American Career College, Inc. et al. v. Mario Oswaldo Medina, Sr., et al Case No. 2:21-cv-00698-PSG (SK) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed December 09, 2022 Counsel Edward M. Cramp, Karen Lehmann Alexander, Sarah Alexis Gilbert, Duane Morris LLP, San Diego, CA, Ayad Mathews, Bryce Aaron Young, San Diego, CA, Deanna Jean Lucci, Patricia P. Hollenbeck, Duane Morris LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for American Career College, Inc. et al. Jonathan J. Coleman, Robert Scott Harlan, Roy J. Jimenez, Tredway Lumsdaine and Doyle LLP, Long Beach, CA, for Mario Oswaldo Medina, Sr., et al. Kim, Steve, United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF DEFENDANT ORTIZ'S PROBATION OFFICE EMAILS *1 Plaintiffs seek the compelled disclosure of certain facially privileged emails (and their attachments) that Defendant Ortiz sent to or from his work email account in the possession, custody, and control of the Los Angeles County Probation Department. (ECF 216). Defendant Ortiz, as directed by the Court, submitted for in camera review the contested emails. (ECF 217, 219). Having completed its review, the Court finds that Defendant Ortiz waived the attorney-client privilege by sending to or from his work email account otherwise facially privileged emails. Not all those emails, however, are relevant and proportionate to the needs of the case, so even if the privilege has been waived as to all such emails, only a subset of those emails needs to be disclosed. Defendant Ortiz had no reasonable expectation of privacy in emails he sent to or from his work account. To make that assessment, courts consider these factors: “(1) is there a company policy banning personal use of e-mails?; (2) does the company monitor the use of its e-mail?; (3) does the company have access to all e-mails?; and (4) did the company notify the employee about these policies?” Tatung Co., Ltd. v. Hsu, 2016 WL 695971, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016). All those factors are met here. The Probation Department has a written policy stating that “[e]mployees shall not appropriate any County property, evidence, or recovered property for their private or personal use.” Los Angeles County Probation Department, Policy Manual 1100-2 (2010), https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/probation/1102323_PPM.pdf. A Probation Department representative confirmed that this is the Department's official policy during a November 2 hearing. (ECF 214 at 14). The manual states that “[t]here shall be no expectation of privacy when using the County email system, the Internet, and the Intranet” and that “[e]mail messages and attachments are the property of the Probation Department and not private communications, whether created or received, and may be subject to review by the Department at any time.” Policy Manual, at 1200-9 (emphasis added). The Department has a policy to monitor its employees' accounts for reported inappropriate email usage. Id. at 1200-12. And the Probation Department representative confirmed that Defendant Ortiz's violation of this policy is under investigation. (ECF 214 at 31). Defendant Ortiz does not contest any of this evidence. Courts have found waiver with even less evidence. See, e.g., Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 742 (7th Cir. 2002) (company's mere announcement that company laptop's could be searched defeated any reasonable expectation of privacy); Tatung, 2016 WL 695971, at *7; Sims v. Lakeside Sch., 2007 WL 2745367, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20, 2007) (no reasonable expectation of privacy for emails sent and received on school's email account where policy said the account is property of the school and should not be used for personal purposes). Nor do his arguments from the hearing address the legal factors courts must consider in this context. “It is unreasonable for any employee in this technological age ... to believe that her e-mails, sent directly from her company's e-mail address over its computers, would not be stored by the company and made available for retrieval.” Alamar Ranch, LLC v. Cnty. of Boise, 2009 WL 3669741, at *4 (D. Idaho Nov. 2, 2009). That principle, stated in 2009, holds even greater weight in 2022. Defendant Ortiz has thus failed to meet his burden to prove that the privilege has not been waived here. See Wadler v. Bio-Rad Lab'ys, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 3d 829, 851 (N.D. Cal. 2016). *2 As a result, the Court orders that these emails (and their attachments) described on the privilege log be produced to Plaintiffs immediately: Log entry 6 (file number 000014); Log entries 8-13 (file numbers 000012-13, 15-21); Log entry 15 (file numbers 000023-29); Log entries 31-32 (file numbers 000050-51); and Log entries 35-37 (file numbers 000054-62). The remaining emails listed on the log, even if no longer protected by the privilege, are either irrelevant or disproportionate to the needs of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Production of those emails is thus unjustified regardless of the waiver issue. IT IS SO ORDERED.