EMERUS HOSPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HEALTH CARE SERVICE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants No. 13 C 8906 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division Signed July 13, 2016 Counsel J. todd Trombley, Pro Hac Vice, Alexander B. Klein, III, The Klein Law Firm, Houston, TX, Carlton E. Odim, Odim Law Offices, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs. Martin J. Bishop, Rebecca R. Hanson, Meredith Ann Shippee, Thomas Charles Hardy, Reed Smith LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Health Care Service Corporation. Meredith Ann Shippee, Thomas Charles Hardy, Reed Smith LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas. Charles M. Gering, Pedersen & Houpt, Chicago, IL, Alexander B. Klein, III, The Klein Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Defendant Availity. Rowland, Mary M., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Clarify and Reconsider [349, 351] is DENIED. STATEMENT Plaintiffs seek clarification and reconsideration of the Court's June 3, 2016 Order [335]. In its June 3 Order, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel in part and ordered Defendants to remove the confidential designation for a substantial portion of the Marcy Sasser deposition. (Dkt. 335 at 3–4). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs now request that Defendants’ remaining confidentiality designations be overruled. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied. “Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984). “To be within a mile of being granted, a motion for reconsideration has to give the tribunal to which it is addressed a reason for changing its mind.” Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004). “Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Industries, Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996); see Keene Corp., 561 F. Supp. at 665 (“Such motions cannot in any case be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during pendency of the summary judgment motion.”). “A motion that merely republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the tribunal no reason to change its mind.” Ahmed, 388 F.3d at 249 (“It's as if the movant, when he appealed, had filed two copies of his appeal brief, and when his appeal was rejected asked us to read the second copy.”). Here, Plaintiffs largely rehash old arguments that the Court has already found unpersuasive. Plaintiffs contend that all of the confidential designation in the Sasser deposition should be overruled because of “the ‘strong’ presumption in favor of publicly disclosing court documents.” (Dkt. 349 at 3) (citing Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2002)). But Jessup was concerned with whether the dispositive settlement agreement filed between a former vice president of a public college president and the college should remain sealed on the public docket. Id. at 927, 930. And here, Plaintiffs are merely focused on the confidentiality designations in a discovery document. See All-Tone Commc'ns, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs., No. 87 C 2186, 1991 WL 139863, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 1991) (emphasizing that “there are significant differences between discovery documents (such as depositions ..., which are properly protected under [a confidentiality order]), and judicial records”). Indeed, as this Court made abundantly clear in its June 3 Order, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that “ ‘secrecy is fine at the discovery stage, before the material enters the judicial record.’ ” (Dkt. 335 at 2) (quoting Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002)). Further, the Court advised Defendants in the June 3 Order that “Plaintiffs are free to rely on any portions of the Sasser deposition in dispositive motion briefing and, to the extent the district court finds any confidential information in the Sasser deposition dispositive, that information will most likely be made part of the public record.” (Dkt. 335 at 2). *2 Plaintiffs also seek clarification of the specific confidential designations that were overruled in the Court's June 3 Order. (Dkt. 349 at 2). In its Order, the Court found that none of the confidential designations on pages 105–115 were warranted and ordered Defendants to remove them. (Dkt. 335 at 3). In addition, after a careful and thorough review of the entire transcript, the Court found that some confidential designations were consistent with the parties’ agreed Confidentiality Order while other designations were not. The Court then described—by page and line number—which additional confidential designations Defendants were to remove. (Id. at 4). Thus, to be clear, the Court overruled Defendants’ confidential designations for the information on the following pages of the Sasser deposition transcript: 22:16–17; 22:20–23:2; 23:5-9; 31:16–32:17; 35:25–36:23; 38:8–16; 40:14–41:2; 43:8–11; 53:22–54:15; 55:1–4; 56:7–16; 57:21–25; 59:10–60:20; 61:23–62:12; 70:2–7; 72:5–18; 81:25–82:5; 84:11–21; 87:10–88:2; 92:12–93:12; 94:23–98:6; 100:8–101:6; 101:10–24; 102:15–103:21; 105:25–115:3; and 124:17–125:11. (Id. at 3–4). Finally, Plaintiffs argue that because the Court previously found that some portions of Sasser's testimony about the BlueChip claims processing system and the Prompt Pay Act Unit should be de-designated as “confidential,” all of Defendants’ confidential designations on these two issues should be removed. (Dkt. 349 at 3–7). Plaintiffs base their contention on the Court's “general discussion and analysis portions of the Court's Order.” (Id. at 2) (citing Dkt. 335 at 3). But the Court's general discussion on why certain portions of Sasser's testimony on the BlueChip system and compliance with the Prompt Pay Act were not entitled to confidential treatment was never meant to imply that all of Sasser's testimony on these two subjects should have the confidential designation removed. Instead, the Court—in its sound discretion—determined which information was deserving of confidential treatment and which was not. See Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1346 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Confidential information is customarily made available, if at all, under a protective order, and the district court has substantial discretion to decide which information should be protected and to frame the order.”). Plaintiffs mere disagreement with that finding is not compelling. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the Court has reviewed the contested designations and finds—once again—that they are covered by the parties’ Confidentiality Order. In sum, Plaintiffs have not identified any manifest errors of fact that gives the Court any reason to modify its June 3 Order—especially given that Plaintiffs have failed to articulate any prejudice from the remaining confidential designations.