NELSON GAMACHE, et al., individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN F. HOGUE, JR., et al., Defendants CASE NO.: 1:19-CV-21 (LAG) United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Albany Division Filed March 15, 2023 Counsel Colin M. Downes, R. Joseph Barton, Washington, DC, Daniel Mark Feinberg, Nina R. Wasow, Feinberg Jackson Worthman & Wasow LLP, Berkeley, CA, William S. Stone, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs. Joelle C. Sharman, Atlanta, GA, Robert E. Lesser, Covington, GA, for Defendants John F. Hogue, Jr., Graham Thompson, Technical Associates of Georgia Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, John Does 1-20, Administrative Committee of the Technical Associates of Georgia, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, James Urbach, Glenn Kirbo, Jeanne C. Hall. Gardner, Leslie A., United States District Judge ORDER *1 Before the Court is Non-Party Moore, Clarke, DuVall & Rodgers, P.C.'s Motion for Reimbursement of Expenses of Subpoena Response (Doc. 175). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs filed this class action pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., against Defendants John F. Hogue, Jr., Graham Thompson, James Urbach, Glenn Kirbo, Randy Hall, and the Administrative Committee of the Technical Associates of Georgia, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs amended their Complaint on April 19, 2019. (Doc. 30). Plaintiffs, all of whom are former employees of Technical Associates of Georgia., Inc. (TAG) and participants in the TAG Employee Stock Ownership Program, allege that Defendants engaged in prohibited transactions and breached fiduciary duties in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1105, 1106(a)(1)(D), and 1106(b). (Id. at 26–33). On June 1, 2020, Plaintiffs served a document subpoena on non-party Moore Clark DuVall & Rodgers, P.C. (MCDR), seeking documents related to the 2011 refinancing at issue in this case. (See Doc. 98 at 3; Doc. 98-2). On June 10, 2020, MCDR objected to the subpoena on multiple grounds, claiming that: (1) the documents requested were protected by attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, (2) the requests were overly broad and sought documents that were irrelevant, (3) the requests were vague and ambiguous, and (4) it would be burdensome for MCDR to produce documents responsive to the subpoena. (See Doc. 98-1 ¶ 3; Doc. 98-3). On July 16, 2020, Plaintiffs' Counsel offered to narrow the scope of the subpoena and agreed to exclude emails internal to MCDR, to use search terms and custodian lists to narrow searches for electronically stored information, and to permit MCDR to eliminate duplicative responsive electronically stored information if it was already produced by TAG. (See Doc. 98-4 at 1). Pursuant to Local Rule 37, Counsel met and conferred to resolve the dispute. (See generally Docs. 98-3 to 98-6). During these discussions, MCDR requested that Plaintiffs bear MCDR's “charges for compliance with the subpoena.” (See Doc. 98-5 at 3). On April 1, 2021, the Court held a discovery conference and ordered the Parties to confer again to determine the scope of the subpoena but granted Plaintiffs leave to file a motion to compel if an agreement was not reached. (Doc. 91). After re-conferring, the Parties agreed on the scope of the subpoena but could not agree on who should bear the costs of compliance. (See Doc. 94-1 ¶¶ 2–3; Doc. 98-1 ¶ 3; Doc. 98-6). Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Compel. (Doc. 98). On March 21, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and granted MCDR leave to file a motion seeking costs under Rule 45. (See Doc. 167 at 5–6). On April 20, 2022, MCDR complied with the Court's Order and produced 20,653 pages of documents responsive Plaintiffs' subpoena. (Doc. 175 at 2; Doc. 175-1 ¶ 7). In total, MCDR seeks $26,680.50 for 95.9 attorney hours expended complying with Plaintiffs' subpoena.[1] (See Doc. 175-2 at 8). On June 3, 2022, MCDR filed the instant Motion. (Doc. 175). Plaintiffs timely responded and MCDR timely replied. (Docs. 178–79). MCDR's Motion is now ripe for review. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.3.1(A). LEGAL STANDARD *2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(1) provides that “[a] party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” “Rule 45 protects non-parties who are subpoenaed to ‘produce documents for litigation that they have no interest in and no ability to control’ from the undue burden and expense imposed by such production.” In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP, 2018 WL 11425554, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2018) (footnote omitted) (first quoting Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, No. C07-5374 RBL, 2015 WL 224914, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2015); and then citing Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, No. 2:09-cv-247-JHH, 2010 WL 11562036, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 1, 2010)). Non-parties “are not immune from the burdens and costs of discovery sought from them simply because they are legally disinterested third parties.... Rule [45] protects them only from ‘undue burden and expense.’ ” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1)). “Rule 45 creates two distinct analyses related to the burden and expense imposed upon non-party targets of subpoenas.” Id. at *2 (first citing Legal Voice v. Stormans Inc., 738 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2013); and then citing In re: Mod. Plastics Corp., 890 F.3d 244, 250 (6th Cir. 2018)). Under Rule 45(d)(1), a requesting party's failure to take “reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on the person subject to the subpoena” “can lead to sanctions, including the award of attorneys' fees in favor of the non-party target.” Id. “A responding target's attorney's fees are awardable against the requesting party only as a sanction for that party's failure to take reasonable steps to avoid ‘undue’ burden and expense on the responding target of the subpoena.” Id. When a subpoenaed non-party “objects [ ] or seeks to quash [the subpoena], or the subpoenaing party files a motion to compel compliance with the subpoena, Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) directs that the court's order compelling compliance ‘must protect a person who is neither a party nor a party's officer from significant expense resulting from compliance.’ ” Id. “This protection against ‘significant’ expense is mandatory, while the Rule 45(d)(1) award of expenses (including fees as a sanction) is discretionary.” Id. (citing Legal Voice, 738 F.3d at 1185); Hernandez v. Hendrix Produce, Inc., No. CV613-053, 2014 WL 953503, at *2 n.5 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 10, 2014) (noting that under Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii), the “Court must shift to [the requesting party] any non-party's subpoena compliance costs if they are significant” (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(ii); and then citing Legal Voice, 738 F.3d at 1184)). “Under Rule 45(d)(2)(B), only two considerations are relevant to the cost-shifting inquiry: (1) whether the subpoena imposes expenses on the non-party, and (2) whether those expenses are significant.” In re Blue Cross, 2018 WL 11425554, at *2 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 302 F.R.D. 532, 534 (C.D. Cal. 2014); see also Monitronics Int'l, Inc. v. Hall, Booth, Smith, P.C., No. 1:15-cv-3927-WSD, 2016 WL 7030324, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2016). “[T]he non-party is not automatically entitled to fully shift its entire costs to the serving party.... [O]nly those expenses ‘resulting from compliance’ can be shifted to the requesting party.” In re Blue Cross, 2018 WL 11425554, at *2. Unrelated or unreasonable expenses “are not caused by or ‘result from’ compliance with the subpoena” and therefore are not compensable. See id. (citing G & E Real Est., Inc. v. Avison Young-Washington, D.C., LLC, 317 F.R.D. 313, 316 (D.D.C. 2016)). “Moreover, the requesting party is required to bear only ‘significant’ expenses, not all expenses.” Id. “[T]he district court must order the party seeking discovery to bear at least enough of the cost of compliance to render the remainder non-significant.” Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 2016 WL 7030324, at *13. *3 “Despite the required protection from significant expense, ‘[a] non-party can be required to bear some or all of its expenses where the equities of a particular case demand it.’ ” Sun Cap. Partners, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 12-CIV-81397–Marra/Matthewman, 2016 WL 1658765, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2016) (alteration in original) (first quoting In re Honeywell Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); and then citing In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB, 2007 WL 4287676, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2007)). “[T]o determine how much cost to shift from the non-party to the discovering party,” courts consider three factors: (1) “whether the non-party actually has an interest in the outcome of the case,” (2) “whether the non-party can more readily bear its cost than the requesting party,” and (3) “whether the litigation is of public importance.” Id. (citation omitted). The presence of one or more factors does “not deprive [a c]ourt of the discretion to apportion some of the costs to the propounding party.” In re Hornbeam Corp., No. 14-CV-24887-LOUIS, 2019 WL 5106768, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2019) (citations omitted); Kipperman v. Onex Corp., No. 1:05-CV-1242-JOF, 2008 WL 11333467, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2008). DISCUSSION As discussed below, the Court finds that MCDR is entitled to reimbursement of expenses related to its response to the subject non-party subpoena pursuant to Rule 45.