LANDFALL 2, INC., a Florida corporation, Plaintiff, v. DATASCORE-AI, LLC, a Texas limited liability company; BRENT BIGGS, individually; and DATASCORE ENTERPRISES, CORP., a Delaware corporation, Defendants Case No. 22-cv-80801-MIDDLEBROOKS/MATTHEWMAN United States District Court, S.D. Florida Signed February 08, 2023 Counsel Darren Raymond Aponte, Aponte Law, P.A., Palmetto Bay, FL, for Plaintiff. Amy Yoon, Pro Hac Vice, Binah B. Yeung, Pro Hac Vice, Cairncross & Hempelmann, P.S., Seattle, WA, Woodrow Heath Pollack, Shutts and Bowen, LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendants. Matthewman, William, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER AWARDING REASONABLE EXPENSES, INCLUDING COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL *1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the following: (1) the Court's December 15, 2022 “Omnibus Interim Order on Discovery Motions and [Order] Imposing Sanctions Against Plaintiff and its Counsel” [DE 56], in which the Court found Defendant Datascore Enterprises, Corp. (“Defendant”) entitled to an award of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, under Rules 37(a)(5)(A) and 16(f)(2); (2) the Court's Second Omnibus Interim Discovery Order [DE 67], which set deadlines for Defendant and Landfall 2, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) to address the amount of reasonable expenses; and (3) the Declaration of Binah B. Yeung Regarding Defendant Datascore Enterprises, Corp.’s Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses Per DE 56 and 67 (“Declaration”) [DE 70]. Plaintiff failed to respond to the Declaration as required by the Court.[1] The Court has carefully reviewed the filings and the Court's prior Orders, as well the entire docket in this case. I. BACKGROUND On November 15, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel [DE 40]. The Court set a briefing schedule, requiring Plaintiff to file a response to the Motion to Compel on or before November 23, 2022. [DE 42]. Plaintiff and its counsel failed to file the response as required by the Court. Thus, the Court granted the motion by default and on the merits. [DE 45]. Importantly, in the Court's November 30, 2022 Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel [DE 45], the Court stated that: In light of the granting of Defendant's Motion [DE 40], the Court now has under consideration the imposition of sanctions and/or cost-shifting against Plaintiff and its counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A). Accordingly, on or before December 12, 2022, Plaintiff and its counsel shall SHOW CAUSE why they should not jointly have to pay Defendant's reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by Defendant in bringing [the] Motion [to Compel]. [DE 45 at 8]. Plaintiff and its counsel failed to respond to the Show Cause Order. Thus, following a December 13, 2022 hearing conducted via Zoom Video Teleconference (“VTC”)—which was set both to discuss the status of discovery in the case and to address a separate motion that had been filed by Defendant—the Court issued an “Omnibus Interim Order on Discovery Motions and [Order] Imposing Sanctions Against Plaintiff and its Counsel” (“First Omnibus Order”) [DE 56]. In the First Omnibus Order [DE 56], with respect to Defendant's Motion to Compel [DE 40], the Court found that an award of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, was warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A), and that none of the exceptions were applicable. [DE 56 at 11–12]. The Court also found that “Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Court's November 18, 2022 briefing schedule on the Motion to Compel—and with the November 30, 2022 Show Cause Order—was not substantially justified, and that no circumstances exist[ed] that would make an award of expenses unjust.” Id. at 13. Thus, as an additional basis, the Court found that an award of reasonable expenses in connection with the Motion to Compel [DE 40] was appropriate under Rule 16(f)(2). Id. at 13. As stated by the Court, this meant that Plaintiff and its counsel were to “pay Defendant for Defendant's efforts in preparing and pursuing the Motion to Compel [DE 40], for updating the Court on the status of discovery in the Notice [DE 50], for addressing the discovery deficiencies at the December 13, 2022 Zoom VTC hearing, and for filing the December 19, 2022 Notice.” Id. at 14. *2 Accordingly, the Court directed Defendant to “file an affidavit or declaration of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which includes the hours claimed and the hourly rate sought, as well as the billing logs for each biller and a statement concerning their qualifications and/or experience,” on or before December 29, 2022. Id. at 16. The Court also directed Plaintiff and its counsel to “respond and state any objections they wish to assert as to the amount of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, claimed