DECURTIS LLC, Plaintiff, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Defendant. Carnival Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Decurtis Corporation and DeCurtis LLC, Defendants Case No. 20-22945-Civ-SCOLA/TORRES United States District Court, S.D. Florida Signed June 17, 2021 Counsel Jared Kneitel, Pro Hac Vice, Wuinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Seattle, WA, Jason Paul Stearns, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Tampa, FL, Jeffrey C. Wu, Pro Hac Vice, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Salt Lake City, UT, Martha Anne Leibell, FL, Adam Louis Schwartz, Antonio M. Hernandez, Jr., Homer Bonner Jacobs, P.A., Miami, FL, Brian John Lechich, Miami, FL, John F. O'Sullivan, Quinn Emanuel, Miami, FL, Allison Penfield, Pro Hac Vice, Daniel J. Klein, Pro Hac Vice, Jennifer H. Wu, Pro Hac Vice, Kyle N. Bersani, Pro Hac Vice, Nicholas Groombridge, Pro Hac Vice, Groombridge, Wu, Baughman & Stone LLP, New York, NY, Andrew K. Glenn, Pro Hac Vice, Edward E. Shapiro, Pro Hac Vice, Lindsey R. Skibell, Pro Hac Vice, Lyn R. Agre, Pro Hac Vice, Michael P. Bowen, Pro Hac Vice, Tian Gao, Pro Hac Vice, Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes LLP, New York, NY, Andrew C. Nordahl, Pro Hac Vice, David C. Gustman, Pro Hac Vice, Jeffery M. Cross, Pro Hac Vice, Jennifer L. Fitzgerald, Pro Hac Vice, Jill C. Anderson, Pro Hac Vice, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Chicago, IL, Marc L. Kaplan, Pro Hac Vice, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Chicago, IL, Christopher A. Mathews, Pro Hac Vice, Justin C. Griffin, Pro Hac Vice, Patrick T. Schmidt, Pro Hac Vice, Scott L. Watson, Pro Hac Vice, Zachary A. Schenkkan, Pro Hac Vice, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, James D. Judah, Pro Hac Vice, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, San Francisco, CA, Saurabh Gupta, Pro Hac Vice, Groombridge, Wu, Baughman & Stone LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff DeCurtis LLC. Jared Kneitel, Pro Hac Vice, Wuinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Seattle, WA, Jason Paul Stearns, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Tampa, FL, Jeffrey C. Wu, Pro Hac Vice, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Salt Lake City, UT, Martha Anne Leibell, FL, Brian John Lechich, Miami, FL, John F. O'Sullivan, Quinn Emanuel Miami, FL, Jorge Tadeo Espinosa, GrayRobinson.com, Miami, FL, Adam Louis Schwartz, Antonio M. Hernandez, Jr., Homer Bonner Jacobs, P.A., Miami, FL, Allison Penfield, Pro Hac Vice, Daniel J. Klein, Pro Hac Vice, Jennifer H. Wu, Pro Hac Vice, Kyle N. Bersani, Pro Hac Vice, Nicholas Groombridge, Pro Hac Vice, Groombridge, Wu, Baughman & Stone LLP, New York, NY, Andrew K. Glenn, Pro Hac Vice, Edward E. Shapiro, Pro Hac Vice, Lindsey R. Skibell, Pro Hac Vice, Lyn R. Agre, Pro Hac Vice, Michael P. Bowen, Pro Hac Vice, Tian Gao, Pro Hac Vice, Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes LLP, New York, NY, Andrew C. Nordahl, Pro Hac Vice, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Chicago, IL, Jason White, Pro Hac Vice, Karon Fowler, Pro Hac Vice, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Chicago, IL, Julie S. Goldemberg, Pro Hac Vice, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Saurabh Gupta, Pro Hac Vice, Groombridge, Wu, Baughman & Stone LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant DeCurtis LLC. Diana Marie Fassbender, Orrick, Washington, DC, Eileen M. Cole, Pro Hac Vice, Emily Luken, Pro Hac Vice, John Jurata, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Steven J. Routh, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Washington, DC, Jorge Tadeo Espinosa, GrayRobinson.com, Miami, FL, Olivia Clements, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York, NY, Robert Ralph Jimenez, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Coral Gables, FL, Robert L. Uriarte, Tammy Su, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Menlo Park, CA, David R. Medina, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Johannes Hsu, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Irvine, CA, Laura B. Najemy, Pro Hac Vice, Sheryl K. Garko, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Boston, MA, T. Vann Pearce, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Washington, for Plaintiff Carnival Corporation. Diana Marie Fassbender, Orrick, Washington, DC, Eileen M. Cole, Pro Hac Vice, Emily Luken, Pro Hac Vice, John Jurata, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Steven J. Routh, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Washington, DC, Jorge Tadeo Espinosa, GrayRobinson.com, Miami, FL, Mayanne Downs, GrayRobinson, P.A., Orlando, FL, Olivia Clements, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York, NY, Robert Ralph Jimenez, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Coral Gables, FL, Tammy Su, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Menlo Park, CA, David R. Medina, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Johannes Hsu, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Irvine, CA, Laura B. Najemy, Pro Hac Vice, Sheryl K. Garko, Pro Hac Vice, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Boston, MA, T. Vann Pearce, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Washington, for Defendant Carnival Corporation. Jason Paul Stearns, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Tampa, FL, Martha Anne Leibell, FL, Brian John Lechich, Miami, FL, John F. O'Sullivan, Quinn Emanuel, Miami, FL, Jorge Tadeo Espinosa, GrayRobinson.com, Miami, FL, Adam Louis Schwartz, Antonio M. Hernandez, Jr., Homer Bonner Jacobs, P.A., Miami, FL, Allison Penfield, Pro Hac Vice, Daniel J. Klein, Pro Hac Vice, Jennifer H. Wu, Pro Hac Vice, Kyle N. Bersani, Pro Hac Vice, Nicholas Groombridge, Pro Hac Vice, Groombridge, Wu, Baughman & Stone LLP, New York, NY, Andrew K. Glenn, Pro Hac Vice, Edward E. Shapiro, Pro Hac Vice, Lindsey R. Skibell, Pro Hac Vice, Lyn R. Agre, Pro Hac Vice, Michael P. Bowen, Pro Hac Vice, Tian Gao, Pro Hac Vice, Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes LLP, New York, NY, Andrew C. Nordahl, Pro Hac Vice, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Chicago, IL, Jason White, Pro Hac Vice, Karon Fowler, Pro Hac Vice, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Chicago, IL, Julie S. Goldemberg, Pro Hac Vice, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Saurabh Gupta, Pro Hac Vice, Groombridge, Wu, Baughman & Stone LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant DeCurtis Corporation. Torres, Edwin G., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS TO COMPEL *1 This matter is before the Court on DeCurtis, LLC's and DeCurtis Corporation's (collectively, “DeCurtis”) and Carnival Corporation's cross-motions to compel. [D.E. 148, 158-1]. Each party filed an expedited response on April 30, 2021. [D.E. 153-54]. Therefore, the motions are now ripe for disposition. After careful consideration of the motions, responses, relevant authorities, and for the reasons discussed below, the motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.1 I. ANALYSIS On April 9, 2021, the parties appeared before the undersigned to resolve pending discovery disputes. The Court gave each party leave to file a supplemental motion on the docket and both parties presented memorandums with requests that the Court compel certain productions or otherwise sustain