DANIEL CASTAGNA, Plaintiff, v. NEWMAR CORP., et al., Defendants Case No. 3:15-CV-249 JD United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division Signed March 04, 2020 Counsel Scarlett M. Steuart, Elizabeth Ahern Wells, Ronald L. Burdge, Burdge Law Office Co., LPA, Dayton, OH, for Plaintiff. Aaron C. Medley, Kightlinger & Gray LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Glenn L. Duncan, Lisa Gilkey Schoetzow, Thorne Grodnik LLP, Elkhart, IN, for Defendant Newmar Corporation. J. Thomas Vetne, Hunt Suedhoff Kalamaros LLP, South Bend, IN, Timothy P. Jensen, PHV, Pro Hac Vice, O'Sullivan McCormack Jensen & Bliss, Wethersfield, CT, for Defendant Magnum Energy, Inc. DeGuilio, Jon E., United States District Judge ORDER *1 In this order, the Court addresses the parties’ motions in limine, as well as the defendants’ motions to strike opinions by Mr. Castagna's three liability experts. A. Mr. Castagna's Motions in Limine Mr. Castagna filed several motions in limine. As the defendants note, he filed each motion separately, contrary to the Court's order that all motions in limine be made in a single filing. Though counsel's oversight in that regard creates unnecessary clutter, that does not warrant striking the filings, so the Court addresses the motions on their merits. 1. Impeaching Bailey Mr. Castagna first moves to preclude the defendants from impeaching Mr. Bailey, an expert witness, with certain prior convictions. The Court grants this motion as unopposed. 2. Spoliation Mr. Castagna next moves to bar evidence relevant to the defendants’ request for spoliation sanctions, which the Court has already denied. In particular, he moves to exclude counsel's communications attempting to locate the missing inverter components, as well as to bar any argument that Mr. Castagna was at fault for the loss of evidence so the jury should infer that the evidence was adverse. The Court agrees in both respects. The Court has already ruled on the defendants’ motions for spoliation sanctions, and held that the defendants were not entitled to argue to the jury that it should infer that the lost evidence would have been unfavorable to Mr. Castagna. The defendants insist that it is important for them to show that the evidence was lost while under Mr. Castagna's control, but they never articulate how that would be relevant except to argue that the jury should draw an adverse inference against Mr. Castagna. Again, the defendants are free to establish the fact that evidence was lost, and to argue that without the missing evidence Mr. Castagna is unable to meet his burden of proof. But who was in control or at fault is irrelevant to what evidence is available and whether that evidence is sufficient to determine the cause of the fire. Raising those issues would just be a backdoor way of arguing an adverse inference, so the Court excludes that evidence under Rules 401 and 403. The defendants also argue that counsel's emails attempting to locate the evidence are relevant as an admission of how important that evidence was. The Court disagrees. The primary concern counsel expressed in those emails was that the defendants would seek spoliation sanctions. [DE 190-1 p. 3 (stating that the loss of evidence “raises a real spoliation problem that the defendants are going to raise and argue like the dickens about”), (“I know the defense attorneys are going to claim spoliation of evidence and try to throw the case out... That (any missing parts at all) is what matters to me because I know that is what the defense attorneys are going to complain about.”), p. 6 (“This is a major concern of mine, regardless of whether it has an impact on the case, but particularly because of the insinuations being made by the defense attorneys in this litigation over the absence of this evidence.”)].[1] This evidence is thus another backdoor attempt to argue an adverse inference to the jury. In addition, the defendants are free to establish through their own experts that any lost components are important to determining the cause of the fire. But given the limited probative value of counsel's emails on that topic, and the potential for prejudice through insinuations of an adverse inference, the Court excludes this evidence under Rule 403. 3. Insurance *2 Mr. Castagna next moves to exclude any evidence regarding his insurance coverage for the RV. He argues that this evidence would be irrelevant, prejudicial, and misleading. This motion is somewhat overbroad, as the defendants designated voluminous insurance records as exhibits and Mr. Castagna asserted specific objections to many of those records, and those objections are better resolved in that context. It is also difficult to determine exactly what evidence Mr. Castagna seeks to exclude through this motion or what exactly the defendants intend to use and for what purpose. Two issues can be clarified now, though. First, the defendants argue that the insurer is relevant to its spoliation arguments, as they wish to show that evidence was in the insurer's control when it was lost. For the reasons just discussed, the Court will not permit this evidence for that purpose. Second, the parties dispute whether or to what extent evidence of insurance coverage is relevant to mitigation of damages. The defendants’ theory in that respect is difficult to pin down. They argue that Mr. Castagna should have had his insurance company pay to repair the vehicle, and that in failing to do so he failed to mitigate his damages. To the extent they mean to argue that Mr. Castagna's damages should be reduced by the amount that the insurance company would have paid for repairs, or that he should have asked someone else to pay for his losses instead of suing these defendants, that would be inappropriate and will not be allowed. The defendants clarify in a supplemental filing that they do not intend to make that argument.