[2] I. Significant Costs MCDR seeks an award of $26,680.50 based on 95.9 hours of attorney work. (See Doc. 175-2 at 8). Plaintiffs contend the attorneys' fees incurred as result of MCDR's own desire to check for privileged and confidential documents are not subject to reimbursement, especially because Plaintiffs' Counsel suggested production “pursuant to a clawback provision” and further suggested that “MCDR could eliminate duplicative documents by electronically deduplicating MCDR's documents against the previously produced [TAG] documents.” (Doc. 178 at 3). Plaintiffs also argue that they should not be required to pay MCDR's market rates because these rates include overhead and profit. (See id. at 4–8). MCDR argues that, under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, it was required to check its clients' documents for responsiveness and privilege rather than hand them over subject to a clawback provision. (Doc. 179 at 2). MCDR also argues that, although it did not officially respond to Plaintiffs' deduplication suggestion, MCDR performed this process and does not seek compensation for doing so. (See id.). Last, MCDR argues that most district courts within the Eleventh Circuit utilize the lodestar approach, which permits reasonable attorneys' fees. (See id. at 6–9). To determine whether a non-party's claimed costs are related and reasonable, most district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have used some variation of the lodestar method—i.e., “the number of hours reasonably expended ... multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate” plus any other relevant costs. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see, e.g., Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. Terran Orbital Corp., No. 20-cm-80718-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2020 WL 5367319, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2020) (utilizing the lodestar method); Cont'l 332 Fund, LLC v. Albertelli, No. 2:17-cv-41-FtM-38MRM, 2019 WL 9089587, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2019); In re Hornbeam Corp., 2019 WL 5106768, at *4; In re Blue Cross, 2018 WL 11425554, at *3–7. Under the lodestar method, “[t]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to the award and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates.” In re Hornbeam Corp., 2019 WL 5106768, at *4 (citing Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999)). This burden includes, *4 submitting “specific and detailed evidence” from which the court can determine the reasonably hourly rate as well as billing records that reflect the time spent on different claims; “the general subject matter of the time expenditures ought to be set out with sufficient particularity so that the district court can assess the time claimed for each activity.” Id. (quoting Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427) (other citation omitted). In determining the number of hours reasonably expended, fee applicants must exercise “billing judgment.” Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). “This must necessarily mean that the hours excluded are those that would be unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one's adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of counsel.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301 (emphasis and citation omitted). “The party opposing fees also has an obligation to provide specific and precise objections concerning hours that should be excluded.” In re Hornbeam Corp., 2019 WL 5106768, at *5 (first citing Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428; and then citing Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301). “Generalized statements that the time spent was reasonable or unreasonable [ ] are not particularly helpful and not entitled to much weight.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. Additionally, courts are not permitted “to be generous with the money of others, and it is as much the duty of courts to see that excessive fees and expenses are not awarded as it is to see that an adequate amount is awarded.