or overrule the opposing party's objections. We consider each motion in turn. A. Carnival's Motion to Compel [D.E. 148] Carnival seeks to overrule DeCurtis's discovery objections and to compel it to produce several categories of documents by no later than May 31, 2021. Carnival says that DeCurtis has withheld documents for too long and that that the failure to produce items has led to the staying of case deadlines and the postponement of mediation. Carnival is now concerned that DeCurtis seeks to take advantage of these delays in proceedings before the Patent Office and that the parties are in danger of falling short of a fact discovery deadline currently set for July 12, 2021. Either way, Carnival claims that, following the disposition of the pending motions to dismiss, there is no need to delay discovery any further and it requests that the Court compel DeCurtis to produce at least five categories of information that remain outstanding. DeCurtis opposes Carnival's motion because Carnival is attempting to rewrite both the procedural history of this case and the Court's disposition of the parties’ motions to dismiss. DeCurtis says that Carnival is responsible for the discovery logjam thus far and that Carnival's motion should either be denied as moot based on an agreement to produce the items requested or denied as overbroad or unduly burdensome. DeCurtis also opposes Carnival's proposed modification to the case schedule because it deviates significantly from the Patent Rules and the revised deadlines are either illogical or inconsistent. DeCurtis proposes an alternative schedule that better fits the needs of this case and asks that the Court deny Carnival's motion to compel in all respects. (1) Technical Documents and Source Code Information Carnival's first request takes aim at DeCurtis's refusal to produce technical documents and source code information. Carnival complains that DeCurtis has violated the Patent Rules and that the refusal to produce these documents has significantly derailed this case. Carnival says that, without these documents, it has been unable to obtain the discovery it needs for depositions, expert discovery and trial, and that there is no reason these documents should be withheld. *2 Carnival's motion is well taken because there is no longer any objection to the production of these documents after Judge Scola dismissed Carnival's trade secret claims with prejudice. DeCurtis makes that concession clear in its response when it asserts that it will no longer object to the production of these documents and will serve Carnival with these items on or before May 14, 2021. Given that DeCurtis has agreed to produce these documents on or prior to May 14, Carnival's motion to compel these items is GRANTED.2 If DeCurtis has not already produced these documents, it must do so within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. (2) DeCurtis's Communications with NCL and Virgin Carnival's second request is for DeCurtis to produce certain communications with its customers, Norwegian Cruise Lines (“NCL”) and Virgin Voyages (“Virgin”). Carnival claims that the reason DeCurtis refuses to produce these documents is because the latter believes Carnival failed to disclose information on its trade secrets. But, Carnival says that these communications are directly relevant to the claims of both parties and that there is no compelling reason to delay this production any further. [D.E. 87 at ¶ 2 (“DeCurtis LLC further seeks a declaration of non-infringement as to whether the DeCurtis Experience Platform and associated technology that DeCurtis LLC has implemented for its customers Virgin Cruise Intermediate Limited, Inc. (“Virgin”) and Norwegian Cruise Line (“NCL”) the “DXP System”) infringes”); D.E. 88 at ¶ 150 (“DeCurtis has contracted with its customers, including Virgin and NCL, to provide and maintain systems that infringe the ’184 Patent.”)]. Since these communications are relevant to several causes of action – including the patent, tortious interference, unfair competition, and antitrust claims – Carnival asks that the Court compel DeCurtis to produce these documents. DeCurtis's only response is that it agrees “to provide discovery regarding customers of the accused DXP Systems[.]” [D.E. 154 at 8]. DeCurtis also suggests elsewhere in its response that Carnival's demands are now moot. It is thus unclear if DeCurtis has already produced the requested documents or if these items are forthcoming. Either way, Carnival's requests are relevant and there is no reason to delay their production. As a result, Carnival's motion to compel is GRANTED and, to the extent DeCurtis has not already done so, it shall produce the requested communications within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. (3) Advertising and Marketing Materials The third issue is whether DeCurtis should be compelled to respond to discovery requests seeking information on the “identification of Carnival or use of Carnival's names, marks, codes, drawings, specification, or other reference to Carnival” in DeCurtis's “advertising, marketing, or promotional activities,” and any of “DeCurtis’[s] advertising, marketing, or promotional materials that refer to Carnival, Carnival's Ocean® Platform, or Carnival's OceanMedallion™, or to any of Carnival's code, drawings, specification, or to xIOT,” including “all documents and communications discussing Carnival, Carnival's Ocean® Platform, or Carnival's OceanMedallion™.” [D.E. 148 at 8-9]. Carnival explains that these requests are relevant to its breach of contract claims because the parties’ master services agreement (the “MSA”) forbids DeCurtis's unauthorized use of Carnival's names or marks. Carnival also adds that that these items are relevant to its infringement claims since the documents could show that DeCurtis disclosed or misused Carnival's confidential or proprietary information. *3 Carnival's argument is well-founded because, in response to the relevant discovery requests seeking this information (i.e. Request Nos. 3 and 64), DeCurtis's refusal to provide these materials was based primarily on the need for a Protective Order and Carnival's failure to identify its alleged trade secrets with reasonable particularity. [D.E. 148-5, 148-7]. But, neither of these objections is compelling given the procedural posture of this case, the recent dismissal of Carnival's trade secret claims, and the stipulated Protective Order reached between the parties. [D.E. 141]. The same reasoning applies to Request No. 28 and Interrogatory No. 12 because DeCurtis did not make a trade secrets objection and instead agreed to respond and produce documents. [D.E. 148-5, 148-6]. However, despite agreeing to the production of these items, there is nothing in the record that shows any compliance and Carnival served these requests many months ago. Carnival's motion to compel is therefore GRANTED as to the advertising and marketing materials and DeCurtis shall complete any production of these items within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. (4) Interrogatory No. 11 The next issue is whether the Court should compel DeCurtis to supplement a response to Interrogatory No. 11: Describe in as much detail as possible [of DeCurtis's] development of the Relevant Systems, including the date on which development began, any prototypes of the Relevant Systems, the circumstances surrounding development, the documents and materials used in any way in the development of the Relevant Systems, and the Persons involved in this development. [D.E. 148 at 15]. Carnival claims that, during the parties’ meet and confer, DeCurtis agreed to respond to this interrogatory with a production of documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). But instead of citing or producing any documents, Carnival says that DeCurtis amended its response and stated that it would make available for inspection the source code for the relevant guest engagement systems. Carnival argues that this response is insufficient because no production has since been made and that – if DeCurtis chooses to respond by identifying documents or the source code – then it must do so with enough specificity to satisfy Rule 33(d). DeCurtis never provides a specific response in connection with interrogatory No. 11. It only suggests that the issue is moot because it “will be producing documents and supplementing its interrogatory responses consistent with its objections and responses[.]”