E. HANLIN BAVELY, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE OF AAA SPORTS, INC., Plaintiff, v. PANINI AMERICA, INC., Defendant Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-093 United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division Filed January 27, 2023 Mazzant III, Amos L., United States District Judge ORDER *1 Pending before the Court is Defendant Panini America, Inc.'s Motion to Quash Plaintiff's Subpoenas Issued to Third Parties NFL and NFLPA (Dkt. #90). Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the Motion should be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. BACKGROUND The background of this lawsuit as it relates to discovery between the parties is more thoroughly set forth in the Court's order on Plaintiff's motions to compel (Dkt. #104). On February 10, 2022, Plaintiff E. Hanlin Bavely, Chapter 7 Trustee of AAA Sports, Inc., filed this lawsuit, accusing Defendant Panini America, Inc. of copyright infringement and violating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the “DMCA”) (Dkt. #1). On March 14, 2022, Defendant filed its Answer and Counterclaims, denying Plaintiff's allegations and asserting defenses (Dkt. #10). On November 2, 2022, Defendant filed its Amended Answer (Dkt. #63). On December 12, 2022, Defendant filed this Motion, asking the Court to quash subpoenas to the National Football League (the “NFL”) and the National Football League Players Association (the “NFLPA”), as well as enter a protective order (Dkt. #90). On December 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed its response (Dkt. #98), and, on December 27, 2022, Defendant filed its reply (Dkt. #100). LEGAL STANDARD I. Motion to Quash Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), parties “may obtain discovery regarding any non[-]privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense ....” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance, for the purposes of Rule 26(b)(1), is when the request is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Crosby v. La. Health & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011). Relevant information includes “any matter that bears on, or that could reasonably lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). In other words, “[r]elevancy is broadly construed, and a request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is ‘any possibility’ that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” S.E.C. v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 437 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (quoting Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 470 (N.D. Tex. 2005)). Consequently, “[u]nless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of a party, the request for discovery should be allowed.” Brady, 238 F.R.D. at 437. The Court has provided guidance in matters of discovery. The Court's scheduling order requires that the parties produce, as part of their initial disclosure, “documents containing, information ‘relevant to the claim or defense of any party.’ ” (Dkt. #21 at p. 3). Moreover, the Local Rules of the Eastern District of Texas provide further guidance suggesting that information is “relevant to any party's claim or defense [if]: (1) it includes information that would not support the disclosing parties' contentions; ... (4) it is information that deserves to be considered in the preparation, evaluation or trial of a claim or defense....” LOCAL RULE CV-26(d). It is well established that “control of discovery is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 341 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Williamson v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 382 (5th Cir. 1987)). *2 Pursuant to Rule 45(d)(3), upon timely motion, “the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that,” inter alia, requires disclosure of privileged or protected matter or subjects a person to undue burden. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A). “The court must balance the need for discovery by the requesting party and the relevance of the discovery to the case against the harm, prejudice, or burden to the other party.” RYH Props., LLC v. West, 2011 WL 13196550, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2011) (citing Cmedia, LLC v. LifeKey Healthcare, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 387, 389 (N.D. Tex. 2003)). When determining whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome, a court may consider: “(1) relevance of the information requested, (2) the need of the party for the documents, (3) the breadth of the document request, (4) the time period covered by the request, (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents, and (6) the burden imposed.” West, 2011 WL 13196550, at *2 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004); Brady, 238 F.R.D. at 437). The Court may also consider whether “the subpoena was issued to a non-party to the litigation and the expense and inconvenience of compliance to the non-party.” Id. (citing Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818). The moving party has the burden of showing “that compliance with the subpoena[s] would be unreasonable and oppressive.