[2] Instead, they argue that Mr. Castagna's ability to repair the vehicle goes to any damages he might seek for loss of use of the vehicle following the fire. They argue that if Mr. Castagna could have repaired the vehicle using reasonable efforts, he should not be able to continue collecting damages that accrued because he couldn't use it. If offered for that narrower purpose, this evidence may have at least some relevance, though it is limited. The defendants are free to argue that Mr. Castagna should have had the vehicle repaired to mitigate his damages. But Mr. Castagna does not appear to dispute that he had the means to repair the vehicle if he thought that appropriate, and the defendants can still make that point without specifying that the insurer would have paid those costs. There is also a significant concern for prejudice or misleading the jury. It would be easy for the jury to misinterpret this evidence as suggesting that Mr. Castagna's damages should be reduced by the amount the insurer should have paid or that he should have pursued his recovery from his insurer instead of the defendants. Even the defendants’ own filings struggle to make clear that this defense would only pertain to the loss-of-use damages. *3 Given the limited value of the insurance coverage on this issue and this danger of prejudice, the Court excludes this evidence under Rule 403. The Court acknowledges that this ruling could be affected by evidence at trial about why Mr. Castagna did not have the vehicle repaired, or by rulings on other insurance-related evidence, for example. If the defendants wish to argue that any developments at trial warrant a different outcome, though, they will need to first raise the issue outside the presence of the jury. 4. Witnesses not timely disclosed Finally, Mr. Castagna moved to bar testimony by three witnesses that were not timely disclosed during discovery. The defendants withdrew two of those witnesses in response to the motion, leaving only one in dispute: Michael Engh, an employee of the dealership where Mr. Castagna bought his RV. The defendants first added Mr. Engh to their Rule 26 disclosures in October 2019, over two years after the close of discovery. The defendants suggest that they adequately identified Mr. Engh through other means, but the Court disagrees. For example, they referred generically to “Representatives in the sales and service department(s) of North Trial RV Center,” but that does not adequately identify Mr. Engh as someone they intended to use as a witness, particularly since it does not appear that Mr. Engh was involved in Mr. Castagna's purchase. They also state that the “names of the North Trial finance department employees appeared on Newmar's exhibits” that were produced in discovery, but that is misleading, as Mr. Engh's name does not appear in those exhibits. [DE 222-3]. Mr. Engh's name was also mentioned in passing during a deposition, but again, that fails to identify Mr. Engh as an individual that the defendants may use to support their defenses. Because the defendants did not properly disclose Mr. Engh as a witness, they cannot call him to testify at trial “unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2017). The failure was not substantially justified. The defendants suggest that Mr. Engh's testimony was prompted by a document they did not receive until after discovery, but they haven't shown why they couldn't have identified Mr. Engh or learned of his potential testimony using reasonable diligence during the extensive discovery period. Nor is the failure harmless. Allowing his testimony would require the parties to schedule, travel to, and conduct his deposition at this late date, on the eve of trial. Imposing that inconvenience and expense is unwarranted at this stage. In addition, the defendants have not explained why it is necessary to call Mr. Engh as opposed to the other dealership employees on their witness list. Thus, the Court grants the motion to exclude testimony by Mr. Engh. B. Defendants’ Motions in Limine The defendants filed the following joint motions in limine. 1. Warranty return records The defendants first move to exclude warranty return records for the Magnum inverter. The records consist of a spreadsheet that notes, as to each returned inverter, which component failed (meaning which component was replaced) and what problem the customer reported. Some of those customer reports include that the customer saw smoke, that there was a “thermal event,” or that the unit “burned up.” [DE 207-1]. The defendants argue that these records are inadmissible because there is no evidence about what caused those incidents or whether they occurred under similar circumstances to the incident in this case, and that the customers’ reports constitute hearsay within hearsay. *4 Mr. Castagna argues that the records should not be excluded as hearsay because they are business records. While the records themselves might be business records, the customers’ reports constitute a second level of hearsay for which Mr. Castagna has not identified any exception. On