. [D.E. 154 at 2.]. DeCurtis also adds that it hired contract attorneys to review large volumes of electronically stored information and that it will review these documents for responsiveness and privilege as quickly as possible. DeCurtis notes, however, that it does not anticipate this review to be completed by the end of May and that it would be an undue burden to do so. While Carnival is entitled to the discovery requested, DeCurtis might have legitimate concerns that a production by the end of May 2021 is too aggressive of a timeframe to review an extraordinarily large volume of documents. DeCurtis never makes clear, however, how many documents might be needed to provide an adequate response to Interrogatory No. 11 and when the contract attorneys might otherwise complete their review. That uncertainty cannot continue because, absent a continuation of the discovery cutoff, the deadlines in this case are fast-approaching and it has become increasingly clear that the parties need a well-defined structure to move this case to final disposition. We will therefore require DeCurtis to amend Interrogatory No. 11 within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. If this timeframe becomes impracticable, DeCurtis may seek an extension or an agreement with Carnival, but any request must be supported with good cause and a specific date for the production to be completed. To this extent, Carnival's motion to compel an amended response to Interrogatory No. 11 is GRANTED. (5) Objections to the DXP System The following issues look to whether DeCurtis has made proper objections to Carnival's discovery requests that relate to the DXP system. DeCurtis alleges, in its first amended complaint, that it “has marketed the DXP System to cruise lines that are competitors of Carnival,” and that Carnival interfered with DeCurtis “contractual and business relationships.” [D.E. 87 at ¶¶ 39, 106]. Based on this allegation, Carnival says that it should be entitled to explore the identity of DeCurtis's customers and other related products, but that DeCurtis refuses to produce any discovery or even identify any other company that is unrelated to NCL and Virgin. Carnival complains that this dispute arises in two different respects and we consider each in turn. *4 The first dispute concerns Carnival's request for information on DeCurtis's products and systems that use “Bluetooth Low Energy” (“BLE”) technology and “location services.” Carnival accuses DeCurtis of failing to produce any responsive documents in connection with these terms because the discovery requests are vague and ambiguous. Carnival complains that DeCurtis's argument has no merit because it clearly understands the meaning of these terms and points to DeCurtis's website where it markets the DXP System. Carnival claims that, when DeCurtis describes the DXP System online, it poses the question – “[w]hat is Bluetooth Low Energy?” – and answers it with the following response. A BLE is a wireless personal area network technology designed specifically for short-ranged communication. A DeCurtis BLE Module contains industry changing technology for the location and proximity market. Unlike any other reader on the market, ours can read hundreds of beacons per second proving specific location, not just relative proximity information, which allows businesses to improve the guest experience in various ways. [D.E. 148 at 17]. Carnival also accuses DeCurtis of using the terms “location engine” and “location services” on its online website but then refusing to produce any discovery based on a vagueness objection when DeCurtis knows full well the definition of its own products. Given the unmistakable meaning of these terms, Carnival asks that DeCurtis be compelled to respond with the same definitions that it applies to its own marketing materials. Discovery requests generally require an opposing party to exercise reason and common sense when interpreting the meaning of everyday words. See Ward v. Nierlich, 2005 WL 8157752, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2005) (“The law is clear that ‘a party responding to discovery requests should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized in interrogatories.’ ”) (citation omitted). The problem here is that none of the terms that Carnival identifies include a commonsense definition that is susceptible to only one meaning. See id. (“Lead Defendants claim that the words ‘venture,’ formal/informal, ‘business interest,’ and ‘inflated,’ to name just a few, are vague and/or ambiguous is without merit. The above-referenced words, and many more, are clearly capable of understanding and the interrogatories employing same must be answered.”). Instead, these are highly technical terms that must be carefully defined. Carnival assumes that DeCurtis knows the meaning of these terms because the latter uses them on its website and presents a vagueness objection that is tantamount to gamesmanship. But, even if DeCurtis has a separate understanding of what these terms mean, it is unclear why that same definition should apply for the discovery requests that Carnival drafted. If Carnival wanted DeCurtis to adopt the same definitions, Carnival should have made that clear in its discovery requests especially where, as here, the difference in the definition of a technical term can lead to a dramatically different outcome in the pool of documents that might be responsive. Carnival is thus not blameless for DeCurtis interpreting these terms differently because it had every opportunity to define these terms but failed to do so. The motion to compel is therefore DENIED because, given the technical nature of the definitions in Carnival's requests, DeCurtis cannot be tasked with guessing the meaning of these terms. To the extent there is time allowed under the Court's case schedule, Carnival may re-serve these requests with the specific definitions it seeks to apply.3 *5 The second dispute is whether DeCurtis should be compelled to respond to discovery requests (1) that seek information on “reasonably similar” products to the DXP System and (2) actual or potential customers. Carnival claims that DeCurtis has limited its discovery responses solely to the DXP System and two customers, NCL and Virgin. Carnival says this is untenable because DeCurtis's own allegations show that it provided the DXP System to third parties. Carnival also accuses DeCurtis of using the discovery process as a sword and a shield because – while