IN RE: FIDDLER'S CREEK, LLC FIDDLER'S CREEK, LLC, Plaintiff, v. NAPLES LENDING GROUP LC and DANIEL CARTER, Defendants Case No: 2:14-cv-379-FtM-29CM United States District Court, M.D. Florida Filed November 13, 2015 Counsel Carrie Stolzer Robinson, Ricardo A. Reyes, Tobin & Reyes, PA, Boca Raton, FL, Edward K. Cheffy, Naples, FL, Paul J. Battista, Genovese, Joblove & Battista, PA, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. Abbey L. Kaplan, Erin E. Bohannon, Kluger, Kaplan, Silverman, Katzen & Levine, PL, Miami, FL, Ashley Bruce Trehan, Frank Stuart Harrison, Scott Underwood, Stanley Parker, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, PC, Tampa, FL, Linda J.Z. Young, Raymond James Financial, Inc., St. Petersburg, FL, Mark C. Anderson, Anderson Law, PLLC, Fort Myers, FL, for Defendant. Mirando, Carol, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 102)[1] and Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Add Counterclaims and Third Parties (Doc. 101),[2] both filed on June 12, 2015.[3] For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted. Also before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Amend Case Management Order to: (I) Extend Discovery and Related Deadlines, (II) Reflect a Non-Jury Trial for Naples Lending Group, LC, (III) Clarify Court Direction as to Mediation, and (IV) Request for Hearing (Doc. 153). Plaintiff responded in opposition (Doc. 158). Defendants filed a Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Amend Case Management Order (Doc. 158). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion to amend is granted, and Defendants’ motion for leave to file reply is denied. Finally, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Production and Complete Response to Portions of Defendants’ Third Request for Production and Request for Hearing (Doc. 150). Plaintiff responded in opposition (Doc. 155) and also filed a Motion for Leave to File Response in Excess of Twenty Pages (Doc. 154). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to compel is taken under advisement, and Plaintiff's motion for leave to file response in excess of twenty pages is granted nunc pro tunc. I. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint Because a determination that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend its complaint may obviate the need for ruling on some or all of Defendants’ requests for relief in the motion to amend its answer and affirmative defenses, the Court first will address Plaintiff's motion. As acknowledged by both parties, Defendants only oppose Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to add prayers for punitive damages. In all other respects, therefore, Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend will be granted as unopposed.[4] *2 Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that for amendments not filed as a matter of course, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Although leave to amend shall be freely given, a motion to amend may be denied on numerous grounds such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of the Div. of Univs. of the Fla. Dep't of Educ. ex rel. Univ. of S. Fla., 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003); Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). If a proposed amendment would not survive a motion to dismiss, the motion to amend will be denied as futile. Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 2010). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked assertions” will not do. Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Plaintiff first asserts that it need not obtain leave of court or make an evidentiary proffer to claim entitlement to punitive damages, because the Florida statute requiring a proffer before pleading a claim for punitive damages conflicts with federal procedural rules. Doc. 102 at 5 (citing Deiparine v. Siemens Medical Solutions USA Inc., 2010 WL 5479653, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. 2010)). Plaintiff contends, however, that it seeks leave of Court to add punitive damages out of an abundance of caution. Defendants, in turn, contend that the proposed amendment to include punitive damages is futile, and the motion to amend was filed after undue delay and therefore should be denied. Doc. 121 at 6. Specifically, Defendants argue that the conduct alleged by Plaintiff fails to rise to the level of conduct warranting punitive damages under Florida law. Id. at 7. Finally, Defendants contend that the statements and actions giving rise to the claims for which Plaintiff intends to seek punitive damages are protected by Florida's litigation privilege, as they occurred during the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Under Florida law, a plaintiff is precluded from asserting claims for punitive damages unless record evidence or a proffer by the plaintiff establish a reasonable basis for recovery of punitive damages. Fla. Stat. § 768.72(1). The statute explicitly permits amendments to assert claims for punitive damages. Id. Accordingly, because this case originally was filed in state court, Plaintiff could not immediately have pled punitive damages, but reserved the right to amend at a later date to include such claims for punitive damages. By contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit, but do not require, a plaintiff to assert all claims for relief to satisfy basic pleading standards. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) (to state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain “a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief”). Where a state law conflicts with a federal procedural rule, as section 768.72 conflicts with Rule 8, the federal rule prevails. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Addressing this very issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit previously determined that section 768.72, Florida Statutes, conflicts with Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and therefore federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the standard set forth in Rule 8. See Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Our application of Hanna leads us to conclude that the pleading component of § 768.72 does not apply ... due to its conflict with Rule 8(a)(3). For that reason, we hold that the pleading requirements of Florida Statues § 768.72 are inapplicable in federal diversity cases.”), vacated in part on other grounds on reh'g by 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000). The Court therefore agrees with Plaintiff that leave of Court ordinarily is not required to assert claims for punitive damages in federal diversity cases. Because Plaintiff seeks to amend its complaint, however, the Court still must review the proposed second amended complaint to determine whether amendment would be futile, as Defendants contend. *3 Florida law allows claims for punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference and constructive fraud. See, e.g., Mgmt. Health. Sys., Inc. v. Access Therapies, Inc., No. 10-61792-CIV, 2010 WL 5572832, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2010) (plaintiff could seek punitive damages on tortious interference claims); Laney v. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (noting that Florida courts have held that breach of fiduciary duty supports punitive damages); Palm Beach Atlantic College, Inc. v. First United Fund, Ltd., 928 F.2d 1538, 1546 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[U]nder Florida law, an award of punitive damages is proper when a defendant's conduct is characterized by willfulness, wantonness, maliciousness, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, outrageous conduct, deliberate violence, moral turpitude, insult, or fraud.” (quotation marks omitted)). To sufficiently state a claim of punitive damages, however, a plaintiff must allege specific acts rather than mere conclusory allegations. Deiparine, 2010 WL 5479653, at 4-5. Thus, whether Plaintiff's proposed amendment to include punitive damages is futile in this case depends on whether Plaintiff has alleged such specific acts. Upon review of Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint and the relevant pleadings, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has asserted more than mere conclusory allegations in support of its claims for punitive damages. Unless amendment would be too prejudicial or some other circumstance renders the proposed amendment unjust, the Court concludes that Plaintiff should be allowed to amend its complaint to include claims for punitive damages. Defendants assert that, even if punitive damages are available and sufficiently pled, Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend should be denied as unduly prejudicial and barred by Florida's litigation privilege. As an initial matter, Defendants’ arguments with respect to prejudice are not well-taken, given that Defendants oppose amendment as prejudicial yet make the same arguments as to why amendment is not prejudicial in their motion to amend their answers and affirmative defenses. Cf. Doc. 102 at 7 (Plaintiff asserting amendment will not prejudice Defendants because discovery does not close in this matter until December 31, 2015; the scope of discovery is unlikely to be altered by amendment; and Defendants have been on notice that Plaintiff intended to seek punitive damages since the inception of this case, yet Plaintiff was prohibited from doing so while the case remained in state court) with Doc. 101 at 10-11 (Defendants asserting amendment including counterclaims will not prejudice Plaintiff because “the issues being litigated are not new to this matter” and have already been the subject of discovery, and the discovery deadline does not occur until December 31, 2015). Thus, the Court finds that the timely request to amend is not unduly prejudicial. As to whether Florida's litigation privilege applies to preclude amendment in this case, the Court concludes it does not. As Plaintiff correctly contends, not every action related to litigation is protected. Doc. 139 at 9 (citing North Star Capital Acquisitions, LLC v. Krig, 611 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1329-32 (M.D. Fla. 2009)). Instead, “[t]he litigation privilege in Florida provides all persons involved in judicial proceedings, including parties and counsel, an absolute privilege from civil liability for acts taken in relation to those proceedings.” North Star, 611 F.Supp.2d at 1329; see