Brandon Bartlett, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants Civil Action No. 2:17-03031-RMG-MGB United States District Court, D. South Carolina Filed September 01, 2020 Baker, Mary G., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 This case has been filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. On December 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion for Sanctions (“sanctions motion”) in this case, and included 15 other cases in the docket heading of the motion. (Dkt. No. 129.) On April 7, 2020, the undersigned issued an omnibus Order and Report and Recommendation (“R&R), which resolved the sanctions motion in every case in which it had been filed. (Dkt. No. 146.) Accordingly, the Order and R&R contained some rulings and recommendations that were specific to the other cases in which the sanctions motion was filed. On June 15, 2020, the District Judge issued an Order in this action and in Wilson et al. v. SCDC et al., 1:17-cv-3032 RMG-MGB, remanding to the undersigned certain matters pertaining to the undersigned's April 7, 2020 Order and R&R. (Dkt. No. 159.) Specifically, the District Judge adopted “the portion of the R&R setting forth the legal standards and the discussion relating to the attorneys’ fees sanction as the order of the Court” and remanded “the matter to the Magistrate Judge to set a reasonable attorneys’ fee as a sanction based upon attorney hours and expenses resulting from SCDC's discovery rule violations.” (Id. at 4.) The District Judge further “held in abeyance the Magistrate Judge's recommendations regarding sanctions associated with allegedly lost ESI” (electronically stored information) and remanded this specific matter for further consideration. (Id. at 5.) Accordingly, the Court now has two separate tasks: (1) assess reasonable attorneys’ fees as a sanction as ordered in the underlying April 7, 2020 Order and R&R; and (2) make further recommendations to the District Judge concerning the sanctions related to the ESI matter. Because the assessment of reasonable attorneys’ fees will not require adoption or rejection from the District Judge, the Court issues this Order separately from the recommendations made to the District Judge with respect to the ESI matter.[1] For the reasons set forth below, the Court awards Plaintiff attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,531.00 as a sanction based upon attorney hours and expenses resulting from SCDC's discovery rule violations. APPLICABLE LAW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides sanctions for conduct abusive of the discovery process. Under Rule 37(a)(5)(A), If a motion for an order compelling disclosure or discovery is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. *2 Rule 37(a)(5)(A), Fed. R. Civ. P. Additionally, Local Civil Rule 7.09 provides, “Where the court finds that a motion is frivolous or filed for delay, sanctions may be imposed against the party or counsel filing such motion.” Local Civil Rule 7.09 D.S.C; see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991)) (“[A] court may assess attorney's fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Fee awards are be made using a “lodestar” calculation (reasonable hourly rate multiplied by hours reasonably expended). Grissom v. Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2008). In determining the lodestar figure, the court considers the Johnson/Barber factors: (1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases. Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978) (adopting twelve factor test set forth in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)). These factors needs not be strictly applied in every case inasmuch as all of the factors are not always applicable. Super Duper, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 6:05-1700-HFF, 2009 WL 866463, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2009) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir. 1990)). DISCUSSION The April 7, 2020 Order and R&R found sanctions were appropriate in this action for the following reasons: (1) SCDC failed to supplement certain discovery responses in compliance with a June 6, 2019 Court Order; (2) SCDC delayed the disclosure and production of the Roth Report in this case;[2] (3) SCDC filed a frivolous motion for protective order, to which Plaintiff had to respond in opposition; and (4) SCDC failed to produce certain documents in compliance with a September 25, 2019 Court Order. The Order and R&R found that, based on the above conduct, Plaintiff was entitled to “the reasonable expenses associated” with certain filings in this action, specifically: (1) Plaintiff's May 24, 2019 Status Report/Motion to Compel (Dkt. No. 59); (2) a June 5, 2019 hearing (Dkt. No. 64); (3) Plaintiff's September 23, 2019 opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. No. 114); and (4) Plaintiff's September 23, 2019 Motion for Production of Records (Dkt. No. 114). *3 In awarding these sanctions, the Court cautioned that it would “only award fees and expenses to Plaintiffs that are reasonable” and ordered Plaintiffs to “submit evidence regarding the time and money they spent specific to the cases and the docket numbers specified in this conclusion section.” (Dkt. No. 146 at 36.) The Court further noted that “many of the briefs and motions at issue are identical among the cases” and therefore, “Plaintiffs should not duplicate their efforts when calculating their reasonable fees and expenses.” (Id.) Plaintiff's