DeCurtis wants to limit requests to two specific customers and the DXP System – DeCurtis seeks damages for Carnival's intrusion into its business relationships. Carnival claims that this is not allowed because, when a party alleges tortious interference, there is an obligation to identify the relationships that the opposing party harmed. See Maxi-Taxi of Fla., Inc. v. Lee Cty. Port Auth., 2008 WL 1925088, at *13 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2008) (“[A] claim of tortious interference with a business relationship claim requires proof of an existing relationship with identifiable and specific customers.”). Hence, Carnival reasons that DeCurtis cannot bring a claim for tortious interference and seek damages for harm caused to third-party relationships and, at the same time, refuse to identify the third parties. Carnival also says that its patent infringement contentions are not limited to the DXP System sold to NCL and Virgin and that the accused instrumentalities contemplate other guest engagement systems sold to third-party customers: For every claim identified in the section above, Carnival identifies as accused instrumentalities (a) the DeCurtis Experience Platform and associated technology (also known, collectively, as the “DXP System”) that DeCurtis has implemented for and licensed to Virgin Cruises Intermediate Limited Inc. d/b/a Virgin Voyages (“Virgin”) and Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd. (“NCL”); (b) guest engagement systems made, used, sold, offered for sale, and/or imported by Virgin, NCL, and/or other DeCurtis customers which use some or all of the DXP System (including, but not necessarily limited to, (i) the device marked by Virgin as “the Band” along with devices and systems with which “the Band” operates and (ii) the systems and devices marketed as “Cruise Freedom” by NCL); (c) hardware, software, and/or firmware components of (a) and (b); and (d) all systems, devices, and methods, regardless of how named, that are reasonably similar to any of (a)-(c). The foregoing are referred to herein collectively as the “Accusted Instrumentalities.” [D.E. 148-16 (emphasis added). Carnival further claims that Rule 26 favors broad discovery because only DeCurtis knows whether there are other systems that might be closely related to the DXP System. See, e.g., Panavision Imaging, LLC v. OmniVision Techs., Inc., 2010 WL 11507883, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2010) (affirming a magistrate judge's order compelling a defendant to produce discovery “in light of the fact that the information that Plaintiff seeks to discover is unavailable publicly, the very purpose of this discovery is to assist Plaintiff in identifying and narrowing those uncharted Canon image sensor products that are allegedly infringed by the patents-in-issue.”). Carnival says that, without any public information available, it cannot identify any other customers of the accused DXP System or other related products. And since Carnival's discovery requests are already sufficiently narrow, it claims that there is no need for DeCurtis to engage in any guesswork for it to provide the information requested. DeCurtis opposes the production of any unaccused products or customers other than NCL or Virgin because the patent rules are designed to streamline litigation, make the parties more efficient, and to require specificity in connection with a plaintiff's infringement claims. DeCurtis says that Carnival cannot skirt these requirements and that, if Carnival wants to obtain additional discovery on other products, systems, or customers, it must identify what it seeks in an amended infringement contention and “be as specific as possible.” [D.E. 44 at 7]. DeCurtis also claims that, while courts have permitted discovery into the customer identities of other accused products, those cases are distinguishable because the patentee identified the products with specificity. DeCurtis argues that this is noticeably different than the facts presented here because Carnival seeks discovery on “reasonably similar” products and potential customers – neither of which is allowed under relevant case law. See Star Envirotech, Inc. v. Redline Detection, LLC, 2015 WL 12745086, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015) (“[T]he Court agrees that Plaintiff's demand for information concerning offers to sell the Accused Products is overbroad.”). Finally, DeCurtis says that Carnival's motion should be denied because it failed to prove that other instrumentalities are unavailable from public sources. Since this is a burden that Carnival must meet and it failed to do so, DeCurtis asks that the relief requested be denied. See Mediatek, Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 2013 WL 588760, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2013) (stating that the patent rules “ ‘place the burden of specifically identifying all accused devices on the plaintiff.’ ”) (quoting Infineon Technologies AG v. Volterra Semiconductor Corp., 2012 WL 6184394, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012)). *6 “The overriding principle of the Patent Local Rules is that they are designed [to] make the parties more efficient, to streamline the litigation process, and to articulate with specificity the claims and theory of a plaintiff's infringement claims.” Bender v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., 2010 WL 1135762, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted). The patent rules require the party claiming infringement “to crystallize its theories of the case early in the litigation and to adhere to those theories once disclosed,” Bender, 2010 WL 363341, at *1, and “place the burden of specifically identifying all accused devices on the plaintiff.” Infineon Technologies AG, 2012 WL 6184394, at *3. These rules also require the party claiming infringement to identify: [F]or each asserted claim, each accused apparatus, product, device, process, method, act or other instrumentality ... of each opposing party of which the party is aware. This identification shall be as specific as possible. Each product, device, and apparatus shall be identified by name or model number, if known. Each method or process must be identified by name, if known, or by any product, device, or apparatus which, when used, allegedly results in the practice of the claimed method or process[.] [D.E. 44 at 7]. The relevant provision here is Patent Rule 3–1 that operates as a discovery device to “take[ ] the place of a series of interrogatories that defendants would likely have propounded had the patent local rules not provided for streamlined discovery.” Network Caching Tech., LLC v. Novell, Inc., 2002 WL 32126128, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2002). It requires “specific identification of particular accused products,” and does not “tolerate broad categorical identifications like ‘mobile devices running Android,’ nor ... the use of mere representative examples.” Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. 