shall be shared by both parties regardless of which party first receives the report and whether he or she receives the report in person, during a telephone call, or in a voicemail, text message, email, or other written communication. The receiving party shall provide the report to the other party by email immediately upon receipt by forwarding an email, emailing a copy of a text message or other written communication, or recounting the substance of a telephone conversation or voicemail in an email. Regular parenting time schedule: The children shall reside primarily with the plaintiff. The defendant shall have regular parenting time on alternating weekends and one evening a week as set forth below. The parties shall continue to follow the weekly rotation of regular parenting time as set forth in the October 2018 parenting plan to not disrupt parenting time for either party. For the avoidance of doubt, the defendant shall have Thursday evening parenting time on January 26, 2023 if he had weekend parenting time from Friday, January 20, 2023 to Monday, January 23, 2023, and he shall have Monday evening parenting time on January 23, 2023 if he will have weekend parenting time from Friday, January 27, 2023 to Monday, January 30, 2023. During the last week of March, June, September, and December of each year while these orders are in effect, the plaintiff shall provide to the defendant by email a schedule of the parties’ parenting time for the following three months. The plaintiff shall include all holidays, school vacation days, other days when school is not in session, and any vacation parenting time that will occur during that time period. (a) Weekend parenting time: The defendant shall have regular weekend parenting time with the children on alternating weekends. The defendant's weekend parenting time shall commence after school, after any scheduled school activity, or after any non-school related activity, whichever is later, on the Friday of his scheduled weekend. The defendant shall pick the children up on Friday and return them to school on Monday at the conclusion of his weekend parenting time. If school is not in session on the Friday prior to the defendant's weekend parenting time, he shall pick the children up on Friday at 4:00 p.m. at the plaintiff's residence or from any school or non-school related activity, whichever is later. If school is not in session on the Monday following the defendant's weekend parenting time, he shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence on Monday at 9:00 a.m. If the children are scheduled for remote learning on the Monday following the defendant's weekend parenting time, he shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence at least one hour prior to the time the children's virtual school day is to commence. If each child's virtual school day commences at a different time, the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence on Monday at least one hour prior to the time the earlier virtual school day commences. *31 (b) Weekday evening parenting time: The defendant shall have regular parenting time with the children every Monday evening prior to his weekend parenting time and every Thursday evening following his weekend parenting time. Parenting time on Monday and Thursday evenings shall commence after school, after any scheduled school activity, or after any non-school related activity, whichever is later. The defendant shall pick the children up at school or following their activities for his weekday evening parenting time and return them to the plaintiff's residence by 7:30 p.m. on Monday and Thursday evenings. If school is not in session on a Monday or Thursday evening when the defendant has weekday evening parenting time, the defendant shall pick the children up at 4:00 p.m. at the plaintiff's residence or from any school or non-school related activity, whichever is later. The defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence by 7:30 p.m. on Monday and Thursday evenings. If the children participate in an activity during the defendant's weekday evening parenting time that extends past 7:30 p.m., the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence immediately after the conclusion of the activity. Holiday parenting time schedule: The following holiday parenting time schedule shall supersede the regular parenting time schedule: (a) Martin Luther King, Jr. Day: The parenting time of the party who has regular parenting time with the children on the weekend immediately prior to Martin Luther King, Jr. Day shall continue on Martin Luther King, Jr. Day until the children return to school the following day. If school is not in session on the following day, the Martin Luther King, Jr. Day parenting time shall end on Tuesday at 9:00 a.m. (b) Presidents’ Day: The parenting time of the party who has regular parenting time with the children on the weekend immediately prior to Presidents’ Day shall continue on Presidents’ Day until the children return to school the following day. If school is not in session on the following day, the Presidents’ Day parenting time shall end on Tuesday at 9:00 a.m. (c) Easter: If Easter falls during the children's spring vacation, the parent who has parenting time with the children for that week of spring vacation shall also have Easter parenting time with the children. If Easter does not fall during the children's spring vacation, the children shall be with the plaintiff in even-numbered years and with the defendant in odd-numbered years. If Easter falls on a Sunday during the defendant's weekend parenting time in an even-numbered year, he shall drop the children off at the plaintiff's residence by 9:00 a.m. that day. The children shall remain with the plaintiff until they return to school the following day. If Easter falls on a Sunday during the plaintiff's weekend parenting time in an odd-numbered year, she shall drop the children off at the defendant's residence at 9:00 a.m. that day. The children shall remain with the defendant until they return to school the following day. If school is not in session on the following day, Easter parenting time shall end on Monday at 9:00 a.m. (d) Mother's Day: The plaintiff shall have parenting time on Mother's Day from 9:00 a.m. on Mother's Day until the children return to school the following day. (e) Memorial Day: The parenting time of the party who has regular parenting time with the children on the weekend immediately prior to Memorial Day shall continue on Memorial Day until the children return to school the following day. If school is not in session on the following day, the Memorial Day parenting time shall end on Tuesday at 9:00 a.m. *32 (f) Father's Day: The defendant shall have Father's Day parenting time with the children from 9:00 a.m. on Father's Day until the children return to school the following day. (g) July Fourth: (1) When July Fourth falls on a Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday: The defendant shall have July Fourth parenting time in all even-numbered years, and the plaintiff shall have July Fourth parenting time in all odd-numbered years. July Fourth parenting time shall be from 9:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m., at which time the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence. (2) When July Fourth falls on a Friday or Saturday: If July Fourth falls on a Friday or a Saturday in any particular year, whether it is an even-numbered year or an odd-numbered year, the party who has parenting time that weekend shall have the children for July Fourth parenting time that year. (3) When July Fourth falls during a party's summer vacation parenting time: If July Fourth falls during a party's summer vacation parenting time, the summer vacation schedule shall supersede the July Fourth holiday schedule. (h) Labor Day: The parenting time of the party who has regular parenting time with the children on the weekend immediately prior to Labor Day shall continue on Labor Day until the children return to school the following day. If school is not in session on the following day, the Labor Day parenting time shall end on Tuesday at 9:00 a.m. (i) Columbus Day: The parenting time of the party who has regular parenting time with the children on the weekend immediately prior to Columbus Day shall continue on Columbus Day until the children