JARED CLINTON, Plaintiff, v. RYAN GARRETT, BRIAN MINNEHAN, and RYAN STEINKAMP, Individually and in Their Official Capacity as a Law Enforcement Officers for the Des Moines, Iowa Police Department; and CITY OF DES MOINES, IOWA, Defendants No. 4:20-cv-00166 United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division Filed March 15, 2023 Counsel Gina Messamer, Jessica Donels, Brown & Bergmann, L.L.P., Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff. Michelle Mackel-Wiederanders, Luke DeSmet, Des Moines City Attorney, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants. Gritzner, James E., United States District Judge ORDER ON PRETRIAL MOTIONS *1 This case is before the Court on a Motion in Limine, ECF No. 74, filed by Defendants Ryan Garrett, Brian Minnehan, Ryan Steinkamp, and the City of Des Moines, Iowa. Also before the Court is a Motion in Limine, ECF No. 75, filed by Plaintiff Jared Clinton, as well as a Motion to Bifurcate, ECF No. 81, filed by Clinton. The motions are fully submitted.[1] No hearing is requested. I. BACKGROUND In October 2019, Officers Garrett, Minnehan, and Steinkamp pulled Clinton over for a suspected violation of Iowa's vehicle registration requirements. Clinton's car had no license plates. Although a temporary registration tag was taped to the rear window, the officers could not read it and wanted to verify whether the tag was legitimate. Shortly after approaching Clinton's car, Officer Garrett smelled marijuana. The officers searched the vehicle and its occupants and discovered a vape pen believed to contain THC in the driver's side map pocket. Clinton was arrested at the scene and charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code § 124.401(5). He spent approximately four hours in jail. The criminal case was voluntarily dismissed after Clinton filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the traffic stop. Clinton filed this lawsuit asserting officers Garrett, Minnehan, and Steinkamp violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Clinton also asserted civil conspiracy claims against the officers and vicarious liability claims against both the City of Des Moines and its police chief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court denied qualified immunity and determined Garrett, Minnehan, and Steinkamp are liable under § 1983 and the Iowa Constitution for stopping Clinton's vehicle without reasonable suspicion. The Court also held as a matter of law that the City is liable for the officers' state constitutional violation pursuant to Iowa Code § 670.2. The question of damages was left for trial, and all other claims were dismissed. Defendants challenged the Court's denial of qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. See Clinton v. Garrett, 49 F.4th 1132, 1144 (8th Cir. 2022). A three-day trial is set to begin April 10, 2023. Pursuant to the Court's scheduling order, the parties submitted motions in limine seeking to exclude various matters from introduction at trial. Both motions are opposed in part. Clinton also filed a motion to bifurcate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), requesting that trial be divided into separate phases addressing his claims for compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants resist bifurcation. II. MOTION TO BIFURCATE Determining the procedure by which this case will be tried can help to clarify several of the evidentiary issues disputed in the parties' motions in limine. Therefore, the Court begins with Clinton's motion to bifurcate. *2 “For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Punitive damages are among the issues that courts have discretion to bifurcate. See Thorne v. Welk Inv., Inc., 197 F.3d 1205, 1213–14 (8th Cir. 1999). Bifurcation “can avoid the potential that evidence pertinent to punitive damages will improperly prejudice a determination on liability and compensatory damages.” Kuiper v. Givaudan, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1055–56 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (citing Parsons v. First Invs. Corp., 122 F.3d 525, 529 (8th Cir. 1997)). “On the other hand, where evidence on one issue is relevant to other issues that the movant seeks to bifurcate into a separate phase of the trial, the movant is not prejudiced, and the court does not abuse its discretion in declining to bifurcate the issues.” Id. (citing EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1998)). Clinton argues that bifurcation is necessary in this case because certain evidence that is undisputedly relevant to the issue of punitive damages—namely, the officers' justifications for their unconstitutional traffic stop—is irrelevant to the issue of compensatory damages. Clinton argues that introduction of the officers' “excuses” prior to a verdict on compensatory damages “would effectively invite the jury to reconsider the Court's summary judgment decision on liability” and allow sympathy and confusion to influence his compensatory award. Pl.'s Mot. to Bifurcate 2, ECF No. 81. Compensatory damages are “damages grounded in determinations of plaintiffs' actual losses.” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (citation omitted). Their purpose is “to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (citation omitted). Punitive damages, by contrast, are designed to punish willful conduct and deter similar behavior by others. See Thurairajah v. City of Fort Smith, 3 F.4th 1017, 1026 (8th Cir. 2021). To award punitive damages in a § 1983 case, the jury must find the defendant's conduct was either “motivated by evil motive or intent” or “involve[d] reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Similar standards apply under Iowa law. See, e.g., Freeman v. Bonnes Trucking, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 871, 879–80 (Iowa 1983) (stating punitive damages may be awarded “where a defendant acts maliciously,” including “where the defendant acts illegally or improperly with willful or reckless disregard for another's rights”). Why a defendant violated a plaintiff's rights is typically irrelevant to measuring the actual losses a plaintiff suffered. That is especially true in this case, where the Court has determined as a matter of law that Defendants' conduct was not legally excused. But intent evidence is highly relevant to determining whether a defendant acted with malice or callous indifference. See Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining the focus of the punitive damages inquiry “is on the intent of the defendant and whether the offensive conduct