TRACY GEORGE, Plaintiff, v. ALLEN MARTIN VENTURES, LLC et al., Defendants Case No. 21-cv-2876-RJL-ZMF United States District Court, District of Columbia Signed March 30, 2023 Counsel Jon Lodwick Brunenkant, Brunenkant & Associates, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff. Robin E. Martin, Aldie, VA, Pro Se. Dennis John Quinn, Carr Maloney, P.C., Washington, DC, Roy Ira Niedermayer, Jessica Summers, Paley Rothman Goldstein Rosenberg Eig & Cooper, Chtd., Bethesda, MD, for Defendant First Class Title, Inc. Dennis John Quinn, Carr Maloney, P.C., Washington, DC, for Defendant Daniel J. Kotz. Faruqui, Zia M., United States Magistrate Judge MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER *1 Pending before the Court are two motions—a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and a Motion to Extend Time to Complete Discovery—by Defendant, First Class Title, Inc. (“FCT”). See Def. FCT's Mot. Compel Disc. Resps. (“Def.’s Mot. Compel”), ECF No. 23; Def. FCT's Mot. Extend Time Complete Disc. (“Def.’s Mot. Disc.”), ECF No. 29. Also pending is a third motion—Motion to Extend Defendants’ Deadline to File Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosures—by Defendant, Daniel J. Kotz and FCT (“Defendants”). See Mot. Extend Defs.’ Kotz and FCT Deadline File Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosures (“Defs.’ Mot. 26(a)(2)”), ECF No. 26. Considering the motions, the oppositions and replies thereto, the undersigned hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Compel, and DENIES the Motion to Extend Time to Complete Discovery and the Motion to Extend Defendants’ Deadline to File Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosures. I. BACKGROUND On November 1, 2021, Plaintiff Tracy George filed a complaint against Defendants claiming negligence and breach of fiduciary duties. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5, ECF No. 1. On April 25, 2022, Judge Leon set Plaintiff's Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures deadline as September 1, 2022, and Defendants’ deadline as September 30, 2022. See Scheduling Order 1, ECF No. 21. The discovery deadline was October 31, 2022. See id. A. FCT's Discovery Requests On June 8, 2022, FCT's counsel served ninety-one Requests for Admissions, nine Interrogatories and nineteen Requests for Production of Documents (“First Discovery Requests”) by first class mail with a courtesy copy emailed to Plaintiff's counsel. See Def.’s Mot. Compel ¶ 1; Def.’s Mot. Compel, Ex. A, First Set of Interrogatories, ECF No. 23-1; Def.’s Mot. Compel, Ex. B, Request for Production Documents, ECF No. 23-2; Def.’s Mot. Compel, Ex. C, First Requests for Admissions, ECF No. 23-3. Plaintiff's responses and objections were due on July 8, 2022. See Def.’s Mot. Compel ¶ 2. On July 13, 2022, FCT's counsel emailed Plaintiff's counsel regarding the status of the missing responses to the First Discovery Requests. See Def.’s Mot. Compel, Ex. E, Email from Jessica Summers (“First Summers Email”), ECF No. 23-5. Plaintiff's counsel did not respond to the email. See Def.’s Mot. Compel ¶ 4. On July 18, 2022, FCT's counsel sent another follow-up email to Plaintiff's counsel. See Def.’s Mot. Compel, Ex. F, Email from Jessica Summers, ECF No. 23-6. On July 19, 2022, Plaintiff's counsel responded that he was “not sure what happened” but he “only received [ ] hard copies in the mail last week” and “[had] not received any copies via email.” See Def.’s Mot. Compel, Ex. G, Email from Jon Brunenkant, ECF No. 23-7. Plaintiff's counsel subsequently stated “it must have been the July 13 email that I saw and later got your hard copy and did not pay attention to the original dates until this recent chain of emails. But I have now checked all my emails, spam and trash and I cannot locate an original June 8th email.” See Def.’s Mot. Compel, Ex. H, Email from Jon Brunenkant, ECF No. 23-8. FCT's counsel confirmed a delay with the United States Postal Service's initial delivery of the hard copies of the First Discovery Requests. See Def.’s Mot. Compel ¶ 9. In turn, FCT's counsel extended the deadline for Plaintiff's responses to the First Discovery Requests to August 12, 2022. See id. *2 On August 12, 2022, at 5:50 p.m., FCT's counsel emailed Plaintiff's counsel inquiring about the status of the missing responses and stated their intent to file a motion to compel. See Def.’s Mot. Compel, Ex. I, Email from Jessica Summers (“Summers Deadline Email”), ECF No. 23-9. On Monday August 15, 2022, at 2:26 a.m., Plaintiff's counsel emailed that FCT's counsel would receive Plaintiff's responses “Monday.” Id. FCT's counsel responded that FCT would file a motion to compel if Plaintiff's discovery responses were not produced by 6:00 p.m. See id. Plaintiff did not meet this deadline. See Def.’s Mot. Compel ¶ 10. Consequently, FCT filed a Motion to Compel. See Def.’s Mot. Compel at 1. FCT requested the Court to deem “all matters set forth in FCT's First Requests for Admissions” admitted by Plaintiff, for Plaintiff to respond fully to FCT's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents without objections, and for Plaintiff to pay attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing the Motion to Compel. Id. On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff only produced answers to the First Requests for Admissions. See Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. Compel Disc. Resps. (“Def.’s Reply”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 25. On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff produced unsigned answers to FCT's First Interrogatories and filed a motion opposing FCT's Motion to Compel. See Pl.’s Opp'n Def.’s Mot. Compel (“Pl.’s Opp'n”) ¶¶ 1–3, ECF No. 24. Plaintiff argued that it had “now fully responded to FCT's discovery requests.” Id. On August 30, 2022, FCT filed its Reply. See Def.’s Reply at 1. FCT claimed that Plaintiff's responses to FCT's First Request for Admissions did not comply with Rule 36(a)(4) because Plaintiff failed to “properly admit or deny sixty-eight of the ninety-one Requests.” Id. ¶ 4; see also Def.’s Reply, Ex. A, Pl.’s Answers to Def.’s Req. for Admis. (“Pl.’s Admissions”), ECF No. 25-1. FCT also claimed that “Plaintiff's answers to FCT's Interrogatories do not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 in that they are not signed and fail to fully respond, or object, to the [I]nterrogatories posed.” Def.’s Reply ¶ 6; see also Def.’s Reply, Ex. B, Pl.’s Answers to Def.’s First Interrogs. (“Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers”), ECF No. 25-2. Finally, FCT argued that Plaintiff “has still not provided any written responses to FCT's First Request for Production. Rather Plaintiff, through counsel has produced a handful of unlabeled documents with no indication as to which requests they are in response to or whether any objections have been raised.”