NACOLA MAGEE, et al. Plaintiffs, v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC Defendant Case No. 12 C 1624 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division Signed July 31, 2014 Counsel Daniel A. Edelman, Cassandra P. Miller, Cathleen M. Combs, James O. Latturner, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs Nacola Magee, James Peterson. Daniel A. Edelman, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff Kathy Cole. David M. Schultz, Jennifer W. Weller, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant. Martin, Daniel G., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel [82] is granted in part and denied in part. STATEMENT Plaintiffs Nacola Magee and James Peterson (“Plaintiffs”) have filed this class action suit against Defendant Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (“PRA”) for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of individuals in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana.[1] PRA purchases defaulted debts that are owed to other entities for personal, family, or household purposes. Plaintiffs claim that PRA violated the FDCPA by sending out debt-collection letters that were misleading because they contained settlement offers on debts that PRA failed to state were already time-barred. PRA further violated the FDCPA by referring to credit reporting practices that it knew did not apply to untimely debts. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c, most delinquent debts cannot appear on a debtor's credit report more than seven years and 180 days after the start of the delinquency. On May 29, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel with the District Court. Judge Darrah referred it to this Court as part of discovery supervision. The motion seeks four categories of information: (1) supplemental responses to certain interrogatories; (2) additional document production; (3) notes that were kept concerning Plaintiffs’ accounts; and (4) a sampling of class files. The Court addresses each of these issues in turn. A. Interrogatories 1. Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 14 Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 14 asked if PRA purchased “out-of-state” debt (by which Plaintiffs meant “out-of-statute” debt) owed by persons in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana, as well as by individuals in New Mexico, New York City, or Massachusetts. Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana do not require PRA to disclose to individuals like Plaintiffs that their debts are time-barred. By contrast, New Mexico, New York City, and Massachusetts require collectors to inform the debtor that a debt is barred by a statute of limitations. The interrogatories further asked PRA to state the percentage of face value it paid for such out-of-statute debts, and the return it realized on its investment. The interrogatories were designed to gauge the degree to which debtors would react differently to PRA had the company informed them that their debt was barred because a limitations period had expired. After two sets of supplemental responses, PRA stated that it was in the process of confirming that the payments it receives from disclosure and non-disclosure jurisdictions do not materially differ. Plaintiffs agree that this would resolve the matters at hand. Accordingly, Defendant is directed to produce the results of a search comparing the amount of money collected from debtors in Illinois and Indiana, on the one hand, and New Mexico, New York City, and Massachusetts, on the other, between the period of March 6, 2011 to March 26, 2012.[2] 2. Interrogatory No. 15 *2 Interrogatory No. 15 asked PRA if it had “provided data regarding collection of out-of-statute debts to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) or the Attorney General (“AG”).” PRA claims that this interrogatory is not likely to lead to admissible information concerning liability or damages. Defendant also objects to the request as vague and overly broad. Plaintiffs have not provided any explanation of how the information sought in this request is relevant. Instead, Plaintiffs rely heavily on an earlier discovery dispute involving similar collection issues in Rawson v. Source Receivables Mgt., LLC, et al., No. 11 C 8972 (Bucklo, D.J.). They note that District Judge Bucklo overruled Magistrate Judge Valdez in that case and directed the defendants to respond to interrogatories concerning the relative values of out-of-statute debts for both disclosure and non-disclosure jurisdictions. (Pl.’s Mot. at Ex. 9). Plaintiffs fail to inform the Court, however, that Judge Bucklo only addressed requests similar to Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 14. She was not asked to decide if a request like Interrogatory No. 15 was relevant. This Court finds that it is not. Relevance is broadly construed during discovery. Wilstein v. San Tropai Condo. Master Assoc., 189 F.R.D. 371, 375 (N.D. Ill. 1999). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs are still required to make some minimal showing of how the information they seek applies to their claims. They have not explained what roles the FTC, the CFPB, or the AG pIay in this suit, why debt-collection data would have been submitted to these agencies, or why that data would be relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegations. In the absence of such discussion, the Court finds that Interrogatory No. 15 is not relevant. Even if it were relevant, the interrogatory is also vague and cannot be meaningfully answered. PRA would be required to guess at what Plaintiffs are seeking: What “data” are being sought? What out-of-statute debts are involved, and in what jurisdictions around the country? What Attorney General offices are Plaintiffs trying to reference – state, federal, or both? Insofar as Plaintiffs provided definitions of these terms in their discovery requests, they have not given them to the Court to review. These unanswered questions make the interrogatory overly broad. PRA is not required to respond to Interrogatory No. 15. B. Document Requests 1. Request Nos. 6 and 7 Document Request No. 6 sought the “forms of templates for letter [sic] that PRA sent out to debtors in Illinois, New Mexico, New York City, and Massachusetts, where PRA sought to collect out-of-statute debts.” Document Request No. 7 asked for the same information concerning debtors in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. PRA claims that it should not be required to respond to these requests on three grounds: (1) it does not purchase debt accounts on a state-by-state basis; (2) these requests “seek form templates for correspondences sent to individuals not in any a part [sic] of or related to the two purported classes at issue in this lawsuit;” and (3) the FDCPA is a strict liability statute that does not involve PRA's intent. These objections are insufficient to bar discovery. PRA has not explained how its first objection corresponds to its own supplemental discovery responses. PRA eventually answered Request No. 6 by stating that “to the extent it can obtain form collection correspondences sent on out-of-statute accounts owed by persons in New Mexico, New York City, and Massachusetts during the relevant time period, it will produce these.” (Resp. at 4). PRA gave a similar response to Request No. 7. The parties have not addressed the degree to which these responses overlap with the full scope of the document requests’ terms. Nevertheless, PRA's answers strongly suggest that it does not believe that all document production should be prohibited merely because PRA does not buy debt accounts on a state-by-state basis. *3 PRA's two remaining objections do not account for the relevance standard that applies to discovery. “Relevance” is defined more broadly during discovery than it is at trial, and courts construe the standard with considerable latitude. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Wilstein, 189 F.R.D. at 375. Discovery is ordinarily allowed even “[i]f there is a possibility that [it] may lead to information relevant to the subject matter of the action.” In re IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 2010 WL 1526070, at *5 (N.D. Ill. April 8, 2010) (emphasis added). See also Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (“If relevance is in doubt, courts should err on the side of permissive discovery.”). PRA construes this standard too narrowly. Merely noting that the document requests do not strictly correspond to the Amended Complaint or the FDCPA is insufficient. Discovery is never limited to the narrow scope of a legal claim. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (“[D]iscovery is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues.”). PRA complains that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated relevance. But PRA itself bears the final burden on this issue as the party opposing discovery. See Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 235 F.R.D. 447, 450 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 207 (N.D. Ind. 1990). Plaintiffs argue throughout their briefs that debt is less valuable to PRA in jurisdictions like New York City than it is in Illinois based on whether or not local laws require PRA to notify debtors that their obligations are time barred. This Court agrees with the premise of Judge Bucklo's order in Rawson that this opens a broad avenue of relevance that could include more than information strictly related to Plaintiffs’ legal claims. PRA also argues that responding to these two document requests would be onerous. To prevail on this issue, PRA must do more than assert a generalized claim. It must make a specific showing of what the burdens would be. See, e.g., Rawat v. Navistar Intern. Corp., 2011 WL 3876957, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (finding that allegations of “an exceptionally large number of documents” were not sufficient); Perry v. City of Gary, Ind., 2009 WL 2253157, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2009) (“[I]f a party is to resist discovery as unduly burdensome, it must adequately demonstrate the nature and extent of the claimed burden by making a specific showing as to how disclosure of the requested documents and information would be particularly burdensome.”). PRA fails to meet this standard because it has not explained the time, effort, or costs that would be involved in responding to Plaintiffs’ requests. 2. Request Nos. 15-17 Plaintiffs also asked PRA to turn over documents relating to the purchase of out-of-statute debts. Request No. 15 includes residents of Illinois and Indiana. Request No. 16 applies to those in New Mexico, New York City, and Massachusetts. Request No. 17 asks for “documents specifying the amount paid for out-of-statute debts owed by persons in New Mexico, New York City, and Massachusetts.” PRA opposes production of these documents on the same grounds cited for the previous discovery requests. The Court rejects these claims for all the reasons discussed above. Broadly construed, Plaintiffs’ requests are relevant for discovery purposes. PRA has not shown that production would be overly burdensome. PRA is directed to respond in full to Document Request Nos. 6-7 and 15-17. C. Account Notes and Communications *4 Plaintiffs asked PRA to turn over copies of account notes and correspondence that the company sent to them concerning the debts involved in this case. Defendants initially produced only redacted copies of these documents. They have now supplemented that production after the parties met and conferred. However, Plaintiffs have identified a number of additional letters that were mentioned in the produced documents, but which PRA failed to turn over. These documents should also be produced. Defendant is to turn over the August 19, 2011 letter sent to Plaintiff Magee. It shall also produce the letters sent to Plaintiff Peterson dated August 19, 21, 26, and 28, 2011 and September 14, 2011. D. Class Files Finally, Plaintiffs ask the Court to compel a 20% sampling of class files for each of the two classes involved in this case. Defendant estimates that the first class comprises 260,000 individuals; the second has 270,000 members. Defendant agrees to a sampling of 200 files but claims that it does not fully understand what Plaintiffs are asking for in this request. Plaintiffs’ motion left the Court with the same uncertainty. In the reply, however, Plaintiffs have set out specific terms that are largely adopted from a similar order entered by Magistrate Judge Schenkier in Hale v. AFNI, Inc., 08 C 3918. (Reply at Ex. 3). After careful consideration, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ proposal is appropriate. Accordingly, PRA shall produce a random sampling of class files by taking a list of putative class members for each class. The files shall be arranged in alphabetical order. For every third person, PRA shall produce that class member's account file (including account notes, letters, and correspondence) until the class list is exhausted, or until 200 account files have been selected, whichever occurs first. PRA may redact these files for confidential information such as social security numbers, except for the last four digits. This information may be necessary to distinguish files from one another. PRA may also redact names, addresses, and other identifying information of the putative class members. All information shall be subject to the confidentiality order already entered in this case. The class definitions to be used are those stated on page 6 of Plaintiffs’ Reply. IT IS SO ORDERED. ENTER: Footnotes [1] Plaintiffs inform the Court that after filing the instant motion they learned that PRA does not send collection letters to Wisconsin debtors for out-of-statute debts. Plaintiffs no longer include Wisconsin in their discovery requests. [2] As Plaintiffs suggest in their reply brief, this language also covers the terms of Document Request No. 18. That request sought “[a]ll documents specifying the return on investments regarding purchases of out-of-statute debts.”