return to school the following day. If school is not in session on the following day, the Columbus Day parenting time shall end on Tuesday at 9:00 a.m. (j) Thanksgiving: The children's Thanksgiving break shall be divided into two parts. The first part of the Thanksgiving break shall commence at 9:00 a.m. if school is not in session, or after school or activities if school is in session, on the Wednesday immediately prior to Thanksgiving and shall continue until 9:00 a.m. on the Friday immediately following Thanksgiving. The second part of the Thanksgiving break shall commence at 9:00 a.m. on the Friday immediately following Thanksgiving and shall continue until the children return to school on Monday. If school is not in session, the second part of the Thanksgiving break shall end on Monday at 9:00 a.m. In even-numbered years, the children shall be with the defendant for the first part of the Thanksgiving break, and with the plaintiff for the second part of the Thanksgiving break. In odd-numbered years, the children shall be with the plaintiff for the first part of the Thanksgiving break, and with the defendant for the second part of the Thanksgiving break. (k) Christmas/Winter break: The children's Christmas/Winter break shall be divided into two parts. The first part of the Christmas/Winter break shall commence after school or activities on the last day of school prior to Christmas and shall continue until 12:00 p.m. on Christmas. The second part of the Christmas/Winter break shall commence at 12:00 p.m. on Christmas and shall continue until the children return to school after the Christmas/Winter break. If school is not in session on the day that the children are scheduled to return to school after the Christmas/Winter break, the Christmas/Winter break shall end that day at 9:00 a.m. *33 In even-numbered years, the children shall be with the defendant for the first part of the Christmas/Winter break, and with the plaintiff for the second part of the Christmas/Winter break. In odd-numbered years, the children shall be with the plaintiff for the first part of the Christmas/Winter break, and with the defendant for the second part of the Christmas/Winter break. (l) Jewish Holidays: (1) Passover: In even-numbered years, the children shall be with the plaintiff on the first night of Passover from 5:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m., and with the defendant on the second night of Passover from 5:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m., after which the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence. In odd-numbered years, the children shall be with the defendant on the first night of Passover from 5:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m., after which the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence, and with the plaintiff on the second night of Passover from 5:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. If Passover falls during the children's spring vacation, the spring vacation schedule shall supersede the Passover holiday parenting time schedule. (2) Rosh Hashanah: In even-numbered years, the children shall be with the plaintiff on the first night of Rosh Hashanah from 5:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m., and with the defendant on the second night of Rosh Hashanah from 5:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m., after which the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence. In odd-numbered years, the children shall be with the defendant on the first night of Rosh Hashanah from 5:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m., after which the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence, and with the plaintiff on the second night of Rosh Hashanah from 5:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. (3) Yom Kippur: In even-numbered years, the children shall be with the defendant on Yom Kippur from 5:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m., after which the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence. In odd-numbered years, the children shall be with the plaintiff on Yom Kippur from 5:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. For the avoidance of doubt, a party's Yom Kippur parenting time shall take place on the day of the Yom Kippur break fast and shall not include the previous evening. (4) Jewish holidays observed on a Friday, Saturday, or Sunday: If a Jewish holiday falls on a Friday, Saturday, or Sunday, the children shall be returned at 9:30 p.m. to the residence of the party who has parenting time that weekend. Birthdays: (a) The children's birthdays: The party who has parenting time with a child on her birthday shall celebrate the child's birthday with her that day. The other party shall celebrate the child's birthday with her during his or her next scheduled parenting time. Each party may plan a separate birthday party for each child during his or her parenting time. (b) The parties’ birthdays: Each party shall have parenting time with the children on his or her birthday from after school or the children's activities until 7:30 p.m., if school is in session, and from 9:00 a.m. until 7:30 p.m., if school is not in session. If school is in session on the defendant's birthday, he shall pick the children up at school or following their activities and return them to the plaintiff's residence by 7:30 p.m. If school is not in session on the defendant's birthday, he shall pick the children up at the plaintiff's residence at 9:00 a.m. and return them to the plaintiff's residence by 7:30 p.m. *34 A party's birthday parenting time shall supersede the regular parenting time schedule. If a party's birthday falls during the other party's weekend parenting time, the party who is celebrating a birthday shall pick the children up at the other party's residence at 9:00 a.m. and return them to that party's residence by 7:30 p.m. Vacation parenting time: The following vacation parenting time schedule shall supersede the regular parenting time schedule: (a) Spring vacation: The children's spring vacation shall be divided into two parts. Week One shall commence after school, any school activities, or any non-school activities on the Friday immediately prior to the first day of the spring vacation and shall continue through 12:00 p.m. on the Sunday of the second weekend of the spring vacation (nine nights). Week Two shall commence at 12:00 p.m. on the Sunday of the second weekend of the spring vacation and shall continue until the children return to school on the Monday following the third weekend of the spring vacation (eight nights). In all even-numbered years, the children shall be with the defendant for Week One of the spring vacation and with the plaintiff for Week Two of the spring vacation. In all odd-numbered years, the children shall be with the plaintiff for Week One of the spring vacation and with the defendant for Week Two of the spring vacation. (b) Public school breaks: In the event one or both children attend a public school that has a February break and/or an April break, the parties shall share the breaks as follows: (1) In all even-numbered years, the children shall be with the plaintiff for the February break, and they shall be with the defendant for the April break. (2) In all odd-numbered years, the children shall be with the defendant for the February break, and they shall be with the plaintiff for the April break. (3) Both the February break and the April break shall commence after school or activities on the last day of school prior to each break and shall continue until the children return to school when school resumes following the break. (c) Summer vacation: Each party shall have ten consecutive days of vacation with the children during the school summer vacation. Each party's summer vacation parenting time shall commence on a Friday at 4:00 p.m. and shall end on the second Monday thereafter at 4:00 p.m., for a total of ten days. The parties shall exchange their proposed summer vacation dates by email no later than April 15 of each year. The plaintiff shall have the right of first selection in all even-numbered years. The defendant shall have the right of first selection in all odd-numbered years. A party who does not provide the other party with his or her proposed summer vacation dates by email by May 15 shall lose one summer vacation