ANTAMEX INTERNATIONAL, INC. and OLDCASTLE BUILDINGENVELOPE, INC., Plaintiffs, v. ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY and ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY. Defendants Civil No. 20-15232 (JHR/AMD) United States District Court, D. New Jersey Filed August 01, 2022 Counsel Benjamin Alex Garber, David L. Braverman, Braverman Kaskey, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs. Steven Cantarutti, David Matthew Farkouh, Coughlin Midlige & Garland LLP, Morristown, NJ, for Defendants. Donio, Ann Marie, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER [D.I. 59] [D.I. 60] *1 This matter comes before the Court by way of two motions filed by Plaintiffs, Antamex International, Inc. (hereinafter, “Antamex”) and Oldcastle BuildingEnvelope, Inc. (hereinafter, “OBE”),[1] regarding discovery issues. First, Plaintiffs filed a motion [D.I. 59] seeking to compel Defendant Zurich Insurance Company (hereinafter, “ZIC”) to produce the producer agreement between ZIC and non-party Hunter, Kielty, Muntz & Beatty (hereinafter, “Hunter Kielty”). Second, Plaintiffs filed a motion [D.I. 60] for an extension of time to complete discovery and for issuance of letters rogatory. Both motions are opposed by Defendants, ZIC and Zurich American Insurance Company (hereinafter, “ZAIC”). The Court has considered the submissions of the parties and decides these matters pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons set forth below and for good cause shown, Plaintiffs’ motions are denied. The instant action involves an insurance coverage dispute in which Plaintiffs generally allege that Defendants wrongfully denied coverage and failed to defend and indemnify Plaintiffs in an underlying litigation concerning a construction project at The Piers at Caesars (hereinafter, “The Piers”) in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The general contractor of the construction project was Tutor Perini Building Corporation (hereinafter, “Tutor Perini”), a non-party in the instant litigation, who subcontracted with Antamex who, in turn, contracted with another subcontractor for the manufacture, fabrication and installation of a glass curtainwall at The Piers. (Second Am. Compl. [D.I. 14], p. 2, ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs allege that the sealant used to manufacture and install the glass curtainwall was defective, which caused “large black streaks to form across the building's glass curtain wall[.]” (Id.) The project owner brought a lawsuit against Tutor Perini, OBE and others regarding the defective sealant, alleging more than $8 million in damages. (Id. at pp. 8-9, ¶¶ 47, 51.) In that litigation, Tutor Perini filed a third-party complaint against Antamex, and Antamex agreed to indemnify Tutor Perini pursuant to its subcontract with Tutor Perini. (Id. at p. 8, ¶ 49.) Plaintiffs assert that Antamex paid $2 million to settle the underlying action and, in addition, incurred hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees, costs and expenses litigating the underlying action on behalf of itself and Tutor Perini. (Id. at p. 9, ¶¶ 52-53.) In connection with the construction project at The Piers, Antamex had obtained insurance policies from ZIC and ZAIC. (Second Am. Compl. [D.I. 14], at pp. 4-7, ¶¶ 21-39.) The commercial general liability policy with ZIC provided that “Zurich agrees to pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become obligated to pay as damages by reason of the liability imposed by law upon the Insured or assumed by the Insured under an Insured Contract. Zurich also agrees to defend any claim or suit against the Insured seeking damages to which this insurance applies ... because of: a) Bodily Injury sustained by any person or persons; b) Property Damage; c) Personal Injury caused by an Occurrence ... [.]” (Id. at p. 5, ¶ 23.) Similarly, the commercial general liability policy with ZAIC provided that ZAIC would “pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies” and that ZAIC would “have the right and duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking those damages.” (Id. at p. 7, ¶ 35.) Plaintiffs allege in this action that Antamex made demands upon Defendants pursuant to these insurance policies for indemnity and defense in the underlying litigation, but both ZAIC and ZIC denied coverage. (Id. at pp. 9-10, ¶¶ 57-59.) One of the bases upon which Defendants denied coverage was that OBE was not a named insured under the relevant policies. (See id.) Plaintiffs now assert in this case claims against Defendants for breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and they seek to recover herein the settlement costs, legal fees and other expenses incurred by Antamex in the underlying litigation. (See id. at pp. 2, 12-13, ¶¶ 2, 80-93.) *2 At issue in the present motion to compel is a producer agreement between ZIC and Hunter Kielty, the producer company associated with the ZIC policies. (Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Compel Production of Documents [D.I. 59-1], pp. 1-2.) Plaintiffs contend that pursuant to the subcontract between Tutor Perini and Antamex, Antamex added Tutor Perini as an additional insured to its policies carried by ZIC, which was purportedly evidenced by a certificate of insurance issued by Hunter Kielty. (Id. at p. 2.) Plaintiffs represent that Tutor Perini made claims to ZIC for indemnification and coverage in the underlying litigation under Antamex's policies, but ZIC “never considered Perini's claim or made any