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818. II. Protective Order Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), the Court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). The burden is upon the party seeking the protective order “to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, a protective order is warranted in those instances in which the party seeking it demonstrates good cause and a specific need for protection. See Laundry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 901 F.2d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for protective order because it is “in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984); see Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 684 (5th Cir. 1985). ANALYSIS Defendant filed the current motion requesting the Court enter a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).[1] Plaintiff served the NFL and NFLPA with subpoenas requesting essentially the same information and documentation that Plaintiff has already asked this Court to compel Defendant to produce. Additionally, through the subpoenas, Plaintiff seeks internal communications from the NFL and NFLPA about the “Stat Smashers” card inserts. Specifically, the subpoena served on the NFL and NFLPA requests: REQUEST NO. 1: All documents and communications concerning the Copyrighted Works. REQUEST NO. 2: All proofs and pictures submitted to You concerning to the Copyrighted Works. REQUEST NO. 3: All documents and communications concerning the 2020 Accused Products. REQUEST NO. 4: All proofs and pictures submitted to You concerning the 2020 Accused Products. REQUEST NO. 5: All documents and communications concerning the 2021 Accused Products. REQUEST NO. 6: All proofs and pictures submitted to You concerning the 2021 Accused Products. REQUEST NO. 7: All documents and communications between You and Panini concerning copyright licensing. REQUEST NO. 8: All documents and communications concerning or referencing any products, trading cards, or otherwise that contain the phrase “Stat Smashers.” REQUEST NO. 9: All documents and communications concerning or referencing any products, trading cards, or otherwise that contain the phrase “Stat Smashers.” REQUEST NO. 10: All documents and communications concerning or referencing any products, trading cards, or otherwise that contain the phrase “Wild Card.” *3 [REQUEST NO. 11:] All documents and communications concerning AAA. (Dkt. #90, Exhibit 1 at p. 11). I. Standing As an initial matter, Plaintiff contends that Defendant does not have standing to bring this motion on a nonparty's behalf. The Court disagrees. It is true that a party generally does not have standing to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued to a third party. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3), a court “shall quash or modify [a] subpoena if it requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no exception or waiver applies, or [if it] subjects a person to undue burden.” Dean v. Anderson, 2002 WL 1377729, *3 (D. Kan. 2002) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) and (iv)). “[O]nly the party or person to whom the subpoena is directed has standing to move to quash or otherwise object to a subpoena.” Id. (citations omitted). However, there are exceptions to this general rule. A party can challenge a subpoena issued to a nonparty when the party is in possession or control of the materials subpoenaed or “where the party seeking to challenge the subpoena has a personal right or privilege with respect to the subject matter requested in the subpoena.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1979) (internal citations omitted) (ruling movants lacked standing because they were not in possession of the materials subpoenaed and had no personal right or privilege in the materials subpoenaed); Bounds v. Cap. Area Fam. Violence Intervention Ctr., Inc., 314 F.R.D. 214, 218 (M.D. La. 2016) (“Parties have limited standing to quash subpoenas served on non-parties pursuant to Rule 45.”) (internal citation omitted); Black v. DMNO, LLC, No. 16-02708, 2018 WL 488991, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2018) (“[I]n order to challenge the subpoena, the movant must be: in possession or control of the requested material; be the person to whom the subpoena is issued; or have a personal right or privilege in the subject matter of the subpoena.”) (internal citations omitted). Defendant argues that Requests No. 1–10 implicate proprietary or confidential information relating to its business and finances. According to Defendant, the documents implicated by these requests, “by their very nature, contain proprietary and confidential business information concerning Panini's customers, the terms of the exclusive licensing