Mauricio JASSO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., Defendants Case No. 2:20-cv-00858-CDS-BNW United States District Court, D. Nevada Signed November 17, 2022 Counsel Amanda Suarez, Pro Hac Vice, Andrew E. Beaulieu, Pro Hac Vice, Jeffrey W. Gutchess, Pro Hac Vice, Joanna Niworowski, Pro Hac Vice, Irina Sadovnic, Pro Hac Vice, AXS Law Group, PLLC, Miami, FL, Courtney Caprio, Pro Hac Vice, Caprio Law, P.A., Miami, FL, Anthony P. Sgro, Colleen N. Savage, I, Jennifer W. Arledge, Sgro and Roger, Las Vegas, NV, Kelly B. Stout, Hone Law, Henderson, NV, for Plaintiffs. Erica J. Stutman, Gregory Marshall, Pro Hac Vice, Jacob C. Jones, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, AZ, Hayley J. Cummings, Richard Gordon, Jeffrey L. Willis, Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., Las Vegas, NV, Jill Griset, Pro Hac Vice, McGuireWoods LLP, Charlotte, NC, for Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Erica J. Stutman, Jacob C. Jones, Gregory Marshall, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, AZ, Hayley J. Cummings, Richard Gordon, Jeffrey L. Willis, Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant Katherine Darrall. Erica J. Stutman, Jacob C. Jones, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, AZ, Hayley J. Cummings, Jeffrey L. Willis, Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., Las Vegas, NV, Mark J. Connot, Rex Garner, Fox Rothschild, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant Jose Rico. Weksler, Brenda, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER re ECF No. 278 *1 Before the Court is Plaintiffs Mauricio Jasso et al.’s motion to seal. ECF No. 278. No opposition has been filed as the documents in question derive from a third party. Plaintiffs seeks to seal Exhibits D, F, and K filed in connection with their motion to compel (at ECF No. 277) and to redact the portion of the motion discussing those exhibits. The unredacted motion and all exhibits are currently sealed at ECF No. 280. Plaintiffs explain the information in question was produced by a third party (Bank of America, N.A.) that has designated these documents as confidential, triggering the protective order in place at ECF No. 25. I. Analysis Generally, the public has a right to inspect and copy judicial records. Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Such records are presumptively publicly accessible. Id. Consequently, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption. Id. In the case of dispositive motions, the party seeking to seal the record must articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process. Id. at 1178–79 (alteration and internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has further held that the full presumption of public access applies to technically non-dispositive motions and attached documents as well if the motion is “more than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). Among the compelling reasons which may justify sealing a record are when such “court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, avoiding a litigant's embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records. Id. “[A] different standard applies to ‘private materials unearthed during discovery,’ as such documents are not part of the judicial record.” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180). Under Rule 26(c), a court may enter a protective order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” “The relevant standard for purposes of Rule 26(c) is whether good cause exists to protect the information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality.” Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Given the “weaker public interest in nondispositive materials,” the court applies the good cause standard in evaluating whether to seal documents attached to a nondispositive motion. Id. “Nondispositive motions ‘are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action,’ and, as a result, the public's interest in accessing dispositive materials does ‘not apply with equal force’ to non-dispositive materials.” Id. (citing Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). It is within the court's discretion whether to seal documents. Id. at 679. A. Good cause exists to seal the exhibits attached to Plaintiff's motion and to redact portions of the motion discussing the exhibits. *2 Because Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is not dispositive or more than tangentially related to the merits of the case, the Court applies the good cause standard. First, the Court notes that stipulated protective orders alone do not justify sealing court records. See, e.g., Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that reliance on a blanket protective order, without more, will not make a showing of good cause); Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475–76 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that blanket stipulated protective orders are over inclusive by nature and do not include a finding of “good cause”). Blanket protective orders are designed to facilitate discovery exchanges; they do not provide a finding that any specific documents are secret or confidential to overcome the presumption of public access. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 (addressing “the hazard of stipulated protective orders,” and noting they often “purport to put the entire litigation under lock and key without regard to the actual requirements of Rule 26(c)”). Here, the Court finds good cause to seal the documents in question as these documents contain confidential and private information regarding specific financial accounts. In addition, the public's understanding of the judicial process would not be served by having access to this information. As a result, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal will be granted. II. Conclusion and Order IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs Mauricio Jasso et al.’s Motion to Seal (ECF No. 278) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to maintain under seal ECF No. 280.