coverage decisions related thereto.” (Id. at p. 3)(emphasis omitted). Plaintiffs also represent that ZAIC denied Tutor Perini's claim for coverage “in part based on the grounds that Perini was purportedly not a named insured.” (Id.) Plaintiffs assert that because ZAIC refused to indemnify and ZIC refused to consider Tutor Perini's claim in connection with the underlying litigation, “Antamex was forced to defend and indemnify Perini itself” which, as set forth above, included legal fees and settlement of the underlying litigation. (Id.) Plaintiffs now seek the producer agreement between Hunter Kielty and ZIC “to determine what authority Hunter Kielty had to issue certificates of insurance for the policies and bind Defendants by such certificates.” (Id. at p. 7.) Plaintiffs argue that “Hunter Kielty's authority is directly relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims as it bears directly on Defendants’ obligations to provide coverage under the policies.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also argue that the objections asserted by Defendants in response to Plaintiffs’ discovery request were boilerplate in nature and therefore should be deemed waived. (Id. at pp. 7-8.) Defendants oppose production of the producer agreement between ZIC and Hunter Kielty on grounds of relevance. Defendants note that Tutor Perini is not a party to this case, that the Second Amended Complaint does not contain a claim on behalf of Tutor Perini, and that Plaintiffs’ assertion in the present motion papers concerning ZIC's failure to consider Tutor Perini's claim falls outside the scope of the pleadings. (Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Opp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel Production of Documents Identified as “Producer Agreements” with Hunter, Kielty, Muntz & Beatty [D.I. 64], p. 8.) Defendants argue that while the claims in the Second Amended Complaint relate to “Plaintiffs’ claim for coverage with respect to a demand for indemnification of Perini under Antamex's policies,” the issue of “whether additional insured coverage should have been provided” to Tutor Perini is “separate and distinct” from the claims in this case. (Id. at pp. 8-9.) Defendants argue in this respect that Plaintiffs have not “pleaded any allegations that they are pursuing coverage on Perini's behalf in this litigation.” (Id. at p. 4.) Defendants also argue that the producer agreement is confidential and proprietary and therefore protected from disclosure or, at a minimum, should be produced only in redacted form. (Id. at p. 10.) Finally, Defendants argue that their objections should not be deemed waived because they “served written responses and objections, had a meet and confer, and filed [an] opposition brief (in addition to at least twice discussing this issue at status conferences).” (Id. at p. 9.) The scope of discovery is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), which provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Further, “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. The party seeking discovery bears the burden of demonstrating its relevance as defined by Rule 26(b). See Caver v. City of Trenton, 192 F.R.D. 154, 159 (D.N.J. 2000). The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that the producer agreement between Tutor Perini and ZIC is relevant to the claims in this case. Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1), the parameters for discovery purposes are defined by the claims and defenses contained in the pleadings. Thus, as defined by the Second Amended Complaint, the claims in this litigation are claims by Antamex and OBE based upon ZIC's and ZAIC's failure to provide coverage under the insurance policies issued to Antamex. Noticeably absent from the Second Amended Complaint is any claim for ZIC's failure to consider Perini's claim as an additional insured. Tutor Perini is not a party in this case and does not seek to assert its additional insured rights in this litigation, nor do Plaintiffs seek in the pleadings to enforce the additional insured rights of Tutor Perini. Instead, Plaintiffs here assert claims against Defendants for failure to provide coverage to Plaintiffs for their indemnification costs. As the issue of whether coverage should have been provided to Tutor Perini as an additional insured is separate and distinct from the claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint, Hunter Kielty's authority to bind ZIC to provide coverage to Tutor Perini as an additional insured is not relevant to the contractual indemnification issues here. The Court, consequently, concludes that the producer agreement between Hunter Kielty and ZIC is not relevant for discovery purposes, and Plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of this document is therefore denied.[2] *3 In so finding, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendants waived any objections to Plaintiffs’ discovery request because of the allegedly boilerplate nature of Defendants’ objections. While it is well-established that “[b]road-based, non-specific objections ... fall woefully short of the burden that must be borne by a party making an objection to an interrogatory or document request” and “ ‘may result in waiver of the objections[,]’ ” Harding v. Dana Transp., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1084, 1102 (D.N.J. 1996) (internal citation omitted), a supplement which contains specific objections to the discovery requests may be considered by the court. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 260, 264 (N.D. Ill. 1979 (“Although the filing by plaintiffs of the catch-all objection was clearly improper, the supplement filed after the time to respond had run contained specific objections to the interrogatories. The supplemental objections will be considered[.]”). In support of the argument that boilerplate objections constitute a waiver of objections, Plaintiffs cite NE Technologies, Inc. v. Evolving Systems, Inc., No. 06-6061, 2008 WL 4277668, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2008), in which the court “acknowledge[d] that in some circumstances, boilerplate objections can constitute a waiver of objection.” In NE Technologies, however, the court deemed the objections sufficient and not waived where the party who provided allegedly deficient objections thereafter set forth the basis for its objections in its brief in opposition to a motion to compel. NE Techs., 2008 WL 4277668, at *5. Similarly, here, Defendants provided a more specific basis for their relevance objection in opposition to the motion to compel, and the Court finds that such objections are sufficient and not waived.[3] Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen discovery and for issuance of letters rogatory. Plaintiffs represent that on January 4, 2022, they served upon ZIC a notice of deposition for Stephanie Frost, a former ZIC employee who was purportedly primarily responsible for underwriting the relevant insurance polices. (Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. to Reopen Discovery and for the Issuance of Letters Rogatory (hereinafter, “Pls.’ Br.”) [D.I. 60-1], p. 2.) On March 4, 2022, ZIC notified Plaintiffs that Ms. Frost would not voluntarily appear as a witness for ZIC. (Id.) On March 11, 2022, Plaintiffs sent a letter to the Court advising that they require the deposition of Ms. Frost and requesting the issuance of letters rogatory because Ms. Frost lives in Canada. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) The Court conducted a status conference on March 30, 2022, at which time the issue of Ms. Frost's deposition was addressed. (See Order [D.I. 58], Mar. 30, 2022, p. 2, ¶ 4.) Because the discovery period was to expire the following day, Plaintiffs were directed to file a motion to reopen discovery to obtain Ms. Frost's deposition and a motion for issuance of a letter of request. (Id.) Plaintiffs filed the instant motion addressing both issues on April 15, 2022. Plaintiffs contend that they require the deposition of Ms. Frost because she purportedly has direct knowledge concerning what ZIC knew about the acquisition of Antamex, which bears on Plaintiffs’ claim that ZIC should have provided coverage to OBE in the underlying litigation. (Pls.’ Br. at p. 2.) Plaintiffs request that discovery be reopened for the limited purpose of obtaining Ms. Frost's deposition. (See Proposed Order [D.I. 60-3].) Plaintiffs argue that there is good cause to reopen discovery because they requested the deposition within the discovery period and did not learn that Ms. Frost would not voluntarily appear for a deposition until March 4, 2022, less than a month before the end of the fact discovery period. (Pls.’ Br. at p. 3.) Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that the deposition of Ms. Frost is necessary because she was “primarily responsible for underwriting the relevant insurance policies” and can offer “firsthand knowledge about what the underwriters understood about the relationship between Antamex and OBE at the time the policies were written.” (Id. at p. 4.) *4 In opposition to the motion, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate good cause to reopen discovery. Defendants note that Plaintiffs served a deposition notice for Ms. Frost on January 4, 2022, less than two months before the close of fact discovery, and waited nearly forty days after learning that Ms. Frost would not voluntarily appear for a deposition before filing the instant motion. (Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Opp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Reopen Discovery and for the Issuance of Letters Rogatory (hereinafter, “Defs.’ Opp. Br.”) [D.I. 65], p. 4.) Defendants also argue that the deposition of Ms. Frost is not discoverable under Rule 26(b) because the information Ms. Frost may have, if any, is cumulative and duplicative of other discovery that Defendants have already produced. (Id. at pp. 6-7.) Defendants note in this regard that they produced the underwriting file, which “should be the primary source for information about what knowledge ZIC had, if any, regarding OBE's acquisition of Antamex in the 2006-2007 period of underwriting[,]” as well as a corporate designee for topics relating to underwriting of the policies and responses to interrogatories and document requests. (Id. at p. 7.) Defendants also note that Plaintiffs are another primary source for this information because they have knowledge of “what Plaintiffs or their representatives communicated to ZIC” about the relationship between Antamex and OBE. (Id.) Further, Defendants assert that the last ZIC policy at issue began on March 31, 2006, and thus “the underwriting of the policy was concluded prior to the acquisition by OBE months later in August 2006.” (Id.) Finally, Defendants note that Ms. Frost last worked on the Antamex account fifteen years ago. (Id.