EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. PROCTOR FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant Civil Action No. 19-11911 United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division Signed May 19, 2020 Counsel Diana Marin, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Detroit Field Office - Legal, Detroit, MI, Nedra D. Campbell, Department of Justice — USAO, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff. Gillian P. Yee, Marlo J. Roebuck, Jackson Lewis, P.C., Southfield, MI, for Defendant. Grand, David R., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (ECF No. 21) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (ECF No. 18) *1 Before the Court are two competing motions: (1) Defendant's Motion to Compel Executed Authorizations for Release of Charging Party's Employment and Medical Records; and (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order. (ECF Nos. 18, 21). Both motions have been fully briefed and were referred to the undersigned for hearing and determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). (ECF Nos. 20, 22, 25, 26, 29, 31). Having reviewed the pleadings and other papers on file, the Court finds that the facts and legal issues are adequately presented in the parties’ briefs and on the record, and it declines to order a hearing at this time. Background On June 27, 2019, Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed a complaint against Defendant Proctor Financial, Inc. on behalf of Charging Party Angela Kellogg (“Kellogg”), alleging that Proctor Financial retaliated against Kellogg by issuing her a three-day suspension on November 7, 2016, for complaining about race discrimination. (ECF No. 1). In its complaint, the EEOC seeks, among other categories of relief, the following damages on behalf of Kellogg: back pay, job search expenses, and loss of benefits, as well as past and future non-pecuniary losses, “including but not limited to emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience and humiliation[.]” (Id., PageID.6). In its motion, Proctor Financial asks that Kellogg be required to sign authorizations for the release of certain employment and medical records. Specifically, Proctor Financial seeks to obtain: (1) employment records from three of Kellogg's former or current employers (Credit Acceptance Corporation, Homeview Lending, and Birmingham Bancorp); and (2) medical records from two of Kellogg's treating physicians (Michael White and Tae Won Park). (ECF No. 21). Proctor Financial argues that Kellogg's employment records are relevant because, at her deposition, she admitted that she provided inaccurate information about her employment history when applying for employment with Proctor Financial. (Id., PageID.157). Thus, Proctor Financial contends that the employment records it seeks could expose other false statements, thus bearing on Kellogg's credibility. (Id.). With respect to the medical records at issue, Proctor Financial asserts that, at her deposition, Kellogg testified that she suffered from emotional distress as a result of the events alleged to have taken place during her employment with Proctor Financial. (Id., PageID.158). Specifically, Kellogg testified that she was placed on medication for depression in 2017 by Dr. Michael White, and treated with a psychiatrist, Dr. Tae Won Park, at least in part as a result of the “increased pressure” she allegedly felt while working at Proctor Financial after filing an EEOC charge. (Id.). In response, the EEOC argues that the requested discovery is neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of this case. (ECF No. 25). Specifically, the EEOC disputes that Proctor Financial needs the employment records at issue, claiming that the relevant discovery rules do not “provide carte blanche permission to obtain all documents that might bear on a witnesses’ [sic] credibility.” (Id., PageID.321). With respect to Proctor Financial's request for Kellogg's medical records, the EEOC disputes that such discovery is necessary where, as here, it is seeking only “garden variety” emotional distress damages on Kellogg's behalf. (Id., PageID.322-23). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the EEOC's arguments lack merit. Analysis *2 Rule 26(b)(1) controls the scope of discovery and provides, in relevant part: Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Although Rule 26 was amended in 2015 to include a ‘proportionality’ requirement, the basic tenet that Rule 26 is to be liberally construed to permit broad discovery remains unaltered.” United States v. Quicken Loans Inc., No. 16-14050, 2017 WL 2306444, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 2017) (internal quotations omitted). Applying these principles, Kellogg should be required to execute authorizations for the release of her employment records from the three specific employers at issue. This is not a case where Proctor Financial is simply “fishing” into Kellogg's background in the hope of uncovering information helpful to its defense. Rather, Kellogg admitted at her deposition that, when applying for employment with Proctor Financial, she provided inaccurate information regarding her prior employment. For example, Kellogg represented to Proctor Financial that she left her employment with GMAC for a better opportunity, but she admitted at her deposition that she was involuntarily terminated. (ECF No. 25-1, PageID.418; ECF No. 25-7, PageID.464). Similarly, Kellogg did not list her prior employment with Birmingham Bancorp on her application to Proctor Financial, failing to disclose that she had been involuntarily terminated from that employment as well. (ECF No. 25-1, PageID.418; ECF No. 25-7). Given these significant and material inconsistencies, the Court agrees with Proctor Financial that “[t]he best way to determine [Kellogg's] employment history is by obtaining it directly from her employers.” (ECF No. 26, PageID.403). Accordingly, allowing the limited discovery Proctor seeks from three specific employers is reasonable and proportional to the needs of the case. See, e.g., Green v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad, Inc., No. 16-11587, 2017 WL 10398218, at *5-6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 2017) (permitting discovery to test plaintiff's credibility). With respect to Proctor Financial's request that Kellogg execute authorizations for the release of her medical records from two specific providers, these records, too, are discoverable, and will not burden Kellogg in the least. Despite the EEOC's claim that it is seeking only “garden variety” emotional distress damages on Kellogg's behalf, Kellogg put her emotional state at issue when she testified at her deposition that she had been diagnosed with depression, placed on medication for that condition, and treated with a psychiatrist on two to five occasions in 2017 because of the increased pressure she experienced while working at Proctor Financial after filing an EEOC charge. (ECF No. 26-1, PageID.425-26). Given these facts, as well as the fact that Proctor Financial is seeking records from only two medical providers – one of whom had a very limited relationship with Kellogg – such discovery should be permitted. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sheffield Fin., LLC, No. 1:06CV00889, 2007 WL 1726560, at *4 (M.D.N.C. June 13, 2007) (ordering discovery of mental health records over objections that the damages sought were only of the garden variety type where the plaintiff sought damages for “past and future emotional distress, humiliation, anxiety, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment of life”). Conclusion *3 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Compel Executed Authorizations for Release of Charging Party's Employment and Medical Records (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order (ECF No. 18) is DENIED. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, Kellogg shall execute authorizations for the release of her employment records from Credit Acceptance Corporation, Homeview Lending, and Birmingham Bancorp. Similarly, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, Kellogg shall execute authorizations for the release of her medical records from Dr. Tae Won Park and Dr. Michael White. IT IS SO ORDERED.