by Defendant, as well as any objections to the time sought or hourly rate claimed,” on or before January 5, 2023. Id. Subsequently, in the Court's December 29, 2022 Second Omnibus Interim Discovery Order [DE 67], the Court noted that discovery “still remains outstanding from Plaintiff even though the discovery cutoff date has passed in this case.” [DE 67 at 5]. Therefore, “because the Court continue[d] to deal with the remnants of Defendant's November 15, 2022 Motion to Compel [DE 40]—with [Defendant's] expenses therefore continuing to accrue in litigating the Motion to Compel to its conclusion”—the Court altered the deadline of the parties’ filings regarding the amount of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees. Specifically, the Court required Defendant to file “the affidavit or declaration of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which includes the hours claimed and the hourly rate sought, as well as the billing logs for each biller and a statement concerning their qualifications and/or experience” on or before January 6, 2023. Id. at 5. The Court required Plaintiff and its counsel, in turn, to “respond and state any objections they wish to assert as to the amount of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, claimed by Defendant, as well as any objections to the time sought or hourly rate claimed,” on or before January 13, 2023. Id. at 5. On January 6, 2023, Defendant timely filed the Declaration of Binah B. Yeung Regarding Defendant Datascore Enterprises, Corp.’s Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses Per DE 56 and 67 (“Declaration”) [DE 70]. Within the Declaration, Defendant stated the qualifications and/or experience of each biller and attached billings log [DE 70-1] which established the hours claimed and hourly rate sought. In total, Defendant sought $19,438.50 in connection the Motion to Compel [DE 40], $4,930.00 in connection with the December 9, 2022 Notice [DE 50], $6,918.00 for attending the December 13, 2022 hearing on the Motion to Compel, $12,970.00 in connection with the December 19, 2022 Notice [DE 58], $4,971.50 in connection with the December 27, 2022 hearing on the Motion to Compel, $32,645.50 in connection with the January 6, 2023 “Declaration of Counsel Regarding Status of Discovery and Memorandum in Support of Sanctions Requested” [DE 71], and $5,003.50 in connection with filing the Declaration itself. Demonstrating their continuing pattern of noncompliance with Court orders and rules in this case, Plaintiff and its counsel did not respond. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Entitlement The Court has already found that Defendant is entitled to reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, in litigating the Motion to Compel [DE 40] to its conclusion. Thus, the Court solely focuses on the determination of an appropriate amount. B. Amount of Expenses, Including Attorney's Fees A reasonable attorney's fee award is “properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1994)). This “lodestar” may then be adjusted for the results obtained by the attorney. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427 (citing Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994)). “In determining what is a ‘reasonable’ hourly rate and what number of compensable hours is ‘reasonable,’ the court is to consider the 12 factors enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).” Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008). These factors are: *3 (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. at 1350 n.2 (citation omitted). However, the Court may also use its own experience in assessing the reasonableness of attorney's fees. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999). The reasonable hourly rate is defined as the “prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 436 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299)). The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing the claimed market rate. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. With regard to the type of evidence that the fee claimant should produce in support of a claim, in Barnes, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that [t]he “fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303. That burden includes “supplying the court with specific and detailed evidence from which the court can determine the reasonable hourly rate. Further, fee counsel should have maintained records to show the time spent on the different claims, and the general subject matter of the time expenditures ought to be set out with sufficient particularity so that the district court can assess the time claimed for each activity .... A well-prepared fee petition also would include a summary, grouping the time entries by the nature of the activity or stage of the case.” Id. (citations omitted). 168 F.3d at 427. In submitting a request for attorney's fees, fee applicants are required to exercise “billing judgment.