day with the children for each day following May 15 that he or she does not provide his or her proposed summer vacation dates to the other party. A party that does not provide the other party with his or her proposed summer vacation dates by May 25 shall forfeit all summer vacation parenting time with the children for that year. The plaintiff shall not schedule summer vacation parenting time that would interfere with the defendant's Father's Day parenting time. Overnight travel: When a party intends to travel overnight with one or both of the children, he or she shall inform the other party of the planned itinerary and provide the following information: the duration of the trip; the name of the host or hotel; the lodging address; land-line telephone numbers (if any); airline flight numbers; travel information, including means of travel, departure times, arrival times, and destinations; and instructions for how to contact the children. *35 The traveling party shall provide the foregoing information and itinerary to the other party in writing at least five days prior to the scheduled travel or, if the travel is scheduled less than five days in advance, as soon as the trip is planned. If the traveling party does not provide the travel information and itinerary prior to the planned trip, he or she shall not take the children on the trip. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties shall provide travel plans for spring and summer vacations in writing not less than fifteen days in advance. International travel and passports: Each party shall be permitted to travel to domestic and international destinations with the children unless the United States Department of State has posted a Level 4 – Do Not Travel – advisory alert for the proposed destination. The plaintiff shall safeguard and hold the children's passports until each child attains the age of eighteen or graduates from high school, whichever is later, except when the defendant requires access to them to travel internationally with the children. If the defendant is planning to travel internationally with the children, he shall notify the plaintiff and request the children's passports. The plaintiff shall provide the defendant with a copy of the children's passports so that he can make travel arrangements. The plaintiff shall provide the children's passports to the defendant two weeks prior to the scheduled trip. The defendant shall return the children's passports directly to the plaintiff at his next scheduled parenting time following the trip. The parties shall cooperate to keep each child's passport current and shall share equally the costs of same. Travel by private plane: If a party plans to travel with the minor children by private plane, he or she shall provide the other party with the flight number, the tail number of the aircraft, and scheduled departure and arrival times. If the traveling party does not provide the travel information and itinerary prior to the planned trip, he or she shall not take the children on the trip. Additional orders: (a) Timely arrival at school, appointments, lessons, sports, and other activities: The party who is responsible for taking the children to school in the morning shall ensure that the children arrive at school on time. Each party shall ensure that the children are transported to and from their activities, lessons, sports, medical and dental appointments, therapy sessions, tutoring sessions, and other scheduled events or appointments which occur during his or her parenting time so that the children arrive on time. (b) School “in session” defined: School shall be “in session” when the children are attending school in person or participating in virtual learning at home. (c) School cancellations, delayed openings, and early dismissals: If school is cancelled on a day when the defendant is responsible for taking the children to school, the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff's residence at 9:00 a.m. that day. In the event of a delayed opening on a day when the defendant is responsible for taking the children to school, the defendant shall be responsible for the care of the children until he takes them to school. In the event the children are dismissed early on a day when the defendant has parenting time commencing at the end of the school day, the defendant shall be responsible for picking the children up from school at the time of such early dismissal. *36 (d) Completing homework and computer access: The party who has parenting time on an evening prior to a school day shall be responsible for having the children complete all homework assignments due the following school day. Each party shall provide all necessary resources at his or her residence to allow the children to complete their homework or other school-related projects or activities during his or her parenting time, including a computer and reliable Internet access via an Internet service provider and/or a WiFi hotspot. Each party shall ensure that all routers in his or her residence are working, that Internet boosters are installed in the areas where the children do their work, and that all cables and wiring are available to the children as needed. A child shall not be required to use the WiFi hotspot on her cell phone to complete her homework or other school-related projects or activities at either party's residence. If Internet or WiFi service is interrupted at the defendant's residence for any reason during his parenting time so that the children cannot complete their homework or other school-related projects or activities, the defendant's parenting time shall end. The children shall notify the plaintiff and arrange for her to pick them up at the defendant's residence and take them to her residence so that they can complete their homework or other school-related projects or activities there. (e) Attendance at events: Each party shall be free to attend and interact with the children at all activities of either child that are open to the public, including any recitals, sporting events, competitions, performances and the like that are engaged in by either or both of the children, even if such activities occur during the other party's parenting time. Each party shall provide the other party with half of the “parent” or “family” tickets distributed or made available for any special event involving the children. (f) Invitations: Each party shall be responsible for responding to the children's invitations to events that occur during his or her parenting time, respectively. If a party receives an invitation for one or both of the children to attend an event that will take place during the other party's parenting time, he or she shall provide the invitation to the other party within twenty-four hours of receipt. (g) Communication with the children: Each party shall have reasonable access to the children while they are with the other party by telephone, text message, FaceTime, Skype, and/or email during reasonable hours of the day and evening. Each party shall respect the child's wishes regarding the frequency and length of such communications. The parties shall not discuss this dissolution action with the children, with other persons, or with each other where the children might overhear the conversation. The parties shall safeguard all documents relating to this dissolution action, including this memorandum of decision, so that the children are not able to see them. Neither party shall speak to the children about the other party's past or present medical or mental health issues. (h) Communication between the parties: The parties shall communicate directly with each other on all issues concerning the children. The parties shall not use the children as intermediaries for communication with each other. *37 Each party shall answer the other party's telephone calls and timely respond to any missed telephone calls and/or voicemail from the other party. Each party shall not ignore the other party's telephone calls or hang up on the other party during a telephone call. The defendant shall make sure his voicemail box on his cell phone is empty so that the plaintiff may leave a voicemail for him. Effectively immediately, the parties shall communicate by email rather than by Our Family Wizard. Each party may terminate his or her Our Family Wizard account. Except as