agreement, exclusive licensing requirements for products, financial information related to the exclusive licensing agreement, and confidential business communications” (Dkt. #90 at p. 5). Plaintiff, for its part, does not make any real attempt to dispute Defendant's assertion that these documents contain proprietary or privileged information. Instead, Plaintiff declares that “there are no good-faith arguments Panini can raise as to ‘privacy or proprietary interest’ in the otherwise relevant documents” (Dkt. #98 at pp. 15–16) and focuses its brief on its contention that Defendant can make no argument about quashing these documents for overbreadth or undue burden. *4 In short, it is irrelevant whether Defendant has standing under Rule 45 because Defendant also brought its motion under Rule 26(c). This is significant because “a party has standing to move for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) ... even if the party does not have standing pursuant to Rule 45(d).” Bounds v. Cap. Area Fam. Violence Intervention Ctr., Inc., 314 F.R.D. 214, 218 (M.D. La. 2016); see also Kilmon v. Saulsbury Indus., Inc., No. MO:17-CV-99, 2018 WL 5800759, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018) (“A motion for a protective order may be made by any party and such party may seek a Rule 26(c) protective order if it believes its own interest is jeopardized by discovery sought from a third person.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, any party to litigation has standing to move for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) seeking to limit the scope of discovery, even if the party does not have standing pursuant to Rule 45(d) to bring a motion to quash a third-party subpoena. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Charles W. Smith & Sons Funeral Home, Inc., No. 4:21-CV-00731, 2022 WL 3566927, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2022) (citing Bounds, 314 F.R.D. at 218). “Given that [Plaintiff] does not challenge [Defendant's] standing under Rule 26, [Defendant's] standing argument under Rule 45 is largely irrelevant.” Garcia v. Prof'l Cont. Servs., Inc., No. A-15-CV-585-LY, 2017 WL 187577, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2017). Accordingly, as a party to this litigation, Defendant has standing under Rule 26 to seek a limitation on the scope of the subpoenas and the Court may consider Defendant's motion. Rule 26(c)(1) authorizes protective orders, for good cause shown, “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). Additionally, a party can challenge relevance under Rule 26(c). Crescent City Remodeling, LLC v. CMR Constr. & Roofing, LLC, No. CV 22-859, 2022 WL 17403556, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 2, 2022). The Court has broad discretion to decide whether to issue a protective order. See Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 684 (5th Cir. 1985). The trial court enjoys wide discretion in setting the parameters of a protective order, including whether to grant or deny a request for a protective order and how far to restrict discovery. Crescent City, 2022 WL 17403556, at *3. To determine whether a protective order is appropriate, the Court must keep in mind that a party may discover “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Discovery outside of this scope, however, is prohibited. See id. at (b)(2), (C)(iii). Rule 26 also requires that discovery, even if relevant, be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. at (b)(1). Rule 26 offers a variety of potential options that the court may use to protect the moving party, including forbidding or limiting the scope of discovery into certain matters or requiring other confidential commercial information not be revealed or be revealed in only a certain way. Id. at (c)(1)(D), (G). A district court may exercise its sound discretion in determining how far to restrict discovery; and, in particular, in determining whether to grant or deny a request for a protective order is entrusted to the district court's sound discretion. II. Protective Order Defendant argues that the Court should enter a protective order regarding the subject matter of the subpoenas because the subpoenas are(1) harassing, (2) unnecessary and disproportionate to the needs of the case, thus imposing an undue burden on non-parties NFL and NFLPA, (3) overly broad and seeking confidential information, (4) concern subject matter that is already at issue in a motion to compel, (5) exceed the number of depositions allowed under Federal Rule 30, and (6) seek information and testimony that are irrelevant to the claims and defenses in this lawsuit. *5 Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that gathering information from the NFL and NFLPA regarding licensing agreement between the NFL, NFLPA, and Defendant, as any potential communications about the “Stat Smashers” card inserts, is necessary to litigate its case. According to Plaintiff, because these documents and communications are “highly probative of each of the claims asserted in this action” (Dkt. #98 at p. 6), the Court must deny Defendant's motion in its entirety. The Court disagrees. The Court concludes that the subpoenas issued on the NFL and NFLPA request irrelevant records and are unduly burdensome. Because the Court can dispose of the motion based on the irrelevant and burdensome nature of the subpoena requests, the Court will not address the other arguments made by the parties. A. Request No. 7 In Request No. 7, Plaintiff asks the NFL and NFLPA to produce “[a]ll documents and communications between You [the NFL and NFLPA] and Panini concerning copyright licensing” (Dkt. #90, Exhibit 1 at p. 11). 