CHRISTINA OTHON v. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY Civ. No. 3:18CV00958(KAD) United States District Court, D. Connecticut Filed November 25, 2019 Counsel Heena Kapadia, Carmen Chapman, Law Office of Heena Kapadia, Trumbull, CT, for Christina Othon. Emily McDonough Souza, Patricia E. Reilly, Murtha Cullina LLP, New Haven, CT, Martha McNamara Royston, Gartner, Inc., Stamford, CT, Matthew K. Curtin, Murtha Cullina, Hartford, CT, for Wesleyan University. Merriam, Sarah A. L., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL (DOC. #68) *1 Pending before the Court is a motion to compel filed by plaintiff Christina Othon (“plaintiff” or “Othon”), seeking to require defendant Wesleyan University (“defendant” or “Wesleyan”) to provide additional responses to plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production (“RFP”). See Doc. #68. For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff's motion to compel (Doc. #68) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. I. Background Plaintiff, a former employee of Wesleyan, brings claims asserting gender-based retaliation and discrimination in employment, under both state and federal law. See generally Doc. #57. Plaintiff also brings state law claims for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. See id. at 27, 32. Plaintiff “was hired on a tenure-track appointment[ ]” as an Assistant Professor in Wesleyan's physics department in July 2010. Id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that she was denied tenure in February 2017 due to ongoing and systemic gender bias within the department generally, and in Wesleyan's methods of evaluating tenure candidates. See generally Doc. #57. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant retaliated against her for seeking to address that alleged bias through defendant's office of Diversity and Equity. See id. at 12-15. Plaintiff resigned from her position with defendant on August 1, 2017, and began employment at Ripon College on August 18, 2017. See Doc. #66 at 10, 12; Doc. #68-4 at 4. II. Legal Standard Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the scope and limitations of permissible discovery: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “The party resisting discovery bears the burden of showing why discovery should be denied.” Cole v. Towers Perrin Forster & Crosby, 256 F.R.D. 79, 80 (D. Conn. 2009). III. Discussion Plaintiff's motion to compel seeks additional responses to plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production. See Doc. #68. After conducting “meet-and-confer” sessions, the parties have narrowed the issues for Court review. See Doc. #139 (status report). A. Interrogatory 1 Plaintiff moves to compel additional responses to interrogatory 1, which states: Please identify all persons who answered these Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents or who provided information or responses used in responding to each of these interrogatories. If more than one person provided information for a single interrogatory, please identify with precision the information provided by each person. In identifying said persons, please provide the following information pursuant to Local Rule 26(c)(3), namely, “the person's full name, present or last known address, and when referring to a natural person, additionally, the present or last known place of employment.” *2 Doc. #68-1 at 16. Defendant contends that interrogatory 1 “is vague and ambiguous[ ]” because the requests “are not being answered by a person[ ]” but by an entity. Id. at 16. Defendant further objects to providing the addresses of any employees, asserting that said employees may be contacted through defense counsel. See id. Wesleyan also contends that this request “seeks privileged information ... to the extent that Wesleyan's General Counsel was involved in preparing the responses[.]” Doc. #83 at 16. Defendant identified only Joyce Jacobsen, Provost and Senior Vice President of Academic Affairs, Wesleyan University, in its original response to interrogatory 1. See Doc. #68-1 at 17. Plaintiff contends that “the Interrogatories require the input of personnel other than just the Provost.” Id. Plaintiff argues: “This question is asked routinely so that plaintiff can determine which witnesses have knowledge with respect to the various issues and identify those witnesses who would need to be deposed” and asserts that “Plaintiff needs the addresses of these individuals in case they need to be subpoenaed.” Id. In its response to the motion to compel, defendant “directs Plaintiff to its responses to the Initial Discovery Protocols, where Wesleyan listed all persons with knowledge of the claims and defenses at issue in this lawsuit along with a brief description of that knowledge.” Doc. #83 at 17. In addition, “Defendant [has] agreed to partially supplement its response to Interrogatory No. 1 by involving Tom Morgan and identifying him in response to Interrogatory No. 1.” Doc. #139 at 2. However, the parties’ July 25, 2019, joint status report indicates that interrogatory 1 is still in dispute. See id. Parts of interrogatory 1 do indeed “represent the most standard of discovery requests in that they simply seek ... the names of individuals who participated in the preparation of the interrogatory answers[.]” Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., No. 3:98CV02464(AVC), 2001 WL 173765, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 2001). This request, however, goes beyond that standard request, to demand that defendant identify any person who “provided information” used in responding to the interrogatories, and describe “with precision” exactly what information was provided by what person. Doc. #68-1 at 16. The individuals who actually prepared and verified the interrogatory answers have now been identified. Further inquiry runs the risk of infringing on the work product privilege. Neither party has cited any case law on the work product issue, and plaintiff does not respond at all to the assertion of privilege. The Court generally adopts the reasoning of Tracy v. NVR, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 130 (W.D.N.Y. 2008), with regard to this dispute. There, the Court drew “a distinction between discovery requests that seek the identification of persons with knowledge about the claims or defenses (or other relevant issues) -- requests that are plainly permissible -- and those that seek the identification of persons who have been contacted or interviewed by counsel concerning the case.” Id. at 132. It is reasonable to require defendant to identify any persons, other than those already identified in response to this interrogatory, “who provided substantial assistance in preparing” Wesleyan's discovery responses. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, No. 3:13CV00837(JBA), 2015 WL 630966, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2015). Wesleyan need not identify every person who assisted in any way with its responses, nor need it describe exactly what information each person contacted by or on behalf of counsel provided. What plaintiff needs, and what must be disclosed, is the names of any individuals who provided “substantial assistance” in preparing these responses. Plaintiff may then conduct her own inquiry of these individuals. *3 As to the issue of addresses, Wesleyan shall indicate as to each person identified whether that person is a current employee of Wesleyan. As to any person no longer employed by Wesleyan, Wesleyan shall provide the last known address of that individual, either business or personal. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel additional responses to interrogatory 1 is GRANTED, in part. B. Interrogatory 4 Plaintiff moves to compel responses to interrogatory 4. Interrogatory 4 asks: “For each faculty member identified in response to Interrogatory No. 3,[1] please describe their work that supported the scholarship requirement for tenure when they were considered for tenure including, but not limited to, publications and grants.” Doc. #68-1 at 17. Defendant objects to interrogatory 4 and has provided no response. See id. at 17-19. The Court has previously identified three individuals as “comparators” in this matter. See Doc. #118. Defendant was ordered to produce “complete tenure dossiers” for these three comparators. Id. at 11. Plaintiff states: “The information sought would be readily available in their tenure dossier[.]” Doc. 68-1 at 18. As to the three comparators, therefore, plaintiff already has the information sought. The Court finds that, for the reasons discussed in its prior ruling identifying these comparators, that is a sufficient response. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel responses to interrogatory 4 is DENIED. C. Interrogatory 6 and RFP 4 The parties’ joint status report dated July 25, 2019, indicates that the disputes regarding this interrogatory and RFP have been resolved. See Doc. #139 at 2. D. Interrogatory 7 and RFP 5 Plaintiff moves to compel additional responses to interrogatory 7 and RFP 5. Interrogatory 7 asks defendant to describe each and every complaint by a female faculty or staff of the physics department, or any student who had taken a physics class, whether formal or informal or oral or in writing related to gender bias, discrimination based on sex/gender or abusive treatment by a male student or faculty and state in detail the information sought by way of the subsections a through d. This Interrogatory includes any complaints to or concerns raised with Human Resources, the Office of Equity and Inclusion, the Faculty Committee for Rights and Responsibilities, the current or former Dean of Students, the current or former Class Deans, the current or former Dean of Natural Sciences, the current or former Chairs of the Physics Department, the Provost's office, the President's Office or any other formal or informal committee which would receive such complaints, for the time period one year prior to the plaintiff's employment until the present. Doc. #68-1 at 20-21. RFP 5 asks defendant to “produce a copy of all documents identified in response to Interrogatory No. 7 which refer to, reflect or concern any complaint by faculty, staff or student any investigation thereof.” Id. at 21. *4 Defendant objects, and asserts that interrogatory 7 is “overly broad, unduly burdensome and vague and ambiguous as framed[.]” Id. Defendant notes that the interrogatory is “not limited to formal complaints such as those filed in court, with an administrative agency or with Wesleyan's Title IX Office[.]” Id. In response to interrogatory 7, defendant identified documents “related solely to Plaintiff's complaint to Defendant's Title IX office.” Id. at 22. Defendant did not provide any response or produce any documents “related to the complaints made by female faculty members and students.” Id.