counsel subsequently filed a report that “detail[s] ... all expenses, attorney hours, and costs associated with” this case, and seeks attorneys’ fees for work performed by attorneys James Edward Bell, III and Gabrielle Sulpizio. (Dkt. No. 165.) However, Plaintiff's counsel has not limited their calculation of hours to work that is expressly connected to the dockets and related filings outlined in the April 7, 2020 Order and R&R—some entries in the report are expressly connected to certain docket numbers in the record, while other entries are not tied to any specific docket numbers. Plaintiff includes a description of each “task” connected to the hours computed for each entry. In a separate briefing, Plaintiff briefly states, “The basis for this time [recorded in the report] was solely due [to] the delaying actions in discovery and included time for drafting and responding to the Sanctions Motion, frivolous Motions for Protective Orders, the drafting of several deficiency letters, and prepping for status conferences and hearings due to the discovery delays.” (Dkt. No. 156 at 19.) Upon careful consideration of the parties’ filings, the record as a whole, and the applicable law, the Court finds that it would not be appropriate to award Plaintiff for all of the attorneys’ fees he seeks in this action. Before assessing the attorneys’ fees to be awarded in this case, the Court first considers certain threshold arguments raised by Defendants. A. Threshold Issues Relevant here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has offered “no reasonable basis upon which to award fees,” and therefore, “no award of fees is appropriate.” (Dkt. No. 152 at 11.) In support, Defendants cite case law considering the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.[3] (Dkt. No. 152 at 10–11 (citing, e.g., Plunkett v. Stephens, No. C.A. 3:93-0304-19, 1997 WL 907958, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 18, 1997) (denying petition for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 where the request is “so exorbitant and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of [this] Court....” (citation omitted)). Such case law is inapplicable here, where the fees are sought pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Civil Rules. Further, as discussed below, the Court does not agree that there is no reasonable basis upon which to award fees. Defendants further assert that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the documented attorney hours expended are reasonable because he has not submitted contemporaneously recorded time sheets and appears to have relied on block-billing in half-hour increments. (Dkt. No. 152 at 7–10.) “The moving party [ ] has the burden of demonstrating that the hours spent are reasonable”. Cox v. Deal, No. 2:09-CV-2715, 2011 WL 3418397, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2011) (citing Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788 (D. Md. 2000)). “Specific and contemporaneous time sheets are preferred, but a detailed summary is acceptable.” Id. “A summary must have sufficient detail for the court to rule on the reasonableness of the award.” Id. (citing Costar Group, Inc., 106 F. Supp. at 788 (“[T]he records must specify for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.”)). Here, the Court finds that the task descriptions and reported hours contained in Plaintiff's fee report provide sufficient detail for the Court to assess a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees. As detailed below, the Court has taken care to only award attorneys’ fees that have been incurred as a direct result of the sanctionable conduct discussed herein. *4 Finally, Defendants challenge the reasonableness of the hourly rate for Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Bell and Ms. Sulpizio. (Dkt. No. 152 at 13–15.) Plaintiff's fee report details that Mr. Bell's hourly rate is $894.00 and Ms. Sulpizio's hourly rate is $350. (Dkt. No. 165 at 18.) “The hourly rate included in an attorney's fee must ... be reasonable.” Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1994) “As the fee applicant, [Plaintiff] [bears] the burden of establishing the reasonableness of those hourly rates.” Doe v. Kidd, 656 F. App'x 643, 654 (4th Cir. 2016). “This requirement is met by compensating attorneys at the ‘prevailing market rates in the relevant community.’ ” Caperton, 31 F.3d at 175 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). “This determination is fact-intensive and is best guided by what attorneys earn from paying clients for similar services in similar circumstances.” Id. “Examples of the type of specific evidence that [the Fourth Circuit has] held is sufficient to verify the prevailing market rates are affidavits of other local lawyers who are familiar both with the skills of the fee applicants and more generally with the type of work in the relevant community.” Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 245 (4th Cir. 2009). In connection to Plaintiff's sanctions motion, Plaintiff's counsel submitted a “Certification of Hourly Rate Regarding Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Sanctions.” (Dkt. No. 132.) Here, Mr. Bell certified that the hourly rates requested in the fee report are the “most recent hourly rate[s]” for Mr. Bell and Ms. Sulpizio. (Id. at 7.) Mr. Bell stated that “[t]his rate was used in the pending cases against the South Carolina Electric and Gas litigation, was supported by Affidavits, and reviewed by Counsel for adequacy. Since the above are the most recently approved hourly rates, Counsel believes these would be appropriate to apply to the above captioned cases.” (Id. at 8.) Mr. Bell offered no citation or case name for “the pending cases” referenced here. Further, any affidavits submitted in connection to those “pending cases” have not been put in the record in this action. Because this “Certification” provided by Mr. Bell does not satisfy Plaintiff's burden to establish the reasonableness of the requested hourly rates, the Court allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to supplement the record on this limited issue. Specifically, the Court held a hearing on August 26, 2020, and ordered the parties to submit any “evidence/exhibits they intend to present at the hearing on this limited issue by August 21, 2020.” (Dkt. No. 171.) Plaintiff declined to supplement the record with any evidence or exhibits prior to this hearing. At the hearing, Plaintiff cited the case, Sauders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., No. C.A. 2:03-0934-23, 2011 WL 1236163, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2011), wherein another court in this district awarded attorneys’ fees to Mr. Bell pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 28-11-30[4] at an hourly rate of $600. Sauders involved a series of complex cases alleging inverse condemnation, negligence, and trespass, which had been litigated “for over 17 years.”[5] Id. at *11. Following the August 26, 2020 hearing, Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking leave to supplement the record with the Sauders Order, as discussed at the hearing. (Dkt. No. 178.) Plaintiff explained that “Counsel presumed the Court could take judicial notice of this Order since it was filed in this Court and in the same division.” (Id.) While Plaintiff should have provided the Sauders case as an exhibit prior to the hearing, the Court will allow supplementation of the record in this instance and grants Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Record (Dkt. No. 178.) There is no prejudice caused by this delay in supplementation because Defendants have briefed the issue at hand both in their initial briefing (Dkt. No. 152 at 13–15) and in supplemental briefing prior to the August 26, 2020 hearing (Dkt. Nos. 176; 177.) Further, the inclusion of the Sauders Order in the record does not resolve the hourly rate issue in Plaintiff's favor. There is no basis to find that Sauders, which involved very different circumstances than those at issue here, is satisfactory evidence of what “attorneys earn from paying clients for similar services in similar circumstances.” Caperton, 31 F.3d at 175. *5 Because Plaintiff has offered no support for the hourly rates requested other than the Sauders Order and the aforementioned “Certification,” he has failed to submit satisfactory evidence to support the requested hourly rates. See Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990) (“In addition to the attorney's own affidavits, the fee applicant must produce satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an award.”) (internal quotations omitted). However, based upon the Court's own knowledge of the relevant prevailing market rates, the Court exercises its discretion to approve a rate of $152 per hour for Ms. Sulpizio and Mr. Bell. This rate corresponds to the current rates paid to attorneys providing service under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.[6] See Shelley v. Tribble, No. CA 3:11-3477-CMC, 2014 WL 6460552, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2014) (approving hourly rate under Criminal Justice Act in § 1983 action where the plaintiff “failed to present satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate” to support requested hourly rate). With these threshold issues resolved, the Court considers the amount of “reasonable expenses” requested by Plaintiff in connection to the specific monetary sanctions awarded in the April 7, 2020 Order and R&R. For the reasons detailed below, the Court finds an award of significantly lesser attorneys’ fees than that sought by Plaintiff is appropriate in this action. B. Expenses Related to Failure to Supplement Document Production and Delayed Disclosure and Production of the Roth Report The April 7, 2020 Order and R&R awarded monetary sanctions based in part on: (1) SCDC's failure to supplement certain responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests, in violation of a June 6, 2019 Court Order; and (2) SCDC's failure to produce the unredacted Roth Report or a privilege log identifying the existence of the Roth Report in its supplemental responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests. Based on this conduct, the Court ordered SCDC to pay the reasonable expenses associated with Plaintiff's May 24, 2019 Status Report/Motion to Compel (Dkt. No. 59) and the June 5, 2019 hearing (Dkt. No. 64), pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A), Fed. R. Civ. P. More specifically, after conducting a hearing on June 5, 2019, the Court issued an Order on June 6, 2019, in which it construed Plaintiff's May 24, 2020 Status Report as a Motion to Compel and ordered Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's discovery request seeking post charts from 2015-2018 at Lieber Correctional Institution by June 14, 2019. (Dkt. No. 65 at 4.) The Order stated that, “If Defendants assert that there are no documents responsive to this request, other than what has been