[1] Def.’s Reply ¶ 7. FCT has requested attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing the Motion to Compel. See id. ¶ 9. B. Plaintiff's Expert Report On August 22, 2022, Plaintiff gave notice that it had identified a potential expert. See Pl.’s Memo. in Partial Opp'n Def.’s Mot. to Extend Deadline to File Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosures (“Pl.’s 26(a)(2) Opp'n”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 27. On September 1, 2022, Plaintiff produced an expert report. See id. On September 14, 2022, Defendants emailed Plaintiff that the expert report did not “include information required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)” and the “U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Local Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(vii).”[2] Id. ¶ 2. Defendants requested supplements by September 19. See Defs.’ Mot. 26(a)(2) ¶ 15. *3 On September 19, 2022, Plaintiff responded that the “only potential omission ... was that Plaintiff's counsel had not provided a statement of the compensation to be paid” to the expert, and the expert was available for a deposition if “Defendants’ counsel so desired.” Pl.’s 26(a)(2) Opp'n ¶ 3. Plaintiff attached their expert's billing rates to this response. See id. On September 30, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion to Extend the Deadline to File Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosures by thirty days. See Defs.’ Mot. 26(a)(2) ¶ 20. Defendants allege Plaintiff's expert report is “incomplete” and contains “conclusions of law” such that Defendants are unable to “finalize” their “expert engagement or provide a comprehensive and appropriate disclosure regarding their expert.” Defs.’ Mot. 26(a)(2) ¶¶ 16–19. On October 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Partial Opposition. See Pl.’s 26(a)(2) Opp'n at 1. Plaintiff argues its expert report complies with Rule 26(a)(2) and urges the court to deny Defendants’ request that Plaintiff supplement the report. See id. at 1. Plaintiff does not object to a five-week extension of the “entire” “procedural schedule to allow all parties to get back focused on this case.” Id. at 1, 3. On October 21, 2022, FCT filed a Reply. See Defs.’ Reply to Extend Deadline to Fle Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosures (“Defs.’ Reply 26(a)(2)”) 1, ECF No. 28. FCT alleges it “will not have sufficient information to designate an expert, if any, until FCT's Motion to Compel Plaintiff's responses to FCT's first discovery requests has been resolved.” Id. ¶ 4. FCT further states that while it “appreciates” the five-week extension, Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(2) disclosure deadline should be extended until thirty days “after the production of Plaintiff's complete and fully responsive discovery responses.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 5. C. Discovery Extension On October 27, 2022, FCT filed a Motion to Extend Time to Complete Discovery. See Def.’s Mot. Disc. at 1. FCT argues its First Discovery Requests were issued “nearly five months before the discovery deadline to ensure that it would have adequate time to complete discovery within the time allotted.” Id. ¶ 11. FCT argues that until the Court resolves its Motion to Compel, FTC is “unable to fully and adequately complete its discovery in this case.” Id. ¶ 12. FCT requests extending discovery to sixty days after the responses FCT seeks the Court to compel from Plaintiff are received. See id. ¶ 14. FCT also requests reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing the Motion to Extend. See id. On October 28, 2022, the Court issued an Order holding in abeyance the Motion to Extend Defendants’ Deadline to File its Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosures and FCT's Motion to Extend Time to Complete Discovery. See Min. Order (Oct. 28, 2022). This order stayed all applicable discovery deadlines pending resolution of the Motion to Compel. See id. II. LEGAL STANDARD Parties “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevant information “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. Relevance “encompass[es] any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on any party's claim or defense.” United States ex. rel. Shamesh v. CA, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (cleaned up). *4 A “party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection [when] ... a deponent fails to answer a question, ... fails to answer an interrogatory ... [or] fails to produce documents.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). “[A]n evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). As a threshold matter, the movant “bears the initial burden of explaining how the requested information is relevant.” Jewish War Veterans v. Gates, 506 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2007). Next, “[w]hen the opposing party has answered the movant's requests, the movant has the burden of showing that the opposing party's responses are incomplete.” Porter v. Sebelius, No. 11-cv-1546, 2014 WL 12768504, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2014). The non-moving party then takes on the burden to “explain why discovery should not be permitted.” Jewish War Veterans, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (cleaned up). “[J]udges enjoy wide discretion in managing the discovery process.” 