calls for deterrence and punishment over and above that provided by compensatory awards” (citation omitted)). As such, the jury will be entitled to consider the subjective intent of Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan to determine whether punitive damages are warranted, but not to determine compensatory damages. If these separate issues are submitted together, there is a substantial risk that the jury will misapply intent evidence as a mitigating factor in Clinton's compensatory award. Bifurcation is the best way to avoid confusion. *3 Defendants argue that a bifurcated proceeding is inefficient and may risk spilling over the three-day window previously allocated for trial in this case. Rule 42(b) identifies expeditiousness and economy as pertinent factors in the bifurcation decision. “However, the key issue is whether bifurcation is necessary to avoid prejudice.” Kuiper, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (citing Athey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 234 F.3d 357, 362 (8th Cir. 2000)). Here, the safeguarding benefits of bifurcation outweigh the potential for procedural delay. Trying the case in two phases will cause some inefficiencies. But duplication of testimony should be minimal because the facts relevant to compensatory and punitive damages are largely distinct. If more than three days are ultimately needed, the Court will not cut short reasonable and necessary presentation of evidence. Defendants also contend that removing intent issues from the compensatory phase of trial “would leave jurors with dozens of questions and speculation about the type, degree or character of the unconstitutionality of the stop,” causing unfair prejudice to Defendants. Defs.' Resist. 3, ECF No. 82. However, bifurcation does not mean the jury must calculate compensatory damages for an entirely abstract constitutional harm. As discussed below with respect to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, see infra Section V.1, the Court will allow limited contextual evidence regarding the officers' stated basis for Clinton's stop during the compensatory damages phase. This information is inextricable from the constitutional violation Clinton asserts: a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion. By contrast, evidence regarding the officers' subjective beliefs about the lawfulness of the stop, including evidence related to their training, will be reserved for the second phase. Clinton's motion to bifurcate must be GRANTED. Trial will proceed in two stages. The issue of compensatory damages will be tried first. After that portion of the case has been submitted and a verdict returned, the same jury will be instructed that it has an additional matter to consider. III. MOTION IN LIMINE STANDARD The Court turns next to the parties' motions in limine. Under appropriate circumstances, motions in limine may be used to exclude inadmissible or prejudicial evidence or argument before trial. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). Their purpose is “to eliminate from further consideration evidentiary submissions that clearly ought not be presented to the jury,” to “sharpen[ ] the focus of later trial proceedings,” and to “permit[ ] the parties to focus their preparation on those matters that will be considered.” Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Fam. Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997). Whether to exclude evidence prior to trial is a matter of discretion for the district court. See United States v. Jirak, 728 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Parish, 606 F.3d 480, 486 (8th Cir. 2010)). Rulings on a motion in limine are “preliminary and may change depending on what actually happens at trial.” Walzer v. St. Joseph State Hosp., 231 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir. 2000) Not all evidentiary questions are appropriate to resolve on a motion in limine. “A reviewing court is handicapped in any effort to rule on subtle evidentiary questions outside a factual context.” Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. Motions in limine should not be used when an evidentiary submission “cannot be evaluated accurately or sufficiently by the trial judge” in a pretrial context. Jonasson, 115 F.3d at 440. In such instances, the court should “defer ruling until during trial, when the trial judge can better estimate its impact on the jury” and evaluate evidentiary issues “in a more concrete setting.” Id.; see also United States v. Dahlin, 734 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“Forbearance can prevent gratuitous advisory opinions and can promote judicial economy and accurate decisions.” (citation omitted)). *4 Guided by the foregoing legal structure, the Court will proceed to consider the motions in the order they were filed. IV. DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE A. Settlement Offers Defendants request that any reference to prior settlement offers be prohibited at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Clinton does not resist and moves separately for the same relief. See Pl.'s Mot. in Limine 3, ECF No. 75. Both parties' motions as to settlement offers must be SUSTAINED. B. Damages After the Initial Traffic Stop Defendants seek to exclude evidence related to damages Clinton sustained following the officers' initial stop of his vehicle. According to Defendants, there is no dispute that the officers detected the odor of marijuana emanating from Clinton's car within fifteen seconds of pulling Clinton over, creating probable cause for his continued detention and ultimate arrest. Defendants contend this independent basis for a lawful seizure severs the causal connection between the unconstitutional stop and the damages attributable to Clinton's arrest. Defendants therefore argue that evidence of Clinton's damages should be strictly limited to damages arising from the period of time between the initiation of the traffic stop and the moment police smelled marijuana. According to Clinton, Defendants' argument must fail from its start because “there is a dispute of fact as to whether law enforcement smelled marijuana” when they approached Clinton's vehicle. Pl.'s Resist. 1, ECF No. 76. Clinton asserted in his pleadings that Defendants extended the stop beyond reasonable necessity and searched Clinton and his vehicle without probable cause. See Pet. ¶¶ 47, 55, ECF No. 1-1. However, he did not advance those theories in resistance to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and therefore abandoned his claims as to search and seizure violations after the initial stop.