specifically set forth herein, a party shall respond to an email from the other party within twenty-four hours of receipt and shall not ignore emails from the other party. All emails between the parties shall be respectful at all times, and the content of any email shall be limited to informational purposes only. Each party shall refrain from including any demeaning, derogatory, or argumentative language in his or her email. (i) Encouraging affection and mutual respect: The parties shall minimize the children's exposure to harmful parental conflict and shall act respectfully and civilly to each other at all times. A party shall refrain from using disparaging, offensive, hurtful, and/or disrespectful language to the other party or with respect to the children. The parties shall use moderate volume voice levels and shall refrain from yelling in the presence of or around the children. Each party shall exert every reasonable effort to foster a feeling of affection between the children and the other party. Each party shall use his or her best efforts to refrain from doing anything to diminish the opinion of the children as to their mother or father or to act in such a way as to hamper the free and natural development of love and respect between parent and child. Neither party shall make any disparaging remarks regarding the other party or other family members to the children or in reasonable proximity to the children. In particular, the defendant shall not use disparaging language, including but not limited to such terms as anorexic, bulimic, or stupid, when referring to the plaintiff in front of the children. (j) Health and safety: Each party shall ensure that his or her residence is safe for the children. Each residence shall have working smoke alarms and carbon monoxide detectors installed in all locations in the residence as required by the Town of Greenwich building code. All smoke alarms and carbon monoxide detectors in each residence shall be checked monthly to ensure that they are in working condition. All walkways and driveways shall be cleared following a snowstorm as soon as reasonably possible. If a party has a contagious virus such as the flu or COVID prior to or during his or her parenting time, he or she will notify the other party so that the parenting time can be adjusted, if necessary. If the children are uncomfortable at one party's residence for any safety or health reasons, they may contact the other party to pick them up and take them to that party's residence until the health or safety issue is resolved. (k) Keys and alarm code: Each child shall have a key to each party's residence, including a separate key for any deadbolt lock. Each child shall also have the code to deactivate the alarm system at the Round Hill Road property. If the children are locked out of the Round Hill Road property, they may contact the plaintiff to pick them up and take them to her residence for the remainder of the defendant's parenting time. *38 (l) Transportation: The defendant shall pick up the children up for his regular parenting time at the door of the plaintiff's residence, at their schools, or at any school or non-school activity, depending upon the children's schedules. The defendant shall be responsible for transporting the children during his weekend parenting time to and from all scheduled activities, including school activities, non-school activities, lessons, practices, social events, gatherings with friends, and study groups. When the defendant returns the children to the plaintiff's residence, he shall return them to the door of the residence. (m) Reasonable requests to modify the parenting time schedule: Each party shall accommodate the reasonable request of the other party to adjust the parenting time schedule so that the children shall be available for special events, such as extended family celebrations, provided that there is reasonable notice and the event does not conflict with another special event that has already been scheduled. Except in the event of an emergency, all changes to the parenting schedule shall be mutually agreed to in writing. (n) Adjusting the schedule if a party has three weekends of parenting time in a row: If a party has parenting time for three consecutive weekends as a result of scheduled holiday and vacation parenting time, the parties shall use their reasonable best efforts to adjust the parenting time schedule so that the other party has parenting time with the children on one of those weekends. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, parenting time shall continue as originally scheduled with one party having parenting time for three consecutive weekends. (o) Viacord: Neither party shall terminate Viacord without the prior, written consent of the other party. The defendant shall pay all costs related to maintaining Viacord. Pendente lite motions relating to custody: In view of the final custody orders set forth above, no further action is required on the following pendente lite motions that were reserved to the time of trial: the plaintiff's motion for temporary sole legal custody re: scheduling routine medical appointments dated 5/20/2022 (#671.00); the defendant's motion for order, temporary sole legal custody, non-routine medical matters, pendente lite dated May 23, 2022 (#672.00); and the plaintiff's motion for temporary sole legal custody re: psychological services dated 5/24/2022 (#673.00). Property distribution: “The trial court is empowered to deal broadly with the equitable division of property incident to a dissolution proceeding, and, consistent with the purpose of equitable distribution statutes generally, the term property should be interpreted broadly as well.” (Citation omitted.) Roos v. Roos, 84 Conn. App. 415, 420, 853 A.2d 642, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 936, 861 A.2d 510 (2004). Under General Statutes § 46b-81(a), the court may assign to either party all or any part of the estate of the other party at the time of entering a decree dissolving a marriage. Subsection (c) of § 46b-81 provides in pertinent part that, “[i]n fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court ... shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.” General Statutes § 46b-81(c). *39 “The issues involving financial orders are entirely interwoven. The rendering of a judgment in a dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent upon the other.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cleary v. Cleary, 103 Conn. App. 798, 807, 930 A.2d 811 (2007). “General Statutes § 46b-81 confers broad powers upon the court in the assignment of property, and the allocation of liabilities and debts is a part of the court's broad authority in the assignment of property.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Roos, supra, 84 Conn. App. at 420. In arriving at an equitable division of the marital estate, the court has considered the factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-81 as well as the parties’ proposed orders. (a) Bank and brokerage accounts: The plaintiff shall retain the First Republic Bank checking account and the UBS Resource Management account identified on her financial affidavit, free and clear of any claim by the defendant. The defendant shall retain the First Republic Bank checking account and the Morgan Stanley account identified on his financial affidavit, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff. (b) Retirement accounts: The plaintiff shall retain the UBS IRAs reflected on her financial affidavit. On or before February 2, 2023, the defendant shall transfer to the plaintiff 100 percent of the JPMorgan Rollover IRA and the JPMorgan IRA identified on his financial affidavit, valued as of the date of entry of the dissolution judgment, along with investment gains and losses thereon. The defendant shall retain his interest in the Geneve 401(k). (c) Closely-held business interests: On or before February 2, 2023, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of $808,000, representing the value of the defendant's 66.5 interest in Scann2 Partners, according to his financial affidavit. The defendant shall retain his interests in DLP I, DLP III, and SCN International SARL. (d) Lump sum payment to the plaintiff: The defendant shall make a lump sum property distribution to the plaintiff in the total amount