3E Mobile, LLC v. Global Cellular, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 3d 50, 53 (D.D.C. 2016) (cleaned up). “When this discovery process is abused, courts are permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 to award sanctions.” Smith v. Ergo Sols., LLC, No. 14-cv-382, 2018 WL 5810836, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2018). “The central requirement of a Rule 37 sanction is that it be just.” Arias v. Dyncorp Aero. Operations, LLC, 677 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Bonds v. Dist. of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Courts are “directed to award attorney's fees to the moving party when granting a motion to compel,” “[u]nless the opposing party's objection was substantially justified or circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Barnes v. Dist. of Columbia, 283 F.R.D. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)) (cleaned up). Additionally, a party that fails to respond to proper discovery requests within the time allotted by either the federal rules or separate agreement may waive their objections to that discovery. See, e.g., Caudle v. Dist. of Columbia, 263 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2009). III. ANALYSIS A. Requests for Admissions 1. Sufficiency of Answers “Requests for admissions are not a discovery device.” Harris v. Koenig, 271 F.R.D. 356, 372 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 265 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D.D.C. 2003)) (cleaned up). Their purpose is “to narrow the scope of issues to be litigated and to thereby expedite the litigation process.” Kendrick v. Sullivan, No. 83-cv-3175, 1992 WL 119125, at *3 (D.D.C. May 15, 1992) (cleaned up). Therefore, “federal courts express their concern when they breed additional litigation because one party is dissatisfied with the answer of the other.” Harris, 271 F.R.D. at 372 (citing Nat'l Semiconductor, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 74). A requesting party may “move to determine the sufficiency of an answer or objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6). Courts may deem a matter admitted when parties’ answers to requests for admissions are “deficient.” Dist. of Columbia ex rel. Z-Modular, LLC v. MCN Build, Inc., 2020 WL 4001458, at * 2 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Stark-Romero v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Co. (AMTRAK), 275 F.R.D. 551, 556 (D.N.M. 2011)) (cleaned up). But deeming a matter admitted is a “severe sanction that should be imposed only where it has been demonstrated that a party has intentionally disregarded the obligations imposed by Rule 36(a).” Dist. of Columbia ex rel. Z-Modular, LLC, 2020 WL 4001458, at * 2 (quoting Stark-Romero, 275 F.R.D. at 556) (cleaned up). Local Rule 26.2(d) requires a motion to compel to “identify and quote each [ ] request in full immediately preceding the answer, response or objection thereto.” LCvR 26.2(d); see also LCvR 30.4; Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 267 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2010) (although “plaintiffs did not quote each interrogatory or request in full in their motion to compel,” “they did identify the interrogatory or requests in question and provided the full text as an attachment” and thus “reasonably complie[d] with the spirit of Local Rule 30.4”). Yet FCT failed to do so. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 4. In fact, FCT failed to identify the sixty-eight responses FCT deemed to be “deficient.” Id.; see Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys., Inc., 267 F.R.D. at 3. *5 The Court is left to assume that the sixty-eight responses in question are those that do not begin with an “admit” or “deny.”[3] See Pl.’s Admissions. Yet the failure to say either of these words is not enough alone to warrant a finding of deficiency. See Harris, 271 F.R.D. at 374. There is “nothing in [Rule 36] that divides the legitimate responses to a Request for Admissions into watertight compartments of utter admissions and utter denials.” Harris, 271 F.R.D. at 374. Rather, “given that it is unreasonable to expect that one party can always accept the other party's characterization of an event, the rule permits a party to qualify its answer.” Id. These sixty-eight responses typically are qualifications, however, at other times are arguably non-responsive or duplicative. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 4; Pl.’s Admissions. But it was FCT's burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff has “intentionally disregarded the obligations imposed by Rule 36(a).” Dist. of Columbia ex rel. Z-Modular, LLC, 2020 WL 4001458 at *2 (quoting Stark-Romero, 275 F.R.D. at 556) (cleaned up). And it has not done so. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 4. Thus, the Court denies without prejudice FCT's request that Plaintiff's responses be deemed admitted.[4] See Dist. of Columbia ex rel. Z-Modular, LLC, 2020 WL 4001458 at *2 (quoting Stark-Romero, 275 F.R.D at 556) (cleaned up); Def.’s Reply ¶ 5. 2. Timeliness “A matter is admitted unless, within [thirty] days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). However, courts have “broad discretion to permit parties to file a response out of time when such filing will facilitate a proper presentation of the merits and when the untimely response will not prejudice the requesting party in maintaining the action.” Dorsky Hodgson & Partners, Inc. v. National Council of Sr. Citizens, 766 A.2d 54, 57 (D.D.C. 2001) (cleaned up). Essentially, courts “must strike a balance between diligence in litigation and the interests of justice.” United States v. $30,354, 863 F. Supp. 442, 445 (W.D. Ky. 1994) (cleaned up). Plaintiff provided her responses four days late after receiving an extension from FCT. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 3. This delay was minor. See $30,354, 863 F. Supp. at 445; Def.’s Reply ¶ 3. And “nothing [in Rule 36] automatically requires that the requests for admission be deemed admitted merely because [the thirty-day deadline] ha[s] transpired.” Henok v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 12-cv-292, 2014 WL 12775626, at *9; see also Tequila Centinela, S.A. de C.V. v. Bacardi & Co., 247 F.R.D. 198, 205 (D.D.C. 2008) (no penalty for answers that were forty-nine days late). Thus, the Court denies FCT's request. See Henok, 2014 WL 12775626, at *9. B. Interrogatories 1. Completeness of Responses “[E]ach interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). A party fully answers an interrogatory by “provid[ing] true, explicit, responsive, complete, and candid answers.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Prop., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 29, 32, 34 (D.D.C. 2007) (cleaned up). “[E]vasive or incomplete” answers constitute a failure to answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). A party who believes that the opposing party has failed to fully answer an interrogatory may “move to compel a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a); see also LCvR 26.2(d); Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys., Inc., 267 F.R.D. at 3. The moving party bears the burden of proving that the discovery responses are deficient. See Guantanamera Cigar Co. v. Corporacion Habanos, S.A., 263 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009). *6 Despite the requirements of Local Rule 26.2(d), FCT does not specify which of Plaintiff's answers “failed to fully respond, or object, to the interrogatories posed.” Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys., Inc., 267 F.R.D. at 3; see Def.’s Reply ¶ 6. And again, the Court is left to guess. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 6. Perhaps FCT contends all nine answers are incomplete? But it is still unclear how Plaintiff's answers are deficient, as FCT “has [not] detailed [the] alleged defects in [Plaintiff's] responses.” Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 34; see Def.’s Reply ¶ 6. Instead, FCT “generally contest[s] the sufficiency of [Plaintiff's] responses.” Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 34; see Def.’s Reply ¶ 6; Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers. However, Plaintiff answered each interrogatory “separately and fully in writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3); see Equal Rights Ctr., 246 F.R.D. at 34. Plaintiff's answers are responsive and non-evasive. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a); Equal Rights Ctr., 246 F.R.D. at 32; Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers. For example, Interrogatory #4 requests that Plaintiff: Describe the nature of your relationship with Robin Martin. Include in your response how long and in what capacity you have know[n] Robin Martin and any prior business dealings with Robin Martin. Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers at 2. Plaintiff answers: Plaintiff has known Robin Martin for a number of years as the girlfriend and later wife of Troy Martin who Plaintiff has known for 20 years. The only business dealing Plaintiff had with Robin Martin was loan agreement in 2019 pursuant to which Plaintiff lent Ms. Martin $20,000 to renovate a property she owned in Virginia. That loan was repaid without any problems. Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers at 2. Similarly, Interrogatory #9 requests that Plaintiff: Describe any and all attorney fees, expenses and costs incurred by you for which you were describing a recovery in your Complaint and identify how each was calculated. Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers at 3. Plaintiff answers: Plaintiff will seek recovery of all costs incurred in litigation including filing fees, costs of service, witness fees, deposition video fees and any other out-of-pocket costs billed to her or her attorney, and attorney fees billed at $650/hour. Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers. at 3. And even where Plaintiff has not provided the information requested, Plaintiff's responses are within the confines of Rule 33. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3); Equal Rights Ctr., 246 F.R.D. at 32. For example, Interrogatory #2 requests that: For each witness you have retained or specifically employed to provide expert testimony in this case or employed by you whose duties regularly involve giving expert testimony and whom you expect to testify at trial, provide a complete statement of the opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore. Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers at 1. Plaintiff answers: You have been provided with Mr. Shaun Marble's resume previously and when his review is complete you will be provided with his expert report. Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers at 2. “[I]t is sufficient for a party to answer an interrogatory by stating that it is presently unable to provide the information sought,” but “additional information would be forthcoming in compliance with its continuing duty to supplement prior disclosures.” Equal Rights Ctr., 246 F.R.D. at 33 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2); 7-3 Moore's Federal Practice-Civil § 33.102). This is what Plaintiff has done here. See Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers at 1–2. Ultimately, FTC failed to carry its burden given its failure to explain—with support from caselaw—why the offending responses are deficient. See Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys., Inc., 267 F.R.D. at 3; Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 34; Def.’s Reply ¶ 6. 2. Timeliness “The responding party must serve its answers and any objections within [thirty] days after being served with the interrogatories.