Jolie SAVAGE v. CITY OF WHITTIER, et al Case No. 2:21-cv-08067-VAP-PDx United States District Court, C.D. California Filed August 19, 2022 Counsel Catherine Ellen Rogers, Law Office of Kath Rogers, Los Angeles, CA, Rebecca Brown, National Lawyers Guild Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, Leslie Ivie, Restoration Law Center, Van Nuys, CA, Olu K. Orange, Orange Law Offices PC, Los Angeles, CA, for Jolie Savage. Daniel S. Cha, Greenberg Gross LLP, Costa Mesa, CA, Nathan A. Oyster, John Russell Horstmann, Burke Williams and Sorensen LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for City of Whittier, Mark Goodman, John Draper, Michael Przybyl, Jason Zuhlke, Jeffrey Robert. Nathan A. Oyster, Burke Williams and Sorensen LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for City of Whittier, Jeff Piper. Thomas Joseph Feeley, Law Offices of Thomas J. Feeley, P.C., Glendale, CA, for Mediator. Donahue, Patricia, United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Denying Without Prejudice Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Testimony [Dkt. No. 66] *1 After an informal discovery conference, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendant City of Whittier to provide deposition testimony pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) on five specified topics (the “Motion”). The Motion is fully briefed and the Court has read and considered all of the documents filed [Dkt. Nos. 66, 68, 70] and the two videos submitted by the City. The Court has also considered the arguments of counsel at the informal discovery conference. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied without prejudice. I. Background Plaintiff Jolie Savage filed a civil rights complaint against Defendants City of Whittier (the “City”), Whittier Police Department (“WPD”) Chief Jeff Piper, and WPD Officers Paul Segura, Mark Goodman, John Draper, Michael Przybyl, Jason Zuhlke, and Jeffrey Robert. [Dkt. No. 1.] The Complaint sets forth six claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: 1. Deprivation of First Amendment right to freedom of speech, against all Defendants; 2. Deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, against all Defendants; 3. Deprivation of Fourth Amendment right to protection from unlawful search and seizure, including the use of excessive force against all Defendants at the scene; 4. Conspiracy to violate civil rights, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, against all Defendants at the scene; 5. Unconstitutional policy, custom or procedure, under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against the City; and 6. Failure to train, supervise, discipline or correct, under City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), and Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991), against the City and Chief Piper. [Complaint, Dkt. No. 1.] Plaintiff alleges that on July 28, 2020, she attended a peaceful protest against police brutality, which was a counter-demonstration to an unlawful “Police Appreciation Parade” being held at the same time, outside the WPD station and surrounding blocks; that as an act of political protest, Plaintiff and other protesters positioned their bodies in the roadway to block cars involved in the parade; that pro-police motorists in the parade pushed and yelled at protesters; that WPD officers responding to the event focused their efforts exclusively on the protesters and allowed parade-goers to remain in the street and continue their activities without police interference; that some pro-police parade-goers became physically violent and threatening with the protesters; and that Plaintiff told two officers not to hurt a young unhoused man whom they had started pushing with their batons. [Id. at ¶¶ 18-20.] Plaintiff further alleges that unbeknownst to her, Defendant Segura sent orders over the police radio “to arrest a black female ... who was standing in the middle of the street”; that Plaintiff was one of only three Black individuals in the crowd; that at approximately 7:15 p.m., Defendants Goodman and Draper grabbed Plaintiff's arms and tackled her to the ground, and she landed on her back; that while she was on the ground, she felt an officer reach a hand over her nose and mouth and she feared her breathing would be obstructed; that she feared for her life; that four to five officers peered down at her as Defendants Goodman and Draper kneeled over her, still restraining her arms; that she could feel people stepping on her hair as officers formed a circle around her while she was pinned to the ground; that one of the officers on top of her briefly released her wrist and moved his hand toward her nose and mouth, and in fear for her life she tried and failed to bite him; that in response, an officer pushed his forearm into her face, pushing her face to the ground; that the Defendants turned her from her back onto her stomach, while still gripping her arms; that she felt an officer's knee pressing his weight against her back, she screamed that she could not breath, and the Defendants then stood her upright; that she struggled to see because her glasses had fallen, and she said she could not see; that Defendant Draper laughed asked “you can't breathe?”; and that she replied that she could not see and she tried to adjust her glasses using her shoulder. [Id. at ¶¶ 21-25.] *2 Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants walked her to a nearby parking lot; that she told an officer her handcuffs were painfully tight, the officer just stared at the handcuffs, which were behind her back, and her arm was bleeding in the location of the handcuffs. She alleges that she was taken to jail and booked; during her over ten hours in custody, no one answered her inquiry why she was being arrested, and she was searched three times. She further alleges that at about 1:00 a.m., she started feeling severe pain in her back and neck, asked to see a doctor, was told that someone would come