of $50,000,000, payable as follows: (1) Payment from The Six Cataracts Trust: The defendant shall pay the plaintiff $15,000,000 from The Six Cataracts Trust no later than February 23, 2023. Commencing on January 1, 2024 and continuing on January 1 every other year thereafter, the defendant shall pay $500,000 from The Six Cataracts Trust to the plaintiff until he has paid a total of $25,000,000 to the plaintiff from the trust. The payments by the defendant to the plaintiff shall not be taxable to the plaintiff and shall not be deductible by the defendant for income tax purposes. Interest shall accrue on any payment that is not made by the due date at the statutory rate of 10 percent per annum pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a. (2) Payment from The DASSA Trust, The Scout Resources Trust, and The Ann Holdings Trust: The defendant shall pay the plaintiff $15,000,000 from the three self-settled trusts – The DASSA Trust, The Scout Resources Trust, and The Ann Holdings Trust – no later than February 23, 2023. Commencing on January 1, 2024 and continuing on January 1 every other year thereafter, the defendant shall pay $500,000 from the three self-settled trusts to the plaintiff until he has paid a total of $25,000,000 to the plaintiff from these trusts. The payments by the defendant to the plaintiff shall not be taxable to the plaintiff and shall not be deductible by the defendant for income tax purposes. Interest shall accrue on any payment that is not made by the due date at the statutory rate of 10 percent per annum pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a. *40 (e) Trust assets: Except for the lump sum property distribution to the plaintiff set forth in paragraph (d) above, the defendant shall retain his interest in The Six Cataracts Trust, The DASSA Trust, The Scout Resource Trust, and The Ann Holdings Trust. (f) Children's accounts and trust: The plaintiff shall remain the custodian of the four accounts for the benefit of the children identified on her financial affidavit. The defendant shall remain the trustee of the Netter children's trust identified on his financial affidavit. (g) Motor vehicles: The plaintiff shall retain the leased Audi under the terms of her lease, free and clear of any claim by the defendant. She shall be solely responsible for all costs associated with the lease and operation of the vehicle, including automobile insurance, personal property taxes, and repairs, and she shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless from any liability therefrom. The defendant shall retain the 2007 Land Rover, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff. He shall be solely responsible for all costs associated with the ownership and operation of the vehicle, including automobile insurance, personal property taxes, and repairs, and he shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless from any liability therefrom. (j) Personal property: Each party is awarded his or her own clothing, jewelry, and personal items such as books and memorabilia. The plaintiff is awarded the family photographs. She shall make digital copies of the family photographs and provide the digital copies to the defendant. The parties shall equally share the cost of making digital copies of the family photographs. The plaintiff shall obtain an estimate in advance of the cost of making digital copies of the family photographs and provide that information to the defendant by email. The defendant shall pay his 50 percent share of the cost to the plaintiff prior to receiving the digital copies of the family photographs from the plaintiff. The plaintiff is awarded all personal property located in her apartment on Greenwich Avenue, her personal property located in the Round Hill Road property, and any other personal property that is otherwise in her possession. The defendant is awarded all of his personal property located in the Round Hill Road property except the family photographs, which are addressed above, and the plaintiff's personal property that remains in the Round Hill Road property. As previously ordered by this Court on June 9, 2021 (#539.00, on appeal to the Appellate Court at AC 44803), the plaintiff shall have access to the Round Hill Road property between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. for two days to remove her personal property from the Round Hill Road property. The plaintiff shall propose six dates between January 25, 2023 and February 24, 2023 on which she is available to remove her personal property from the Round Hill Road property. The plaintiff shall propose these dates to the defendant by email. The defendant shall select two of the six dates. He shall notify the plaintiff of his selection by email within twenty-four hours of receiving the plaintiff's email with her proposed dates. The two dates selected by the defendant shall be the dates on which the plaintiff shall have access to the Round Hill Road property to remove her personal property. *41 The plaintiff shall be accompanied by an off-duty Greenwich police officer when she is at the Round Hill Road property to remove her personal property. The Greenwich police officer shall remain at the Round Hill Road property at all times while the plaintiff is at the property. The plaintiff shall pay for the services of the Greenwich police officer. The plaintiff may be accompanied by up to two other individuals to assist her in removing her belongings, neither of whom shall be Barbara Netter. These individuals shall be permitted to enter the Round Hill Road property with the plaintiff. The defendant may be present while the plaintiff is at the Round Hill Road property. The children shall not be present under any circumstances. The defendant shall arrange for the property to be unlocked and opened when the plaintiff arrives. The security system shall be unarmed. The lights shall be working. The heat shall be on.[50] The defendant shall not photograph, record, or monitor by security camera or other means of surveillance the plaintiff's removal of her personal property from the Round Hill Road property. The defendant shall not interfere with the plaintiff's access to the Round Hill Road property or to her personal property. The defendant shall not remove, move, or hide any of the plaintiff's personal property to prevent her from removing it from the Round Hill Road property. The plaintiff shall promptly notify the defendant when she has completed removing her personal property from the Round Hill Road property. Debts and liabilities: Except with respect to the orders entered herein regarding the defendant's payment of the plaintiff's legal fees, each party shall be solely responsible for the debts and liabilities set forth on his or her financial affidavit and shall indemnify and hold harmless the other party from any liability therefor. Educational support order: Having found that the parties would have financially supported Arianna and Samantha in their post-secondary educational efforts had the family remained intact, and that Arianna and Samantha are likely to pursue post-secondary education, the court shall retain jurisdiction to consider and enter appropriate orders for Arianna and Samantha's post-secondary educational expenses, including health insurance, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c. Life insurance: The defendant shall obtain, pay for, and maintain a term life insurance policy in the face amount of $5,000,000 for as long as the defendant has a court-ordered obligation to pay alimony, child support, and/or post-secondary educational expenses for Arianna and Samantha. The defendant shall designate the plaintiff as the sole beneficiary of such life insurance policy, with the proceeds thereof payable to the plaintiff in a lump sum upon the defendant's death. If the defendant does not currently have such life insurance in effect, he shall obtain the life insurance policy required under these orders no later than March 31, 2023. The defendant shall schedule any medical examination necessary to obtain such life insurance on or before February 2, 2023. Within three days of scheduling the appointment, the defendant shall provide documentary proof to the plaintiff by email that he has scheduled whatever medical examination is necessary. The defendant's medical examination, if required, shall take