2011 WL 4479305, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2011); see also O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3–1 requires contentions to “specify each claim of each patent that is allegedly infringed, each product that allegedly infringes, and the location in the product where each element of each asserted claim is found.”) (citing U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3–1). That means, while representative examples may be a useful tool for proving an infringement case at trial, “a full list of accused products must be disclosed as part of a party's infringement contentions.” Id. If a party wishes to amend contentions to add additional accused products, it may only do so “with leave of the Court upon a timely showing of good cause.”4 [D.E. 44 at 10]. Here, DeCurtis objects to Carnival's request for “reasonably similar” instrumentalities because courts that have allowed this type of discovery have relied on a different set of Patent Rules. Not quite. While there is some merit to that statement, courts have also applied the same Northern District of California rules that apply here and allowed much of the same discovery that Carnival now seeks. See, e.g., Panavision Imaging, LLC, 2010 WL 11507883, at *1 (allowing “reasonably similar” discovery even where “[t]he parties [have] agreed to use the Northern District of California Patent Local Rules ... in this matter.”). DeCurtis's next argument is that Carnival should not be allowed to seek any discovery on other unaccused systems because it has failed to be specific in what it seeks. But, this assertion fails to considers cases where a patentee is unable to rely on publicly available information to specifically identify an accused product. When these situations occur, courts give patentees much greater leeway to seek discovery because otherwise the information is unidentifiable and cannot be properly alleged: *7 The gist of the pending issue is whether plaintiff is entitled to information regarding the additional toilets identified by defendant on July 23, 2014. To help decide the issue, the Court asked the parties to brief two cases decided in the Northern District of California that interpreted discovery rights and obligations based on the Northern District's Patent Local Rules (which the parties agreed would be applicable to this action). Without rehashing the parties’ descriptions of those decisions, the Court finds that the operative distinction is that here information regarding the toilets made by defendant is not publicly available. Further, the Court finds that defendant's affirmative representation in its interrogatory response that it made only two different toilets effectively estops defendant from contending that plaintiff should have figured out for itself that defendant's verified interrogatory response was incorrect. MAG Aerospace Indus., Inc. v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 2014 WL 12751759, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014); see also Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650, 657–58 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (“Honeywell has shown that ... the information it seeks in this motion is not publicly available, and hence Honeywell was unable to accuse any additional products in its [patent infringement contentions],” but since Honeywell communicated to defendant its belief that additional products could be infringing, Honey was “entitled to discovery related to these products.”). DeCurtis's final assertion is that Carnival failed to show that the information it needs to make more specific allegations is not already publicly available. This is the strongest argument presented because courts generally require some evidence or “a reasonable basis to suspect” that products infringe on the patents in question and that the information requested is not otherwise publicly available. Samsung SDI Co. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 2007 WL 4302701, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2007) (“Defendants have not persuaded the Court that they have a reasonable basis to suspect that additional products allegedly infringe the patents-in-issue. It appears that Defendants seek the Court's permission to engage in a fishing expedition, so that they do not have to conduct an investigation into whether or not additional products infringe their patents. To deny such a request is not contrary to law.”). Patentees can satisfy their burden in several ways, but one of the most common methods is to rely on experts and affidavits: Plaintiff's expert opines that the “[i]nformation that is available on websites and technical notes, if publicly available, is not sufficient by itself to fully analyze infringement of the [patents-in-issue] ... [and that] [f]or such detail, schematics showing the circuitry of the CMOS image sensor product, which are not publicly available, are necessary.” Canon neither disputes this assertion nor articulates a way in which Plaintiff can further analyze whether Canon's CMOS image sensors infringe the patents-in-issue without this information. Panavision Imaging, LLC, 2010 WL 11507883, at *4 (internal citations omitted). Other patentees meet this burden at court hearings, where they present data or other research showing that the information requested is not publicly available: For purposes of this motion, Honeywell has shown that the information it seeks is not publicly available. CPT's modules contain a variety of different Driver ICs made by a variety of different manufacturers. CPT has not shown that all of these manufacturers post data sheets for their Driver ICs online. Furthermore, Honeywell has effectively argued that, to the extent that CPT has access to this information, CPT can acquire it much more easily than Honeywell can by purchasing and breaking down CPT's products. At the hearing, CPT offered the results of a Google search to show how easily Honeywell could obtain Driver IC data sheets. However, the only data sheet CPT offered as an example was one that it produced to Honeywell during discovery, not one that it found on the internet. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that the information sought by Honeywell is publicly available. *8 Honeywell Int'l Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d at 656. In this case, Carnival has failed to provide the Court with any experts, affidavits, or research to show that the information requested is not publicly available. Carnival has instead relied on the pleadings where DeCurtis alleges that Carnival threatened and interfered with the business relationships of actual and potential customers. [D.E. 87 at ¶¶ 3, 103-106]. This is sufficient to compel additional discovery on the identities of other customers, in connection with the DXP System, because DeCurtis admits that these relationships exist. And commonsense dictates that locating more specific information on these contractual and business relationships will be difficult to obtain in the public domain. The same cannot be said, however, of the request to compel the production of “reasonably similar” systems. It is first unclear if these systems exist. But, even assuming that they do, Carnival must explain (1) why it cannot obtain sufficient information in the public domain, (2) present evidence to that effect, and (3) explain why there is a reasonable basis to suspect that these products may infringe on the patents in question. If Carnival can meet these requirements, the motion to compel can be revisited. But for now, the motion is only GRANTED in part with respect to the identities of DeCurtis's actual or potential customers in connection with the DXP System. (6) Remaining Objections Next, Carnival seeks to overrule DeCurtis's objections to Request Nos. 78, 82, 83, and Interrogatory Nos. 15 and 16. Starting with Interrogatory No. 