to check on her, and no one did; that at approximately 4:30 a.m., she was released, and she was subsequently diagnosed with a left elbow fracture. [Id. at ¶¶ 26-29.] Plaintiff further alleges that alleged offense used to justify her arrest was tantamount to “jaywalking” (Vehicle Code 21954(A)), an infraction punishable by fine, not by incarceration, and the criminal charges against her were dismissed; that Defendants would not have detained her with such excessive force, but for her statements and her political activities; that she was singled out and targeted as one of only three Black people at the event; and that none of the Defendants intervened or attempted to stop any other Defendant from violating her rights. [Id. at ¶¶ 30-34.] The City contends there was a lawful basis for Plaintiff's arrest and the only force used was minimal. It disputes Plaintiff's description of the facts relating to her arrest on July 28, 2020, and it submits two video recordings taken on July 28, 2020. [Dkt. No. 68-3.] One is taken from the rooftop of the WPD and captures events leading up to Plaintiff's arrest (from a distance) and the aftermath. The other video, taken by a witness, shows Plaintiff's arrest from the ground level. [Id.] The Court has viewed both videos (Exhibits 1 and 2). Exhibit 1 is taken from the rooftop of the WPD, which appears to be a two-or three-story building. From that height and distance, it shows events in the street below, before, during and after Plaintiff's arrest. Exhibit 2 is a video recording taken by a witness at the scene on July 28, 2020, which shows events at ground level. Exhibit 1 shows a group protesting in front of the WPD and attempting to slow and block traffic, and cars are honking. It shows that several minutes before her arrest, Plaintiff stood in the street in front of two white vehicles and yelled obscenities at the occupants. (Ex. 1 at 4:26 – 6:37). It also shows that Plaintiff stopped blocking traffic, spoke with officers standing in the street, yelled at officers not to touch her, and pushed an officer. (Ex. 1 at 6:39 – 7:02). Officers in the street began to form a line to separate protesters from traffic. (Ex. 1 at 7:02 – 7:54). Plaintiff remained near the line (taunting officers, according to Defendants), until two officers identified by Defendants as Officers Goodman and Draper attempted to arrest Plaintiff and move her toward the sidewalk. (Ex. 1 at 7:55 – 7:58). After the officers moved Plaintiff approximately ten feet, she fell to the ground. (Ex. 1 at 7:59). Other protesters rushed towards the line of officers, which appears to cause the officers to form a partial circle around Plaintiff and the arresting officers. (Ex. 1 at 8:00 – 8:52). Another witness recorded the events immediately before Plaintiff's arrest and the arrest itself from the ground level. (See Ex. 2). While Plaintiff stood in front of the officer line, the two officers identified by Defendants as Officers Goodman and Draper took hold of Plaintiff's arm and attempted to effect an arrest. (Ex. 2 at 0:05 – 0:09). As officers attempted to move Plaintiff away from the officer line, Plaintiff fell to the ground and was lying on her back. (Ex. 2 at 0:09). An officer identified by Defendants as Officer Goodman used his right forearm to restrain Plaintiff after it appears that she attempted to bite him. (Ex. 2 at 0:19 – 0:20). Officers Goodman and Draper turned Plaintiff onto her stomach; Plaintiff shouted that she could not breathe; and Officer Draper stopped using his knee to restrain her and stepped back while still attempting to handcuff her. (Ex. 2 at 0:25 – 0:33). While Plaintiff's arrest was occurring, officers continued to hold the line to prevent protesters from accessing the arresting officers. (Ex. 2 at 0:34 – 1:20). After officers handcuffed Plaintiff, she was escorted from the scene and walked through the gate to the WPD. (Ex. 1 at 8:53 – 9:03). II. Pertinent Legal Standards *3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense” and proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).[1] Relevant information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id. In determining whether the discovery sought is proportional, the court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Rule 30 governs depositions and provides in pertinent part: In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) (emphasis added). The responding party has “a duty to make a conscientious, good-faith effort to designate knowledgeable persons for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions and to prepare them to fully and unevasively answer questions about the designated subject matter.” Pet Chalet Inc. v. Cnty. of Riverside, 2015 WL 13918268, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2015). Under Rule 37(a), a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery if an “entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6),” which includes an “incomplete disclosure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(A), 37(a)(3)(B)(ii), 37(a)(3)(C). “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). III. Discussion Plaintiff moves to compel the City to provide a deponent pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) to testify regarding topis C, D, E, G, and H (the “Disputed Topics”) in the deposition notice. [Dkt. No. 66-1.] Plaintiff contends that the Disputed Topics are relevant to her Monell, Canton and Larez claims and to Defendants' credibility. The Monell allegations in the Complaint are that the City has de facto policies, customs, and/or practices of: (i) harassing, intimidating, and threatening to arrest and arresting persons exercising their First Amendment rights of freedom of expression; (ii) inadequately investigating police officer employees upon complaints of misconduct or claims for damages involving police misconduct; (iii) failing to discipline, failing to investigate, and retaining personnel who falsely detain persons in violation of