place no later than forty-five days thereafter. If the defendant currently has such life insurance in effect, he shall provide confirmation of the life insurance policy to the plaintiff by email on or before February 2, 2023 and annually thereafter. *42 If the defendant does not have such life insurance in effect as of the date of entry of the dissolution judgment, he shall provide confirmation to the plaintiff by email that he has obtained such life insurance within ten days of obtaining such life insurance and annually thereafter. The defendant may not reduce the face amount of the policy or change the beneficiary, including adding any new beneficiary or beneficiaries’, without the express written consent of the plaintiff or an order of the court. Health insurance and unreimbursed medical expenses: Each party shall be responsible for his or her own health insurance. The defendant shall cooperate with the plaintiff so that she may obtain her own health insurance coverage, at her expense, in accordance with state and federal law. Each party shall be solely responsible for his or her own unreimbursed or uninsured medical expenses. The defendant shall at his sole expense maintain Arianna and Samantha on his existing health insurance policy or provide comparable health insurance coverage for them until they reach the age of majority. See Keeys v. Keeys, 43 Conn. App. 575, 576-77, 684 A.2d 1214 (1996) (in absence of parties’ written agreement, court may not order post-majority health insurance); Tow v. Tow, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-FA-07-4029986-S (April 15, 2014, Ficeto, J.) (same). This order shall not preclude (i) the entry of a post-majority educational support order that provides for health insurance coverage, or (ii) the enforcement of an agreement between the parties to provide such health insurance coverage for Arianna and Samantha, post-majority. On or before February 2, 2023, the defendant shall: (i) provide the plaintiff with documentation of Arianna and Samantha's health insurance coverage; (ii) execute and return to the plaintiff all Healthcare Spending Account forms, including authorizations and/or reimbursement forms, so that the plaintiff may submit claims for the children's medical expenses directly to the insurance company and receive reimbursement payments from the insurance company; (iii) provide a Flex Benefit debit card to the plaintiff to use for the children's medical expenses. The plaintiff shall use the Flex Benefit debit card before applying funds from the Children's Account. The plaintiff shall use the Flex Benefit debit card solely for the benefit of the children. All of the children's medical expenses that must be paid in advance of submitting a claim to the insurance company for reimbursement shall be paid from the Children's Account. These medical expenses shall include, but not be limited to, insurance deductibles; co-pays; medical, optical, surgical, hospital, psychiatric, psychological, therapy, and nursing expenses; dental and orthodontia expenses; and the cost of prescription drugs. Any insurance reimbursement payments received by either party shall be deposited into the Children's Account within seventy-two hours of receipt. The party who receives such payment shall notify the other party by email within twenty-four hours of receipt. The defendant shall be responsible for 100 percent of the children's unreimbursed medical expenses. This is a deviation from the child support guidelines, which provide that the plaintiff shall be responsible for 18 percent of such expenses and the defendant shall be responsible for 82 percent of such expenses. The court finds under all of the facts and circumstances of this case that the application of the child support guidelines would be inappropriate or inequitable based upon the following deviation criteria: a parent's earning capacity; substantial assets; coordination of total family support; extraordinary disparity in parental income; and the best interests of the children. Taxes and dependency exemption: *43 The defendant shall claim Arianna as a dependent for all income tax purposes. The plaintiff shall claim Samantha as a dependent for all income tax purposes. When Samantha is the only child eligible to be claimed as a dependent for income tax purposes, the parties shall alternate claiming her as a dependent. The plaintiff shall claim Samantha as a dependent in all even-numbered years, and the defendant shall claim her as a dependent in all odd-numbered years. The party not claiming Samantha as a dependent in any given year shall sign and provide to the other party Internal Revenue Service Form 8332, or any other declaration required to implement the terms of this order, on or before February 1 of each year. Attorney's fees: The plaintiff is awarded $3,300,000 in attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-62; to order otherwise would undermine these financial orders. All attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's litigation misconduct, including the discovery sanctions, and any fees awarded pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-87 on the plaintiff's pendente lite motions for contempt, are included in this attorney's fees award. The defendant shall pay the attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff in full no later than February 23, 2023. The defendant shall be responsible for any and all legal fees incurred by him during the pendency of this action. In view of the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff set forth above, no further action is required on the following pendente lite motions and objections that were reserved to the time of trial: the plaintiff's sixth motion for contempt and/or order re: discovery orders dated 3/5/2021 (#486.00); the plaintiff's 7th and amended motion for contempt and/or order re discovery orders dated 9/7/2021 (#565.00); the plaintiff's motion for legal fees and sanctions dated 4/30/2021 (#509.00); the plaintiff's motion in limine and for sanctions re defendant's failure to comply with standing orders dated 5/3/2021 (#522.00); the plaintiff's motion for order and/or contempt re defendant's failure to comply with 5/26/21 court order dated 6/1/2021 (#537.00); the defendant's motion to terminate and return of paid discovery sanctions, pendente lite, dated December 19, 2020 (#408.00); the defendant's objection to plaintiff's motion for contempt re: legal fees and defendant's motion for legal fees, pendente lite dated August 4, 2022 (#695.00); and the defendant's objection to plaintiff's motions for contempt and sanctions and 7th amended motion for contempt and/or order re: discovery order, pendente lite dated September 6, 2022 (#705). The guardian ad litem: The defendant's motion for order, removal of GAL and replacement with attorney for the children, pendente lite (#652.00 and #654.00) and the defendant's motion for reimbursement of GAL fees paid by defendant, pendente lite (#682.00) are denied. Attorney Tusch is discharged from his role as the guardian ad litem of the minor children upon the entry of the dissolution judgment. According to the periodic review worksheet filed on January 10, 2023, the plaintiff owes Attorney Tusch $7,086 and the defendant owes Attorney Tusch $11,604 as of January 1, 2023 (#725.00). Each party shall pay his or her share of the fees owed to the guardian ad litem no later than February 15, 2023. This order shall survive the entry of the dissolution judgment. Exchange of financial information: *44 For as long as the defendant has a financial liability to the plaintiff, whether for alimony, child support, or post majority educational support pursuant to this dissolution judgment, the defendant shall provide to the plaintiff each year, but no later than May 1 of each year, or October 30 (if extensions are filed), copies of his federal and state personal and trust tax returns, W-2s, 1099s, and K-1s for the immediately preceding year. In addition, the defendant shall provide copies of all statements and/or documents evidencing distributions to him from trusts during the previous tax year. Effectuation of orders: Each party shall sign whatever documents are presented by the other party to effectuate these orders within ten days of presentment. Unless otherwise specifically set forth herein, these orders are