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2). “Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (emphasis added). Good cause “requires a greater showing than excusable neglect.” Starlight Int'l., Inc. v. Herlihy, 181 F.R.D. 494, 497 (D. Kan. 1998) (quoting Broitman v. Kirkland (In re Kirkland), 86 F.3d 172, 175 (10th Cir. 1996)) (cleaned up); see also Byrd v. Reno, 1998 WL 429676, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1998) (defining good cause as “medical emergency” or where requests are so “patently irrelevant” that accepting a late objection is necessary for the court to prevent “misuse of its processes”). Courts in this district have considered the following factors in determining whether a waiver of objections was justified: *7 (1) the length of the delay or failure to particularize; (2) the reason for the delay or failure to particularize; (3) whether there was any dilatory or bad faith action on the part of the party that failed to raise the objection properly; (4) whether the party seeking discovery has been prejudiced by the failure; (5) whether the [discovery] request was properly framed and not excessively burdensome; and (6) whether waiver would impose an excessively harsh result on the defaulting party. Nasreen v. Capitol Petroleum Grp., LLC, 340 F.R.D. 489, 497–98 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 33) (cleaned up). Plaintiff's nine interrogatory responses—albeit late—did not assert any objections. See Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers at 1–3. But more answers could be forthcoming as Plaintiff remains under a continuing obligation to supplement. See Equal Rights Ctr., 246 F.R.D. at 33. And it is possible Plaintiff may wish to assert objection(s) in any such supplement. See id. However, Plaintiff may not do so because the above factors weigh in favor of finding Plaintiff's objections waived. Nasreen, 340 F.R.D. at 497–98. a. Length of the delay Lengthy delays in responding to discovery requests weigh in favor of finding a waiver of objections. See Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 33 (twenty-one to thirty-seven days); Fonville v. Dist. of Columbia, 230 F.R.D. 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2005) (twenty days). A four-day delay may justify a waiver of objections—where prior extensions were already granted. See Starlight Int'l., Inc., 181 F.R.D. at 497 (objections waived where responses were four days late and offending party had already received a thirty-day extension). FCT extended the first deadline—which Plaintiff missed—by thirty-five days. See Def.’s Mot. Compel ¶¶ 2–9. However, Plaintiff did not produce responses until seventeen days after the second deadline. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 6. Thus, the length of delay—seventeen days after the extended second deadline—weighs in favor of waiver of objections. See Starlight Int'l., Inc., 181 F.R.D. at 497; Def.’s Reply ¶ 6. b. Reason for the delay Parties must proffer “some reasonable basis for noncompliance within the time specified” to show good cause. Starlight Int'l., Inc., 181 F.R.D. at 497 (quoting Broitman, 86 F.3d at 175) (cleaned up). “[S]imple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance of the rules usually does not suffice.” Id.; see Blumenthal, 186 F.R.D. at 240 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding counsel's “assertion that it believed ... a much better use of counsel's time [was] prepar[ing] the discovery responses rather than ... a motion for extension of time” does not constitute good cause) (cleaned up). Plaintiff never offered to FCT or the Court a reason for the delay in responding to the second deadline. See Starlight Int'l., Inc., 181 F.R.D. at 497; Def.’s Reply ¶ 6. As such, this factor “weighs in favor of waiver.” Nasreen, 340 F.R.D. at 498. c. Dilatory or bad faith action Dilatory or bad faith conduct weighs in favor of finding waiver of objections. See Nasreen, 340 F.R.D. at 498 (dilatory conduct found where plaintiff had been on “notice” that her counsel may withdraw and “yet took more than four months to secure new counsel”). In Caudle, the court found a party's conduct could be “characterized as dilatory” because it “failed to move for an additional extension of time in which to respond to discovery; ... proffer[ed] no reason for such failure; and after receiving a [fourteen]-day extension of the discovery deadline, ... did not file its responses to document requests and interrogatories, respectively until [twenty-one] and [thirty-seven] days after the extended discovery cutoff.” 263 F.R.D. at 34. *8 Plaintiff did not request an extension “to respond to discovery,” offered “no reason for such failure,” and even after receiving an extension from FCT, did not timely respond to the discovery requests. Id.; see Def.’s Reply ¶ 6. When Plaintiff's counsel realized that he could not meet the second deadline, he should have sought an extension with FCT's counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Indeed, FCT's counsel had already demonstrated a willingness to grant an extension. See Def.’s Mot. Compel ¶¶ 2–9. If extension via consent was impossible, Plaintiff's counsel should have moved for an extension. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). However, Plaintiff's counsel did neither. See Def.’s Reply ¶¶ 4–6. Instead, Plaintiff's counsel only stated “Monday” in response to FCT's email requesting an update about the outstanding discovery. Def.’s Mot. Compel ¶ 12. And Plaintiff's counsel offered no explanation after submitting the late responses. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 6; Summers Deadline Email. Thus, this factor “weighs in favor of waiver.” Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 33. d. Prejudice to FTC A “lack of prejudice to [FCT] does not constitute a showing of good cause.” Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 33 (citing Starlight Int'l., Inc., 181 F.R.D. at 497). Although, “some of the prejudice” may be “cured by the extension of discovery deadlines, ... such extensions of discovery necessitated by the actions of one party generally result in increased litigation costs for all parties and the loss of information/witnesses attributable to the passage of time.” Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 34 (cleaned up). Thus, even if a Defendant “could not show any prejudice from Plaintiff's delayed discovery responses, that alone is not sufficient to forestall a waiver of objections.” Nasreen, 340 F.R.D. at 499. FCT argues it has been prejudiced by Plaintiff's failure to timely deliver discovery requests particularly with its ability to “identify” and “engage” an expert and to complete discovery. Def.’s Reply 26(a)(2) ¶¶ 3–4. While “an extension of discovery deadlines” may resolve FCT's alleged prejudice, “the ultimate adjudication of this case” has been delayed. Nasreen, 340 F.R.D. at 498 (cleaned up). Moreover, an extension has been “necessitated by the actions of one party.” Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 34. Accordingly, “this factor also weighs in favor of waiver of objections.” Id. e. Burdensome Discovery requests must be “properly framed and not unduly burdensome.” Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 34. “[P]arties do not waive objections to discovery requests that [are] overly broad, at times vague, and [ ] not legally supported.” Nasreen, 340 F.R.D. at 499 (quoting Doerr v. Abplanalp, No. 19-cv-1194, 2020 WL 6870912, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2020)). But “[i]t is not a court's duty to parse the discovery requests with a fine-tooth comb and interpose each and every objection the non-moving party might have made had that party timely responded to the requests.” Nasreen, 340 F.R.D. at 499. Having reviewed FCT's nine Interrogatory requests, the “Court finds them to be generally well crafted and not unduly burdensome.” Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 34; see Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers. Thus, the Interrogatories “pass muster” and this factor weighs in favor of waiver. Nasreen, 340 F.R.D. at 499–500 (quoting Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 33). f. Harsh result A waiver of objections is not “an unduly harsh result” where the non-moving party demonstrates “a pattern of unjustifiable delay.” Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 35 (party demonstrated “a pattern of unjustifiable delay ... in its failure to [timely] respond to discovery ... in the piecemeal way in which supplementation of those responses has been provided, and [in its] practice of asserting late objections.”); Nasreen, 340 F.R.D. at 499 (“The Court is hard-pressed to find that a waiver of objections [was a harsh result where] ... Plaintiff ignored [discovery] for four months.”). Plaintiff has demonstrated a “pattern of unjustifiable delay” by missing the second deadline without explanation or notice to opposing counsel. Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 35; see Def.’s Mot. Compel ¶¶ 4–9; Def.’s Reply ¶ 6. This factor weighs in favor of waiver. See Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 35. *9 Thus, these six factors weigh in favor of waiver. See Nasreen, 340 F.R.D. at 497–98. 3. Invalid Signature To be properly verified, interrogatory answers must be answered “fully in writing under oath” and signed by “[t]he person who ... answers ... them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b); L. Civ. R. 11.2 (verification requires a statement that the writing “is subscribed as true under penalty of perjury”). Additionally, “the attorney who objects must sign any objections.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5). “[S]trict adherence to the signature requirement in Rule 33 is especially important because interrogatories serve ... as a means of producing admissible evidence; there is no better example of an admission of a party opponent, which is admissible because it is not hearsay, than an answer to an interrogatory.” Antoine v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08-cv-615, 2009 WL 10694779, at *2 (D.D.C. June 26, 2009) (cleaned up). If a signature was not provided or was invalid, courts typically order the offending party to supplement with a proper signature. See, e.g., Escamilla v. Nuyen, No. 14-cv-00852, 2015 WL 4245868, at *9 (D.D.C. July 14, 2015). Plaintiff electronically signed the interrogatory responses. See Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers at 3. However, electronic signatures are invalid. See Antoine, No. 08-cv-615, 2009 WL 10694779 at *2. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall supplement her prior response with a proper signature within twenty-one days. See Escamilla, 2015 WL 4245868 at *9. C. Request for Production of Documents Responses to document requests must include a specific objection or an agreement to produce the documents. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2). Plaintiff has not provided written responses to FCT's First Request for Production. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 7. Plaintiff's justification is that she “supplied all documents and emails in her possession.” Pl.’s 26(a)(2) Opp'n ¶ 7. But this does not satisfy Rule 34(b)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2). FCT “is entitled to individualized, complete responses to each of the requests, as numbered and identified in the requests accompanied by production of each of the documents responsive to the request, regardless of whether the documents have already been produced.” Louen v. Twedt, 236 F.R.D. 502, 505 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) and Fishel v. BASF Grp., 175 F.R.D. 525, 531 (S.D. Iowa 1997)); see also MCC Controls v. Hal Hays Constr. 2020 WL 6034321, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2020) (same) (cleaned up). Indeed “[e]ven if there are no documents responsive to a request for production, [FCT] is entitled to a response.” Louen, 236 F.R.D. at505 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b); Fishel, 175 F.R.D. at 531). As such, Plaintiff must respond within twenty-one days to each document request in a manner as described above. “A party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i). Yet the documents Plaintiff produced were unlabeled with no indication as to which requests they were in response. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 7. This does not comply with Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i). See United States v. O'Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[I]f all the documents have been produced in an undifferentiated mass in a large box without file folders or labels, then these documents have not been produced in the manner in which they were ordinarily maintained as Rule 34 (b)(2)(E)(i) requires”). Even if Plaintiff kept her documents without organization in the ordinary course of business, she has an additional obligation in discovery: to make the documents “usable” to the responding party. O'Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 19. Plaintiff could have done so by producing the documents “according to the categories in the request.” Sparton Corp. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 10, 16 (2007). As such, Plaintiff's supplemental production—as ordered above—must include organized and labeled documents with references to which request they are in response. See id. D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs *10 If a motion to compel is granted, the Court must “require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct or both of them to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Where a motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may “apportion the reasonable expenses” incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons “in a just manner.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C); Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, No. 97-cv-602, 1998 WL 647214, at *2 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 314 F. 3d 625, 2003 WL 69563 (D.C. Cir. 2003). However, “the court must not order this payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A); see, e.g., United Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Couture, No. 19-cv-1856, 2020 WL 3402396, at *2 (D.S.C. June 19, 2020). “[A] party's position is not substantially justified if there is no legal support for it, if the party concedes the validity of his opponent's position after causing everyone time and money, or, worse, defies an unequivocally clear obligation.” Boca Investerings P'ship, 1998 WL 647214, at *2. There is no requirement that the court find that counsel acted in bad faith. See Alexander v. Interim Legal Servs., Inc., 1997 WL 732432, at *1 (D.D.C. 1997) (cleaned up). FCT requests attorneys’ fees and costs in relation to its Motion to Compel. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 9. Plaintiff has demonstrated a disregard for deadlines and a failure to comply with the discovery rules. See supra. Plaintiff has not explained the reason for her missed deadlines or inadequate responses under Rule 34; rather, Plaintiff argues that she is insulated from sanction because she has now complied with her discovery obligations. See Def.’s Mot. Compel ¶¶ 1–2, 10; Pl.’s Opp'n ¶¶ 1–3. The Court disagrees. See United Prop. & Cas., 2020 WL 3402396, at *2-3. An award for attorney's fees is warranted with regards to the deficiencies in the Requests for Production of Documents responses.[5] See Def.’s Reply ¶¶ 6, 7; Boca Investerings P'ship, 1998 WL 647214 at *2; Inova Health Care Servs. for Inova Fairfax Hosp. v. Omni Shoreham Corp., No. 20-cv-784, 2022 WL 4598578, at *14 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2022) (awarding “plaintiffs [sixty percent] of their attorney's fees and expenses”). However, it is premature to render a decision as to the scope of such award given that FCT may have subsequent fee claims related to supplemental discovery / motions to compel as discussed above. See Def.’s Reply ¶¶ 4, 6, 7. Regardless, the parties will ultimately need to submit further briefing as to the amount of a reasonable fee award. See Inova Health Care Servs., 2022 WL 4598578 at *15. E. Motions to Extend “Rule 6(b) is a rule of general application giving wide discretion to the court to enlarge [the Federal Rules’] time limits or revive them after they have expired.” Advisory Comm. Note on Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). However, a scheduling order entered “shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the [presiding] judge.” Dag Enterprises, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 226 F.R.D. 95, 104 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b); LCvR 16.4). Good cause “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Dag Enterprises, Inc., 226 F.R.D. at 105–106 (cleaned up); see also Saunders v. Dist. of Columbia, 279 F.R.D. 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2012). “[T]he focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up). “Mere failure on the part of counsel to proceed promptly with the normal processes of discovery and trial preparation should not be considered good cause.” Olgyay v. Soc'y for Env't Graphic Design, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 219, 220 (D.D.C. 1996) (cleaned up). *11 Defendants first ask the Court to extend time to file their Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures for an additional thirty days “after the production of Plaintiff's complete and fully responsive discovery responses” because Plaintiff's expert report is “incomplete” and contains “conclusions of law.” Defs.’ Reply 26(a)(2) ¶ 2, 5; Defs.’ First Req. ¶¶ 15–16. Plaintiff disagrees that her report is incomplete and proposes instead that “the [entire] procedural schedule” be increased for all parties by five weeks. See Pl.’s 26(a)(2) Opp'n at 3. Given that Plaintiff's report appears to be complete, this Motion is denied without prejudice.[6] See Pl.’s 26(a)(2) Opp'n ¶ 7. FCT next asks the Court to extend discovery by an additional sixty days after the production of Plaintiff's “complete and fully responsive responses” to FCT's discovery requests. Def.’s Mot. Disc. at 3. FCT issued its First Discovery Requests “nearly five months before the discovery deadline to ensure that it would have adequate time to complete discovery within the time allotted.” Def.’s Mot. Disc. ¶ 11. However, Plaintiff's repeated delays resulted in FCT receiving the discovery responses two months shy of the close of discovery. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 6. The Court finds that FCT's actions “bespeak [the] diligence [required for good cause].” Saunders, 279 F.R.D. at 38 (cleaned up). All deadlines have passed during the pendency of this discovery dispute. See Min. Order (Oct. 28, 2022). Thus, the original Scheduling Order is no longer viable. See Scheduling Order at 1. And “the delay resulting from litigation over the parties’ [discovery] disputes warrants additional time for [ ] discovery.” Rundquist v. Vapiano SE, 277 F.R.D. 205, 213 (D.D.C. 2011) (plaintiff's request for an additional sixty days of jurisdictional discovery is granted); see Winston & Strawn LLP v. Law Firm of John Arthur Eaves, 307 F.R.D. 259, 263 (D.D.C. 2014) (“there is no prejudice to the Plaintiff in granting a limited extension of discovery for [thirty] days so that both sides can take their respective depositions that were noticed prior to the end of discovery.”) “In an exercise of its broad discretion, the Court shall not grant the requested two-month extension.” Saunders, 279 F.R.D. at 38; see Def.’s Mot. Disc. ¶ 14. “Instead, the Court shall afford the parties a more limited additional [six weeks], until and including [May 31, 2023], to complete all discovery in this action, including any expert discovery.” Saunders, 279 F.R.D. at 38. If the parties require additional time due to related litigation or alleged deficiencies with the prior discovery responses, they may move for more time. See id. IV. CONCLUSION *12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS FCT's Motion to Compel in part and DENIES FCT's Motion to Compel in part and DENIES FCT's Motion to Extend Discovery and Defendants’ Motion to Extend Time to File Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosures. Plaintiff shall provide a Rule 33-compliant signature page and produce FCT's requested documents by not later than April 20, 2023. It is further ORDERED that FCT and Defendant Kotz shall provide their Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures by not later than April 30, 2023. It is further ORDERED Plaintiff's rebuttal Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures will be due no later than May 15, 2023. It is further ORDERED that the parties’ Rule 26(e)(2) supplementation of disclosures and responses shall be due not later than May 31, 2023. It is further ORDERED that the discovery deadline is May 31, 2023. This is a final order issued pursuant to Local Rule 72.2. The parties are hereby advised that, under the provisions of Local Rule 72.2(b) of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, any party who objects to this Order must file a written objection thereto with the Clerk of this Court within 14 days of the party's receipt of this Order. When considering an objection, the District Judge will determine whether this Order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See LCvR 72.2(c). Footnotes [1] It is unclear when Plaintiff responded to FCT's Request for Production of Documents. See Def.’s Reply ¶ 7. [2] Local Civil Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(vii) does not appear in the list of Local Civil Rules for this District. See U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules D.C. (2023), https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/files/local_rules/Local%20Rules%20Jan_2023.pdf. Defendants appear to be referencing a D.C. Superior Court rule, which does not apply to this Court. [3] The other twenty-three of Plaintiff's responses begin with an “admit” or “deny.” Pl.’s Admissions. The Court assumes that these are the responses FCT deems as compliant. [4] FCT may file a new Motion to Compel which should identify and quote the sixty-eight questions and objectionable responses pursuant to Local Rule 26.2(d). Further, such motion should address individually or by category why Plaintiff's responses are deficient. See, e.g., Pietrangelo v. Refresh Club, Inc., No. 18-cv-1943, 2022 WL 4245486, at *8–9 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2022) (denying request to compel responses to eight interrogatories and granting request to compel response to a single interrogatory). [5] The Court will not award fees for the untimeliness of Plaintiff's Interrogatory Answers. See supra. “Although the Court acknowledges that there is some authority for the proposition that mere untimely responses—as opposed to a complete failure to serve responses—can constitute a failure to serve the responses for Rule 37(d) purposes, ... the Court declines to follow that authority.” Kruger v. Cogent Communications, Inc., 14-cv-1744, 2016 WL 11121058, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2016) (citing Antico v. Honda of Camden, 85 F.R.D. 34, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1979)) (cleaned up). It would be unjust here to impose an award of attorneys’ fees where “there was not a complete failure to serve the answers and written responses ... even if they were untimely served.” Kruger, 2016 WL 11121058, at *5 (cleaned up); see Pl.’s Interrogs. Answers at 1–3. [6] Defendants cite Rule 26(a)(2), which lists several requirements for expert reports. See Pl.’s 26(a)(2) Opp'n ¶ 4–5. But it is unclear what remains outstanding given Plaintiff's supplemental disclosure which included the expert's resume and statement of billing rates. See Fed. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B); Pl.’ 26(a)(2) Opp'n ¶ 4. Should Defendants wish to refile a Motion to Extend their Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosures Deadline, Defendants must specify why Plaintiff's report remains incomplete under Rule 26 and cite to specific case law. See Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 10-cv-2250, 2020 WL 6445881, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2020) (plaintiffs “have shown good cause to extend the deadline for their expert reports” because the documents they “seek are plainly responsive” to their document requests, thus the “requested extension [ ] is necessary in part because the District failed to fully comply with those requests and to supplement its document productions by the deadline as ordered by the Court”). This includes detailing why and how Plaintiff's expert report contains conclusions of law. See Fed. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B); Tr. Properties, Inc. v. Endeka Enterprises, LLC, No. 01-cv-1491, 2002 WL 34371514, at *1 (D.D.C. June 24, 2002) (“Endeka further argues that Lynch's testimony should be excluded because he offers conclusions of law, specifically that the reduced commission Trust Properties charged to Fenton was a commission rebate, permitted under District of Columbia law, rather than an illegal kickback.”).