constitutional rights; and (iv) condoning, ratifying, failing to discipline, failing to investigate, and retaining personnel who use excessive and/or unjustified force upon persons with whom they come in contact in violation of constitutional rights. *4 [Dkt. No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 60.] The allegations based on Canton and Larez are that the City and Defendant Chief Piper: (i) have reason to know, based upon arrest reports, claims for damages, and among other things, that WPD officers and/or employees regularly engage in the misdeeds alleged in the Complaint; (ii) have failed to properly train, supervise and/or discipline WPD employees, officers, managers, and supervisors as to the legal requirements and protections applicable to detained persons under the U.S. and California Constitutions and other laws; and (iii) these failures amount to a de facto policy and are intentional and/or the result of the City and Chief Piper's deliberate indifference. [Id. ¶ 67.] To establish Monell liability absent a formal government policy, Plaintiff must present evidence of “practices of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents” and “[t]he custom must be so ‘persistent and wide-spread’ that it constitutes a ‘permanent and well settled city policy.’ ” Id. at 918. “[A] custom or practice can be inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded.” Hunter v. Cty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011). Failure to train government employees may constitute a sufficient policy under Monell if the failure constitutes “deliberate indifference” or otherwise “reflects a deliberate or conscious choice” by the government entity. Canton, 489 U.S. at 389-93 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a failure to supervise is “sufficiently inadequate,” it may amount to “deliberate indifference.” Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2008). Negligence in training or supervision does not give rise to a Monell claim; rather, the need to train must be “obvious.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). A. Category C Category C seeks testimony regarding any mechanism or program used by the City[2] from July 28, 2015, to July 28, 2020, for tracking data on actions by WPD officers, including but not limited to uses of force, deadly uses of force, use of restraint tactics and maneuvers, and the use of such data in any type of early warning system to detect potential concerns about officers' utilization of such uses, tactics and maneuvers. [Dkt. No. 66-1 at 5.] Defendants object to Category C as overbroad, imprecise, and impermissibly seeking information related to every WPD officer and information, such as deadly uses of force and officer-involved shootings, that is irrelevant. [Dkt. Nos. 66-2 at 5-6; 68 at 10.] Plaintiff responds that Category C seeks testimony regarding “two discreet and defined questions; first, if Defendant has a mechanism or program for tracking data on actions taken by [WPD] officers and second, if and how such data is used to detect potential concerns regarding officer behavior.” [Dkt. No. 70 at 4.] Plaintiff claims that Category C does not seek information relating to “every officer” with the WPD, but rather the City's data tracking system, which is relevant to her Monell claims. [Id.] *5 The Court agrees with Defendants that the term “actions by WPD officers” is vague, overly broad and not reasonably particularized because it is not defined other than as “including but is not limited to uses of force, deadly uses of force, and use of restraint tactics and maneuvers.” [Dkt. No. 68 at 10.] Whether the City has programs for tracking data on actions taken by WPD officers involving deadly force, which is not alleged in this case, is not probative of Plaintiff's Monell and Canton allegations. See Cathey v. City of Vallejo, 2015 WL 5734858, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (court found documents related to use of lethal force irrelevant to the plaintiff's claims of excessive force from overly tight handcuffs, as there was no suggestion of lethal force in the case); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 698, 706 (9th Cir. 2005) (defining lethal force as force that creates a substantial risk of causing death of serious bodily injury). Likewise, whether the City has programs for tracking data on all uses of force by WPD officers is not probative of WPD's policies, customs and practices in handling protests or in addressing, using force against, detaining, and/or arresting protesters. It is also not probative of whether or how WPD officers are trained to handle protests, respond to protesters, and use force against, detain, and/or arrest protesters. Category C sweeps too broadly and encompasses information that is not relevant. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to compel testimony on Category C, as currently written, is denied without prejudice. B. Categories D and E As to sworn members of the WPD, for the period July 28, 2015 to July 28, 2020, Plaintiff seeks testimony regarding all instances of use of force and/or restraint tactics and maneuvers (Category D) and regarding any disciplinary and/or corrective actions regarding use of force and/or restraint tactics and maneuvers (Category E). Plaintiff contends this testimony is relevant and proportional to the Monell claims because it seeks information necessary to establish widespread, persistent, permanent, well-settled practices – as well as repeated constitutional violations for which officers were not discharged or reprimanded. However, the caselaw does not support Plaintiff's broad argument that all uses of force by all WPD officers during the relevant time period are discoverable because she has brought Monell claims. As Defendants state, the phrase “use of force” encompasses a broad spectrum of possible actions, ranging from the application of handcuffs to deadly force, not all of which are relevant. [Dkt. No. 68 