effective immediately. Findings and orders with respect to the pendente lite motions reserved for the time of trial: The court makes the following additional findings of fact and enters the orders below with respect to the parties’ pendente lite motions that were reserved for the time of trial and have not been addressed in the final orders set forth above: 1. The defendant's motion for mistrial, pendente lite (#664.00) and the defendant's amended motion for mistrial, pendente lite (#668.00): The defendant first moved for a mistrial on April 21, 2022, following the forty-seventh day of trial. He filed his second motion for a mistrial on the forty-ninth day of trial. The court has wide discretion in deciding a motion for a mistrial. Speed v. DeLibero, 215 Conn. 308, 315, 575 A.2d 1021 (1990). “[A] mistrial should be granted only as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot have a fair trial and the whole proceedings are vitiated.” Ferino v. Palmer, 133 Conn. 463, 466, 52 A.2d 433 (1947). The decision of our Supreme Court in Matza v. Matza, 226 Conn. 166, 189-91, 627 A.2d 414 (1993) is instructive, with many of the relevant facts similar to this case. “The following facts are relevant to this claim. The defendant had been represented by three attorneys during the various stages of the proceedings, each of whom withdrew on account of various disagreements with the defendant. At the time the defendant moved for a mistrial, this dissolution action was over two years old. ... When the trial resumed ... the defendant represented herself and stated that she was prepared to cross-examine the plaintiff. For the remainder of the trial, the defendant actively participated in the trial and received aid from the court in conducting cross-examination. ... The trial referee found that the reasons offered in support of the defendant's repeated requests for additional continuances and a mistrial were not worthy of belief. The trial referee stated in his memorandum of decision that ‘I find ... that they were made simply to delay the proceedings and to seek to put the plaintiff to greater unjustified expense.’ ” Id. at 189-190. Our Supreme Court concluded “[a]fter a full review of [the] record ... that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a mistrial. The protracted nature of the case, the defendant's course of behavior throughout the proceedings, the factual findings regarding the defendant's intent to delay the proceedings and the resulting prejudice to the plaintiff all amply support the trial court's decision to deny the motion for a mistrial.” Id. at 191. The reasons for denying a mistrial in Matza are equally applicable here. In addition, the defendant's motion to remove the guardian ad litem, pendente lite is without merit. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for mistrial, pendente lite (#664.00) and the defendant's amended motion for mistrial, pendente lite (#668.00) are denied. *45 2. The plaintiff's motions regarding unreimbursed medical expenses: (a) The plaintiff's second and amended motion for order and/or contempt re unreimbursed medical expenses, pendente lite (#403.00). (b) The plaintiff's third and amended motion for order and/or contempt re unreimbursed medical expenses, pendente lite (#508.00). (c) The plaintiff's fourth and amended motion for order and/or contempt re unreimbursed medical expenses, pendente lite (#655.00). (d) The plaintiff's fifth and amended motion for order and/or contempt re unreimbursed medical expenses, pendente lite (#674.00). (e) The plaintiff's sixth and amended motion for order and/or contempt re unreimbursed medical expenses, pendente lite (#675.00). (f) The plaintiff's seventh and amended motion for order and/or contempt re unreimbursed medical expenses, pendente lite (#684.00). (g) The plaintiff's eighth and amended motion for order and/or contempt re unreimbursed medical expenses, pendente lite (#698.00). (h) The plaintiff's ninth and amended motion for order and/or contempt re unreimbursed medical expense, pendente lite (#700.00. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had notice of the provisions of the December 2017 order, and that the provisions of the December 2017 order are clear and unambiguous. The plaintiff has met her burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant wilfully violated the December 2017 order when he failed to pay his 80 percent share of the children's unreimbursed medical expenses. The defendant is found in contempt. The plaintiff's motions for contempt regarding unreimbursed medical expenses are granted. The defendant shall pay the sum of $29,103.37 to the plaintiff on or before February 2, 2023. Interest on any unpaid amount due shall accrue thereafter at the statutory rate of 10 percent per annum until paid in full. This order shall survive the entry of the dissolution judgment. Attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-87 are included in the attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff set forth above. 3. The plaintiff's motion for contempt re: automatic orders (Scann2 Partners), pendente lite (#501.00): The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had notice of the automatic orders that were served on him when this dissolution action was commenced, and that such orders are clear and unambiguous. The court also finds that the plaintiff has met her burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant wilfully violated the clear and unambiguous automatic orders when he transferred $1,240,115 from his personal assets to Scann2 Partners during the pendency of this action. The court holds the defendant in contempt. The motion for contempt is granted. The defendant's objection thereto is overruled. Attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-87 are included in the attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff set forth above. 4. The plaintiff's motion for contempt re: automatic orders (Rose Associates), pendente lite (#502.00): The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had notice of the automatic orders that were served on him when this dissolution action was commenced, and that such orders are clear and unambiguous. The court also finds that the plaintiff has met her burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant wilfully violated the clear and unambiguous automatic orders when he sold his 100 percent interest in Rose Associates to DASSA, LLC in December 2019. The defendant received approximately $900,000 from this sale. *46 The defendant never sought the plaintiff's consent to make this transaction. The defendant never sought a court order to sell this asset, despite being in court regularly in December 2019 to address payment of the guardian ad litem's fees – fees that the defendant apparently paid with part of the proceeds from the sale of Rose Associates. The defendant never informed the plaintiff of this transaction until it was discovered at his February, 2020 deposition. The defendant is found in contempt. The motion for contempt is granted. The defendant's objection thereto is overruled. Attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-87 are included in the attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff set forth above. 5. The plaintiff's motion for contempt re: automatic orders (legal fees), pendente lite (#503.00): The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had notice of the automatic orders that were served on him when this dissolution action was commenced, and that such orders are clear and unambiguous. The court also finds that the plaintiff has met her burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant wilfully violated the clear and unambiguous automatic orders when he transferred, removed, and/or disposed of marital assets in the amount of $431,810.88 during the pendency of this action for exorbitant and unnecessary legal fees and costs unrelated to this marital dissolution action. The defendant is found in contempt. The motion for contempt is granted. Attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-87 are included in the attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff set forth above. 