also Levin, 639 So.2d at 608 (“The immunity afforded to statements made during the course of a judicial proceeding extends not only to the parties in a proceeding, but to judges, witnesses, and counsel as well.”). Litigation privilege is an affirmative defense. Id. (citing Am. Nat'l Title & Escrow of Fla., Inc. v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 810 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). Here, however, Defendants were not parties, counsel, or witnesses in the Chapter 11 proceedings, as acknowledged by Judge May upon Defendants’ first attempt to assert litigation privilege, which he rejected. Doc. 139 at 9-10. *4 Thus, because the Court finds that the parties’ positions with respect to amendment are not a surprise; and both parties contend the other party will not be prejudiced if the Court permits amendment, but will be greatly prejudiced if amendment is denied, Plaintiff will be permitted to amend its complaint. Upon the filing of the amended complaint, Defendant may file its amended answers and affirmative defenses within the time ordinarily prescribed for doing so. II. Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Add Counterclaims and Third Parties Because the Court finds that Plaintiff should be permitted to further amend its complaint, Defendants will be permitted to file an amended answer and affirmative defenses within the time ordinarily permitted for filing such responses. Defendants also will be permitted to add counterclaims and third-parties. Defendants seek leave to assert a counterclaim for breach of contract against Plaintiff “for failure to provide confidential information as contemplated by the relevant confidentiality agreement and the parties’ understanding of that agreement.” Doc. 101 at 3. Defendants also seeks leave to amend to add a counterclaim for fraudulent inducement against Plaintiff. Doc. 101 at 7. Additionally, Defendants seek to add claims against Aubrey Ferrao (“Ferrao”), Plaintiff's sole equity holder, President and Manager, Anthony DiNardo (“DiNardo”), Plaintiff's chief financial officer and Vice President, and William Reagan (“Reagan”), an agent for Ferrao and DiNardo. Id. at 3, 4, 6-7. As mentioned above, Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Although leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, a motion to amend may be denied on numerous grounds such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the [plaintiff], and futility of the amendment.” Maynard, 342 F.3d at 1287 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendants argue that leave to amend its answer and to assert a counterclaim should be granted “because the issues being litigated will not be new to this matter and have already been the focus of much of the written and oral discovery to date.” Doc. 101 at 10. Specifically, Defendants state that the counterclaim for breach of the confidentiality agreement was raised as an affirmative defense in Defendants’ Answer and Affirmative Defenses in the Bankruptcy proceeding (8:11-ap-522-KRM, Bankr., M.D. Fla., Doc. 37). Id. at 9-10. Therefore, Plaintiff was aware of the claim and able to focus its discovery. Id. at 10. Defendants now also seek to add Ferrao, DiNardo and Reagan as third-parties because Defendants allege that they recently discovered that Ferrao, DiNardo and Reagan made direct misrepresentations and material omissions during their interactions with Defendants in relation to the execution of the confidentiality agreement. Id. at 7. Accordingly, Defendants request leave to add claims for fraudulent inducement, aiding and abetting a fraudulent inducement, and conspiracy to fraudulently induce. Id. Defendants contend that good cause exists to allow for amendment. Doc. 101 at 11. Defendants also state that Plaintiff and the third-parties would not be prejudiced because there is ample time remaining in discovery for Plaintiff and the third-parties to address the counterclaims. Id. Conversely, Defendants argue that they would suffer prejudice should the request be denied. Id. *5 Plaintiff responds that it would be highly prejudicial to allow Defendants to amend given their undue delay in seeking leave to amend. Doc. 120 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were aware or should have been aware long ago of the facts giving rise to its counterclaims, third party claims and affirmative defenses. Id. at 8. Moreover, significant discovery has been taken in this action, and Plaintiff and the third-parties would be prejudiced due to the increase in the scope of necessary discovery with the discovery cut-off in this action set for December 31, 2015. Id. at 12. The Court notes that the Defendants filed a Motion to Amend the Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. 153). Defendants seek to extend the discovery deadlines and any remaining deadlines by four (4) months. Doc. 153 at 1. Plaintiff does not contest the extension of the discovery deadlines. Doc. 156 at 1. Additionally, the parties provided the Court, via email, an agreed proposed order with the requested extensions. In light of the agreed extensions, the Court finds that any prejudice to Plaintiff due to Defendants’ amendments to add counterclaims and third-parties will be minimized by extending the deadlines for the parties to complete discovery. Accordingly, the Court will extend the deadlines in the Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. 