[2] Further, in his own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Clinton pursued claims only with respect to the initial stop and asked the Court to “set this matter for trial as to damages.” Pl.'s Mot. Partial Summ. J. ¶ 5, ECF No. 26. As requested, the Court resolved all issues of liability at summary judgment. See Clinton, 49 F.4th at 1136 (“The district court entered an order deciding all claims as a matter of law but leaving the amount of damages for a jury trial.”). On this record, the constitutionality of the officers' conduct after the initial traffic stop is not up for debate. The essential question at hand is whether Clinton can recover for damages arising from a lawful seizure that was precipitated by an unlawful one. But for the officers' decision to stop Clinton without reasonable suspicion, they would not have detected the marijuana odor, and Clinton would not have been searched, arrested, or jailed. In criminal cases, courts must decide whether evidence discovered as an indirect result of an unconstitutional search or seizure—the “fruit of the poisonous tree”—must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016). But “the exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 cases.” Klein v. Steinkamp, 44 F.4th 1111, 1116 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Lingo v. City of Salem, 832 F. 3d 953, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2016)). The issue here is not the admissibility of evidence obtained from a wrongful seizure, but rather the scope of civil remedies for a wrongful seizure. *5 “[Section] 1983 creates a species of tort liability.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994) (quoting Stachura, 477 U.S. at 305). Accordingly, federal courts look to common law principles to “defin[e] the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery” under the statute.[3] Id. (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257–258 (1978)). The touchstone for determining the scope of recovery is proximate cause. Cnty. of L.A. v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 430–31 (2017) (“[P]laintiffs can—subject to qualified immunity—generally recover damages that are proximately caused by any Fourth Amendment violation.”); see also Nauck, 284 F.3d at 928; Audio Odyssey, Ltd. v. Brenton First Nat. Bank, 245 F.3d 721, 739 (8th Cir. 2001), judgment vacated & opinion reinstated 286 F.3d 498 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Trudeau v. Wyrick, 713 F.2d 1360, 1367 (8th Cir. 1983). Whether proximate cause exists depends on the “foreseeability or the scope of the risk created by the predicate conduct.” Mendez, 581 U.S. at 431 (quoting Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444–45 (2014)). In other words, a plaintiff must show “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Id.; see also Patterson v. City of Omaha, 779 F.3d 795, 801 (8th Cir. 2015) (upholding a jury's nominal damages award where the plaintiff “did not establish [a] direct causal link showing that [the defendant's] use of excessive force caused [the plaintiff's] injury”). Except in situations where “the question is so free from doubt as to justify” a determination as a matter of law, proximate cause “is generally a jury question.” Nauke, 284 F.3d at 928 (quoting Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1994)). The Supreme Court's Mendez decision provides helpful guidance for applying proximate cause principles in a § 1983 case involving multiple Fourth Amendment seizures. In Mendez, officers made a warrantless entry into the home where the plaintiff, Angel Mendez, was sleeping. Mendez, 581 U.S. at 423–24. Startled awake, Mendez picked up a nearby BB gun. Id. at 424. The officers opened fire, injuring Mendez. Id. Mendez brought suit under § 1983, alleging the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully entering his home and by exercising excessive force in response to the perceived threat of Mendez's gun. Id. at 425. After a bench trial, the district court found the officers liable on Mendez's unlawful-entry claim but awarded nominal damages, finding Mendez's act of picking up the BB gun was a superseding cause of his physical injuries. Id. The district court further found that the officers' use of force was reasonable. Id. Nevertheless, it awarded $4 million in damages on Mendez's excessive force claim based on the Ninth Circuit's rule that an otherwise lawful use of force is unreasonable where an officer provokes a violent response through an independent constitutional violation. Id. at 425–26. The Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part. See id. at 426. The Supreme Court vacated judgment, finding the Ninth Circuit's provocation rule “incompatible with [the Court's] excessive force jurisprudence.” Id. at 427. “If there is no excessive force claim under Graham,” the Court reasoned, “there is no excessive force claim at all. To the extent that a plaintiff has other Fourth Amendment claims, they should be analyzed separately.” Id. at 429. Notably, the Court made clear that the objective of the provocation rule—holding police accountable for the “foreseeable consequences of all their constitutional torts”—was already accomplished through traditional causation doctrines: [T]here is no need to dress up every Fourth Amendment claim as an excessive force claim. For example, if the plaintiffs in this case cannot recover on their excessive force claim, that will not foreclose recovery for injuries proximately caused by the warrantless entry. The harm proximately caused by these two torts may overlap, but the two claims should not be confused. *6 Id. at 431. The Court directed the Ninth Circuit to revisit the question of whether Mendez's injuries from the officers' lawful use of force were proximately caused by the officers' unconstitutional entry. Id. at 432. On remand, the Ninth Circuit held that Mendez's injuries were, in fact, a foreseeable consequence of the warrantless entry and that Mendez's intervening actions did not destroy proximate cause. Mendez v. Cnty. of L.A., 897 F.3d 1067, 1076–82 (9th Cir. 2018). Both before and after Mendez, federal courts have regularly concluded it is proximate cause—not the lawfulness of a subsequent search or seizure—that determines the scope of a plaintiff's recovery for a Fourth Amendment violation. See Martinez v. Carson, 697 F.3d 1252, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding the district court erred in concluding the defendants “could only be liable