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428. “But trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). “Thus, when a court finds that a fee applicant has failed to exercise billing judgment, the court is obligated to do it for them.” In re Hornbeam Corp., 2019 WL 5106768, at *5 (citing Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428). And “[w]hen a district court finds the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high, the court has two choices: it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut.” Bivins v. Wrap it Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). MCDR properly declined Plaintiffs' suggestion to produce the requested documents subject to a clawback provision. Under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, “[a] lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or ... would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent.” GA. RULES PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (2021). According to MCDR, TAG “did not consent to general disclosure of MCDR's records of prior representation beyond the scope of the [s]ubpoena, and did not consent to disclosure of privileged matters.” (Doc. 179 at 2). “[I]t is axiomatic that the privilege belongs to the client, not the attorney.” Moclaire v. State, 451 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Thus, “[t]o comply with its ethical obligation not to produce attorney-client privileged documents,” MCDR was required to review the documents for privilege before it produced them. Frey v. Minter, No. 4:18-CV-191 (CDL), 2019 WL 5268548, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2019). As other district courts have noted, when a party seeks documents from a law firm, “it create[s] a situation where it ... might be responsible for paying for attorney-client privilege review.” Angell v. Kelly, 234 F.R.D. 135, 139 n.1 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (citing Williams v. City of Dallas, 178 F.R.D. 103, 113 (N.D. Tex. 1998)). Thus, the costs MCDR expended conducting a privilege review are related to its compliance with Plaintiffs' subpoena. *5 As for deduplication, MCDR states that its staff “compared the email messages produced by TAG in this case ... with those in MCDR's Microsoft Outlook email accounts and attempted to eliminate duplicate messages prior to counsel's review.” (Doc. 179 at 2; see Doc. 175-1 ¶ 6; Doc. 175-2 ¶ 6). Moreover, MCDR has not sought reimbursement for the time spent eliminating duplicate messages. (See Doc. 175). Thus, while MCDR may not have responded formally to Plaintiffs' deduplication suggestion, MCDR appears to have incorporated it. More importantly, MCDR bore the costs of this effort and is not seeking reimbursement. Rule 45, however, “does not establish a blanket requirement that all of a nonparty's legal fees are reimbursable so long as they are somehow related to its efforts in responding to a subpoena.” Raymond James & Assocs., Inc., 2020 WL 5367319, at *3 (quoting In re Am. Hous. Found., No. 2:12-cv-00222, 2013 WL 2422706, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 4, 2013)). With regard to reimbursement of attorneys' fees under Rule 45, courts have reduced hours when the time billed included (1) “legal work related to resisting [a] subpoena rather than complying with it”; (2) “administrative tasks, such as e-filing documents and inserting Bates stamps”; (3) “block billing; vague billing; and other issues that make it impossible for the Court to decipher which time was actually reasonable”; and (4) excessive time spent “searching for, locating, and compiling documents responsive to the subpoena.” Id. Upon review of the billing records submitted by MCDR's attorneys, Mr. C. Jason Wilcox and Mr. Rickie Lee Brown, Jr., the hours billed do not appear to be excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. The billing is sufficiently detailed, and Counsel made an effort to exclude time that was spent on tasks that were “administrative and partially legal in nature.” (Doc. 175-1 ¶ 9). The Court next examines whether the hourly rates sought by MCDR are reasonable. “A reasonable rate is defined as the ‘prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” In re Hornbeam Corp., 2019 WL 5106768, at *4 (quoting Norman, 836 F.3d at 1299). District courts may rely on their “own expertise in determining a reasonable hourly rate” in the local market. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1304. Mr. Wilcox is a senior partner at MCDR's Albany office and has been a practicing attorney since 1997. (Doc. 175-2 ¶¶ 2, 4). He is barred in Georgia and is admitted to practice in all trial and appellate courts in Georgia, all U.S. District Courts in Georgia, the Western District of Tennessee, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court. (Id. ¶ 3). Mr. Wilcox's “usual and customary hourly rate [ ] for [his] services, and actually paid by clients to MCDR for [his] services, is $310 per hour.” (Id. ¶ 5). Although Mr. Wilcox's “billable rate may be reasonable for other litigation matters, his time here was spent coordinating, reviewing, and conducting document review relevant to the subpoenas served on [MCDR].” In re Hornbeam Corp., 2019 WL 5106768, at *4. Mr. Wilcox “was joined by [Mr. Brown], a junior [partner], who billed for the same work at an hourly rate of [$275].” Id.; (see Doc. 175-1 ¶ 2, 5). “Because the services for which [MCDR] seek[s] reimbursement was not complex work, ... the Court finds that billing a [senior] partner's rate of [$310] for document review for privilege was not reasonable. The Court will apply the same rate of [$275] for both attorneys.” In re Hornbeam Corp., 2019 WL 5106768, at *4 (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974)); see also Waters v. Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1294 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “novelty and difficulty” are factors to consider in attorneys' fee awards (citation omitted)).[3] This results in a total calculation of $26,372.50 ($275 per hour for 95.9 hours) in fees reasonably incurred by MCDR. Further, the fees are significant. See, e.g., Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 113 (finding that $9,000 was significant enough to shift discovery costs). II. Equitable Cost Shifting *6 The Court next determines how to apportion MCDR's reasonable costs in complying with Plaintiffs' subpoena by examining the three equitable factors discussed above. As to the first factor, MCDR argues that it is not an interested non-party because it did not “render[ ] fiduciary advice in relation to the claims asserted in this case.” (Doc. 175 at 9; Doc. 179 at 11). Plaintiffs argue that MCDR is an interested non-party because it provided Defendants Hogue and Thompson legal advice regarding ERISA compliance in relation to the 2011 Transaction. (Doc. 178 at 8). Plaintiffs also note that MCDR sent a letter on behalf of TAG's Board of Directors in response to Plaintiff Gamache's inquiries that were addressed to the Board of Directors as fiduciaries of the Plan. (See id. at 9). The Parties have not cited, nor is the Court aware of, any binding articulable standard for determining whether a non-party is interested. Our sister court, however, has articulated a persuasive legal standard that “encapsulate[s] the general principles that informed the outcomes of relevant cost-sharing cases.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., No 2:11-cv-03577-RDP, 2016 WL 6892113, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 17, 2016), R. & R. adopted, 2016 WL 6897798 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 22, 2016). “An interested non-party is an entity that does not have an actionable right at issue in the litigation, but has a significant, underlying connection to the case and, typically, some sort of financial or reputational stake in the litigation's outcome.” Id. (citations omitted). Applying this standard here, the Court finds that MCDR is an interested non-party. Although it may not have played a central role in the 2011 Transaction, Plaintiffs have pointed to evidence that shows MCDR was involved in the 2011 Transaction. For example, Defendants Hogue's and Thompson's affidavits state that they “sought and received legal advice from MCDR” “[i]n connection with the refinancing of the ESOP loan, the personal guarantee[s they were] required to provide, the award of stock that [they] negotiated and received, and the potential personal liability that TAG and [they] faced under ERISA and other laws with respect to each of these transactions.” (Doc. 83-1 ¶ 6; Doc. 83-2 ¶ 6). Additionally, when Plaintiff Gamache sought information on the ESOP on behalf of TAG's Board in their fiduciary capacity, it was MCDR that drafted and sent the response. (See Doc. 111-2). As the Court has previously explained, such “communication[s] with ESOP participants about an employee benefit plan is a textbook ERISA fiduciary function.” Gamache v. Hogue, 595 F. Supp. 3d 1344 at 1354 (M.D. Ga. 2022). This evidence demonstrates that MCDR has a “significant, underlying connection to the case” and at least has a “reputational stake in the litigation's outcome.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 2016 WL 6892113, at *5. Thus, the first factor weighs in Plaintiffs' favor. Under the second factor, courts assess the non-party's “financial ability to bear the costs of compliance.” Id. at *6. Based on the evidence before the Court, it is difficult to make this assessment. MCDR failed to provide detailed financial information. Rather, it generally argues that “it is not a major national or regional firm” and urges the Court to look to the “ ‘comparative’ nature of this portion of the cost-shifting inquiry.” (Doc. 175 at 9); see Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 2016 WL 6892113, at *6. But, “the comparative component of the cost-shifting analysis is only relevant to the extent that a clear picture of the non-party's financial resources suggests that the cost of compliance could constitute an undue burden.” Ala Aircraft Indus., Inc., 2016 WL 6892113, at *6; see, e.g., Bell Inc. v. GE Lighting, LLC, No. 6:14-CV-00012, 2014 WL 1630754, at *14 (W.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2014) (noting the non-party's testimony regarding its major asset, revenue, and that it was in “fairly poor financial condition”). The dearth of financial detail provided by both parties, however, “precludes a productive comparative analysis.