that point, Mr. Castagna instead argues that the customer reports are not offered for their truth, but to show notice. First, however, the reports are not relevant for that purpose, as that sort of notice is not an element of Mr. Castagna's claims. Second, Mr. Castagna is plainly offering these records for the truth of those assertions—his argument is that other inverters suffered failures in the manner reported by those customers, which makes it more likely that his inverter did too. The records are thus excludable as hearsay. Even if the records were not hearsay, their probative value would still be substantially outweighed by the prejudicial value, leading to exclusion under Rule 403. The records contain no details about what caused any of the “thermal events” or other issues, or the circumstances under which those incidents occurred. They thus have little to no probative value in establishing that the inverters are prone to cause fires of the type Mr. Castagna experienced. Offering that evidence would invite the jury to speculate at the causes of those incidents and their connection to this case, and could require a detour into distinguishing each of the other incidents, thus creating confusion and delay. The Court therefore grants the motion to exclude these records. 2. Internet forum postings The defendants likewise move to exclude postings on an internet forum by RV owners describing problems they have had with Magnum inverters. This is classic hearsay. Mr. Castagna again argues that these statements are relevant to show that the defendants were on notice, but he has not shown how that is relevant to any of the claims going to trial. Nor has he shown that the defendants were aware that any of these things were posted. The Court thus grants the motion to exclude this evidence. 3. Incidental and consequential damages The defendants next move to bar evidence of incidental and consequential damages. They made that same argument at summary judgment, but the Court held a dispute of fact precluded summary judgment. The present motion is largely just an attempt to relitigate that same issue, but there is no use in doing so now. If the jury resolves that dispute in the defendants’ favor—as the defendants insist it will—then the question will be moot. And if not, the defendants can preserve their argument in a Rule 50 motion and the Court can decide the matter in that context. But the Court has already addressed this issue in a pretrial ruling and need not do so again. The defendants also argue that certain damages will be unsupported, but that is an argument to make to the jury. The defendants also cite a recent opinion from the Seventh Circuit, but that does not warrant reconsideration at this point. That decision held that a warranty's limitations were not unconscionable, despite the plaintiffs’ claim that they didn't receive a copy of the warranty at the time of their purchase. Mathews v. REV Recreation Grp., Inc., 931 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2019). But this Court made that exact same holding at summary judgment. [DE 129 p. 24 (“[T]he Court cannot find that the limitation is unconscionable.”). The Court denied summary judgment for a distinct reason, as there was a dispute of fact as to whether this particular limitation was part of the bargain the parties entered, just as the Indiana Supreme Court held on similar facts in Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078, 1087 (Ind. 1993) (holding that the limitation was not unconscionable, but that “[l]eft unanswered ... is whether the parties in fact agreed” to that limitation); see also Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 948–50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). The defendants have yet to meaningfully engage with those cases. The Court thus denies this motion. 4. Loss of evidence *5 The defendants argue that, because certain evidence was lost after the fire, Mr. Castagna should be precluded from offering evidence as to the cause of the fire, arguing that other causes of the fire may be conclusively eliminated, or challenging the opinions of the defendants’ experts. This is just another, more roundabout way of asking to dismiss the implied warranty claim as a sanction for spoliation. The Court has already explained why spoliation sanctions are not warranted. The defendants are free to argue to the jury whether Mr. Castagna has met his burden of proof in light of the available evidence, but the motion to limit Mr. Castagna's case in these respects is denied. 5. Duration of the warranty The defendants next argue that Castagna cannot recover damages for the fire because the implied warranty of merchantability was limited to twelve months. The Court explicitly rejected that argument at summary judgment. As a matter of law, a limitation on the duration of an implied warranty is unenforceable unless it is “prominently displayed on the face of the warranty.” [DE 129 p. 15–17]. The Court held at summary judgment that the language here is not prominently displayed, so the attempt to limit the duration of the implied warranty is ineffective. This motion only reflects a disagreement with that holding, so the motion is denied. 6. Evidence of a defect The defendants move to exclude evidence that the inverter is defective. It is unclear exactly what they are referring to, though. As the Court held at summary judgment, a warranty claim does not require a plaintiff to prove that a product was “defective” in the manner that might be required for a products liability claim, such as by proving a design defect or manufacturing defect. Mr. Castagna does not intend to do so.