1. Relevance The threshold for relevance at the discovery stage is lower than at the trial stage. Rangel v. Gonzalez Mascorro, 274 F.R.D. 585, 590 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Although Rule 26(b)(1) limits the scope of discovery to nonprivileged and relevant matter, relevance is construed broadly to include “[a]ny matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Put simply, “[a] request for discovery should be allowed unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of a party.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Here, Request No. 7 is not relevant because it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing on the claims or defenses of either party. To start, Defendant did not license the allegedly infringing copyrights to the NFL or NFLPA. Instead, it was the NFL and NFLPA that licensed their intellectual property to Defendant for Defendant's use. As the Court discussed in its order denying Plaintiff's motion to compel (Dkt. #104) (the “Order”), the licensing agreements between Defendant and the NFL and the NFLPA do not relate to Plaintiff's claims whatsoever and are irrelevant. Indeed, Plaintiff specifically excluded the NFL and NFLPA's intellectual property from their complaint (Dkt. #1, Exhibit 15) (“Material excluded from this claim: The application excludes NFL team logos, NFL team names, NFL team uniforms, athlete names, the player photo and headshot, athlete statistics, the Team NFL logo, the National Football League Players Association logo”). The Court addressed this issue at length in the Order. Accordingly, the Court adopts its analysis regarding the relevance of Plaintiff's request for documents and communications between Defendant and the NFL and NFLPA concerning copyright licensing from the Order (Dkt. #4 at pp. 14–17). 2. Unduly Burdensome Request No. 7 is also unduly burdensome. When determining whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome, a court may consider: “(1) relevance of the information requested, (2) the need of the party for the documents, (3) the breadth of the document request, (4) the time period covered by the request, (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents, and (6) the burden imposed.” West, 2011 WL 13196550, at *2. The Court has already noted that Request No. 7 asks for irrelevant documents and communications. Accordingly, this consideration weighs in favor of finding that the requests are unduly burdensome. *6 Additionally, Plaintiff did not limit the breadth or the time period of Request No. 7. To be sure, Plaintiff made no attempt to state its request with any kind of particularity. “Subpoenas pose an undue burden when the subpoena is facially overbroad.” Scrum All. Inc. v. Scrum, Inc., No. 4:20-CV-00227, 2020 WL 6559625, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2020). Facially overbroad subpoenas include those that “seek all documents concerning the parties to [the underlying] action, regardless of whether those documents relate to that action and regardless of date; [t]he requests are not particularized; and [t]he period covered by the requests is unlimited.” Id. (citing Am. Fed'n of Musicians of the U.S. & Can. v. Skodam Films, LLC, 313 F.R.D. 39, 45 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (internal citations omitted)). Plainly, this request is a prime example of a facially overly broad request. Plaintiff requests any communication and document, with no time period restriction, regarding all copyright licensing between Defendant and the NFL and NFLPA, not just the copyrights at issue in this case. Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why it would need every communication and document between Defendant and the NFL and NFLPA pertaining to every copyright Defendant of the NFL and NFLPA has ever had. In fact, as stated, Request No. 7 appears to go so far so to require the NFL and NFLPA to produce every communication about any copyright ever discussed by Defendant with the NFL or NFLPA, not just ones owned by the NFL, NFLPA, or Defendant. Plaintiff cannot claim that Request No. 7 is not overly broad when it requests all communications and documents between Defendant, the NFL, and the NFLPA regarding all copyrights, not just the copyrights at issue. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Request No. 7 is unduly burdensome, and the records requested are irrelevant to the current litigation. The Court grants Defendant's request for a protective order as it relates to Request No. 7. B. Requests Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 Next, in Requests Nos. 1–6 and Requests Nos. 8–10 (collectively, the “Requests”) Plaintiff asks for essentially the same documents and communications in various different ways: “[a]ll documents and communications concerning the Copyrighted Works ... the 2020 Accused Products ... the 2021 Accused Products ... concerning or referencing any products, trading cards, or otherwise that contain the phrase ‘Stat Smashers’ ... [or] ‘Wild Card” ’ and “[a]ll proofs and pictures submitted to You concerning to the Copyrighted Works ... concerning the 2020 Accused Products ... [and] concerning the 2021 Accused Products” (Dkt. #90, Exhibit 1 at p. 11).[2] In other words, the Requests at their core simply ask the NFL and NFLPA to produce all communications and documents relating to the copyrights-at-issue in this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Requests require identical or similar analysis under the arguments made by the parties and the Court will evaluate the Requests collectively. 1. Relevance To begin, the Requests are irrelevant. The Requests cannot be allowed because “it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of a party.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Every argument that Plaintiff makes regarding relevance comes down to the same contention: Defendant misrepresented to the NFLA and NFLPA that it had the right to use the allegedly infringing cards, the NFL and NFLPA may have realized this because someone at the NFL and NFLPA remembered cards sold three decades prior, and then the NFL and NFLPA may have then told Defendant it was infringing on Plaintiff's copyrights. If this happened, Plaintiff argues it would show knowledge as required by the DMCA. Plaintiff makes this contention within each of its arguments and vehemently stands by the proposition that this possibility makes the requests relevant. But, as the Court noted in the Order, *7 Plaintiff's own example best demonstrates the relevancy, or lack thereof, of these licensing agreements. According to Plaintiff, “if the NFL and NFLPA said these cards were made by AAA Sports to Panini that would relate to the knowledge of Panini in ripping off the copyrighted works” (Dkt. #77 at p. 5). However, Plaintiff does not explain the basis for its belief that the NFL and NFLPA may have told Defendant that Stat Smasher cards were copyrighted by AAA Sports. (Dkt. #104 at p. 16). Relevance is a low bar; nonetheless, in this case it is not met. Plaintiff's arguments that the NFL or NFLPA should have known that AAA Sports, Inc. owned and used the same copyrights in the 1980s and 1990s is not relevant to any fact of consequence in the case. The knowledge of the NFL and NFLPA is not of consequence to this case; rather, it is only the Defendant's knowledge that matters. However, Plaintiff cannot require discovery from a third party simply because it thinks, without basis, that the third party could have explicitly told Defendant that Defendant was contravening Plaintiff's rights in the exact manner Plaintiff is suing for. See Northern v. Landstar Sys. Inc., No. 6:20-CV-00466, 2020 WL 5636902, at *1 (W.D. La. Sept. 21, 2020) (“[T]he Court is especially averse to finding relevance on the issue of whether the accident was staged absent a showing of some good faith belief that the accident was staged.... Otherwise, to permit unlimited access to cell phone records based solely upon the requester's unsubstantiated hope that the accident was staged is to permit a speculative fishing expedition.”). While every party hopes to find such a golden nugget in discovery, the Court will not allow Plaintiff to conduct discovery under the mere hope that Defendant admitted guilt to a third-party. “Rule 26(b), although broad, has never been a license to engage in an unwieldy, burdensome, and speculative fishing expedition.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff's argument that the Requests are relevant to show Defendant's distribution of the products is unconvincing. Similar to Plaintiff's licensing agreement argument, the Court tangentially dealt with these arguments in the Order on Plaintiff's motion to compel. As the Court noted in the Order, every document related to the distribution of the allegedly infringing cards has been produced. Defendant, and each of the entities related to the manufacturing and distribution of the allegedly infringing cards, have already produced every document related to the distribution and sale of Defendant's physical and digital cards (see Dkt. #104 at pp. 6–12). Rembrandt Pat. Innovations v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-438, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91756, at *4-5 (W.D. Tex. July 15, 2015) (“The Court finds that until and unless Plaintiffs can establish they are unable to obtain the requested information from the Defendant, subpoenaing the information from [a third party] creates an undue burden that is not outweighed by Plaintiff's need for the information.”). Plaintiffs have already requested and received all information relating to the distribution of Defendant's cards. Furthermore, the NFL and NFLPA do not distribute Defendant's cards and do not participate in the distribution of Defendant's cards. Rather, the NFL and NFLPA merely license their logos and images to Defendant so that Defendant may use those logos and images on their cards. 