98) by four (4) months. Plaintiff also argue that Defendants request for leave to add third-parties should be denied because under Rule 14(a), “[a] defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons or complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.” Doc. 120 at 3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Plaintiff states that the proposed Third Party Complaint does not set forth claims in which Ferrao, DiNardo or Reagan would be liable for all or part of the damages that Plaintiff may obtain against Defendants. Id. at 5. Defendants clarify that they are not seeking to assert claims for indemnification, subrogation, or contribution under Rule 14. Doc. 135 at 4. Rather, they are moving under Rule 15, which allows a party to amend pleadings, and Rule 20, which permits a party to join third-parties as defendants if “ ‘any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions.’ ” Doc. 101 at 11 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)); Doc. 135 at 4. “If it is shown that a claim arising out of the same series of occurrences as a claim already brought, and the claims present common questions of law or fact, addition of a party is permissible under the rule.” City of Tampa v. Fourth Tug/Barge Corp., 163 F.R.D. 622, 624 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Moore v. Comfed Sav. Bank, 908 F.2d 834, 839 (11th Cir. 1990)). The Court has discretion to allow joinder of parties. Barber v. America's Wholesale Lender, 289 F.R.D. 364, 366-67 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (citing Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000)). Here, the Court finds that Defendants claims against the third-parties arise out of the same series of occurrences already brought and thus are permissible under the rule. Additionally, upon review of the proposed amendments, the Court finds that amendments would not be futile as Defendants has asserted a good faith basis for the amendments. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion. III. Motion to Amend Case Management Order to: (I) Extend Discovery and Related Deadlines, (II) Reflect a Non-Jury Trial for Naples Lending Group, LC, (III) Clarify the Court Direction as to Mediation, and (IV) Request for Hearing *6 Defendants seek leave to amend the Case Management and Scheduling Order. Doc. 153. As discussed above, the Court will grant the parties’ request to amend the discovery and remaining deadlines by four (4) months. Defendants also filed a Motion for Leave to File Brief Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Amend Case Management Order (Doc. 158). The Court finds that a reply is not necessary. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is denied. Defendants also request clarification that there will be a jury trial as to Defendant Carter and a non-jury trial as to Naples Lending Group. Id. at 13. Defendant Carter states that if it would be helpful toward facilitating an extension and accommodating the Court's calendar, he will waive his right to jury trial so the entire case would be non-jury. Id. Plaintiff opposes Defendant Carter's request for a non-jury trial. Doc. 156 at 15-16. Plaintiff states that it sought a jury trial on all issues so triable. Id. at 16. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Carter argued in favor of jury trial on those claims against him. Id. Plaintiff does not consent to Defendant Carter's offer to withdraw his jury trial demand. “A proper [jury trial] demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d). Because Plaintiff does not consent to the withdrawal, the claims against Defendant Carter will be tried by jury. Defendants also seek clarification as to whether the mediation deadline reflected in the Case Management and Scheduling Order was a directive to the parties to conduct mediation or whether this deadline merely reflects the parties’ previous mediation with no additional directive to mediate in-person again. Doc. 153 at 14. The Case Management and Scheduling Order in this case is a directive for the parties to mediate this case in-person now that the case is in this Court. The Court also will extend the mediation deadline along with the remaining deadlines in the schedule to allow ample time for the parties to complete the mediation. Additionally, pursuant to the parties’ proposed agreed order, submitted via email, Plaintiff is permitted to substitute Paul S. Singerman for Roberta Colton (“Colton”) as an expert witness, without prejudice to any challenges regarding the expert report of Mr. Singerman, other than a challenge regarding his substitution, the deadlines set forth herein or any stipulations between Plaintiff and Defendants in connection herewith. Mr. Singerman may issue his own expert report; provided, however, that to the extent Mr. Singerman's report contains a total damage amount which exceeds the total damages in the expert report of Colton (the “Colton Report”), or Mr. Singerman's report is not consistent with the theories of liability, including substantive pleadings and hearings, relied upon by Colton in the Colton Report with regard to damages caused by Defendants, then such portions of Mr. Singerman's report and his related testimony shall not be admissible or otherwise utilized by Plaintiff to the extent of such excess damages or inconsistency in theories of liability. For avoidance of doubt, Mr. Singerman's report shall not be a supplement to the Colton Report. Mr. Singerman shall not be subject to responding to Defendants’ discovery until after January 4, 2016. IV. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Production and Complete Response to Portions of Defendants’ Third Request for Production and Request for Hearing *7 Defendants seek resolutions to Plaintiff's objections to Defendants’ Third Request for Production. Doc. 150 at 3. Plaintiff states that the scope of relevant discovery may be altered by the Court's rulings on the parties’ motions to leave to amend their pleadings. Because the Court is allowing Plaintiff to amend its Complaint and Defendants to amend their answer and assert counterclaims, the Court will take the motion to compel under advisement and directs the parties to update the Court as to the remaining scope of the motion in light of the ruling allowing amendments to the pleadings. The parties shall have up to and including November 30, 2015 to provide the Court with an update as to whether the parties were able to resolve or narrow the issues raised. The parties are encouraged to meet and confer in an effort to resolve the issues raised in the motion. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Response in Excess of Twenty Pages. Doc. 154. Plaintiff seeks leave to file a response not to exceed 25 pages to Defendants’ Motion to Compel. Id. at 2. Plaintiff filed a 21-page response (Doc. 155) prior to the Court's ruling on its motion to exceed the page limit. The Court finds good cause to allow the excess pages. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is granted nunc pro tunc. ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 102) is GRANTED. 2. The Clerk is directed to docket Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 102-1) as a separate docket entry. 3. Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Add Counterclaims and Third Parties (Doc. 101) is GRANTED. Defendants may file their amended answers and affirmative defenses within the time ordinarily prescribed for doing so. Defendants also may add their counterclaims and third-parties at that time. 4. Defendants’ Motion to Amend Case Management Order to: (I) Extend Discovery and Related Deadlines, (II) Reflect a Non-Jury Trial for Naples Lending Group, LC, (III) Clarify the Court Direction as to Mediation, and (IV) Request for Hearing (Doc. 153) is GRANTED. 5. Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Brief Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Amend Case Management Order (Doc. 158) is DENIED. 6. An Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order will be issued by separate Order. The Scheduling Order will reflect a jury trial as to Defendant Carter and a non-jury trial as to Defendant Naples Lending Group. All other deadlines and directives in the Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. 98) remain unchanged. 7. The parties are directed to conduct an in-person mediation in accordance with the directives in the original Case Management and Scheduling Order. 8. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Production and Complete Response to Portions of Defendant's Third Request for Production and Request for Hearing (Doc 150) is TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. The parties shall have up to and including November 30, 2015 to provide the Court with an update as to whether the parties were able to resolve or narrow the issues raised in the motion. 9. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Response in Excess of Twenty Pages (Doc. 154) is GRANTED nunc pro tunc. 10. The telephonic Status Conference scheduled for November 17, 2015 at 3:00p.m. is cancelled.[5] DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 13th day of November, 2015. Footnotes [1] Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Doc. 121) and, with leave of Court, Doc. 134, Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 139). Plaintiff also was permitted to file an unredacted copy of its Reply under seal, which the Court has reviewed. See Doc. 144. [2] Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Add Counterclaims and Third Parties (Doc. 120), and, with leave of Court (Doc. 130), Defendants filed a Reply Brief Regarding its Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Add Counterclaims and Third Parties (Doc. 135). [3] The deadline for motions to add parties or amend pleadings under the operative Case Management and Scheduling Order. See Doc. 98. [4] Plaintiff also seeks to dismiss the John Doe Defendants and claims of conspiracy and for injunctive relief. Plaintiff's certification pursuant to Local Rule 3.01(g) states that Defendants do not oppose these requests. See Doc. 102 at 3 ¶ 8. [5] Counsel for the parties also called Chambers indicating a conflict with the scheduled status conference. Should the parties need a status conference in the future, the parties may call Chambers or file a request with the Court.