[3] But Mr. Castagna is certainly entitled to present evidence that the inverter started the fire, which could be referred to as being “defective” in a generic sense. Because there is no dispute in the former respect, and the motion would be unwarranted in the latter respect, the Court denies this motion. 7. Opinions not disclosed The defendants move to exclude any expert opinions that were not properly disclosed during discovery. However, they do not identify any such opinions or even suggest that there are any. The Court cannot determine whether a disclosure complied with the rules, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2), or whether a failure to do so warrants exclusion, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c), without knowing what is at issue and what the circumstances are. Nor is there any use in an order in limine saying that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will apply at trial. The Court therefore denies this motion. 9.[4] Information not disclosed The defendants similarly move to exclude any evidence that was requested during discovery but not disclosed. The only category of evidence they refer to is evidence of Mr. Castagna's travels in 2013 and 2014. Again, though, they do not identify any evidence on that topic that may be offered at trial that was not produced in discovery. Mr. Castagna also represents that the evidence he intends to offer at trial will be exactly the same evidence he produced in discovery and testified to in his deposition. The Court thus denies this motion. 10. Allegations in the complaint The defendants next move to exclude the first amended complaint, which contains allegations relating to claims that have been dismissed. Mr. Castagna agrees, so the Court grants the motion. 11. Send-a-message arguments The defendants finally move to bar argument that the jury should send a message with their verdict. Mr. Castagna does not oppose this motion, so the Court grants it. C. Daubert Motions *6 The defendants also moved to exclude testimony by three experts who offer opinions pertaining to the cause of the fire: Peter Layson, Thomas Bailey, and John Powell. The defendants argue that those witnesses’ opinions do not satisfy Rule 702. As previously discussed, that rule allows a witness “who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to offer an opinion if the following criteria are met: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. A court has a gatekeeping role to ensure that expert testimony meets these criteria, but its focus is on principles and methodology, not the conclusions they generate or the correctness of the expert's conclusions. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827, 834–35 (7th Cir. 2015). The proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of showing those elements are satisfied. The Court addresses each witness in turn, and overrules each of the objections. To be sure, some of the reports could have been more deliberate in spelling out the experts’ reasoning. And the defendants’ motions raise various lines of potential cross-examination or argument as to how the jury should weigh the opinions. The Court is satisfied, though, that the experts are adequately qualified to offer their respective opinions, and that the opinions are supported by sufficient facts and methodology to be admissible under Rule 702. 1. Peter Layson Peter Layson is the principal staff scientist at Applications Engineering Group, Inc., where much of his work involves fire investigations involving mechanical and electrical systems. He has a bachelor's degree in applied physics and many years of subsequent experience and education in physics and electrical systems. He was retained in this case to offer opinions about electrical activity in the area of the fire. His opinions included that the inverter was the only electrical ignition source in the area of the fire and was the only electrical device exhibiting electrical activity consistent with a competent ignition source for the fire. He also opined that the electrical activity observed inside the inverter was consistent with an electrical discharge event in a certain component, but that the specific mechanism could not be determined. He finally opined that the electrical failure in the inverter was sustained and forceful enough to expel heated gases and flames to the exterior of the unit's enclosure. The defendants first object that Mr. Layson is not qualified to offer those opinions because he is not an electrical engineer. They offer no reason, though, that only an electrical engineer would be competent to opine on these subjects. Mr. Layson is a professional physicist with experience in electrical systems, and his opinions arise out of those areas of expertise. If the defendants wish to argue to the jury that an electrical engineer's expertise would be more useful, they can do so, but Mr. Layson is sufficiently qualified in the subjects of his opinions to satisfy Rule 702 in this respect. The defendants also argue that Mr. Layson's expertise does not qualify him to opine as to whether the inverter is defective by design or manufacture. But as the Court has already held, and as the defendants emphasize in their own motion in limine, whether the inverter is defective by