2. Unduly Burdensome The Requests are unduly burdensome. As mentioned, when determining whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome, a court may consider: “(1) relevance of the information requested, (2) the need of the party for the documents, (3) the breadth of the document request, (4) the time period covered by the request, (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents, and (6) the burden imposed.” West, 2011 WL 13196550, at *2. The Court concludes that the considerations weigh in favor of the subpoenas being unduly burdensome. *8 Plaintiff's alleged need for the documents weighs in favor of the Requests being unduly burdensome. Plaintiff contends that he needs the information requested for the same reasons that Plaintiff put forth in its motion to compel: (1) to show distribution of the allegedly infringing cards and establish damages under the DMCA, and (2) to determine whether the NFL and NFLPA knew, and told Defendant, that the cards Defendant was selling were infringing another entity's copyrights. These needs weigh in favor of the Requests being unduly burdensome for the reasons the Court set forth in the previous subsection. Likewise, the Court has already noted in the previous subsection that the Requests ask for irrelevant documents and communications. Accordingly, this consideration weighs in favor of finding that the Requests are unduly burdensome. On their face, the Requests are also not narrowly tailored in scope or time. As mentioned, a facially overbroad subpoena is unduly burdensome and a subpoena is considered facially overbroad when it “seek[s] all documents concerning the parties to [the underlying] action, regardless of whether those documents relate to that action and regardless of date; [t]he requests are not particularized; and [t]he period covered by the requests is unlimited.” Id. (citing Skodam Films, LLC, 313 F.R.D. at 45 (internal citations omitted)). Here, the Requests are facially overbroad. Plaintiff made no attempt to restrict the Requests to certain time periods. Rather, the Requests would require the NFL and NFLPA to sort through decades worth of communications and documents. Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why it did not restrict the time periods. The Requests are unduly burdensome and irrelevant to the current litigation. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's request for a protective order as it relates to Requests No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10. C. Request No. 11 In Request No. 11, Plaintiff asks the NFL and NFLPA to produce “[a]ll documents and communications concerning AAA” (Dkt. #90, Exhibit 1 at p. 11). AAA is defined as AAA Sports, Inc., d/b/a Wild Card, an Ohio corporation, and the debtor in the chapter 7 bankruptcy case which Plaintiff is the trustee for (Dkt. #90, Exhibit 1 at p. 8). 1. Relevance As with the other requests the Court has discussed, Request No. 11 is irrelevant. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how a third-party's documents and communications relating to AAA Sports, Inc. would have any possible bearing on a claim or defense of either party. True, Plaintiff is representing the interests of AAA Sports, Inc. in this litigation. However, the purported reasons set forth by Plaintiff as to why Request No. 11 is relevant do not convince the Court of Request No. 11's relevance. Plaintiff claims that these documents and communications are relevant because they will show that Defendant had intent and knowledge, both of which are required elements under the DMCA. The Court disagrees. AAA Sport, Inc.'s communication with a third-party who is not connected to the current litigation does not bear on, and could not reasonably lead to other matters that bear on, any issue that is or may be present in this case. To be sure, these documents and communications may reveal that the NFL or NFLPA were aware of AAA Sport, Inc.'s copyrighted works from the 1980s and 1990s. The NFL and the NFLPA, though, are not parties to this case and their knowledge is not relevant to any claim or defense. It is Defendant's knowledge and intent that is of consequence. Accordingly, for the same reason it concluded that Request No. 7 was irrelevant, the Court concludes that Request No. 11 is irrelevant. 