for the first few minutes of the seizure” where a jury could have found the defendants' unlawful initial seizure proximately caused the plaintiffs' arrest by other officers); Burke v. McDonald, 572 F.3d 51, 60 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding the district court's jury instructions properly “framed the question of damages as a matter of proximate cause,” noting that “[t]his approach to the issue is consistent with Supreme Court precedent emphasizing that liability under § 1983 flows against the defendant for all damages that are the natural consequences of his actions” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Summers v. Hinds Cnty., Mississippi, No. 3:20-CV-266, 2023 WL 173622, at *4–5 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 12, 2023); Hooks v. Brewer, No. CV 316-023, 2021 WL 8442907, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 29, 2021); Pengelly v. Zimmerman, No. CV 19-10, 2020 WL 8475134, at *8 (D. Mont. Mar. 19, 2020); Conroy v. Caron, 275 F. Supp. 3d 328, 343 n.5 (D. Conn. 2017); Passenheim v. Tolbert, No. 15-CV-0422, 2016 WL 6915504, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2016); Train v. City of Albuquerque, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1253–55 (D.N.M. 2009). Indeed, in a case factually indistinguishable from Mendez, a panel of the Eighth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find a plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by officers' unconstitutional entry into his home, regardless of the fact that the plaintiff's independent act of wielding a gun justified the officers' use of force. See Doran v. Eckold, 362 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Foreseeable intervening acts, be they lawful or unlawful, do not break the chain of causation.”), vacated on other grounds, 409 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Defendants do not deny that causation principles define the scope of recovery for an unlawful seizure claim. See Defs.' Mot. in Limine 4, ECF No. 74 (acknowledging Clinton's recoverable damages include “those that flow from” the fifteen seconds during which he was stopped without reasonable suspicion). Rather, they argue that, as a matter of law, the window of recovery must close at the moment probable cause arises. Defendants rely primarily on Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2019). In that case, plaintiff Sherard Martin was jailed for 65 days after officers discovered a defaced firearm and crack cocaine in his vehicle during a traffic stop. Id. at 596–97. At trial, the jury found the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Martin, but the district court instructed that “they could not award him damages for any time spent in custody after officers found the handgun.” Id. at 597. The Seventh Circuit upheld this limitation as a matter of first impression, citing the Supreme Court's statement that “the rules governing compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the interest protected by the particular right in question.” Martin, 934 F.3d at 599 (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 259). The court reasoned that damages for Martin's incarceration, legal defense, and emotional distress exceeded what was necessary to redress the constitutional harm proved at trial—namely, a brief unlawful seizure prior to the discovery of contraband. Id. at 605 (explaining damages must be limited as a matter of law “regardless of what we might conclude under a proximate cause analysis”). *7 Defendants do not cite, and the Court has not identified, any instance in which the Eighth Circuit has limited recovery for an unlawful seizure based on probable cause for a subsequent arrest. Martin does not authorize a departure from the law of this circuit, which clearly instructs that the scope of damages for a § 1983 claim is a causation question for the jury unless it “is so free from doubt as to justify” determination by the Court. Naucke, 284 F.3d at 928 (quoting Ricketts, 36 F.3d at 779); see also Doran, 362 F.3d at 1051; Audio Odyssey, 245 F.3d at 739; Trudeau, 713 F.2d at 1366. Which, if any, of Clinton's alleged injuries were proximately caused by the unlawful stop is not free from doubt. The scope of Clinton's recovery will therefore be left for the jury to decide. Defendants' motion must be OVERRULED as to evidence of damages arising after the officers smelled marijuana. The jury will be appropriately instructed that it may only award compensatory damages for injuries foreseeably resulting from the unlawful traffic stop. See Mendez, 581 U.S. at 431. C. Plaintiff's Witnesses Defendants next move to preclude any testimony from witnesses not “directly relevant to the Plaintiff's damages for the 14 [sic] seconds between the stop and the establishment of probable cause.” Defs.' Mot. in Limine 4, ECF No. 74. For the reasons discussed above, whether Clinton can recover damages based on events after the initial traffic stop is a question of proximate cause for the jury. Thus, testimony as to those damages is not irrelevant. It is well established that emotional distress damages are available under § 1983. See, e.g., Taylor v. Howe, 225 F.3d 993, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 264–65 n.22) (explaining “humiliation, embarrassment, and mental anguish are compensable” under § 1983). Defendants' motion must be OVERRULED as to witness testimony. D. Reputational Harms Defendants seek exclusion of evidence and argument related to Clinton's reputational injuries. They specifically contend that Clinton must be foreclosed from arguing his reputation was injured by an online video interview in which he voluntarily participated. Clinton does not resist on this point, see Pl.'s Resist. 