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 “provides courts with the “discretion to manage the schedule of litigation[.]”” Faiella v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., -- F.R.D. --, No. 18-11383, 2022 WL 827146, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2022) (quoting Carroll v. Delaware River Port Auth., No. 13-2833, 2015 WL 12819181, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015)). As this Court set forth in Faiella: Rule 16(b)(4) states that “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Good cause in this context is established when “the party seeking the extension” can “show that the deadlines set forth in the scheduling order ‘cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’ ” Williams v. Sullivan, No. 08-1210, 2011 WL 2119095, at *4 (D.N.J. May 20, 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee note to 1983 Amendment). “Good cause may also be satisfied if the movant shows that the inability to comply with a scheduling order is ‘due to any mistake, excusable neglect or any other factor which might understandably account for failure of counsel to undertake to comply with the Scheduling Order.’ ” Id. (quoting Newton v. Dana Corp., Parish Div., No. 94-4958, 1995 WL 368172, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1995)). If the movant cannot demonstrate good cause, “the scheduling order shall control.” Id.(citations omitted).... Courts in this District have noted that the focus of a Rule 16 analysis is the moving party's diligence and not prejudice to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Lasermaster Int'l Inc. v. Netherlands Ins. Co., No. 15-7614, 2021 WL 3616197, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2021)(“ ‘Rule 16(b)(4) focuses on the moving party's burden to show due diligence.’ ”) (quoting Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 84 (3d Cir. 2010)); GlobespanVirata, Inc. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., No. 03-2854, 2005 WL 1638136, at *3-4 (D.N.J. July 12, 2005)(same). Id. “[S]cheduling orders are at the heart of case management. If they can be disregarded without a specific showing of good cause, their utility will be severely impaired.” Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1986). The Court finds good cause to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of taking the deposition of Ms. Frost. Plaintiffs noticed Ms. Frost's deposition on January 4, 2022, at which time the fact discovery deadline was February 28, 2022, and Plaintiffs thus noticed the deposition well before the close of the discovery period. In addition, at the time Plaintiffs noticed the deposition, they “understood that ZIC was attempting to determine possible dates for Ms. Frost's deposition” (Pls.’ Br. at p. 2), and Plaintiffs therefore did not know at the time they noticed the deposition that a letter of request would be necessary to obtain Ms. Frost's deposition. The Court subsequently extended the discovery period until March 31, 2022 and, within one week of learning that Ms. Frost would not voluntarily appear, Plaintiffs sent a letter to the Court regarding this discovery issue. Under these circumstances, where Plaintiffs sought the discovery well within the discovery period, learned that the discovery must be obtained by way of letter of request with less than one month remaining in the discovery period, promptly raised the issue with the Court prior to the expiration of the discovery period, and timely filed the instant motion, the Court finds good cause to extend the discovery period for the limited purpose of obtaining the deposition of Ms. Frost. *5 Despite finding good cause to extend the discovery deadline, however, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a need to obtain Ms. Frost's deposition by way of letter of request. A letter of request, or a letter rogatory, “denotes a formal request from a court in which an action is pending, to a foreign court to perform some judicial act” including “requests for the taking of evidence, the serving of a summons, subpoena, or other legal notice, or the execution of a civil judgment.” 22 C.F.R. § 92.54. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28, “[a] deposition may be taken in a foreign country ... under a letter of request, whether or not captioned a ‘letter rogatory[.]’ ”[4] Further, Local Civil Rule 28.1 provides that “[a] party seeking execution of Letters Rogatory shall comply with the provisions of the Hague Convention, 28 U.S.C. § 1781 et seq.” L. CIV. R. 28.1. “The decision to issue letters rogatory lies squarely within the court's discretion.” Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Sandoz, Inc., Nos. 12-3289, 12-3324, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201037, at *7 (D.N.J. June 7, 2013) “The Supreme Court has explained that in deciding whether to issue letters rogatory, a court should ‘exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position.’ ” Merck, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201037, at *5 (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987)). The Supreme Court noted in Societe Nationale that “[w]hen it is necessary to seek evidence abroad, [ ] the district court must supervise pretrial proceedings particularly closely to prevent discovery abuses.” 