[2] Interrogatory 7 is overbroad as framed. See, e.g., Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 70 F. App'x 20, 24 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he district court acted within its discretion in rejecting plaintiffs’ sweeping discovery request for all formal and informal complaints of ... sexual harassment and discrimination throughout the company, and in limiting discovery to the plaintiffs’ supervisors and to their division.”). Furthermore, to the extent the request seeks even informal, oral complaints, the Court finds that the request is unduly burdensome and the definition of “complaint” vague. Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender when she was denied tenure by Wesleyan, and that the physics department was permeated with gender discrimination. The appropriate scope of discovery is limited, as was the case in Jauhari v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc., relied upon by defendant here, to complaints relevant to the issues in this case. No. 3:16CV00680(AWT), 2017 WL 819902 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2017). Defendant shall provide responses to interrogatory 7(a), 7(b), and 7(c), and RFP 5, for the period from 2008 to 2018. Specifically, defendant shall provide: “(a) the identity of the individual who made the complaint; (b) the identity of the individual to whom the complaint was made; [and] (c) Whether any investigation of the complaint occurred and if so when and by whom[,]” limited to the following types of complaints: • Any formal complaints of gender discrimination made by any female faculty member of the physics department. • Any formal complaints of gender discrimination related to the tenure process made by any female faculty member in the university. • Any formal complaints of gender discrimination made against any member of the committee of physics faculty members that voted to deny plaintiff tenure in 2017, or against any member of the Advisory Committee that reviewed the physics department's decision giving plaintiff a unanimous favorable review in 2015. See Doc. #68-1 at 4, 7. A “formal complaint” for purposes of this Order is limited to written complaints filed in court, with an administrative agency, or with Wesleyan's Title IX Office. The Court does not order a response to 7(d). Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel responses to Interrogatory 7 and RFP 5 is GRANTED, in part, as limited above. E. Interrogatory 8 The parties’ joint status report dated July 25, 2019, indicates that the disputes regarding this interrogatory have been resolved. See Doc. #139 at 2. F. Interrogatory 9 and RFP 18 Plaintiff moves to compel additional responses to interrogatory 9 and RFP 18. The parties’ joint status report dated July 25, 2019, indicates that the disputes regarding interrogatory 9(a)-(d),(i) have been resolved, and that Court intervention is needed as to interrogatory 9(e)-(h). See id. *5 Interrogatory 9(e)-(h) and RFP 18 relate to the investigation of plaintiff's Title IX complaint. The Court recently addressed another discovery dispute concerning the Title IX investigation. See Doc. #148. For substantially the reasons discussed in that Order, the Court denies the motion to compel as to interrogatory 9(e)-(h) and RFP 18, without prejudice to refiling, pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel additional responses to interrogatory 9(e)-(h), and to RFP 18, is DENIED, without prejudice. G. Interrogatory 10 and RFP 19 Plaintiff moves to compel defendant to respond to interrogatory 10 and RFP 19. Interrogatory 10 asks Wesleyan to identify each and every female faculty that has made a complaint related to gender or sex in any manner during the past fifteen years and in doing so, state the nature of the complaint, the department in which the faculty member worked, the identity of the individual whose conduct was at issue, what was done in response to the complaint and whether this faculty member applied for tenure, and if so, the state the decision on tenure. This Interrogatory includes any complaints to or concerns raised with Human Resources, the Office of Equity and Inclusion, the Faculty Committee for Rights and Responsibilities, the current or former Dean of Students, the current or former Class Deans, the current or former Dean of Natural Sciences, the current or former Chairs of a