6, ECF No. 76, and the Court agrees that Clinton cannot be permitted to seek reputational damages based on a voluntary media appearance. However, to the extent Defendants suggest Clinton's alleged reputational injuries are otherwise irrelevant, the argument is unsupported. See Taylor, 225 F.3d at 1012. Defendants' motion must be SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART with respect to Clinton's reputational injuries. Allegations that Clinton's reputation was harmed by the “Just Voices” video interview must be excluded from trial. The Court makes no ruling as to other reputational injury evidence. E. Punitive Damages In addition to resisting a bifurcated procedure, Defendants request that the Court prohibit Clinton from raising the issue of punitive damages altogether. They do not dispute the availability of punitive damages for the state and federal constitutional tort claims Clinton brings. Instead, Defendants contend the Court foreclosed an award of punitive damages in its summary judgment order by finding the officers lacked the requisite intent to sustain Clinton's civil conspiracy claims. Although Defendants do not specify the legal principle on which they rely, the Court interprets their argument as one for collateral estoppel. “While an award of compensatory damages is mandatory upon a finding of liability” for a § 1983 claim, “punitive damages are awarded or rejected in a particular case at the discretion of the fact finder once sufficiently serious misconduct by the defendant is shown.” Washington v. Denney, 900 F.3d 549, 563 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 787 (8th Cir. 1997)). As discussed above, to award punitive damages for Clinton's constitutional tort claims, the jury must find Defendants' conduct was either “motivated by evil motive or intent” or “involve[d] reckless or callous indifference” toward Clintons' search and seizure rights. Thurairajah, 3 F.4th at 1026; see also Freeman, 337 N.W.2d at 879–80. *8 At summary judgment, the Court found Clinton's claims for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 could not proceed because Clinton failed to raise a genuine question of fact as to whether the officers' decision to stop his vehicle was motivated by a discriminatory animus or a specific intent to violate Clinton's rights. See Order 26–27, ECF No. 61. Although closely related, that legal determination is not identical to the factual question the jury must decide to award punitive damages on Clinton's constitutional tort claims. Clinton correctly points out that the Court's discussion of the conspiracy claims did not resolve whether the officers acted with reckless or callous indifference toward Clinton's Fourth Amendment rights. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 51 (explaining “reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights ... [is] sufficient to trigger a jury's consideration of the appropriateness of punitive damages”). Collateral estoppel does not apply where the new issue to be litigated is not identical to the issue previously resolved. See, e.g., Charleston v. McCarthy, 8 F.4th 772, 778 (8th Cir. 2021) (listing identity of issues among the essential elements for collateral estoppel under Iowa law). Clinton is entitled to pursue his claim for punitive damages on Counts I and II at trial. Accordingly, Defendants' motion as to punitive damages must be OVERRULED. Because the Court will bifurcate punitive damages from the compensatory damages phase, the Court also overrules as moot Defendants' alternative request that Clinton be prohibited from arguing punitive damages issues “until he presents clear and convincing evidence of malice.” Defs.' Mot. in Limine 6, ECF No. 74. If Clinton fails to present a submissible case for punitive damages, Defendants may make an appropriate motion during trial. F. Clinton's Prior Traffic Stop Defendants move to preclude Clinton from introducing evidence of a 2018 incident where Des Moines police officers stopped a vehicle in which Clinton was riding. According to Defendants, Clinton disputed the lawfulness of this stop, and the parties settled without admission of fault. Defendants contend that evidence related to the 2018 stop is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Prior acts evidence is admissible for other purposes under Rule 404(b)(2), provided it satisfies additional criteria. See White Commc'ns, LLC v. Synergies3 Tec Servs., LLC, 4 F.4th 606, 612 (8th Cir. 2021) (reciting admissibility elements). But rule 404(b) is not implicated here. The 2018 stop did not involve officer Garrett, Steinkamp, or Minnehan, and the City of Des Moines remains in this case only on a theory of vicarious liability. Evidence that Clinton was previously stopped by different police officers does not inform the character of any defendant who acted in this case. Defendants also object to evidence of the 2018 stop on relevance and prejudice grounds. Clinton contends this evidence is relevant because his previous experience of being pulled over by Des Moines police officers “increased his negative emotional response” to the unlawful stop at issue. Pl.'s Resist. 9, ECF No. 76. The Court agrees that Clinton's previous experience is material to his alleged emotional injuries. See Graves v. City of Waterloo, No. C10-2014, 2011 WL 4007324, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 8, 2011) (finding plaintiff's prior convictions were relevant to damages because “[i]t is reasonable to expect that the amount of emotional distress suffered by someone wrongfully accused of a crime is shaped, at least to a limited extent, by his or her prior experiences, including prior dealings with law enforcement”). Defendants fail to advance a meaningful argument for unfair prejudice. Their motion must be OVERRULED as to evidence regarding Clinton's previous disputed traffic stop. G. Disciplinary Records *9 Defendants request that the disciplinary records of Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, Minnehan, and any other Des Moines Police Department personnel be excluded from trial. Clinton does not resist. Defendants' motion must be SUSTAINED as to disciplinary records. H. Defendants' Prior Alleged Fourth Amendment Violations Defendants move to preclude Clinton from suggesting that Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, or Minnehan have committed unlawful traffic stops in the past. They argue that allegations of misconduct against third parties are irrelevant to Clinton's damages, unfairly prejudicial, and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Clinton responds that the officers' past alleged Fourth Amendment violations are material to the issue of punitive damages. He intends to introduce evidence regarding: (1) a June 28, 2018, incident in which Officer Minnehan pulled over a vehicle containing three African American men for reasons related to a temporary registration tag; (2) a July 14, 2018, incident in which Officers Steinkamp and Minnehan stopped a vehicle based on their inability to read a temporary registration tag; and (3) a July 22, 2018, incident in which Officer Steinkamp stopped and questioned an African American driver regarding his temporary tag. Unlike Clinton's other stop, Steinkamp and Minnehan's allegedly unlawful traffic stops trigger the Rule 404(b) analysis. As prior acts evidence, these stops may only be