design or manufacture is irrelevant, as this is not a products liability case. Mr. Layson's opinions did not address that immaterial topic,[5] so that objection is misplaced. *7 The defendants also argue for several reasons that Mr. Layson's opinions are unreliable. They first argue that Mr. Layson failed to mention the National Fire Protection Association's standard for cause and origin investigations. There's a simple reason for that, though: Mr. Layson's task was not to conduct a cause and origin investigation, but to investigate any electrical sources in the area that might have caused the fire. In doing so, he opined that he identified only one such electrical source. Another one of Mr. Castagna's experts, Mr. Bailey, then considered those opinions as well as other evidence in order to determine what caused the fire and how the fire progressed. But Mr. Layson's opinions are more modest than the defendants portray them, as his focus was on electrical sources and electrical activity. Mr. Layson also adequately explained the basis for those opinions so as to show that they are sufficiently reliable. His report primarily consists of relating his own observations of the vehicle and the fire damage and explaining the significance of those observations, and he invokes the scientific method as the basis for his conclusions. Mr. Layson explains, for example, based on his examinations of the inverter, that the inverter suffered a catastrophic electric failure in its FET board (a point that appears undisputed). He also observed evidence of electrical arcing activity between the AC and DC power supply within the inverter. Conversely, he inspected the AC and DC wiring outside of the inverter but did not observe any electrical arcing activity outside the inverter[6] and found no electrical activity suggestive of a cause for the fire. He also opined based on his observation of the thermal damage to the inverter's case that the FET board's failure was severe enough to expel heated gases and flames. In short, Mr. Layson explained why he believed that the fire could have started in the inverter, and why the evidence did not point to any other source for the fire within the area of fire damage. That reasoning adequately supports his opinions so as to satisfy Rule 702. The defendants also argue that Mr. Layson and Mr. Bailey created a feedback loop by assuming the truth of each other's opinions in reaching their own opinions. Again, however, this argument mischaracterizes Mr. Layson's opinions in that regard. As the defendants note, one of Mr. Layson's opinions is that the inverter was the only electrical ignition source identified “in the area of fire origin.” [DE 168-1 p. 4]. Mr. Layson testified that he relied on Mr. Bailey as to the area of fire origin. Mr. Bailey, in turn, testified that he relied on Mr. Layson's opinions in support of his opinions about where the fire began. The defendants thus object that the two experts each relied on the other's opinions as to where the fire started, assuming their own conclusions. Mr. Layson clarified during his testimony, though, that in referring to the “area of fire origin,” he was only referring to “the area that contains all the fire damage.” [DE 168-5 p. 25 (deposition p. 141)]. In other words, his opinion addressed the potential ignition sources within the compartments underneath the RV. He did not, as the defendants suggest, rely on Mr. Bailey to identify a particular point within that area where the fire started.[7] And the defendants even acknowledge elsewhere in their motion that there is no dispute that the fire originated in a compartment beneath the floor of the motor home. [DE 169 p. 16]. Thus, it was appropriate for Mr. Layson to focus his analysis on that area and to investigate any ignition sources in those compartments. The experts’ opinions are not circular, either, as Mr. Layson relied on Mr. Bailey only for the general area where the fire occurred, and Mr. Bailey then relied on Mr. Layson's opinions about the electrical sources within that area to determine specifically where and how the fire began. *8 The defendants finally argue that Mr. Layson's opinions are unreliable because some evidence of the fire was lost and because there were some tests that he might have conducted but didn't, among other similar criticisms of the evidence he relied on. Rule 702 only requires that opinions be based on “sufficient” facts or data, Fed. R. Evid. 702(c), not that experts turn over every possible stone and spare no expense in support of their opinions. Mr. Layson had a substantial amount of evidence available to him. He participated in inspections of the inverter and the vehicle, reviewed pictures from various other inspections, read deposition testimony from people who observed the fire, and had access to various other information. That evidence provided a sufficient basis for his opinions. The defendants are entitled to argue that Mr. Layson could have done more, or that the evidence he relied on did not accurately portray the state of the vehicle or inverter at the time of the fire. Those are questions of weight for the jury to decide, though. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); Manpower, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Penn., 732 F.3d 796, 806 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert's analysis and the correctness of the expert's conclusions based on that analysis are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact[.]”); Stollings v. Ryobi Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d 753, 766 (7th Cir. 2013) (“An expert may provide expert testimony based on a valid and properly applied methodology and still offer a conclusion that is subject to doubt. It is the role of the jury to weigh these sources of doubt.”). The Court thus finds that Mr. Layson's opinions satisfy Rule 702, so the Court denies the motion to strike those opinions. 2. Thomas Bailey The defendants next move to strike opinions by Thomas Bailey, a certified fire investigator. Mr. Bailey conducted interviews of witnesses of the fire and its aftermath, and he participated in multiple examinations of the vehicle and the inverter. Based on that investigation as well as Mr. Layson's opinions about the electrical ignition sources, Mr. Bailey opined that the fire started at the inverter, then ignited combustible materials nearby and spread to areas where fuel and oxygen were available, before self-extinguishing after running out of fuel or oxygen. The defendants first object that Mr. Bailey is not qualified. They acknowledge that he is a certified and experienced fire inspector. They argue, though, that he is not an electrical engineer or scientist, so he should no be able to testify about a fire involving an inverter. First, though, this argument overlooks that Mr. Bailey expressly relied on Mr. Layson for his analysis of the electronics. Mr. Bailey did not offer any opinions of his own that would have required expertise in that subject; he relied on a specialist for those opinions and built his cause and origin assessment on that foundation.[8] In addition, the defendants have not shown that there is anything so special about a fire involving an inverter that a fire investigator has to be an expert in that specific component before investigating such a fire. Mr. Bailey has significant experience as a fire investigator and drew on that expertise in reaching his opinions. Thus, the Court finds based on Mr. Bailey's training and experience that he is suitably qualified to testify as an expert on the issues addressed in his opinions. The defendants also object that Mr. Bailey's opinions are not sufficiently reliable. On that issue, they primarily reprise their argument that Mr. Bailey's and Mr. Layson's opinions are circular. The Court has already explained why it disagrees. The defendants also argue that because various evidence was lost, it would “seem impossible to rule out other sources for the fire.” [DE 169 p. 19]. Mr. Bailey explained, though, how the available evidence led to his conclusions. He also conducted an extensive investigation that included examinations of the vehicle and the inverter and interviews with people who were at the scene of the fire. The loss of any evidence may be a reason to give his opinion less weight, but that is a question for the jury. As just noted, Rule 702 requires only that opinions be based on “sufficient” facts or data, and Mr. Bailey's opinions meet that threshold. The Court therefore denies the motion to exclude these opinions. 3. John Powell *9 The defendants finally move to exclude testimony by John Powell, another certified fire investigator. Mr. Powell was first retained by Freightliner, which manufactured the RV's chassis, so his investigation focused on whether the chassis or its wiring caused the fire. He participated in some of the initial examinations of the vehicle and also relied on pictures and reports from other experts, among other materials. He concluded that the fire originated in a compartment beneath the floor of the vehicle and that it involved interior components of the inverter. More specifically, he opined that the fire originated inside the inverter's case. He also opined that there was no evidence that any of the repairs to the RV affected the components of the inverter. The defendants object to Mr. Powell's opinions on similar grounds to the previous experts. They argue that because he is not an electrical engineer, Mr. Powell is not qualified to offer opinions relating to an inverter. Again, however, the defendants have failed to establish why such a narrow specialization is required for these opinions. Mr. Powell is a qualified fire investigator with extensive experience and training, including thousands of fire investigations over his decades of work. His investigation led him to conclude that the fire began inside the inverter, but that was the product his expertise as a fire investigator, and Mr. Powell is suitably qualified in that respect. The defendants also argue, as with the other experts, that the lost evidence prevents Mr. Powell from determining the cause of the fire. Again, the Court believes that that argument is better directed to the jury. The defendants further note that Mr. Powell only personally took part in the first two examinations of the vehicle. As his report reflects, though, he also considered the pictures and reports from the other examinations. And the defendants’ argument that it “is doubtful” that Mr. Powell examined the inverter, as he claims, is a challenge to the factual underpinnings of his opinions, which is not a valid basis to exclude expert testimony. Manpower, 732 F.3d at 806. The Court finds that Mr. Powell has adequately articulated his reasoning so as to show that his conclusions meet Rule 702’s reliability threshold. At the outset, the defendants concede that the fire originated in a compartment beneath the floor of