15, Carnival asks that DeCurtis identify communications with third parties about this litigation: Identify and describe any communications with Third Parties about this litigation, the Asserted Patents or Related Patents, or any of Carnival's actions that are a basis for DeCurtis’ claims or defenses in this litigation, including the Persons involved in such communications; date of such communications; and substance of such communications. [D.E. 159 at 8]. Carnival also requests that DeCurtis produce similar information in Request No. 78: Communications with any Third Party regarding any of Carnival's actions that are a basis for DeCurtis’[s] claims or defenses in this litigation. [D.E. 148-7 at 37]. Carnival argues that these requests seek relevant information and that DeCurtis's vagueness objections have no merit. Carnival also says that it gave DeCurtis examples of the type of information that it seeks and that it may include communications about DeCurtis's allegation that David DeCurtis is an inventor of Carnival's patents or that Carnival interfered in DeCurtis's business relationships. Because this information is relevant and Carnival has already attempted to narrow the scope of any vagueness or ambiguity, it asks that DeCurtis be compelled to respond to both discovery requests. There is no reason to overrule all of DeCurtis's objections to Interrogatory No. 15 because it has agreed to produce documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d) “evidencing non-privileged communications between DeCurtis and Third Parties relating to communications with Third Parties about this litigation, the Asserted Patents or Related Patents.”5 The only lingering dispute is whether DeCurtis should be compelled to provide information on any of DeCurtis’ claims or defenses in its communication with any third party. This portion of Interrogatory No. 15 is too overbroad because – much like Request No. 78 – it includes no limits on what information Carnival seeks. It is also unclear what Carnival means when it requests any communication with any third party that could be the basis for DeCurtis's claims or defenses. Carnival needs to be more specific if it seeks this type of information and it can do so by incorporating custodians, date ranges, and search terms in its requests to help target these communications. However, as written, these requests are too overbroad and unduly burdensome to compel a better response. Carnival's motion to overrule DeCurtis's objections to Interrogatory No. 15 and Request No. 78 is therefore DENIED. *9 Moving to Interrogatory No. 16, Carnival asks that DeCurtis identify any communications with third parties on the subject matter of Project Trident, Carnival's OCEAN Platform devices, and DeCurtis's involvement in developing guest engagement systems: Identify and describe any communications with Third Parties about the subject matter of ‘Project Trident,’ Carnival's OCEAN Platform or OceanMedallion devices, or DeCurtis’ involvement in developing guest engagement systems for Carnival, including the Persons involved in such communications; date of such communications; and substance of such communications. [D.E. 159 at 9]. While DeCurtis objects to this interrogatory because it would involve a review of thousands of communications with third-party contractors over several years, it agrees to provide non-privileged communications with third-parties pursuant to Rule 33(d), and “to meet and confer further with Carnival regarding the scope and proportionality of any other information Carnival requests.” Id. at 11. Carnival's response is that DeCurtis's concern of an undue burden is misplaced because Carnival has already produced over 71,000 documents and any communications involving Project Trident only occurred over a two-year timespan. There is some merit in the arguments of both parties because, while Interrogatory No. 16 will inevitably involve a review of thousands of documents, there is no reason why the parties cannot confer on this issue and limit the request to a two-year time frame and a review of specific custodians. This request is the poster child of the need to confer and reach a compromise rather than the Court to impose a specific set of terms and custodians. We will therefore defer to the parties to resolve the scope of Interrogatory No. 16. If the parties are unable to reach a compromise, the issue may be revisited but, for now, the motion to overrule DeCurtis's objections to Interrogatory No. 16 is DENIED. The final objections that Carnival seeks to overrule are in response to Request Nos. 82 and 83: Documents and Communications sufficient to show any use, by or on behalf of a Third Party, of work product or deliverables DeCurtis produced for Carnival. [D.E. 148-7 at 39]. Documents and Communications sufficient to show any benefit, whether real, promised, or projected, by any Third Party, as a result of work product or deliverables DeCurtis produced for Carnival. Id. at 40. DeCurtis objects to these requests, in part, because the terms “work product” and “deliverables” are “contention-laded phrases” under the MSA. DeCurtis says that, after reading the MSA, the parties disagree on what constitutes “work product” and a “deliverable.” Yet, Carnival finds that response unavailing because the requests do not require any interpretation of the MSA. Carnival says instead that DeCurtis can respond based on a straightforward common sense reading of these terms. In other words, Carnival reasons that, if DeCurtis allowed a third party to use or benefit from any work product or deliverables then DeCurtis should be required to produce relevant documents. And to the extent DeCurtis wishes to assert the MSA as a defense, Carnival views that as a question for the Court to resolve at a later date but not a reason comply with discovery under Rule 26. *10 This is not the first time that the parties have disagreed on discovery requests that implicate the MSA. On October 22, 2020, the parties appeared before the undersigned and disagreed on a request for production in connection with the meaning of “Carnival Information.” Like here, the parties interpreted the contractual terms differently and the Court denied a motion to compel because the request was contention-laden: THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's put it this way: Given the nature of the dispute, I think the better way to handle that for purposes of discovery is not to make the request contention-laden. And even though I understand what you're saying is, why use that term, because it's in the contract, because it in and of itself can be a very broadly defined term, I think for purposes of production, I'm just going to hold you to, absent agreement, particularizing your request more specifically. So I'm not necessarily going to compel something where there's – it kinds of boils down the crux of the case. If, however, you ask [DeCurtis] to produce any document that has anything to do with this entity – right? – then they have to produce it, because you've identified the entity and it could be an issue in dispute. ... THE COURT: Okay. Well, in other words, when you get to the points of reviewing what [DeCurtis] produced, if you find it's insufficient, then I think the best thing to do is rather than having me decide a contention-laden request, ask a specific request that's going to encompass that. And then that way, that's something that I can tangibly compel without getting into how