482 U.S. at 546. In deciding whether to issue a letter of request, the court must consider “the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove effective.” Id. at 544. In this regard, a comity analysis requires evaluation of the following factors: (1) the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other information requested; (2) the degree of specificity of the request; (3) whether the information originated in the United States; (4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and (5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located. Id. at 544 n.28 (internal quotation omitted). The party seeking foreign discovery carries the burden of persuading the Court of the necessity of proceeding under the Hague Evidence Convention. See Merck, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201037, at *6 (“[T]he party seeking application of the Hague Convention bears the burden of persuading the trial court of its necessity.”); Tulip Computers Int'l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474 (D. Del. 2003)(“ ‘A party which seeks the application of the Hague [Evidence] Convention procedures rather than the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] bears the burden of persuading the trial court[ ]’ of the necessity of proceeding pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention.”)(quoting Valois of Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344, 346 (D.Conn. 1997)).[5] *6 In this case, Plaintiffs must utilize the Hague Evidence Convention because Ms. Frost is not a party to this litigation, has not voluntarily subjected herself to discovery, resides in Canada, and does not otherwise appear subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Plaintiffs, however, do not address any of the Societe Nationale factors to support their request for issuance of a letter of request for Ms. Frost's deposition. As set forth below, the Court finds that principles of international comity do not support Plaintiffs’ request at this time. In considering the importance of Ms. Frost's deposition testimony, Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Frost purportedly is the only individual who understands the “knowledge the [ZIC] underwriters had about OBE and the acquisition of Antamex[.]” (Pls.’ Br. at p. 2.) Plaintiffs, however, fail to support their conclusory assertion that Ms. Frost has information concerning the acquisition of Antamex. From a temporal perspective, the underwriting was concluded in March 2006, prior to the acquisition of Antamex in August 2006, and there is no evidence that Ms. Frost or any other ZIC representative was informed of the anticipated acquisition at the time of the underwriting. Indeed, ZIC's Rule 30(b)(6) witness testified that in February 2006, a “complete review” was done “of all of the named insureds to be added to the policy” and that “Oldcastle is not mentioned[.]” (Defs.’ Opp. Br., Ex. A [D.I. 65-1], p. 84:1-6.) Moreover, the Court finds it significant that Plaintiffs do not assert that they provided direct notice of the acquisition to Ms. Frost or another ZIC representative at the time of the underwriting, nor do they cite any other evidence – from the underwriting file, corporate designee testimony, or other sources – to demonstrate that Ms. Frost had notice of the anticipated acquisition at the time of the underwriting. Plaintiffs therefore have not made a predicate showing that Ms. Frost may have information concerning the acquisition of Antamex at the time of the underwriting, and accordingly they fail to demonstrate that Ms. Frost's deposition will yield any evidence, let alone important evidence, concerning the issues in this case. Thus, the first comity factor weighs against issuance of a letter of request. Closely related to the first comity factor is the fourth comity factor, the availability of alternative means of securing the information. Defendants argue that other sources contain information concerning ZIC's knowledge of the acquisition of Antamex, as ZIC produced its underwriting file, a Rule 30(b)(6) corporate designee for topics relating to the underwriting of the policies, and interrogatory responses on this issue. (Defs.’ Opp. Br. at p. 7.) Defendants further note that “the other primary source for any information that the underwriters could have had at the time” was Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs know what information they communicated to ZIC concerning the acquisition of Antamex. (Id.) The Court agrees that the information that Plaintiffs seek from Ms. Frost – to the extent she has any information – can be obtained from Plaintiffs themselves, in the underwriting file that has already been produced to Plaintiffs, or from corporate designee testimony and interrogatory responses. Plaintiffs have not articulated a sufficient need to resort to the Hague Evidence Convention, as the information they seek from Ms. Frost is available from alternative sources. The fourth comity factor thus weighs against issuance of a letter of request. *7 As to the second comity factor, the specificity of the request, Plaintiffs have not provided a copy of the deposition notice they previously served on ZIC for Ms. Frost's deposition or the subpoena they intend to serve on Ms. Frost, and consequently the Court cannot conclude that the deposition topics are sufficiently narrowly tailored. The second comity factor therefore does not at this time support the issuance of a letter request. Factor three, whether the information originated in the United States, appears to weigh in favor of issuance of a letter of request. As set forth in the Second Amended Complaint, Antamex is a Canadian corporation with a principal place of business in Ontario, Canada. (Second Am. Compl. [D.I. 14], pp. 2-3, ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs represent that Ms. Frost is also a resident of Canada. (Pls.’ Br. at p. 2.) ZIC's Rule 30(b)(6) deponent was located in Canada for her deposition, and she testified that she has “responsibility for oversight of the liability portfolio for Zurich” in Canada. (Defs.’ Opp. Br., Ex. A at p. 6:13-18.) Given that Ms. Frost worked in ZIC's Canadian office and Antamex is a Canadian corporation, it is likely that any information Ms. Frost received concerning the underwriting of the policy and the acquisition of Antamex – to the extent any such information may exist – originated outside of the United States. Finally, with respect to the fifth comity factor, the Court notes that no party has addressed this factor and, therefore, the Court finds that this factor neither supports nor weighs against issuance of a letter of request. Weighing the five factors set forth above, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of demonstrating the necessity and reasonableness of permitting discovery pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention. The Court and the parties have an important interest in a speedy resolution of this litigation, and issuance of a letter of request at this stage of the litigation will significantly delay the resolution of this matter. See Merck, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201037, at *13 (noting that “letters rogatory procedure can be complicated, dilatory and expensive”). Plaintiffs have already exchanged their affirmative expert report, Defendants are in the process of preparing their rebuttal report, and the dispositive motion deadline is approaching. In the absence of a showing that Ms. Frost is likely to have any information concerning the acquisition of Antamex, the Court does not find a sufficient need to proceed under the Hague Evidence Convention, which will further delay resolution of the matter. Defendants provided numerous alternative sources for the information that Plaintiffs seek, including the underwriting file, corporate designee testimony and interrogatory responses, and Plaintiffs are also a source of the information they otherwise seek through the deposition. Plaintiffs’ motion for issuance of a letter of request is therefore denied. CONSEQUENTLY, for the reasons set forth above and for good cause shown: IT IS on this 1st day of August 2022, ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion [D.I. 59] to compel Zurich Insurance Company to produce the producer agreement between Zurich Insurance Company and Hunter, Kielty, Muntz & Beatty shall be, and is hereby, DENIED; and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion [D.I. 60] for an extension of time to complete discovery and for issuance of letters rogatory shall be, and is hereby, DENIED. Footnotes [1] Plaintiffs represent that OBE is the successor-in-interest to Antamex. (Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Compel Production of Documents [D.I. 59-1], p. 1.) [2] Having concluded that the producer agreement is not relevant to any claims or defenses asserted in this litigation, the Court need not address Defendant's alternative argument concerning the purported proprietary nature of the producer agreement. [3] During the conference held on the record on March 30, 2022, the Court ruled on all of Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ discovery request except for the objection based on lack of relevance, which the Court directed the parties to address by way of formal motion. Defendants articulated the basis of their relevance objection during the conference and, as set forth above, further explained the basis for their objection in opposition to the instant motion to compel. [4] Rule 28 previously utilized the term “letter rogatory,” but the language of the rule was amended in 1993 to refer to a “letter of request” because “it is the primary method provided by the Hague Convention.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 28 advisory committee note to 1993 Amendment. “A letter rogatory is essentially a form of letter of request.” Id. [5] Some courts have held that the party opposing the issuance of a letter of request bears the burden of demonstrating why such application should be denied. See, e.g., Abraxis BioScience, LLC v. Actavis, LLC, No. 16-1925, 2017 WL 2293347, at *2 (D.N.J. May 25, 2017) (“ ‘[S]ome good reason must be shown by the opposing party for a court to deny an application for a letter rogatory.’ ”)(quoting Jovanovic v. Northrop Grumman Corp., No. 05-4487, 2008 WL 4950064, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2008)); Triumph Aerostructures, LLC v. Comau, Inc., No. 14-2329, 2015 WL 5502625, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2015)(“the burden lies with the party resisting the request for discovery to show a lack of relevance or undue burden”). The Third Circuit has not addressed which party bears the burden in connection with an application for issuance of a letter of request. This Court agrees with those courts which have held that the party seeking issuance of the letter of request bears the burden of demonstrating a need to seek evidence abroad. Nonetheless, to the extent the burden is on Defendants to demonstrate a basis for denial of Plaintiffs’ motion, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden by demonstrating that alternative sources of evidence, which have already been produced, will provide the same information Plaintiffs seek to obtain from Ms. Frost, and that resort to the Hague Evidence Convention is thus unnecessary.