6. All remaining pendente lite motions: All other pendente lite motions that were reserved to the time of trial and that are not addressed above are denied. Footnotes [1] Due to the defendant's failure to complete her required release and intake forms, Dr. Biren Caverly was not able to complete the custody evaluation. The court terminated her appointment. [2] As financial matters are in dispute, the court orders that the automatic sealing of the parties’ financial affidavits be terminated pursuant to Practice Book § 25-59A(h). [3] The Wilkins Center treats eating disorders. [4] Plaintiff's Ex. 412. [5] Dolphin Holdings Corp. was the managing member of Dolphin Associates LLC, the general partner of DLP I. According to the defendant's CV, “[s]ince December 1994, DLP I together with related entities, evolved into a sizable fund, involved in various forms of arbitrage as well as ‘active’ investments ....” Beginning in 2005, DFP “also evolved into a sizable entity in the business of managing customer accounts in the same disciplines and invested side by side with, DLP I.” DLP I entered liquidation as of December 31, 2008, pursuant to its original charter. [6] Dolphin Holdings Corp. II was the managing member of Dolphin Associates II, LLC, the general partner of DLP II. According to the defendant's CV, starting in July 2003, DLP II was “principally involved in making concentrated investments in publicly traded companies believed to be significantly undervalued and where the General Partner could seek to rapidly close the valuation gap with ‘active’ approaches.” DLP II was liquidated in March 2005. [7] Dolphin Holdings Corp. III was the managing member of Dolphin Associates III, LLC, the general partner of DLP III. According to the defendant's CV, “[s]ince May 2006, DLP III has been principally involved in making sizable concentrated investments in publicly traded companies believed to be significantly undervalued and where the General Partner seeks to rapidly close the valuation gap with ‘active’ approaches.” [8] The plaintiff testified that her aunt was a realtor and the defendant's good friend was a realtor, and together they set the parties up on a blind date. [9] As discussed below, Marcum determined that the Columbus Circle apartment was purchased after the date of the marriage by a limited liability company controlled by the defendant. [10] The Round Hill Road property is near the Westchester County Airport. [11] The transcripts of the recordings were admitted into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibits 238, 239a, and 240a. The defendant also provided transcripts of the recordings. [12] Plaintiff's Exhibit 240a. [13] Plaintiff's Exhibit 236. [14] Plaintiff's Exhibit 239a. [15] The court (Shay, J.T.R.) denied the defendant's motion for contempt for violation of the automatic orders arising from the plaintiff's leaving the home with the children on March 1, 2017. [16] October 20, 2021 transcript (testimony of Elizabeth Ciccone) at 20:1-3. [17] Id. at 20:3-7. [18] Id. at 31:5-11. [19] Plaintiff's Exhibits 387 and 624 (exhibits to the report). [20] Plaintiff's Exhibits 388 and 625 (exhibits to the report). [21] The plaintiff sold the New Jersey condominium in 2006 or 2007 at a profit of $200,000 to $250,000. She testified that the defendant had her deposit the sale proceeds in a UBS account and told her that he would manage the account for her. She later learned that he did not manage the account at all. [22] Plaintiff's Ex. 625 at 3. [23] All references to a party's financial affidavit shall mean the party's current financial affidavit unless otherwise indicated. [24] Plaintiff's Exhibit 387 at 23. [25] Marcum discounted the market value of the defendant's ownership interests in these entities by 5 percent for lack of marketability. See Exhibit 387 at 23. [26] Although the court's construction of the trust agreements is governed by the law of the state of South Dakota, “the ultimate question of whether the value of the entire trust corpus [is] properly attributable to the defendant's estate must be determined under the law of this state.” Tremaine v. Tremaine, 235 Conn. 45, 61, 663 A.2d 387 (1995). [27] The defendant's April 30, 2021 financial affidavit (#517.00) was the first financial affidavit that he filed in this case, more than four years after this dissolution action commenced, that identified the underlying assets of each trust and gave a value for each asset other than the Geneve Holdings stock held by two of the trusts. Plaintiff's Ex. 15. [28] Plaintiff's Exhibit 473. [29] Marcum detailed the following holdings of The Six Cataracts Trust through its ownership of SDAS, LLC, with a total value of $122,678,483: Merrill Lynch #621 Brokerage, $1,067,685; UBS #8E Brokerage, $22,277,587; 0.70 percent interest in Trefoil-Garnet Capital Partners, LP, $1,095,557; 0.17 percent interest in Hawkes Bay Partners, LP, $991,380; 19 percent interest in Geneve Holdings, $97,229,993; 0.25 percent interest in The Ann Holdings, LLC, $16,282. [30] Defendant's Exhibit G. [31] Each is a defined term in the trust agreement. [32] Marcum detailed the following holdings of The DASSA Trust through its ownership of DASSA, LLC, with a value of $34,660,977: UBS #93 Brokerage $1,628,185; 100 percent interest in Rose Associates $1,063,050; 36.48 percent interest in Scann2 Partners $339,934; 6 percent interest in Geneve Holdings $30,704,208; 0.66 percent interest in Trefoil-Garnet Capital Partners, LP $925,600. [33] Plaintiff's Exhibit 489. [34] Each term is a defined term in the trust agreement. [35] Marcum determined that Scout Resources, LLC paid expenses of the Round Hill Road property totaling $1,265,744 during the period January 1, 2014 through October 31, 2020. [36] Marcum detailed the following holdings of The Scout Resources Trust through its ownership of Scout Resources, LLC, with a value of $2,727,548: UBS #8E Brokerage account $835,620; Cash $2,193; the Round Hill Road property $1,889,735. [37] These terms are defined terms in the trust agreement. [38] Judge Shay suggested in 2017 that it would be prudent for the defendant to retain an expert. [39] May 3, 2022 transcript (Testimony of Elizabeth Ciccone) at 31-89. [40] At least one half of the trustees must be Disinterested Trustees immediately after the defendant has exercised the removal power. [41] A child support guidelines worksheet is attached to the December 2017 order. [42] Such expenses included unreimbursed medical, dental, orthodontic, optical, pharmaceutical, psychiatric, and psychological expenses for the children. See December 2017 order at 6. [43] Attorney Welsh analogized the defendant's recent document production to a game of 52 pick-up. [44] Attorney Welsh testified that $628,909 had been paid to Marcum as of September 12, 2022. September 12, 2022 transcript (testimony of Attorney Welsh) at 32:4. [45] September 12, 2022 transcript at 37:14. [46] Although General Statutes § 46b-62 does not expressly provide for an award of expert witness fees, the courts have interpreted § 46b-62 as permitting the award of expert fees incurred in a dissolution action, upon consideration of the parties’ respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82. See Eslami v. Eslami, 218 Conn. 801, 819, 591 A.2d 411 (1991); Medvey v. Medvey, 98 Conn. App. 278, 287, 908 A.2d 1119 (2006). [47] See Dowling v. Szymczak, 309 Conn. 390, 72 A.3d 1 (2013); Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 999 A.2d 721 (2010); Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 995 A.2d 1 (2010); Tuckman v. Tuckman, 127 Conn. App. 417, 14 A.3d 428 (2011), aff'd, 308 Conn. 194, 61 A.3d 449 (2013). [48] General Statutes § 46b-84(d) provides that “[i]n determining whether a child is in need of maintenance and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide such maintenance and the amount thereof, the court shall consider the age, health, station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and sources of income, estate, vocational skills and employability of each of the parents, and the age, health, station, occupation, educational status and expectation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of the child.” [49] There is no support in the record for the defendant's allegations regarding the plaintiff. Neither Dr. Shienvold nor the guardian ad litem share his views. [50] In the event that the plaintiff's removal of her property is delayed until a warmer time of year, the air conditioning shall be on in the Round Hill Road property.