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). If fee applicants do not exclude “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours, which are hours “that would be unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one's adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of counsel,” the court must exercise billing judgment for them. See id. (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301). The burden rests on the movant to submit a comprehensive request for fees so the court can determine how much time was reasonably expended. Loranger, 10 F.3d at 782. “But trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So, trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). 1. Reasonable Hourly Rate The Court first notes that Plaintiff and its counsel failed to file a response to Defendant's Declaration [DE 70]. Notwithstanding, the Court will exercise its independent judgment in considering the reasonableness of Defendant's requested hourly rates. See Brown Jordan Int'l, Inc. v. Carmicle, No. 14-60629-CV, 2017 WL 5633312, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 14-CV-60629, 2017 WL 5632811 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2017). *4 In total, two different law firms worked on this case. The Court will address each law firm separately. a. Cairncross & Hempelmann i. Binah B. Yeung According to the Declaration [DE 70], Binah B. Yeung is seeking a rate of $450.00 per hour. [DE 70 at 2]. She is a principal at Cairncross & Hempelmann, P.S., and has been licensed for over eleven years. Id. at 1. Moreover, she is licensed in Washington, Oregon, and Alaska, and her practice “focuses primarily on complex business disputes, real estate disputes, and general commercial litigation.” Id. Here, the Court finds that a reduction in Ms. Yeung's hourly rate—from $450.00 to $340.00—is appropriate. See Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v. Marquez, No. 20-81431, 2022 WL 2651661, at *14 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2022) (finding a finding a $335.00 hourly rate appropriate for an attorney with roughly ten years of experience). ii. Amy H. Yoon Amy H. Yoon is seeking an hourly rate of $375.00 for 2022, and an hourly rate of $425.00 for 2023. [DE 70 at 2]. Ms. Yoon is an associate attorney at Cairncross & Hempelmann, “has been a licensed attorney since 2016, and is licensed in Washington, Maryland, and the District of Columbia.” Id. Her practice focuses primarily on commercial litigation. Id. Here, the Court finds that a reduction in Ms. Yoon's hourly rate—from $375.00 in 2022 and $425.00 in 2023, to $300.00 for both 2022 and 2023—is appropriate. See Rolle-Colle v. Dep't of Transp., No. 17-23486-CIV, 2020 WL 5127551, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-23486-Civ, 2020 WL 5116601 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2020) (finding a $300.00 hourly rate reasonable for an attorney with approximately seven years of experience). iii. Henry J. Avery Henry J. Avery is an associate attorney at Cairncross & Hempelmann and is seeking an hourly rate of $325.00. [DE 70 at 2]. He has been licensed since 2018, and his practice “focuses primarily on commercial litigation.” Id. Here, the Court finds that a reduction in Mr. Avery's rate—from $325.00 to $250.00—is appropriate. Bluestarexpo, Inc. v. Enis, No. 21-20875-CIV, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-20875-Civ, 2023 WL 158292 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2023) (finding a $250.00 hourly rate reasonable for an attorney licensed since 2018). iv. Marissa E. Gaugler and Kelsey M. Doyle Marissa E. Gaugler and Kelsey M. Doyle are paralegals at Cairncross & Hempelmann. [DE 70 at 2–3]. Their claimed hourly rates are $200.00 for 2022, and $210.00 for 2023. Id. Ms. Gaugler has worked as a paralegal since 2014, while Ms. Doyle has worked as a paralegal since 2015. Id. The Court finds that a reduction in Ms. Gaugler's and Ms. Doyle's hourly rates—from $200.00 for 2022 and $210.00 for 2023, to $125.00 for both 2022 and 2023—is appropriate in this case. See Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v. Marquez, 2022 WL 2651661, at *14 (finding that a $125 hourly rate is reasonable for a paralegal in South Florida); see also Tillman v. Advanced Pub. Safety, Inc., No. 15-CV-81782, 2018 WL 5768570, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-81782-CIV, 2018 WL 6424899 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2018) (finding a rate of $125.00 per hour to be reasonable for a paralegal with over 20 years of experience). v. Amelia Westling and Kristi Beckham *5 Amelia Westling and Kristi Beckham are both legal assistants at Cairncross & Hempelmann. [DE 70 at 3]. Ms. Westling is claiming an hourly rate of $125.00, and has six years of experience as a legal assistant. Id. Ms. Beckham is claiming an hourly rate of $150.00, and has 25 years of experience