department, the Provost's office, the President's Office or any other formal or informal committee which would receive such complaints. Doc. #68-1 at 30. RFP 19 asks defendant to “produce a copy of documents related to any complaint identified in response to Interrogatory No. 10 and any investigation thereof.” Id. at 31. Defendant asserts numerous objections to interrogatory 10 and RFP 19, and has provided no response. See id. at 30-31. In particular, Wesleyan asserts: “This interrogatory seeks to invade the privacy of Wesleyan's employees by requesting sensitive and confidential information that has no bearing on this matter.” Id. at 30. Further, defendant states that “[t]he information is sought solely to annoy, harass and embarrass the parties involved, if any exist.” Id. Defendant asserts that “[c]ourts have consistently rejected these types of broad requests regarding possible discrimination or harassment complaints.” Doc. #83 at 8. In support of this contention, defendant cites to two cases: Jauhari, 2017 WL 819902, at *1, and Bagley v. Yale Univ., 315 F.R.D. 131 (D. Conn. 2016), as amended (June 15, 2016). Defendant quotes Jauhari for the Court's statement: “[I]t is unclear to the Court how university-wide complaints of discrimination unrelated to the tenure process would have any bearing on the claims in plaintiff's case.” Jauhari, 2017 WL 819902, at *7. The Court also found in that matter, however, that “some measure of non-departmental comparative discovery [was] appropriate.” Id. at *4. The question of the appropriate scope of discovery is, by its nature, case-specific. Plaintiff's argument in support of her motion to compel as to these requests is brief. She asserts that “the information sought ... is relevant and proportional to the needs of the case[ ]” because plaintiff alleges that she suffered retaliation based on her filing of a Title IX complaint with Wesleyan. Doc. #68-1 at 31. Plaintiff then refers the Court to previous discussion in her motion to compel regarding comparators, which the Court has reviewed. See Doc. #68-1 at 14-15. In that argument, plaintiff cites to three cases in support of her request for “company-wide” discovery. The Court has reviewed each of these cases. *6 In Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1990), an age discrimination case, plaintiff sought discovery of a narrow universe of “company-wide” information: (1) management level employees (2) over 40 (3) who had terminated employment within an approximately three-year time period. Likewise, the request in Culkin v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 69, 71, 72 (D. Conn. 2004), was “narrowly tailored,” as the Court observed, to materials related to matters “in which defendant is a party and/or named in any administrative action or lawsuit in Connecticut involving a claim of FMLA discrimination or retaliation” for a five-year period. Finally, in Flanagan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 F.R.D. 42 (W.D.N.Y. 1986), the specific disputed requests are not reproduced in the decision, but there, the Court determined that discovery should generally be limited to a four-year time period, in the Northeast Region of the defendant employer, of persons in the same “Claims Representative” position as plaintiff had held. The request here, seeking information regarding any and all female faculty members who made a formal or informal complaint “related to gender or sex in any manner during the past fifteen years[,]” is dramatically broader than the requests at issue in these cases. Doc. #68-1 at 30. It is unfortunate that the parties were unable to agree upon a narrowed version of this request in their meet-and-confer process, but in the absence of such agreement, the Court will narrow the request, taking into account the needs of the case, and the question of proportionality. In addition to the discovery already ordered to be produced in response to interrogatory 7 and RFP 5, see, supra, Section III.D., defendant shall respond to interrogatory 10 and RFP 19 by providing information regarding any formal complaints of gender discrimination made by any female faculty member from 2013 to 2018. Defendant must provide the date on which the complaint was filed, general nature of the complaint, the forum in which the complaint was filed, and information regarding the ultimate resolution of the complaint. Defendant need not provide the names of the complainants or the names of any individuals accused of discrimination.[3] A “formal complaint” for purposes of this Order is limited to written complaints filed in court, with an administrative agency, or with Wesleyan's Title IX Office. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel responses to interrogatory 10 and RFP 19 is GRANTED, in part. H. Interrogatory 14 and RFP 22 Plaintiff moves to compel responses to interrogatory 14 and RFP 22. Interrogatory 14 asks Wesleyan to identify each and every Wesleyan faculty who had a lab at Wesleyan that departed from Wesleyan sometime in the last fifteen years. For each person identified, please state the following: a. Whether they requested a transfer of equipment in the lab they used at Wesleyan; b. The identity of the individual to whom the request for transfer was directed; c. Whether the request to transfer the lab equipment was granted; d. Whether the faculty member was required to pay for the equipment; e. The identity of each and every Wesleyan University representative involved in granting or denying the transfer request; f. Whether it is customary or policy to grant such requests; and g. Identify all documents which reflect the request for transfer of equipment and the decision to grant or deny the request. *7 Doc. #68-1 at 31. RFP 22 asks defendant to “produce a copy of any and all documents that relate to, concern or reflect any transfers of equipment or requests for transfers that were identified in response to Interrogatory No. 14.” Id. at 32. Defendant objects to interrogatory 14 and RFP 22 and has provided no response. See id. at 31-32. Defendant objects “on the grounds that it is overly broad, unduly burdensome and seeks information that is not relevant to the claims or defenses at issue in this lawsuit.” Id. at 31. Defendant further objects to the 15 year time-frame in the request because it “significantly predates any of the alleged unlawful acts.” Id. at 31-32. Defendant contends that “[t]his case involves the denial of tenure for a female assistant professor of Wesleyan's physics department.” Id. at 32. Defendant asserts that “[i]t is not reasonably proportionate to the needs of this case to require Wesleyan to identify each and every former Wesleyan faculty member who had a lab at Wesleyan in the last fifteen years and the circumstances of their departure from Wesleyan as it relates to the transfer of equipment used in their lab.” Id. Plaintiff argues that she wishes to determine “how many times Defendant allowed a transfer” of lab equipment “or how many times it refused to allow a transfer.” Doc. #68-1 at 32-33. Plaintiff articulates no particular rationale for extending this request to all Wesleyan employees, as opposed to employees of the physics department, or for the selection of fifteen years as a relevant time period. “Employees used as comparators in [an employment discrimination] analysis need not be identically situated, but only must be similarly situated in all material respects.” Berube v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 348 F. App'x 684, 686 (2d Cir. 2009). Generally, “individuals in different academic departments of the university ... are not appropriate comparators as they are not similarly situated.” Jauhari, 2017 WL 819902, at *3. Furthermore, limitation of discovery to the general time frame of plaintiff's employment is appropriate. See, e.g., Holloway v. Dollar Tree Distribution, Inc., No. 3:14CV01661(VAB), 2015 WL 3606326, at *3 (D. Conn. June 8, 2015) (“[T]his request shall be limited from her first date of employment ... to the present.”); see also Munoz v. Manhattan Club Timeshare Ass'n, Inc., No. 11CV07037(JPO), 2012 WL 479429, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2012) (“[T]he request to compel discovery ... is granted ... for the time period of Plaintiff's employment by Defendant[.]”); Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat. Lab., Associated Univs., Inc., No. 94CV02330(TCP), 1996 WL 563829, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1996) (“The court will only compel discovery on Dr. Sundaram's discrimination claims for the time period from approximately one year before his employment status changed through one year after his termination.”). Again, the request seeks relevant information, but is overbroad. The Court therefore orders defendant to provide a response to interrogatory 14, as limited to the following: For the period 2008 through 2018, state how many (if any) departing faculty members of the physics department requested transfer of lab equipment upon their separation from Wesleyan, the years in which any such requests were made, and whether any such requests were granted or denied. *8 Plaintiff's stated purpose in seeking this information is to determine whether her request to transfer lab equipment was handled differently than requests made by similarly situated faculty members. No documentation of any requests by other faculty members is necessary to determine that information, or otherwise relevant to this matter. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel as to RFP 22 is DENIED. Plaintiff's motion to compel defendant's response to interrogatory 14 is GRANTED, in part. I. Interrogatory 16 and RFP 24 The parties’ joint status report dated July 25, 2019, indicates that the disputes regarding this interrogatory and RFP have been resolved. See Doc. #139 at 3. J. RFPs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 The parties’ joint status report dated July 25, 2019, indicates that the disputes regarding these RFPs have been resolved. See Doc. #139 at 2. K. RFP 26 Plaintiff moves to compel additional responses to RFP 26, which asks defendant to: Produce a copy of any and all documents that concern, refer or relate to the decision to deny Plaintiff's application for tenure with Defendant, including, but not limited to, notes, meeting notes, agendas, memos and calendar entries. To the extent there are responsive documents that are communications and subject to disclosure under the Initial Disclosure, they should be produced as part of the Initial Disclosure. Doc. #68-1 at 37. Defendant objects to RFP 26 “on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous as framed, ... overly broad, unduly burdensome and seeks irrelevant information.” Id. at 38. Wesleyan states that it “has not withheld any documents on the basis of its objection.” Doc. #83 at 13. Rather, defendant's objection appears to have been limited to interrogatory 6, which was related to this RFP, but as to which plaintiff's motion to compel has been withdrawn. See Doc. #139 at 2. The only remaining issue appears to be whether defendant has specifically identified which otherwise produced documents relate to the tenure decision. Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant has not pointed to any specific document that is responsive to this request.” Doc. #68-1 at 38. Therefore, “Plaintiff has no way of determining which documents Defendant relies upon as the response.” Id. The Court has often ordered a party to identify, by Bates number, any documents already produced that it contends respond to a particular discovery request. Here, however, the RFP at issue broadly requests any “documents that concern, refer or relate to” the central issue in this case: the denial of tenure. Doc. #68-1 at 37. The Court does not find it necessary to require defendant to specifically identify which of thousands of disclosed documents “concern” or “relate to” that central issue -- particularly in light of the fact that the parties might well disagree as to whether particular documents meet that definition. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel as to RFP 26 is DENIED. L. RFP 27 Plaintiff moves to compel defendant's response to RFP 27. RFP 27 asks defendant to “[p]roduce a copy of the personnel files as defined in Section 31-128a of the Connecticut General Statutes of the faculty members of the physics department who voted on Plaintiff's tenure application.” Doc. #68-1 at 38. Defendant objects to RFP 27 and has provided no response. See id. Defendant contends that the requested information is not relevant, and “objects ... on the grounds that the personnel files sought by Plaintiff contain confidential, personal, and private information, the disclosure of which would invade the privacy of the non-parties about whom the information is sought.” Id. Plaintiff seeks this information, she says, because these individuals are “comparators, but also decision makers.” Id. Plaintiff seeks to determine whether any of these individuals “have had formal complaints filed against them by female students, staff and faculty.” Id. *9 The Court has already addressed, in response to other discovery requests, the issues of comparator information, and of gender-based complaints. See Doc. #118; see also, supra, Section III.D. Plaintiff's articulated basis for the relevance of the information requested by RFP 27 does not support any additional disclosures, and further disclosure would infringe on legitimate privacy interests. See, e.g., Shah v. James P. Purcell Assocs., Inc., No. 3:05CV00306(PCD), 2006 WL 988245, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 2006) (“[T]he Court recognizes the legitimate privacy interests of the employees whose [personnel] files have been requested[.]”). Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel as to RFP 27 is DENIED. M. RFP 29 The parties’ joint status report dated July 25, 2019, indicates that the disputes regarding this RFP have been resolved. See Doc. #139 at 2. N. RFP 30 The Court has previously entered an Order addressing this RFP. See Doc. #118; Doc. #139 at 3. O. RFP 31 RFP 31 asks defendant to “produce a copy of Plaintiff's tenure dossier.” Doc. #68-1 at 40. The parties’ joint status report dated July 25, 2019, does not identify this as a dispute that requires court intervention. See Doc. #139 at 2. The Court therefore presumes that this dispute has been resolved. P. RFP 32 The disputes regarding this RFP have been resolved by the Court. See Doc. #118 at 7. Q. RFP 33 Plaintiff moves to compel responses to RFP 33, which asks defendant to “produce a copy of all student teaching evaluation of the tenured physics faculty for the past seven (7) years.” Doc. #68-1 at 42. The parties’ joint status report dated July 25, 2019, does not identify this as a dispute that requires court intervention. See Doc. #139 at 2. The Court therefore presumes that this dispute has been resolved. R. RFP 34 Plaintiff moves to compel a response to RFP 34. RFP 34 asks defendant to “produce a copy of the student evaluation of teaching study conducted by in the 2015 and 2016 academic year which the Provost discussed with Plaintiff in 2016.” Doc. #68-1 at 43 (sic). Defendant objects on the grounds that the request is vague and ambiguous and has provided no response. See id. Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he Provost advised Plaintiff that a study was conducted [regarding the teaching evaluations] in 2015 and 2016.” Id. Plaintiff further contends that “[t]he student evaluation form used by Wesleyan was flawed because it was in a format that experts in the field viewed as problematic.” Id. Plaintiff continues: “Obviously, the study is relevant since Plaintiff claims discrimination, hostile work environment and disparate impact claims.” Id. Defendant's substantive objection is based on the theory that because “a majority of the members of the Physics Department found that Plaintiff met the standard for excellence in teaching[,]” student evaluations could not have been a basis on which plaintiff was denied tenure, and thus the studies are not relevant. Doc. #83 at 16. The Court agrees that the request, as framed, is vague and ambiguous. Plaintiff contends: “[A]s explained in the Amended Complaint, in 2016, ... [plaintiff] spoke with the Provost regarding the issues connected to the student teaching evaluations. The Provost advised Plaintiff that a study was conducted in this regard in 2015 and 2016.” Doc. #68-1 at 43. The Court has carefully reviewed the Amended Complaint, and has even conducted searches for the terms “Provost,” “report” and “evaluations” in an effort to locate this allegation, but has been unable to find an allegation of any such statement by the Provost in the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel as to RFP 34 is DENIED. *10 To the extent plaintiff is seeking data relating to the gender of students who completed evaluations, the Court has already indicated that it will defer any ruling on disclosure of such data until resolution of the motion to dismiss the Title IX claim. See Doc. #148. The Court is unable to identify any other information being sought by this request. Accordingly, as to data relating to the gender of students who completed evaluations, plaintiff's motion to compel as to RFP is DENIED, without prejudice, pending resolution of defendant's Motion to Dismiss. S. RFP 35 Plaintiff moves to compel a response to RFP 35, which asks defendant to “produce a copy of any other student evaluation of teaching study conducted by Defendant after the 2015 and 2016 academic year.” Doc. #68-1 at 44. The Court notes that plaintiff's asserted basis for this request is that she needs “a sample of the new version of the student teaching form[ ]” that she believes was instituted for other faculty members in 2016. Doc. #68-1 at 44. Any such form would not be responsive to this request for any studies, and no other basis for relevance has been asserted. Accordingly, and for the reasons also stated above as to RFP 34, plaintiff's motion to compel as to RFP 35 is DENIED. IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff's motion to compel (Doc. #68) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. Any additional disclosures ordered by this ruling shall be made on or before December 18, 2019. The motion to compel as to Interrogatory 9(e)-(h), RFP 18, and RFP 34[4] is denied without prejudice to refiling pending resolution of defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff may refile her motion to compel responses to interrogatory 9(e)-(h), RFP 18, and RFP 34 within 14 days after the Court issues a ruling on the Pending Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #15, Doc. #59), if the motion is denied and the Title IX claims remain in the case. See Doc. #148. It is so ordered at New Haven, Connecticut, this 25th day of November, 2019. Footnotes [1] Interrogatory 3 asks defendant to: Identify all faculty members of the physics department who voted on the Plaintiff's tenure application and for each individual please state the person's full name, their gender, title/position with Defendant at time Plaintiff's tenure decision was made and the date that the faculty member obtained tenure at Wesleyan University the current employment status with Defendant and length of employment with Defendant. Doc. #68-3 at 8. [2] The Court notes that this phrasing — referring to “the complaints made” — implies that plaintiff knows that complaints were made. No assertion to that effect appears in the briefing. [3] The Court has ordered more detailed information to be provided in response to interrogatory 7 and RFP 5, which are narrowed to formal complaints by female faculty members of the physics department, and formal complaints by female faculty members related to the tenure process. Here, where plaintiff seeks the information only to establish an alleged university-wide pattern of discrimination, the details of any complaints and the identity of the complainants are not relevant. [4] RFP 34 is denied without prejudice to refiling pending resolution of defendant's Motion to Dismiss only to the extent that RFP 34 is seeking data relating to the gender of students who completed evaluations. Any refiled motion to compel a response to RFP 34, pending resolution of defendant's Motion to Dismiss, shall be limited to that request.