produced, they must aver to this in an affidavit. In any such affidavit, Defendants must specify why these items cannot be produced (ie, they could not be located, etc.).” (Id.) In this same Order, the Court instructed Defendants to produce the unredacted version of the Roth Report to the Court by June 7, 2019 for in camera review so the Court could determine whether the Roth Report should be produced to Plaintiff's counsel in its unredacted form. (Id. at 3.) The Court subsequently ordered Defendants to produce to Plaintiff's counsel the entire unredacted Roth Report by June 10, 2019. (Dkt. No. 67.) The record indicates that SCDC did not produce all of the requested post charts or a responsive affidavit by June 14, 2019. Rather, over six months later, Defendants produced an affidavit from an SCDC employee to Plaintiff's counsel on January 16, 2020, averring that the 2015 post chart could not be located and detailing the search undertaken by SCDC for this post chart.[7] (Dkts. No. 148 at 34.) Further, SCDC only produced the unredacted Roth Report to Plaintiff's counsel on July 19, 2019, after an unsuccessful appeal to the District Judge. Given that the Court compelled this discovery in a Court Order and that the responsive affidavit and unredacted Roth Report were provided only after Plaintiff filed the May 24, 2019 Status Report/Motion to Compel, monetary sanctions are appropriate under Rule 37(a)(5)(A). See Rule 37(a)(5)(A) (providing for an award of attorneys’ fees where, inter alia, “the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion [to compel] was filed”). *6 Plaintiff's fee report details the following hours specific to the May 24, 2019 Status Report/Motion to Compel (Dkt. No. 59) and the June 5, 2019 hearing (Dkt. No. 64)[8]: “May 11-15, 2019: Meet with JEB to review all discovery documents produced and what is missing; draft status report (ECF 59) and file.”[9] (Dkt. No. 165 at 9–10.) Under this entry, Plaintiff records 6.5 hours for Ms. Sulpizio and 2 hours for Mr. Bell. (Id.) “May 23-24, 2019: File review with JEB; t/c with SCDC counsel re status report of discovery docs.” (Id. at 10.) Under this entry, Plaintiff records 1 hour for Ms. Sulpizio and 1.5 hours for Mr. Bell. (Id.) “June 3-5, 2019; June 10, 2019: Attend Discovery Hearing in Charleston, including prep and travel; draft preliminary ruling notes (June 10th).” (Id.) Under this entry, Plaintiff records 6.5 hours for Mr. Bell and 7.5 hours for Ms. Sulpizio. (Id.) Plaintiff's fee report includes other entries summarizing certain “task[s]” that are dated around the time period of the status report and hearing at issue.[10] (Dkt. No. 165 at 9–10.) Because these entries appear to concern counsel's preparations for and discussions with defense counsel about general discovery issues and are not expressly specific to the deficient discovery at issue in the status report and hearing, the Court does not find they are appropriate to consider here. Further, because the monetary sanctions here are based upon only a portion of the discovery requests at issue in Plaintiff's Status Report/Motion to Compel and the June 5, 2019 hearing, the Court finds it appropriate to reduce the hours reported by Plaintiff here by sixty percent. Accordingly, the Court awards attorney's fees in the amount of $1,520 as monetary sanctions.[11] C. Expenses Related to Motion for Protective Order and Failure to Produce Certain Documents Related to Roth Report The April 7, 2020 Order and R&R also awarded monetary sanctions based in part on: (1) SCDC's September 23, 2019 filing of a Motion for Protective Order; and (2) SCDC's failure to produce documents relied on to create the Roth Report. Based on this conduct, the Court ordered SCDC to pay the reasonable expenses associated with Plaintiff's filing of his opposition to Defendants’ motion for protective order (Dkt. No. 114) and Plaintiff's September 24, 2019 Motion for Production of Records (Dkt. No. 114). *7 More specifically, SCDC's Motion for Protective Order sought to protect a flash drive that was originally in Tom Roth's possession and that was responsive to a subpoena served upon Mr. Roth. Rather than produce this flash drive to Plaintiff, Mr. Roth mailed the flash drive to SCDC. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Motion for Protective Order and, in that same document, sought the production of Mr. Roth's flash drive as well as any other documents Mr. Roth relied on to draft the Roth Report. In a September 25, 2019 Order, the Court largely denied the Motion for Protective Order and granted Plaintiff's Motion for Production. As stated in the April 7, 2020 Order and R&R, “there was no basis for Defendants to contest the production of those communications pertaining to the Roth Report, given the Court's extensive rulings on the discoverability of the Roth Report. Thus, the Court can only conclude that the motion was largely filed to unreasonably delay the production of the communications at issue.” (Dkt. No. 146 at 30.) The April 7, 2020 Order and R&R therefore ordered SCDC to pay Plaintiff's reasonable expenses associated with the filing of: (1) Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.09, D.S.C.; and (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Production of Records, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A). As noted, both of these filings were included in the same document; specifically, Plaintiff's September 24, 2019 Motion for Oral Arguments, Expedited Motion for Production of Records, and Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order. (Dkt. No. 114.) Plaintiff's fee report details the following hours specific to this September 24, 2019 filing: “September 23-24, 2019: Research; review of Motion for Protective Order, and draft and file Motion for Oral Arguments Expedited Motion for Production of Records, Response in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Protective Order; discussion of the same with JEB.”