as a legal assistant and paralegal. Id. Here, the Court finds that a reduction in Ms. Westling's and Ms. Beckham's rates—from $125.00 and $150.00 per hour, respectively, to $100.00 and $110.00 per hour, respectively—is appropriate. See Rodriguez v. Guilfoyle, No. 18-23621-Civ, 2019 WL 2254926, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-23621-CIV, 2019 WL 2255019 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2019) (“We also find that Mr. Hernandez's request for an hourly rate of $150 for his legal assistant is excessive and, as a result, we reduce the rate requested to $100 per hour.”). b. Shutts & Bowen i. Woodrow H. Pollack Woodrow H. Pollack is a partner at Shutts & Bowen. [DE 70 at 3]. He has been licensed since 2006, and is seeking an hourly rate of $700.00. Id. His practice “focuses primarily on litigating complex patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret disputes.” Id. Moreover, Mr. Pollack has a master's degree in computer science from Stanford University, is “Board Certified in Intellectual Property by the Florida Bar, is a registered Patent Attorney, and is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell.” Id. Mr. Pollack is also “one of only 9 attorneys in Florida that sits on the Florida Bar's Intellectual Property Certification Committee,” is the “immediate past chair of the IP Certification Committee,” and has been voted as “Lawyer of the Year” or “Top Lawyer” in several intellectual property practice areas. Id. Here, the Court finds that a reduction in Mr. Pollack's hourly rate—from $700.00 to $500.00—is appropriate. See Southern-Owners Ins. Co., 2022 WL 2651661, at *12 (finding a $415.00 hourly rate appropriate for an attorney licensed to practice in Florida for approximately 20 years); Burrow, Inc. v. Euro Furniture & Design LLC, No. 21-cv-22500, 2022 WL 356451, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2022) (“[T]he Court recognizes that patent and intellectual property are specialized areas of law, which continue to command high attorney rates in South Florida.”). ii. Katie L. Chambers Katie L. Chambers, FRP, is an intellectual property paralegal at Shutts & Bowen, and is seeking an hourly rate of $280.00 [DE 70 at 4]. She has more than 14 years of experience. Id. Here, the Court finds that a significant reduction in Ms. Chamber's hourly rate—from $280.00 to $125.00—is appropriate. See Southern-Owners Ins. Co., 2020 WL 2651661, at *14 (finding that a $125 hourly rate is reasonable for a paralegal in South Florida); see also Tillman, 2018 WL 5768570, at *5 (finding a rate of $125.00 per hour to be reasonable for a paralegal with over 20 years of experience). 2. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended Next, the Court must determine whether the hours billed were reasonable. In this regard, Defendant has included the total number of hours spent on several filings related to the initial Motion to Compel [DE 40]. [DE 70 at 5–9]. However, before considering the reasonableness of the number of hours expended, the Court first notes that Plaintiff has waived any argument as to the reasonableness of the billing entries because it did not challenge the billing entries or even respond to the Declaration [DE 70] concerning attorney's fees at all. See Tropical Paradise Resorts, LLC v. JBSHBM, LLC, No. 18-CV-60912, 2021 WL 2269822, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-cv-60912, 2021 WL 2024424 (S.D. Fla. May 21, 2021) (finding that failure to object to the reasonableness of the amount requested resulted in waiver of objection as to the reasonableness of the claimed fees). *6 In any event, the Court has again exercised its independent judgment and has taken the total billing records into consideration for purposes of determining a proper fee award. In doing so, the Court notes that—because the Court has reduced each of Defendant's requested hourly rates—the Court finds it necessary to re-arrange Defendant's attorney's fees request by biller and by law firm in calculating a proper lodestar amount. a. Cairncross & Hempelmann With respect to Cairncross & Hempelmann's hours spent on this case, Defendant is seeking attorney's fees related to the: (1) 33.6 hours of billable time spent by Ms. Yeung; (2) 97.9 hours of billable time spent my Ms. Yoon; (2); (3) 5.3 hours of billable time spent by Mr. Avery; (4) 62.3 hours of billable time spent by Ms. Gaugler; (4); (5) 45.8 hours of billable time spent by Ms. Doyle; (6) 8.1 hours of billable time spent by Ms. Westling; and (7) 3.7 hours of billable time spent by Ms. Beckham. This represents 256.7 hours of total time spent on the case by Cairncross & Hempelmann. The Court has independently reviewed the time entries [DE 70-1] to determine if the hours claimed are reasonable and if the time spent falls within the scope of recoverable tasks. The Court finds that the time claimed is within the scope of an award of attorney's fees. However, the Court also finds that