NACOLA MAGEE and JAMES PETERSON, on behalf of Plaintiffs and the class defined below, Plaintiffs, v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendant Case No. 12-cv-1624 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division Signed May 12, 2015 Counsel Daniel A. Edelman, Cassandra P. Miller, Cathleen M. Combs, James O. Latturner, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs Nacola Magee, James Peterson. Daniel A. Edelman, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff Kathy Cole. David M. Schultz, Jennifer W. Weller, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant. Darrah, John W., United States District Judge ORDER *1 The Court adopts Magistrate Judge Martin's Report and Recommendation [196] and denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions [161]. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Report [200] are overruled. See statement below. STATEMENT Plaintiffs have filed a Motion, seeking default judgment and sanctions for alleged discovery abuses and misconduct, against Defendant Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (“PRA”) and its attorneys, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. On March 5, 2015, Magistrate Judge Martin issued a comprehensive, well-reasoned Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Motion be denied. See Dkt. No. 196. Plaintiffs timely filed objections to the Report, and PRA filed an opposition brief. Standard The parties disagree about what is the proper standard of review for Magistrate Judge Martin's Report and Recommendation. Plaintiffs assert that the Report should be reviewed de novo under Rule 72(b), which governs dispositive motions. PRA counters that, since Magistrate Judge Martin's ruling was not dispositive of any issues, the clear error standard of Rule 72(a) applies. Some courts in the Seventh Circuit have held that discovery sanctions are nondispositive matters and are reviewed only for clear error. See United Central Bank v. Kanan Fashions, Inc., No. l0-cv-331, 2011 WL 4396856, *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2011) (collecting cases); Berry v. Ford Modeling Agency, Inc., No. 09-cv-8076, 2011 WL 3648574, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2011); Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Malachinski, No. 96-cv-6135, 2001 WL 290308, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2001). However, other courts hold that the de novo standard applies when magistrate judges impose sanctions. See Cleversafe, Inc. v. Amplidata, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 424, 426-27 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (collecting cases and citing Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996)); Mintel Intern. Group, Ltd. v. Neergheen, 636 F. Supp. 2d 677, 691 (N.D. Ill. 2009).[1] In conducting de novo review, the district judge reviews only those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which timely objections are made and “is not required to conduct another hearing to review the magistrate judge's findings or credibility determinations.” Goffman v. Gross, 59 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Wasserman v. Purdue Univ., 431 F.Supp.2d 911, 914 (N.D. Ind. 2006). *2 Here, although Magistrate Judge Martin did not impose sanctions, he issued a Report and Recommendation “because the motion raises dispositive issues.” Dkt. No. 196 at 1. “Where, as here, ‘a magistrate judge chooses to issue a Report and Recommendation instead of an Order on a nondispositive motion and neither party opposes that choice, the district judge shall presume that the parties acquiesced to the magistrate judge's treatment of the matter as dispositive and, therefore, shall make a de novo review of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which timely objections are made.’ ” United Cent. Bank v. Kanan Fashions, Inc., No. 10 C 331, 2011 WL 4396856, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2011) (quoting Silva v. Potter, 2006 WL 3298543, *1 (M.D.Fla. Sept. 25, 2006)). Therefore, the Court will conduct a de novo review of the portions properly objected to by Plaintiffs. Analysis Although Plaintiffs clearly disagree with Magistrate Judge Martin's decision, Plaintiffs make very few specific objections to the Report. Plaintiffs first contend that Magistrate Judge Martin “misunderstood” the basis for Plaintiffs’ motion by concluding that the discovery disputes are moot and do not warrant sanctions. Plaintiffs then proceed to rehash those discovery issues, arguing that Magistrate Judge Martin failed to take into account “the entire history” of the case. However, Magistrate Judge Martin oversaw those very discovery disputes; he granted Plaintiffs’ motions to compel and was in the best position to judge whether PRA's conduct warranted sanctions. In the Report, Magistrate Judge Martin directly addressed the discovery issues raised by Plaintiffs, including out-of-statute debts, account notes, and spoliation, and he explained clearly why sanctions were not warranted. (See Report 10-14.) The Court agrees with the Report's conclusion that PRA should not be sanctioned on these bases. Plaintiffs also argue that sanctions are warranted for PRA's delay in disclosing its expert. Magistrate Judge Martin also directly addressed this issue and concluded that this Court's Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to supplement its expert disclosures cured any prejudice to Plaintiffs. The Court agrees that sanctions are not warranted on this basis. Plaintiff also argue that PRA's 30(b)(6) witness was unprepared and unable to answer questions. Magistrate Judge Martin also addressed this argument and concluded that Plaintiffs failed to support this claim with adequate evidence, including failing to properly describe what the 30(b)(6) witness, Mr. Stern, actually testified to. Plaintiffs appear to try to cure this deficiency of evidence by submitting deposition transcripts to this Court, but this is not a proper objection to the Report. Furthermore, PRA provided additional 30(b)(6) witnesses, and as Magistrate Judge Martin stated, the parties reached an agreement on the issues. The Court agrees that sanctions are not warranted on this issue either. Finally, Plaintiffs claim error with Magistrate Judge Martin's alleged failure to address their requests for attorney's fees. Rule 37 grants the Court discretionary authority to impose appropriate sanctions for violations of discovery orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see e360 Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project, 658 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts have wide latitude in fashioning appropriate sanctions.”) (citation omitted). As illustrated by Magistrate Judge Martin's recounting of the discovery history in the Report, PRA's conduct in complying with the discovery orders issued by Magistrate Judge Martin was not so vexatious as to require the sanction of attorney's fees. Consequently, the Court agrees that sanctions are not warranted. *3 Consequently, the Court adopts the March 5, 2015 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Martin and denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment and Sanctions. Footnotes [1] Courts outside this circuit have held that the magistrate judge's decision on a motion for sanctions dictates which review applies. See, e.g., Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1988); Segal v. L.C. Hohne Contractors, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 790, 794 (S.D.W. Va. 2004) (“when a party brings any motion for sanctions, the sanction chosen by the magistrate judge, rather than the sanction sought by the party, governs the determination of whether Rule 72(a) or 72(b) applies”); Giganti v. Gen-X Strategies, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 299, 305 (E.D. Va. 2004) (sanctions are non-dispositive unless the sanction imposed itself is dispositive of a claim or defense); Brown v. Bridges, No. 12-CV-4947-P, 2015 WL 410062, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015); see also 7 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 72.04[2.–4] at 72-51 (1987) (“Sanctions may be either dispositive or non-dispositive, and hence the treatment of them by the magistrate and the district judge varies with the severity of the penalty being considered.”).