[12] Under this entry, Plaintiff records 8 hours for Ms. Sulpizio and 1.5 hours for Mr. Bell. (Id.) Plaintiff's report includes other entries summarizing certain “task[s]” that are dated around the time period of the filing at issue.[13] (Dkt. No. 165 at 11–12.) Because these entries are not expressly specific to Plaintiff's response in opposition to the Motion for Protective Order and Plaintiff's Motion for Production, the Court does not find they are appropriate to consider here. The Court also notes that because Plaintiff did not serve any discovery requests upon SCDC in this action seeking the documents Mr. Roth relied on to draft the Roth Report, there was no basis to compel production of such records from SCDC, beyond those documents included in Mr. Roth's flash drive.[14] Thus, the Court finds it appropriate to reduce the hours reported by Plaintiff here by thirty percent, to acknowledge that Plaintiff was entitled to only the contents of Mr. Roth's flash drive pertaining to the Roth Report.[15] Accordingly, the Court awards attorney's fees in the amount of $1,011 as monetary sanctions.[16] CONCLUSION *8 For the reasons stated above, the Court awards Plaintiff attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,531.00 as a sanction based upon attorney hours and expenses resulting from SCDC's discovery rule violations. Additionally, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Record[17] (Dkt. No. 178). IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] The attorneys’ fees sanction ordered in the April 7, 2020 Order is not dependent on the recommendations made with respect to the ESI matter. [2] The April 7, 2020 Order and R&R discusses the Roth Report in detail. The undersigned incorporates that discussion here. (Dkt. No. 146 at 14.) [3] 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides for the award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party “as part of the costs” in, inter alia, an action to enforce a provision of section 1983. [4] S.C. Code Ann. § 28-11-30(3) provides for the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees incurred by the plaintiff arising out of an inverse condemnation proceeding under certain circumstances. [5] Sauders does not appear to be one of the “pending cases” referenced in Mr. Bell's “Certification.” (Dkt. No. 132.) [6] See CJA: Compensation, https://www.scd.uscourts.gov/Attorney/cja.asp#compensation; Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”). [7] In their response to the underlying sanctions motion, Defendants indicated that they produced the 2016 and 2017 post charts to Plaintiff's counsel and stated they had “not yet provided these for 2015.” (Dkt. No. 130 at 5.) Defendants attached the January 16, 2020 affidavit to their appellate briefing. (Dkt. No. 148-3.) [8] Outlined below are the only entries expressly associated with the docket numbers corresponding to the Status Report/Motion to Compel and hearing at issue. [9] The entry for “May 11-15, 2019” is inconsistent with the record in that this entry indicates counsel filed the Status Report/Motion to Compel at issue at some point during May 11-15, 2019, while the docket shows that this document was filed on May 24, 2019. However, because this is the only entry specifying the actual filing of this Status Report/Motion to Compel, the Court assumes it is a scrivener's error and takes the computed hours for this entry into consideration. [10] The report does not expressly associate these other tasks with the docket numbers at issue. [11] Ms. Sulpizio reported a total of 15 hours associated with the above entries and Mr. Bell reported a total of 10 hours associated with the above entries. This results in attorneys’ fees of $3,800 based on an hourly rate of $152. Given the sixty percent reduction, the appropriate monetary sanction award here is $1,520. [12] This is the only entry expressly associated with the docket number corresponding to Plaintiff's response in opposition to the Motion for Protective Order and Plaintiff's Motion for Production. [13] The report does not expressly associate these other tasks with the docket number at issue. [14] The contents of Mr. Roth's flash drive were directly responsive to the subpoena served upon him by Plaintiff. Because SCDC interfered in the production of this flash drive, it was appropriate to compel the production of this flash drive from SCDC. [15] Because the flash drive was produced after Plaintiff filed the Motion for Production, attorney fees are still appropriate pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A), Fed. R. Civ. P. [16] Ms. Sulpizio reported a total of 8 hours associated with the above entry and Mr. Bell reported a total of 1.5 hours associated with the above entry. This results in attorneys’ fees of $1,444 based on an hourly rate of $152. Given the thirty percent reduction, the appropriate monetary sanction award here is $1,011. [17] As discussed supra section A, the Court finds that the supplementation allowed here does not resolve any issues discussed in this Order in Plaintiff's favor.