some of the time claimed is unnecessary. Specifically, on November 30, 2022, Ms. Yoon and Ms. Yeung spent 6 total hours working on a Reply in support of Defendant's Motion to Compel [DE 40]. But Plaintiff had not filed a Response, and a Reply was therefore unnecessary. Moreover, it does appear that some of the time spent in preparing the January 6, 2023 Declaration [DE 71] regarding the remaining discovery deficiencies and requested sanctions is excessive. As acknowledged by defense counsel, “Defendants [had already] previously described the categories of documents that remained deficient.” [DE 70 at 6]. And, in fact, much of the sanctions memorandum contained within the January 6, 2023 Declaration [DE 71] was identical to the sanctions memorandum filed at DE 58. b. Shutts & Bowen With respect to the number of hours Shutts & Bowen expended on this case, Defendant is seeking attorney's fees related to the: (1) 8 hours of billable time spent by Mr. Pollack; and (2) 11 hours of billable time spent by Ms. Chambers. This represents 19 hours of total time spent on this case by Shutts & Bowen. Here, the Court has also independently reviewed the time entries [DE 70-1] to determine if the hours claimed are reasonable and if the time spent falls within the scope of recoverable tasks. The Court finds that the time claimed is within the scope of an award of attorney's fees, and that Ms. Chambers and Mr. Pollack have exercised proper billing judgment. 3. Calculation of Lodestar Amount “When a district court finds the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high, the court has two choices; it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut.” Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350 (citing Loranger, 10 F.3d at 783); Freestream Aircraft USA Ltd. v. Chowdry, No. 16-CV-81232, 2017 WL 4785458, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2017). Here, the Undersigned finds that an across-the-board reduction with respect to the hours billed by Cairncross & Hempelmann is appropriate, to account for the unnecessary filing of the Reply [44] to the Motion to Compel, and to account for the excessive number of hours spent preparing the January 6, 2023 Declaration [DE 71] regarding discovery and sanctions. The Court will reduce the hours claimed by Cairncross & Hempelmann by 5%. Thus, the fee award is $10,852.80 for Ms. Yeung (reflecting 33.6 hours at an hourly rate of $340.00, reduced by 5%); $27,901.50 for Ms. Yoon (reflecting 97.9 hours at an hourly rate of $300.00, reduced by 5%); $1,258.75 for Mr. Avery (reflecting 5.3 hours at an hourly rate of $250.00, reduced by 5%); $7,398.13 for Ms. Gaugler (reflecting 62.3 hours at an hourly rate of $125.00, reduced by 5%); $5,438.75 for Ms. Doyle (reflecting 45.8 hours at an hourly rate of $125.00, reduced by 5%); $769.50 for Ms. Westling (reflecting 8.1 hours at an hourly rate of $100.00, reduced by 5%); and $386.65 for Ms. Beckham (reflecting 3.7 hours at an hourly rate of $110.00, reduced by 5%). This results in a total fee award of $54,006.08 on behalf of Cairncross & Hempelmann. *7 As to Shutts & Bowen, the Court finds no need to apply an across-the-board or hourly cut, as the Court finds that the firm has exercised proper billing judgment. Thus, the fee award is $4,000.00 for Mr. Pollack (reflecting 8 hours at an hourly rate of $500.00), and $1,375.00 for Ms. Chambers (reflecting 11 hours at an hourly rate of $125.00). This results in a total fee award of $5,375.00 on behalf of Shutts & Bowen. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiff and its counsel, Darren Aponte, Esq. are ORDERED to pay, and shall pay, Defendant's attorney's fees in the amount of: (1) $54,006.08 to Cairncross & Hempelmann; and (2) $5,375.00 to Shutts & Bowen. Plaintiff and its counsel are both jointly and severally liable for these amounts. 2. The two separate payments to Defendant's counsel (Cairncross & Hempelman, and Shutts & Bowen), must be made on or before February 22, 2023. Moreover, the payments shall be made to the respective trust accounts of Cairncross & Hempelmann and Shutts & Bowen, and delivered or mailed to those firms so that payment is received by the due date. 3. On or before February 24, 2023, Defendant's counsel (that is, both Cairncross & Hempelmann, and Shutts & Bowen), shall advise the Court as to whether the payments have been made in full by Plaintiff and its counsel as directed in this Order. If payment has not been made in full, Defendant shall have leave to file a motion seeking appropriate further relief such as a judgment or other appropriate relief. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, in the Southern District of Florida, this 8th day of February, 2023. Footnotes [1] This is part of a pattern in this case of Plaintiff and its counsel failing to comply with Court orders, rules, and directions. The Court assumes the reader's familiarity with the other Court orders and Court filings in this case.