at 10-11.] Uses of force during the relevant time period in responding to protesters, including uses of force in detaining and/or arresting protesters, is probative of Plaintiff's claims that the City has a de facto policy, custom, and/or practice of harassing, intimidating and threatening to arrest and arresting persons exercising their First Amendment rights to assemble and speak. All uses of force in all situations are not probative thereof. Plaintiff also does not limit Categories D and E to the arresting officers, or to the officers on the scene. Plaintiff states that she seeks discovery of incidents throughout the municipality, which she contends will allow her to show that civil rights violations and/or unlawful customs related to her are widespread. In support of this argument, she cites Larez, in which the Ninth Circuit concluded that the evidence of a police department custom or policy to use excessive force was sufficient to establish liability. 946 F.2d at 646. However, the scope of discovery for the Monell claims was not at issue in Larez. In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Ninth Circuit discussed in detail the incident underlying the lawsuit, testimony by a police procedure expert regarding that incident and a study the expert had previously conducted of complaints against the police department, testimony that the police chief was “an official policy maker for the City on police matters,” and the testimony of the police chief. Larez, 946 F.2d at 633-637, 646-647. The discussion in Larez does not suggest that the plaintiff obtained discovery from the city regarding all uses of force during the relevant time period by all officers.[3] Plaintiff also cites Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007), in which the evidence proffered by the plaintiff to establish the policy of failing to train in the use of excessive force focused exclusively on the officer who had used force against the plaintiff. Failure to train one officer was insufficient to establish that the municipality had made the “deliberate” or “conscious” choice required by Canton. Id. at 484. *6 The discovery must be relevant. That Monell and Canton liability cannot be established based on one incident of alleged excessive and unjustified force does not automatically render all uses of force during the relevant period by all WPD officers and all disciplinary and/or corrective actions regarding use of force relevant. Uses of force during the relevant time period that were excessive, unjustified, or the subjects of disciplinary and/or corrective actions as to the two officers who used force against Plaintiff are relevant. Also, uses of force that were excessive, unjustified, or the subjects of disciplinary and/or corrective actions during the relevant time period by WPD officers in responding to protests are relevant. Other topics regarding uses of force may be relevant as well; the parties are far more familiar than the Court is with the facts of the case and are in a better position to prepare requests for discovery of relevant information. Categories D and E sweep too broadly. Additionally, Rule 30(b)(6) requires that the matters for examination be described “with reasonable particularity.” As phrased, Categories D and E fail to meet that standard. Under Rule 30(b)(6), a designated witness's testimony “represents the knowledge of the corporation, not of the individual deponents.” Stamps.com, Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., 2008 WL 11338241, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2008). The City therefore has a duty to prepare the designated person to testify competently on the noticed topics. Id. (“Accordingly, regardless of whether the individual deponent has personal knowledge on the designated topic, a corporation has a duty to make a conscientious, good-faith effort to designate knowledgeable persons for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions and to prepare them to fully and unevasively answer questions about the designated subject matter.”) (citation omitted). Categories D and E provide insufficient particularity for the City to prepare the designated person to testify competently on the noticed topics. Accordingly, the motion to compel testimony on Categories D and E, as currently written, is denied without prejudice. C. Categories G and H Category G seeks from July 28, 2015, to July 28, 2020, all complaints of unlawful or excessive use of force and/or restraint tactics and maneuvers made by any person against the six named Defendant WPD officers.[4] Category H seeks for that same time period, as to every complaint of unlawful or excessive use of force and/or restraint tactics and maneuvers made by any person against the six named Defendant WPD officers, the following: • the investigation into each complaint, including the names of principal investigators assigned to investigate the complaint and the scope of their investigation; • the extent to which senior WPD leadership was apprised of or involved in the investigation and if so who; • conclusions reached as to whether the actions of that Defendant were consistent with WPD policy; • the nature and extent of any discipline imposed on said Defendants as a result of the incident complained of or investigation into said incident; • the individuals involved in deciding upon and imposing any discipline on said Defendants; and • any policy, procedure, practice or protocol change(s) implemented by the WPD or by the City as a result of the incident complained of or investigation into said incident. The City objects on several grounds and without waiving these objections will produce a deponent to testify regarding (1) whether there are any Civilian Complaints or Internal Investigations from 2015 to the present for excessive force against Officers Draper or Goodman and (2) whether there any documents that are disclosable under SB 1421 or SB 16, which are codified at California Penal Code § 832.7 et. seq., for Officer Draper or Officer Goodman. [Dkt. No. 66-2 at 9-11.