ABSOLUTE ACTIVIST VALUE MASTER FUND LIMITED, ABSOLUTE EAST WEST FUND LIMITED, ABSOLUTE EAST WEST MASTER FUND LIMITED, ABSOLUTE EUROPEAN CATALYST FUND LIMITED, ABSOLUTE GERMANY FUND LIMITED, ABSOLUTE INDIA FUND LIMITED, ABSOLUTE OCTANE FUND LIMITED, ABSOLUTE OCTANE MASTER FUND LIMITED and ABSOLUTE RETURN EUROPE FUND LIMITED, Plaintiffs, v. SUSAN ELAINE DEVINE, Defendant Case No. 2:15-cv-328-FtM-29MRM United States District Court, M.D. Florida Signed December 21, 2016 Counsel Christopher Dysard, David Spears, Linda Imes, Pro Hac Vice, Spears & Imes LLP, New York, NY, Dwayne Antonio Robinson, Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton LLP, Miami, FL, Kenneth R. Hartmann, Eric Samuel Kay, Kozyak, Tropin & Throckmorton, PA, Coral Gables, FL, Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Tucker Ronzetti, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs. Carl Francis Schoeppl, Schoeppl Law, P.A., Boca Raton, FL, Ian M. Comisky, Blank Rome, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Matthew D. Lee, Fox Rothschild LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant. McCoy, Mac R., United States Magistrate Judge AMENDED ORDER1 *1 This cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Emergency Motion for Protective Order, Stay of Plaintiffs’ Production of Documents to the Swiss Prosecutor, and for Related Relief (“Defendant's Emergency Motion”) (Doc. 248) filed on February 11, 2016. Additionally, the Court addresses Defendant's Motion to Strike “Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Submission Pursuant to the Court's April 14, 2016 Order” and “Declaration of David Spears in Support of Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Submission Pursuant to Court's April 14, 2016 Order” or, in the Alternative, for Leave to Submit Supplemental Brief and Expert Declaration in Response to Plaintiffs’ Submissions (“Defendant's Motion to Strike”) (Doc. 402) filed on June 9, 2016. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Emergency Motion (Doc. 248) and Defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. 402) are denied. I. Background On February 11, 2016, Defendant filed her Emergency Motion (Doc. 248) requesting “a protective order and a stay with regard to Plaintiffs’ announced production of documents to Swiss authorities.” The same day, the Court entered an Order (Doc. 249) regarding Defendant's Emergency Motion. The Court stated: Based upon Defendant's representations concerning the imminent production of certain documents by Plaintiffs to foreign authorities, the Court finds good cause to order an immediate stay of Plaintiffs’ production of the documents at issue pending the Court's resolution of Defendant's objections to the planned production. Accordingly, Plaintiffs shall not produce the documents at issue until such time as this Court enters an order authorizing the production to occur. (Doc. 249 at 1). On February 19, 2016, Plaintiffs responded (Doc. 268) and filed the declarations of Linda Imes (Doc. 269) and Amy Jeffress (Doc. 270) in support. On February 26, 2016, Defendant filed a reply (Doc. 305) with the affidavits of Bruce Zagaris (Doc. 305-2) and Tobias Zumbach (Doc. 305-3) in support. On March 4, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply (Doc. 308) with the affidavits of Linda Imes (Doc. 309), Georg Friedli (Doc. 310), and Amy Jeffress (Doc. 311) in support. On April 14, 2016, in lieu of a previously scheduled hearing on Defendant's Emergency Motion (Doc. 248), the Court required the parties’ tendered experts be made available for deposition within thirty (30) days of the date of the Order. (Doc. 363 at 3). Additionally, the Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs not to exceed twenty-five (25) pages in length explaining the effect, if any, of the experts’ deposition testimony on the issues raised by the Motion (Doc. 248) or any other discovery-related motion pending before the Court. (Id.). The Court also ordered the parties to file the transcripts of the depositions with the Court. (Id.). On May 10, 2016, the parties filed a stipulation (Doc. 378) as to their respective experts from Switzerland. The parties stated that they “learned of restrictions under Article 271(1) of the Swiss Penal Code on the taking of voluntary depositions in Switzerland.” (Doc. 378 at 2). As a result, the parties agreed that the depositions of Tobias Zumbach and Georg Friedli would not proceed and that the sworn declarations of those individuals would constitute the entirety of their testimony “to be considered by the Court as it deems appropriate.” (Id. at 2-3). *2 On May 31, 2016, the parties filed the deposition transcripts of Bruce Zagaris (Doc. 388) and Amy Jeffress (Doc. 389). The same day, Plaintiffs submitted their supplemental brief (Doc. 390) with the affidavit of David Spears (Doc. 391), and Defendant filed her supplemental brief (Doc. 392). On June 7, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Reply to Defendant's MLAT Supplemental Submission (Doc. 393). Plaintiffs wished to address “Devine's request that the redirect testimony of the Funds’ MLAT expert, Amy Jeffress, be stricken.” (Doc. 393 at 2). On June 8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their reply (Doc. 400). On June 9, 2016, Defendant filed her Motion to Strike. (Doc. 402). On June 23, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike. (Doc. 421). Additionally, on July 19, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ Notice of Supplemental Authority and Motion to Set Briefing Schedule. (Doc. 424 at 2). In doing so, the Court allowed the parties to address the effect, if any, of RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) on any pending discovery motion, including Defendant's Emergency Motion (Doc. 248). (Doc. 424 at 2). The parties filed supplemental briefs. (Docs. 426, 428, 450, 452). The issues presented have been extensively briefed and are ripe for consideration.