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 2016 WL 6892113, at *6. The two named Plaintiffs submitted affidavits indicating that their earned incomes are $8,000 a year or nonexistent but have not provided any other sources of income or relative net worths. (See Doc. 178-1 ¶ 2; Doc. 178-2 ¶ 2). Accordingly, the second factor does not weigh in either party's favor. *7 Last, the third factor examines whether the litigation is of public importance. MCDR argues that “nothing in this litigation is of public importance so as to justify imposing the great costs of Plaintiffs' discovery efforts on non-parties for the greater good of the public at large.” (Doc. 175 at 9). Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument. (See Doc. 178). The Court is unaware of any circumstances that would warrant characterizing this case as one of public importance, especially since “this litigation is between private parties.” See Sun Cap. Partners, Inc., 2016 WL 1658765, at *7. Accordingly, the third factor weighs in MCDR's favor. Balancing the factors, the Court finds that some cost shifting is appropriate as the costs of compliance here were significant. See, e.g., In re Hornbeam Corp., 2019 WL 5106768, at *3 (first citing In re First Am. Corp., 184 F.R.D. 234, 244–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); and then citing In re Seroquel Prod. Liab. Litig., 2007 WL 4287676, at *5. In cases where the equitable factors favored the responding non-party, courts have ordered the requesting party to cover two-thirds of all the non-party's reasonable costs. See id. at *6 (awarding the non-party two-thirds of its reasonable expenses); In re Blue Cross, 2018 WL 11425554, at *6–9 (awarding the total reasonable costs to non-parties when two of the three equitable factors favored the non-parties). Where the equitable factors disfavored the non-party, courts have also awarded costs in a similar range. See, e.g., Cont'l 332 Fund, LLC, 2019 WL 9089587, at *3 (awarding the non-party's total reasonable costs when the non-party was an interested party); Kipperman, 2008 WL 11333467, at *11 (awarding the non-party two-thirds of its reasonable expenses despite finding that the non-party was “not completely disinterested”). A two-thirds shift is reasonable and appropriate here. Furthermore, in light of the equitable factors, the Court finds that this amount is sufficient to render the remainder of MCDR's cost of compliance insignificant. See Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 2016 WL 7030324, at *13. CONCLUSION Accordingly, Non-Party MCDR's Motion for Reimbursement of Expenses of Subpoena Response (Doc. 175) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to pay MCDR $17,581.67 in reimbursement costs for complying with the subpoena within thirty (30) days of this Order. SO ORDERED, this 15th day of March, 2023. Footnotes [1] MCDR provides that it “was required to devote attorney time in the amount of $26,680.50, using the two involved attorneys' usual and customary billing rates.” (Doc. 175 at 4). MCDR included a timesheet, which shows that Attorney Willcox billed 8.8 hours for $2,728.00 and Attorney Brown billed 87.1 hours for $23,952.50, creating a combined total of 95.9 hours for $26,680.50. (Doc. 175-2 at 8). [2] Because Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) applies, the Court does not address Plaintiffs' arguments related to impropriety of sanctions. (See Doc. 178 at 6 n.4, 7–8). [3] The Court notes that, in its experience, document review is usually conducted by associates with some partner supervision. See, e.g., Kreuze v. VCA Animal Hosps., Inc., No. PJM-17-1169, 2019 WL 2107263, at *7 (D. Md. May 14, 2019) (“[D]ocument reviews are generally done by more junior associates and even summer associates in some firms ....”); Spitzer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 12-5910, 2014 WL 12616838, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2014) (noting that some tasks, like document review, “could have been assigned to an associate”). Normally, “[t]ime spent by high-priced senior lawyers on tasks that junior lawyers could have performed more economically, should be stricken from a reasonable attorney's fee award.” McConnell v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 19-0174-WS-MU, 2020 WL 3452983, at *6 (S.D. Ala. June 24, 2020) (citation omitted). The Court recognizes, however, “that ‘the maintenance of a rigid bulkhead between partner and associate work is not feasible’ in a ‘tiny firm,’ such that ‘occasional’ associate work performed by a partner may be acceptable.” Id. at *5 (quoting Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assocs., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 1992)). Given MCDR's relatively small size, the Court assumes MCDR has no associates in the Albany office that could have assisted with the production. (See Doc. 175 at 9).