conflict-driven [it is]. [D.E. 93 at 36-38]. The same reasoning applies here because the meaning of the terms “work product” and “deliverables” are heavily disputed and the reason for that disagreement is due to the language of the MSA. The best approach is the same as the one in October 2020, where DeCurtis can conduct and collect documents that are consistent with its understanding of the information requested. Afterwards, Carnival can review the documents and determine if the production is inadequate. If still insufficient, Carnival can serve a more specific request and seek to compel documents should the need arise. Accordingly, Carnival's motion to compel a production in response to Request Nos. 82 and 83 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part subject to the limitations identified above. DeCurtis shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this order to complete that production.6 (7) Amended Case Schedule The last issue in Carnival's motion is the proposal for an amended case schedule. DeCurtis opposes Carnival's proposed dates because it violates the Court's case track and the relevant patent rules. The problem with Carnival's request is that – other than the proposed order attached to the motion – there are no arguments presented in the motion itself for any of the relief requested. Carnival only says that the proposed case schedule contemplates DeCurtis's production of core documents and that the revised deadlines are commensurate with the work that needs to be performed. But, without any detailed arguments as to how each of these proposed dates complies with the Patent Rules or the current case schedule, it is unclear whether any of the proposed deadlines are appropriate. And there are no specific assertions in support of any deadline that Carnival seeks to be extend. *11 A separate reason Carnival's motion should be revisited is because the parties never met and conferred on this issue as required under the Court's Local Rules and the Order Setting Discovery Procedures. [D.E. 44]. Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) requires that counsel for a moving party confer, or make reasonable effort to confer, with all parties or non-parties who may be affected by the relief sought in the motion. And if the moving party fails to comply with this rule, the Court may deny the motion and impose sanctions. S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(a)(3). Here, the record shows that Carnival failed to undertake the conferral process, that it unliterally developed a list of proposed deadlines, and that DeCurtis did the same in response. Parties may not, however, decide which rules they seek to follow and others they wish to disregard. The parties are therefore directed to comply with these requirements, confer on an amended case schedule, and to present to the Court a joint motion to modify deadlines. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, in whole or in part, either party may file a separate motion to amend the case schedule, but the Court is hopeful that the parties can achieve some cooperation without the expenditure of more judicial resources.7 B. DeCurtis's Motion to Compel [D.E. 158-1] Turning to the cross-motion to compel, DeCurtis spends a lengthy amount of time explaining how the parties reached a discovery stalemate in this case and how Carnival is wrong to lay blame for the many discovery problems that the parties have faced. DeCurtis also provides a detailed summary of how it views Carnival's trade secret claims and why the parties have failed to make greater progress thus far. Aside from these concerns, DeCurtis says that there are major gaps in Carnival's document productions and that the latter has failed to produce anything since January 7, 2021. DeCurtis complains specifically about a failure to respond to Requests Nos. 88 and 89 that seek information in connection with Virgin and NCL. DeCurtis argues that Carnival agreed to produce documents in response to these requests on December 7, 2020 but that, four months later, Carnival has not produced anything notwithstanding the fact that these documents must exist.8 And since Carnival had has failed to produce any documents in several months, DeCurtis asks that the Court compel Carnival to meet its discovery obligations and to promptly produce all responsive documents. A significant shortfall with DeCurtis's motion is that, while it requests Carnival produce all responsive documents to all pending discovery requests, it fails to identify any deficiency other than Carnival's alleged failure to produce information in connection with requests Nos. 88 and 89. The motion is thus defective, at the outset, because it lacks the required specificity for the relief that it seeks. That is, DeCurtis makes a sweeping request for Carnival to produce all responsive documents but fails to identify those items. That is hardly compelling. Apart from this, DeCurtis complains that Carnival has failed to produce any documents in response to Request Nos. 88-89. Carnival's response is that it produced responsive documents “last week” and “will continue to produce additional, responsive documents” in the days ahead. [D.E. 153 at 5]. Carnival has committed the same error that DeCurtis made earlier because, although Carnival asserts that some documents have been produced, it never considers the universe of those documents. It is thus challenging for the Court to impose a deadline for a production to be completed when neither DeCurtis nor the Court have any idea on how many documents this universe includes. *12 Either way, the motion, in connection with Request Nos. 88 and 89, is well taken to the extent it seeks to compel Carnival to complete the production of these documents. But, given the lack of any specifics in Carnival's response or a proposed timeframe for completion, the Court will require any production to be completed within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. If Carnival finds that the deadline is unworkable, it may seek an extension or reach an alternative agreement with DeCurtis so long as it explains with specifics how many more documents might be responsive and why compliance with the deadline cannot be achieved. However, for now, DeCurtis's motion to compel Carnival to produce documents in response to Request Nos. 88 and 89 is only GRANTED in part. The second issue concerns interrogatories. Both parties previously agreed that each side could serve a maximum of 35 interrogatories. [D.E. 72 at 4]. DeCurtis says that, as of right now, it has served 21 interrogatories, but accuses Carnival of failing to answer many of them on the mistaken belief that the limit has already been reached. DeCurtis says that the reason for Carnival's misunderstanding is due to a failure to count properly. DeCurtis claims that – when it served an interrogatory for information on Carnival's 14 trade secrets – Carnival took the position that this amounted to 14 separate interrogatories. And when DeCurtis asked Carnival in interrogatory No. 19 to identify source code files and line numbers for each trade secret, Carnival objected and counted this request as including 9 separate interrogatories: Carnival objects to this Interrogatory as compound because it requires multiple discrete and separate categories of information under the related questions test applied in this Court. Specifically, as drafted, this Interrogatory contains at least nine discrete