2. Unduly Burdensome *9 Request No. 11 is also unduly burdensome. The factors used to determine whether a discovery request is unduly burdensome weigh in favor of Request No. 11 being unduly burdensome. First, as the Court has already discussed, these requests ask for irrelevant documents and communications. Accordingly, this consideration weighs in favor of finding that the requests are unduly burdensome. Additionally, Request No. 11 is not narrowly tailored in scope or time. Indeed, Request No. 11 is facially overbroad and, therefore, unduly burdensome. Request No. 11 asks the NFL and NFLPA to produce any communication and document, with no time period restriction, relating in any way to AAA Sports, Inc. AAA Sports, Inc. was founded in 1986, meaning that the NFL and NFLPA would be forced to search through thirty-seven years' worth of documents and communications. Plaintiff can hardly make the sweeping contention that its requests are not overly broad when it seeks records from the time after AAA Sports, Inc. was no longer in business and before Defendant began producing the allegedly infringing cards, a period that spans multiple decades. Likewise, Plaintiff made no attempt whatsoever to limit the scope of the search for communications and documents relating into AAA Sports, Inc. Rather, Plaintiff requested all communications and documents regarding AAA Sports, Inc, not just those communications and documents that relate to the allegedly infringed copyrights. Request No. 11 is overly burdensome. Request No. 11 is unduly burdensome, and the records requested are irrelevant to the current litigation. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's request for a protective order as it relates to Request No. 11. As a final aside, the Court notes that courts generally prefer that parties “obtain discovery from one another before burdening non-parties with discovery requests.” Scrum, 2020 WL 6559625, at *3 (“As Plaintiff seeks correspondence between Defendants and nonparties, Plaintiff can necessarily obtain that information from Defendants. Instead of burdening nonparties, Plaintiff should obtain the information directly from the source.”). The NFL and the NFLPA are not parties to this lawsuit and are not accused of infringing on Plaintiff's alleged copyrights (Dkt. #1, Exhibit 15) (“Material excluded from this claim: The application excludes NFL team logos, NFL team names, NFL team uniforms, athlete names, the player photo and headshot, athlete statistics, the Team NFL logo, the National Football League Players Association logo”). Which cuts against Plaintiff's contentions that information regarding what the NFL and NFLPA knew about Plaintiff's copyrights is “highly relevant” and “highly probative” to the current litigation. The Court does not mean to say that a nonparty cannot have relevant information to litigation they are not a part of. To the contrary, it is entirely possible, and often true, that third parties to litigation have documents and communications that are relevant to litigation. This is simply not one of those instances. Moreover, here, Defendant is undoubtedly in possession of the records related to Request Nos. 2, 4, 6, and 7 because the requests verbatim ask the NFL and NFLPA to produce documents that Defendant may have given to them. Accordingly, Plaintiff should have used the discovery tools at their disposal to obtain these records from Defendant before burdening a nonparty. * * * *10 The Court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for protective order because it is “in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery.” Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at36 (1984); see Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d at 684. The Court's broad discretion in these matters includes the Court's ability to completely forbid discovery or limit the scope of discovery into certain matters. Id. Given that the Court concluded each of the requests was irrelevant to the any claims or defenses in the current litigation, simply limiting, rather than forbidding, discovery would not resolve the issues Defendant complains of. For that reason, and for the reasons articulated throughout this order, the Court concludes that it is necessary to forbid discovery into all eleven requests made by Plaintiff to the NFL and NFLPA. CONCLUSION It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Panini America, Inc.'s Motion to Quash Plaintiff's Subpoenas Issued to Third Parties NFL and NFLPA (Dkt. #90) is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is further ORDERED that discovery as to Request Nos. 1–11 in Plaintiff's subpoenas to the NFL and NFLPA is restricted in its entirety. IT IS SO ORDERED. SIGNED this 27th day of January, 2023. Footnotes [1] The two subpoenas that are the subject of this motion are identical. Furthermore, the arguments as to both subpoenas are identical. Accordingly, the Court will analyze and refer to the subpoenas served on the NFL and NFLPA together. [2] The Court notes that Request No. 8 and Request No. 9 are identical (Dkt. #90, Exhibit 1 at p. 11).