the vehicle, as Mr. Powell opines. As to his opinion that the fire began inside the inverter's case, Mr. Powell's report sets out his reasoning. He explains that soot deposits show that a fire occurred inside the inverter and vented through a grill in the inverter's case into the vehicle's lower compartments. He noted that the soot deposits and directional charring show that soot and gases vented in greater volumes from the inside to the outside of the inverter. He also noted that the inside of the inverter suffered acute thermal damage and that there was electrical arcing inside the inverter. Mr. Powell also examined the vehicle's wiring to see if any electrical activity outside of the inverter could have triggered the incident. The wiring was enclosed in a plastic gutter, but while the gutter suffered some fire damage, Mr. Powell found no evidence of electrical activity to any of the chassis wiring. Thus, because the evidence indicated that a fire spread from inside the inverter, and the evidence did not reveal electrical activity outside the inverter that could have caused its failure, Mr. Powell concluded that the fire began inside the inverter. He also considered evidence of repairs to the vehicle's wiring, but did not find evidence that those repairs contributed to the incident. He noted that a wiring harness had been cut and then reconnected at some point prior to the fire. He explained, though, that there was no evidence of electrical activity in that component, and no evidence of electrical faulting in the vehicle or its chassis other than inside the inverter. Thus, he concluded that there was no evidence that any repairs to the RV contributed to the fire. *10 These opinions may well be contestable. But Mr. Powell adequately set forth his reasoning and showed how it is founded on his expertise and the evidence. The Court finds that his opinions meet Rule 702’s reliability prongs, and that the defendants’ arguments to the contrary are better made to the jury. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to strike Mr. Powell's opinions too. D. Conclusion The Court GRANTS Ms. Castagna's motions in limine [DE 187, 190, 191, 201], and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the defendants’ motions in limine [DE 207]. The Court also DENIES the defendants’ motion to strike expert testimony. [DE 168]. SO ORDERED. ENTERED: March 4, 2020 Footnotes [1] Even counsel's statement that the missing parts “appear to be central to the fire's origin” comes immediately after a statement that the defendants “are very likely to make a spoliation argument.” [DE 231 p. 9]. The probative value of the first part is minimal in light of the expert testimony the parties can offer on the importance of the missing parts, and the prejudicial effect is significant. [2] They do state, however, that they want to raise that Mr. Castagna dismissed his claims against his insurer in exchange for a release of the insurer's subrogation rights. The defendants have yet to articulate any legitimate purpose for that evidence. Mr. Castagna included the insurer in this suit to the extent the insurer might assert a subrogation claim for any expenses it incurred because of the fire. When the insurer clarified that it was not seeking to recover any of those expenses, Mr. Castagna agreed to dismiss it. That has no relevance to any issue in this case, and appears to be an attempt to insinuate that Mr. Castagna should have just submitted an insurance claim instead of suing the defendants on the warranty. That would be inappropriate, and the Court will not permit evidence that the insurer was a party to this suit or that it has been dismissed. [3] Indeed, it has primarily been the defendants who have injected issues of whether the inverter was “defective.” [4] The defendants’ motion skips number 8. [5] The defendants object that Mr. Layson made statements on those topics during his deposition, but it was the defendants’ own line of questioning that injected the concepts of a design or manufacturing defect. Mr. Layson confirmed that he was not testifying that the inverter had a design defect or manufacturing defect, but was addressing in general whether something caused the inverter to suffer a failure. [DE 168-5 p. 19]. In light of the Court's orders and the defendants’ own motion in limine, the Court trusts that the defendants do not intend to raise issues at trial about design or manufacturing defects. [6] As Mr. Layson explained in greater detail in his affidavit, this indicated to him that AC voltage did not infiltrate the DC electrical system from outside the inverter, in which case the inverter would have been a victim rather than cause of the fire. [7] See also DE 176-1 ¶¶ 17, 19: “During Mr. Bailey's initial inspections of the subject RV he was able to identify an area of fire origin isolated to the under stow compartments of the RV.... I opined, based on the area of fire origin identified by Mr. Bailey and the data collected during his examinations, that the only competent ignition source located in Mr. Bailey's area of fire origin was isolated to the subject inverter/charger.” [8] As Mr. Bailey stated in his report: “Although the investigator did observe the catastrophic failure area within the inverter and did not observe any electrical activity on any of the wiring retained within the compartments, the investigator will rely solely upon the electrical findings of princip[al] scientist Peter Layson.” [DE 168-3 p. 20].