introduced for purposes other than showing the officers' propensity to violate the Fourth Amendment. See Fed. R. Evid. 402(b)(1); United States v. Vaca, 38 F.4th 718, 721 (8th Cir. 2022) (explaining “propensity evidence is out of bounds” under Rule 404(b), meaning a party cannot point to “another bad act to show that an individual is likely to do the same thing again in the future”). Additionally, even if they are proffered for a non-propensity purpose, the prior stops are admissible only if they are “(1) relevant to a material issue; (2) proved by a preponderance of the evidence; (3) higher in probative value than in prejudicial effect; and (4) similar in kind and close in time to the event at issue.” White Commc'ns, 4 F.4th at 612 (quoting Batiste-Davis v. Lincare, Inc., 526 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 2008)). Clinton argues that evidence of Steinkamp and Minnehan's prior stops will help establish the reckless disregard element of his demand for punitive damages by “reinforc[ing] that the defendants were conducting these stops in reckless disregard as to Black Iowan's rights.” Pl.'s Resist. 12, ECF No. 76. This is a propensity purpose. Clinton cannot attempt to prove that the officers acted with reckless disregard toward his own rights by using past acts to show their disposition for reckless disregard. Moreover, even if Clinton had a permissible purpose for introducing the prior stops, he has proffered only conclusory evidence to show these stops involved Fourth Amendment violations. Although Clinton would have the ability to flesh out his allegations at trial, establishing all the details necessary to make these stops relevant would cause a delay that substantially outweighs their probative value. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Defendants' motion must be SUSTAINED as to evidence of the officers' previous traffic stops. I. Character Evidence *10 Defendants request that Clinton and his witnesses be barred from testifying to their opinions about the character, integrity, or honesty of the Defendants, except as permitted by Federal Rules of Evidence 405, 607, 608, and 609. Clinton does not resist. Defendants' motion must be SUSTAINED. J. Undisclosed Medical Records and Testimony Defendants seek exclusion of any reference to medical records not disclosed by Clinton in discovery. They further request that Clinton be prohibited from eliciting testimony from any medical provider not previously disclosed. Clinton does not resist. Exclusion at trial is a proper remedy for failure to disclose relevant evidence. See Carmody v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 713 F.3d 401, 405 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The district court has discretion under Rule 37(c)(1) to apply sanctions against a party who has failed to satisfy initial or supplemental disclosure requirements; for example, excluding the evidence or testimony entirely.”). Defendants' motion must be SUSTAINED as to any medical records and medical witnesses that Clinton failed to disclose. K. Undisclosed Injuries Defendants ask the Court to prohibit Clinton from referencing any injuries or damages Clinton failed to identify in response to Defendants' discovery requests. Absent any reference to the injuries Clinton previously disclosed, Defendants' motion presents a largely unenforceable request. Nevertheless, Clinton does not resist. Defendants' motion must be SUSTAINED as to any injuries or damages Clinton failed to disclose in discovery. L. Payment for Damages Defendants request that Clinton be foreclosed from referencing the source of payment for damages awarded in this case. Clinton does not resist. Informing the jury about the source of payment for damages is improper, as it could unduly influence the size of the jury's award. Krekelberg v. City of Minneapolis, 991 F.3d 949, 959 (8th Cir. 2021) (reversing a verdict where the jury was informed any punitive damages awarded against the defendant police officers would be paid by the city); see also Griffin v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052, 1057 (8th Cir. 1986). Defendants also move to exclude any argument or evidence regarding the disparate financial statuses of the parties. Clinton contends that he is entitled to offer evidence of Defendants' financial condition in support of his claim for punitive damages. Pl.'s Mot. to Bifurcate ¶ 10, ECF No. 81. “Under federal law, evidence of a defendant's financial worth is traditionally admissible for the purpose of evaluating the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded.” United States v. Big D Enterprises, Inc., 184 F.3d 924, 932 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); accord N. Dakota Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Allen, 298 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (D.N.D. 2004). Accordingly, Defendants' motion regarding payment for damages must be SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART. Evidence regarding the Defendants' financial position may be presented during the punitive damages phase. No reference shall be made to the source of payment for the jury's award at any time during trial. M. Dismissal of Charge Defendants move to exclude speculative testimony or argument as to the reason for state prosecutors' dismissal of Clinton's criminal charge. Defendants specifically request that the Court prohibit Clinton from suggesting his criminal case was dismissed because he filed a motion to suppress. Clinton does not resist. Defendants' motion must be SUSTAINED as to speculation regarding the reason for dismissal of Clinton's criminal charge. The Court makes no ruling as to evidence regarding the fact that Clinton's criminal case was dismissed. N. Expert Testimony *11 Defendants seek to bar Clinton from introducing expert testimony as to injuries sustained outside of “the period of 15 seconds between the stop and the establishment of probable cause.” Defs.' Mot. in Limine 9, ECF No. 74. Clinton does not resist. The Court agrees that expert testimony on resolved liability issues would not be relevant. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. However, expert testimony regarding injuries arising after Clinton's initial stop cannot be excluded at this time. For the reasons discussed above, Clinton's damages are not limited to the initial moments of his stop, and Clinton is entitled to present evidence relevant to the extent of his injuries and their causal relationship to the constitutional violation in this case. Accordingly, Defendants' motion must be SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART as to expert testimony. O. Body Camera Footage Defendants seek to preclude introduction of body camera footage “not related to the stop, the establishment of probable cause, and the discovery of marijuana.” Defs.' Mot. in Limine 9, ECF No. 74. They argue that footage of “other prior searches” and “the events subsequent” to the detection of marijuana during Clinton's stop are irrelevant to the issues for trial. Clinton does not respond. Defendants' primary objection to the footage from Clinton's stop appears to be based on their unavailing argument for limiting the scope of Clinton's recovery. But as discussed, what happened after the officers smelled marijuana is relevant to the issues of causation and damages. To the extent Defendants otherwise object to introduction of footage from Clinton's stop or “other prior searches,” Defendants fail to adequately define the evidence they seek to exclude or the basis of the objection. Despite Clinton's non-resistance, the Court lacks sufficient information to enter a ruling in limine. Defendants' motion as to body camera footage must be DEFERRED. P. National Police Misconduct Defendants request that the Court prohibit any reference to police misconduct outside of Des Moines and the ongoing national dialogue regarding police reform. In particular, they seek to preclude suggestions of racial animus and use of the terms “defund the police,” “Black Lives Matter,” “Antifa,” and “Cop City.” Id. at 10. Clinton does not resist. Defendants' motion is SUSTAINED with respect to references to national police misconduct. V. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 1. Basis for the Stop Clinton requests that Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan be barred from explaining their reasons for stopping Clinton during the compensatory damages phase of trial. Clinton also requests that the officers be prohibited from testifying as to their training and beliefs about the lawfulness of temporary tag stops. Additionally, he asks the Court to exclude any testimony from Assistant County Attorney Jordan Rolling about the training he provided officers on this subject. Emphasizing that all liability questions have been resolved, Clinton contends these matters are irrelevant to his compensatory damages and pose a risk of confusing the issues. See Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403. He does not object to their presentation during the punitive damages phase of trial. Defendants respond that “the basic reason or justification for the stop” is necessary to contextualize the constitutional injury Clinton asserts and that a limiting instruction is sufficient to ensure the jury does not use the evidence to re-evaluate the officers' liability. The Court must agree. This is a case about a failure of reasonable suspicion. The officers' stated reasons for stopping Clinton are therefore inextricable from the tortious conduct for which the jury must fashion a remedy. See Mendez, 581 U.S. at 431 (explaining the proximate cause analysis depends on the relationship between “the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged”). The Court will instruct that these reasons were not constitutionally sufficient, mitigating risk of confusion. However, evidence related to the officers' own beliefs about the legality of the stop—including evidence related to their training—is relevant only to the issue of punitive damages and must not be introduced during the compensatory phase. Accordingly, Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART as to evidence related to the basis for the stop. 2. Thankless Profession *12 Clinton moves to exclude evidence and argument suggesting police work is a stressful or thankless profession. Defendants do not resist. Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED as to characterizations of police work as stressful or thankless. 3. Expectations for Damages Clinton requests that Defendants be prohibited from arguing that Clinton's demand for damages exceeds the amount he expects the jury to award. Both parties agree that Clinton's expectations are irrelevant and that argument “should be limited to what is in the record.” See Defs.' Resist. 2, ECF No. 78. Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED as to his expectations for damages. The parties must limit their argument to what award is appropriate based on the evidence presented at trial. 4. Defense Experts Clinton moves to prevent Defendants from introducing expert testimony at trial because they did not designate an expert witness in discovery. Defendants do not resist, noting they do not intend to present expert testimony. Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED as to defense experts. The Court makes no ruling as to opinion evidence by lay witnesses under Rule 701. 5. Ripple Effects of Litigation Clinton requests that Defendants be prohibited from suggesting this lawsuit and others cause “ripple effects” detrimental to society, such as by increasing insurance rates, impacting police practices, and straining government budgets. Defendants do not resist. The Court agrees these effects have no relevance to the issues for trial. Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED as to the collateral consequences of litigation. 6. Taxpayer Responsibility Clinton asks that Defendants be prevented from arguing the taxpayers will bear the ultimate burden of paying for Clinton's damages. Defendants do not resist. Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED as to argument appealing to taxpayer responsibility. 7. Clinton's Drug Use Clinton moves to exclude evidence related to his drug use, including his drug use on the day of the stop. Defendants respond that Clinton's drug use is relevant to the issue of damages. The Court must agree with Defendants. The officers extended the traffic stop and searched Clinton's vehicle because they detected the odor of marijuana. According to the summary judgment record, a THC vape pen was discovered in Clinton's possession, and Clinton admitted to smoking marijuana earlier the same day. Clinton was then arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Because Clinton's drug possession was the basis for his search and arrest, it is relevant to the proximate cause analysis that will determine Clinton's scope of recovery. This probative value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Evidence of Clinton's drug use prior to the day of the stop is not relevant to the issue of damages. Further, absent a qualifying criminal conviction, evidence of Clinton's drug use on the day of the stop is not admissible for purposes of impeaching his credibility. See United States v. Turner, 104 F.3d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Misconduct involving violations of narcotics laws is not an act involving dishonesty or untruthfulness and therefore may not be inquired into under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b).”). Thus, Clinton's motion as to drug use must be SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART. Clinton may propose limiting instructions to ensure evidence related to his use and possession of controlled substances on the day of the stop is not inappropriately considered. 