CRESCENT CITY REMODELING, LLC v. CMR CONSTRUCTION & ROOFING, LLC CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-859 United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana Signed October 27, 2022 Counsel Paul Louis Carriere, Austin Hight, Favret Carriere Cronvich, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Crescent City Remodeling, LLC. Sidney W. Degan, III, Karl Howard Schmid, Stephen T. Perkins, Degan Blanchard & Nash APLC, New Orleans, LA, for CMR Construction & Roofing, LLC. Currault, Donna P., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER AND REASONS *1 Before me is Defendant CMR Construction & Roofing, LLC's Motion to Compel Production of Insurance Information and Documents directed to Plaintiff Crescent City Remodeling, LLC. ECF No. 13. Plaintiff Crescent City Remodeling, LLC timely filed an Opposition Memorandum. ECF No. 14. Defendant sought leave and filed a Reply Memorandum. ECF Nos. 15, 19. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the Court agrees that oral argument is unnecessary. Considering the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, Defendant CMR Construction & Roofing, LLC's Motion to Compel Production of Insurance Information and Documents directed to Plaintiff Crescent City (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED for the reasons stated herein. I. BACKGROUND This suit arises out of a Joint Work Agreement under which Defendant CMR Construction & Roofing, LLC (“CMR”) referred certain work in Terrebonne Parish to Plaintiff Crescent City Remodeling, LLC (“Crescent City”). ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 3. Crescent City asserts that it performed the requested work, but CMR did not pay as agreed. Id. ¶ 5. CMR filed an Answer and Counterclaim asserting that Crescent City failed to perform its various obligations, either intentionally or negligently. ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 36-37. The Court's Scheduling Order established a discovery deadline of January 10, 2023. ECF No. 11. Plaintiff Crescent City's Rule 26 initial disclosures did not include any insurance information, indicating that the claim is for breach of contract and therefore neither party's insurance policies are relevant. ECF No. 13-2, at 2. Disagreeing with that assertion, CMR issued interrogatories requesting that Crescent City identify all policies of insurance that may provide coverage for CMR's counterclaims and requested production of all declaration pages, certificates, policies, endorsements and related documents. In response, Crescent City objected on the basis that the interrogatory is vague, ambiguous, harassing, calls for a legal conclusion in the form of a coverage opinion, the information is not relevant as CMR's CEO testified it sustained no known damages, and CMR's claims are frivolous. ECF Nos. 13-4, at 2, 3. In Opposition, Crescent City essentially reiterates those objections. ECF No. 14. In its Reply, CMR argues that Crescent City willfully refuses to acknowledge that CMR's Counterclaim alleges tortious conduct in addition to its breach of contract claims and mischaracterizes the deposition testimony of CMR's CEO regarding the various types of damages CMR sustained. ECF No. 19. II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) requires production of “any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). The history of Rule 26 is informative: Disclosure of insurance coverage will enable counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and litigation strategy are based on knowledge and not speculation. It will conduce to settlement and avoid protracted litigation in some cases, though in others it may have an opposite effect. The amendment is limited to insurance coverage, which should be distinguished from any other facts concerning defendant's financial status (1) because insurance is an asset created specifically to satisfy the claim; (2) because the insurance company ordinarily controls the litigation; (3) because information about coverage is available only from defendant or his insurer; and (4) because disclosure does not involve a significant invasion of privacy. *2 Advisory Committee Notes 1970 Amendment. Rule 26(a) requires production of any insurance agreement that could possibly apply to require the insurance business—however unlikely it may be—to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in a case.[1] The party to whom the policy must be produced is not required to rely upon the assessment of the producing party about whether there is coverage for the claims that have been asserted.[2] Crescent City's objection based on the deposition testimony of CMR's CEO is overruled. The testimony reflects that the witness has discussed what CMR's damages are, but is not aware that the precise amount has been calculated. ECF No. 14, at 2. Crescent City's general, boilerplate objections based on ambiguity and harassment are also overruled.[3] The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure take a demanding attitude toward objections, and courts have long interpreted the rules to prohibit general, boilerplate objections.[4] The party objecting must state how the objection “relates to the particular request being opposed, and not merely that it is ‘overly broad and burdensome’ or ‘oppressive’ or ‘vexatious’ or ‘not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ ”[5] *3 Crescent City's objections premised on its position that only a breach of contract is asserted or its contention that a response to this inquiry requires a coverage opinion are also overruled. The counterclaim in this case includes claims under La. Civ. Code arts. 2315 (fault), 2316 (negligence, imprudence or want of skill), and 2317 (liability for acts of others). ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 40-42. While Crescent City may dispute the validity of those claims, those claims are stated and have not been dismissed. Accordingly, they are the proper subject of discovery. Likewise, no coverage opinion is required by a response. Rule 26 explicitly requires the production of any insurance policy that “may” apply to satisfy any possible judgment. Identifying a potentially applicable policy is not a concession that coverage exists. To the extent Crescent City has any insurance that may apply to satisfy a potential judgment based on a negligent or intentional failure to perform any of the tasks identified in the Counterclaim (e.g., ¶ 37(a)-(h)), Crescent City is obligated to identify such policy and produce copies of same. III. CONCLUSION CMR is entitled to a copy of any insurance policy that may potentially provide coverage for any claim asserted against Crescent City. While Crescent City may dispute coverage, CMR is entitled to obtain a copy of any potentially applicable policy to review its terms and coverage to assess whether it may, consistent with Rule 11, pursue a claim against any such insurer. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant CMR Construction & Roofing, LLC's Motion to Compel Production of Insurance Information and Documents directed to Plaintiff Crescent City (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Crescent City Remodeling, LLC produce copies of any insurance agreement that could possibly apply to require an insurer to satisfy all or part of any possible judgment in this case within 21 days. Footnotes [1] See Regalado v. Techtronic Indus. N. Am., Inc., No. 13-4267, 2015 WL 10818616, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2015). [2] Calhoun v. Invention Submission Corp., No. 19-1396, 2021 WL 640759, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2021). [3] The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure take a demanding attitude toward objections, and courts have long interpreted the rules to prohibit general, boilerplate objections. 8B CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2173 (3d ed. 2021); see also, e.g., McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485–86 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (simply objecting to requests as “overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant,” without showing “specifically how each [request] is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive” is inadequate to “voice a successful objection.”). A general, boilerplate objection untethered to specific requests (and is thus also a boilerplate objection) is improper. See DL v. Dist. of Columbia, 251 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2008) (citation omitted) (“When faced with general objections, the applicability of which to specific document requests is not explained further, this Court will not raise objections for the responding party, but instead will overrule the responding party's objections on those grounds.” (internal quotations omitted)). The party objecting must state how the objection “relates to the particular request being opposed, and not merely that it is ‘overly broad and burdensome’ or ‘oppressive’ or ‘vexatious’ or ‘not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ ” Cheshire v. Air Methods Corp, No. 15-933, 2015 WL 7736649, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 30, 2015) (quotations omitted). The objection must clearly state how the information sought is not relevant to any claim or defense, or how the request is overbroad, burdensome or oppressive. Chevron Midstream Pipelines, LLC v. Settoon Towing, LLC, Nos. 13-2809, 13-3197, 2015 WL 269051 at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 2015) (citation omitted) (noting objections are boilerplate and insufficient if they merely state “the legal grounds for the objection without: (1) specifying how the discovery request is deficient and (2) specifying how the objecting party would be harmed if it were forced to respond.”). [4] 8B CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2173 (3d ed. 2021); see also, e.g., McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485–86 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (simply objecting to requests as “overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant,” without showing “specifically how each [request] is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive” is inadequate to “voice a successful objection.”). A general, boilerplate objection untethered to specific requests (and is thus also a boilerplate objection) is improper. See DL v. Dist. of Columbia, 251 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2008) (citation omitted) (“When faced with general objections, the applicability of which to specific document requests is not explained further, this Court will not raise objections for the responding party, but instead will overrule the responding party's objections on those grounds.” (internal quotations omitted)). [5] Cheshire v. Air Methods Corp, No. 15-933, 2015 WL 7736649, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 30, 2015) (quotations omitted). The objection must clearly state how the information sought is not relevant to any claim or defense, or how the request is overbroad, burdensome or oppressive. Chevron Midstream Pipelines, LLC v. Settoon Towing, LLC, Nos. 13-2809, 13-3197, 2015 WL 269051 at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 2015) (citation omitted) (noting objections are boilerplate and insufficient if they merely state “the legal grounds for the objection without: (1) specifying how the discovery request is deficient and (2) specifying how the objecting party would be harmed if it were forced to respond.”).