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Segura and Przybyl acted in a supervisory capacity and ordered Defendants Goodman and Draper to arrest her. [Dkt. No. 66 at 10-11.] She also alleges that Defendants Zuhlke and Robert surveilled her, and that Zuhlke communicated information about her to the other officers at the scene. [Id. at 11.] She argues broadly that any history of use of force, restraint tactics and maneuvers by Zuhlke, Robert, Segura, and Przybyl may establish a de facto policy of unlawful excessive force that resulted in excessive force being used upon her on July 28, 2020. She also argues that these topics are relevant to any failure by the City to discipline or correct these officers in response to prior uses of excessive force, thereby ratifying their conduct. *7 Plaintiff also cites cases in which the personnel files and internal affairs histories of defendant officers and non-defendant officers at the scene of alleged excessive force were relevant to Monell claims. See Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227, 229 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 611 (N.D Cal. 1995) (“Plaintiff's request for the internal affairs documents concerning the investigation of the specific incident described in the complaint is relevant and is not overbroad.”); Lavenant v. City of Palm Springs, 2019 WL 6139114, at *3-5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2019) (ordering the city to produce “complaints of excessive force involving officer-involved shootings, dishonesty, or illegal activities, and discrimination against persons with mental disabilities” during relevant time period); see also Curtin v. County of Orange, 2017 WL 5593025, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017) (ordering the county to produce documents relating to complaints regarding sexual assault and any corresponding disciplinary action during the five years prior to the incident for non-party responding officers in sexual assault case against a police officer). [Dkt. No. 70 at 2.] The disputed discovery was probative of the allegations, including the Monell claims, in the cases cited by Plaintiff. By contrast, in this case, Categories G and H are not connected to the allegations in the Complaint. Category G seeks complaints regarding excessive force. That can include deadly force which, as discussed above, is not alleged here. It also includes uses of force in situations entirely distinct from this case. The de facto policies alleged in the Complaint pertain to WPD officers' response to persons exercising their First Amendment rights -- the use of force against those persons; harassment, intimidation and threats to arrest those persons; arresting and detaining those persons, including use of force in effectuating the arrest and handcuffing; and responses to complaints of excessive force against a protester, including complaints of excessive force during the arrest and/or detention of a protestor – as well as failing to train and supervise regarding these topics, failing to investigate misconduct in connection with these topics, and retention of personnel who use excessive and/or unjustified force on these persons. The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff was arrested and subjected to excessive force during her arrest because of her race. Civilian Complaints or Internal Investigations (and the information listed in Category H) during the relevant time period against any of the six officer Defendants involving these topics are relevant. Also, Civilian Complaints or Internal Investigations (and the information listed in Category H) during the relevant time period against any of the six officer Defendants involving dishonesty or illegal activities are relevant to their credibility. However, as worded, Categories G and H are not relevant to the four officer Defendants who did not use force against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's motion to compel as to Categories G and H, as currently worded, is denied without prejudice. As to the relevant topics, the Court does not render any opinion whether they can be described with the particularity required by Rule 30(b)(6). The Court also notes that such information is frequently subject to a protective order, which the parties have not requested in this case.[5] IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the Court denies without prejudice Plaintiff's motion to compel testimony pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) regarding the Disputed Topics, as they are currently drafted. Because the denial is based on relevance and overbreadth, the Court does not address the parties' privilege arguments. Footnotes [1] The scope of permissible discovery after the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is no longer information that is “reasonably calculated to the lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” but is now subject to the proportionality requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). See Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2016 WL 146574, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2016). [2] The Deposition Notice defines the City to include all officers, representatives, employees, agents, consultants, attorneys, and any other person acting or purporting to act on the City's behalf. [3] Although the other cases cited by Plaintiff also address the sufficiency of the evidence, they do not discuss the scope of Monell discovery. See Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918-20, Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2008), and Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2011) also do not address the scope of discovery under Monell and Canton. [4] Categories G and H do not include Defendant WPD Chief Piper. [5] The Court has a model protective order on its Procedures and Schedules page on the Court website.