8. Clinton's Employment *13 Clinton seeks to exclude as irrelevant any evidence of his employment in the cannabis industry subsequent to the events at issue. However, he concedes this evidence is relevant to the extent the Court “allows presentation of evidence regarding [Clinton's] arrest and charge for marijuana possession.” Pl.'s Reply 2, ECF No. 80. As discussed, the events transpiring after officers detected the odor of marijuana are relevant to proximate cause and compensatory damages. Clinton's motion regarding his current employment must be OVERRULED. 9. Clinton's Prior Bad Acts Clinton requests that evidence related to his “behavior, misconduct, or bad acts” prior to the stop at issue in this case be excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial. Pl.'s Mot. in Limine 6, ECF No. 75. Defendants respond that Clinton was previously convicted for theft and that evidence of this conviction is admissible to impeach Clinton's credibility. Subject to Rule 403, evidence of a criminal conviction may be used in a civil case to attack a witness's character for truthfulness if the conviction was for (1) a crime “punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year” or (2) “any crime regardless of the punishment ... if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required ... a dishonest act or false statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). Juvenile convictions are not admissible, and use of stale convictions is severely limited. See id. 609(d); United States v. Babb, 874 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 2017). Here, the parties fail to supply sufficient information for the Court to determine the admissibility of Clinton's prior conviction. Clinton's motion must be DEFERRED with respect to his conviction for theft. Due to the inherent risk of prejudice associated with a prior conviction, Defendants must make a preliminary showing of admissibility outside the presence of the jury prior to introducing evidence regarding Clinton's prior conviction. 10. Horton's Contraband and Charge Clinton moves to exclude evidence of the criminal charges against Raytavius Horton, a passenger of Clinton's who was also found in possession of contraband. Clinton argues this evidence has no relevance to damages and would serve only to smear Clinton for associating with a person engaged in criminal conduct. Defendants respond that “the acts of the other passengers go to the issue of when sufficient cause for the search and seizure developed.” Defs.' Resist. 3, ECF No. 78. Because Defendants' view of Clinton's scope of recovery is unavailing, this response falls short. Furthermore, there is no indication that Clinton was arrested or charged for Horton's contraband, and so evidence related to Horton's conduct has no bearing on proximate cause. Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED with respect to Horton's contraband and criminal charge. 11. Officers' Familiarity with Passengers Clinton similarly requests that the officers be prohibited from testifying to their familiarity with Horton and another passenger based on previous investigations into gang activity. As with Horton's charges, Defendants respond only that this information is relevant to “when sufficient cause for the search and seizure developed.” Id. For the same reasons discussed above, Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED as to evidence of the officers' familiarity with Clinton's passengers from gang investigations. 12. Defendants' Opinions about Clinton's Injuries Clinton requests that Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan be prohibited from testifying as to the nature or extent of Clinton's injuries. He argues that the officers have neither the firsthand knowledge nor medical qualifications to testify in this regard. Defendants do not resist. Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED with respect to testimony by the officers about the nature or extent Clinton's injuries. 13. Apologies *14 Clinton requests that Defendants and their counsel be forbidden from expressing apologies to Clinton in the presence of the jury. Defendants do not resist. Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED with respect to apologies. 14. Defendants' Performance Reviews Clinton moves to exclude the performance reviews of Officers Garrett, Steinkamp, and Minnehan as irrelevant, prejudicial, and improper character evidence. Defendants do not resist. Clinton's motion must be SUSTAINED with respect to the officers' performance reviews. VI. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed, Defendants' Motion in Limine, ECF No. 74, must be sustained in part and overruled in part consistent with the rulings above. Clinton's Motion in Limine, ECF No. 75, must also be sustained in part and overruled in part consistent with the rulings above. Clinton's Motion to Bifurcate, ECF No. 81, must be granted. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 15th day of March, 2023. Footnotes [1] Although the reply period for Clinton's motion to bifurcate has not yet lapsed, the Court finds no reply is necessary. L.R. 7(g). [2] See, e.g., Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining a plaintiff's failure to raise an argument in opposition to a motion for summary judgment results in a waiver of that argument); United States v. NHC Health Care Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058–59 (W.D. Mo. 2001) (finding the plaintiff abandoned certain claims by failing to address them in resistance to a motion for summary judgment). [3] The parties focus their briefing exclusively on the scope of Clinton's § 1983 claim. The Court assumes without deciding for purposes of the present motion that the scope of recovery for Clinton's state constitutional claim is commensurate with the recovery available under § 1983.