subparts. [D.E. 146-7 at 5 (internal citations omitted)]. DeCurtis asks that the Court overrule these objections because the “interrogatories are not compound simply because Carnival has asserted more than one trade secret, any more than interrogatories are compound if a party asserted more than one patent claim.” [D.E. 158-1 at 13]. Instead, DeCurtis says that the interrogatories properly seek information that is necessarily related to each request. DeCurtis also claims that, since the Court has now dismissed Carnival's trade secret claims with prejudice, it would be unfair to count any trade secret interrogatories toward the 35-interrogatory limit. Thus, DeCurtis requests that either the Court overrule Carnival's objections and find that it still has 14 interrogatories remaining or find good cause to grant DeCurtis an additional 14 interrogatories so that DeCurtis does not suffer any prejudiced. This section of DeCurtis's motion lacks merit because – while it complains that Carnival is improperly counting interrogatories – this issue arose long ago. As far back as December 7, 2020, Carnival served responses to interrogatories 16-18 and stated that it would decline to answer interrogatories because DeCurtis had already reached the agreed upon limit. [D.E. 153-3]. Carnival then made the same objection on March 15, 2021 when it responded to interrogatories 19 and 20 and this is when DeCurtis finally took issue with Carnival's position. [D.E. 146-6]. DeCurtis fails, however, to explain why the Court should even consider the merits of Carnival's objection when the issue is untimely under the Court's Local Rules. Indeed, Local 26.1(g)(1) provides, in relevant part, the following: All disputes related to discovery shall be presented to the Court ... within (30) days from the: (a) original due date (or later date if extended by the Court or the parties) of the response or objection to the discovery request that is the subject of the dispute; (b) date of the deposition in which the dispute arose; or (c) date on which a party first learned of or should have learned of a purported deficiency concerning the production of discovery materials. Failure to present the dispute to the Court within that timeframe, absent a showing of good cause for the delay, may constitute a waiver of the relief sought at the Court's discretion. *13 S.D. Fla. L.R. 26.1(g)(1). So, if DeCurtis took issue with Carnival's interpretation of the 35-interrogatory limit, it should have raised that issue on the Court's Discovery Calendar many months ago. And even putting aside the failure to raise the issue within 30 days of the December 2020 discovery response, DeCurtis offers no explanation on why the March 15, 2021 response is also not untimely when it too exceeds the 30-day requirement. DeCurtis's alternative argument is equally unpersuasive because, while it seeks leave to serve 14 additional interrogatories, DeCurtis devotes no more than one conclusory sentence to this request. That is inadequate because “[t]o propound more than twenty-five interrogatories, the party seeking leave must set forth a particularized showing of need.” New River Dry Dock, Inc. v. Falls at Marina Bay, L.P., 2008 WL 2620727, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2008) (citing cases). Yet, DeCurtis has fallen short of that burden with a single sentence requesting leave to serve 14 additional interrogatories. The motion to serve 14 additional interrogatories and to overrule Carnival's objections on the number of interrogatories is therefore DENIED because the relief requested is untimely and s is conclusory. II. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that: A. Carnival's motion to compel the production of technical documents, source code information, communications with NCL and Virgin, advertising and marketing materials, items on a trade secrets log, and a better response to Interrogatory No. 11 is GRANTED. B. Carnival's motion to compel the identities of DeCurtis's actual or potential customers in connection with the DXP system and a production in response to Request Nos. 82 and 83 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. C. In all other respects, Carnival's motion to compel is DENIED. D. DeCurtis's motion to compel Carnival to produce a response to Request Nos. 88 and 89 is GRANTED in part. E. In all other respects, DeCurtis's motion to compel is DENIED. F. Both parties shall complete any productions compelled herein within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 17th day of June, 2021. Footnotes 1 On November 20, 2020, the Honorable Robert N. Scola referred all pretrial matters to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for disposition. [D.E. 102]. 2 Carnival also requests that DeCurtis serve documents included on a trade secret log. This issue has already been resolved because DeCurtis states in its response that it “can now produce the 926 technical documents it had identified for production pursuant to the Court's Rule 3-2 Patent Disclosure, but that it was withholding on the basis of its trade secret objection.” [D.E. 146 at 3]. Carnival's motion to compel the production of these documents is therefore GRANTED, and DeCurtis shall complete any outstanding production of these items within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. 3 Carnival seeks much of the same information in Interrogatory No. 13 with a request for, among other things, information on sales, leases, and licenses of any wearable devices using Bluetooth Low Energy technology or location services. But, without a proper definition of these terms, Carnival's motion to compel is DENIED for the same reasons. 4 Good cause may include, for example, the “recent discovery of nonpublic information about the Accused Instrumentality which was not discovered, despite diligent efforts, before the service of the Infringement Contentions.” [D.E. 44 at 10]. 5 Rule 33(d) provides the following: If the answer to an interrogatory may be determined by examining, auditing, compiling, abstracting, or summarizing a party's business records (including electronically stored information), and if the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same for either party, the responding party may answer by: (1) specifying the records that must be reviewed, in sufficient detail to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the responding party could; and (2) giving the interrogating party a reasonable opportunity to examine and audit the records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summaries. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). 6 DeCurtis objects to a production of documents under Request No. 83 because of legal or contractual obligations to confidentiality with respect to an unknown third party. But, given that DeCurtis failed to present any argument to this effect, there is nothing for the Court to consider for the purposes of sustaining this objection. It is also unclear why any confidentiality concerns cannot be alleviated with the parties’ Protective Order. 7 An agreement on a revised case schedule may be easier to achieve now that the Court has ruled on the pending discovery disputes. 8 DeCurtis believes that responsive documents must exist because of Carnival's response to Interrogatory No. 10, where Carnival admits that it entered into a non-disclosure agreement with Virgin for the purpose of identifying and resolving potential issues related to intellectual property.