[2] II. Background for Defendant's Emergency Motion (Doc. 248) Defendant seeks a protective order and a stay with regard to Plaintiffs’ announced production of documents to Swiss authorities. (Doc. 248 at 1). Defendant states that “Plaintiffs advised Ms. Devine that they intend to comply with an informal request for records – produced in discovery in this case by Ms. Devine and subject to this Court's Protective Order – from a prosecutor in Switzerland conducting a criminal investigation of Florian Homm and others.” (Id.). Defendant argues that “[t]his case, and the instant motion, present an extraordinary set of circumstances” because “[i]t is now clear that Plaintiffs are acting in a de facto joint venture with the prosecutorial arm of the Swiss government.” (Id. at 2). Defendant states that “the United States Department of Justice is conducting an ongoing grand jury investigation in the Central District of California of Ms. Devine's ex-husband, Florian Homm and others.” (Id.). Defendant further states that “[r]ecords of Ms. Devine and her accountants were subpoenaed by the grand jury and are subject to grand jury secrecy rules.” (Id.). Defendant states that “[a]t the request of the Swiss and through Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”) requests, the Swiss sought and the Office of International Affairs of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) provided grand jury information to the Swiss prosecutor.” (Id.).[3] *3 Defendant contends that, as part of their “de facto joint venture,” the Swiss prosecutor shared information with Plaintiffs gathered as part of the criminal investigation of Florian Homm and others. (Id.). Defendant contends that these documents include “records collected by the DOJ and shared with the Swiss pursuant to MLAT request.” (Id.). Defendant states that “Plaintiffs have employed these documents and records to support their Complaint and Amended Complaint, and used some of these documents during Ms. Devine's deposition at the commencement of this action.” (Id.). Defendant further states that “[i]t is apparent that the Plaintiffs and the Swiss prosecutor are in regular communication and Plaintiffs now intend to reciprocate by sharing with the Swiss prosecutor by way of an ‘informal’ request, records, and testimony, they have obtained from Ms. Devine in discovery in this civil matter, many of which are subject to this Court's Protective Order.” (Id.). Defendant contends that such production pursuant to the Swiss prosecutor's informal request for records violates the Court's Protective Order (Doc. 64), the U.S.-Swiss MLAT, and Ms. Devine's rights. (Doc. 248 at 2). Additionally, Defendant states that Plaintiffs’ proposed production to the Swiss prosecutor raises the following issues: (1) whether Plaintiffs can simply deny Ms. Devine's interpretation of this Court's Protective Order and make a production of records subject to that Protective Order to Swiss authorities without seeking a ruling; (2) whether Plaintiffs may permissibly turn over to Swiss authorities more documents produced in discovery by Ms. Devine than even the Swiss authorities requested; (3) whether Plaintiffs, seeking equitable relief in this Court, may utilize in support of their case, documents obtained in violation of the applicable rules for the collection of international evidence and U.S. grand jury secrecy rules; (4) whether Plaintiffs in a U.S. civil action may participate in a de facto joint venture with a foreign government to evade international evidence collection protocols; and (5) whether Swiss authorities may act in concert with Plaintiffs to evade Ms. Devine's rights under Swiss law. (Id. at 3-4 (emphasis in original)). The Court addresses each of these issues in turn below. III. The Parties’ Stipulation and Protective Order[4] A. Permissible Disclosure of Discovery Material to the Swiss Prosecutor under the Protective Order Defendant states that on February 8, 2016, Plaintiffs notified Defendant by letter “ostensibly pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Protective Order” of a request for documents from the Swiss prosecutor to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 248 at 6). Defendant summarized Plaintiffs’ letter, stating in pertinent part: Graziella de Falco Haldemann, the Swiss prosecutor, has requested that the Funds’ counsel produce Susan Devine's list of assets, the transcript of the July 29, 2015 deposition of Ms. Devine in this matter and any other relevant documents produced in response to Judge Steele's directives contained on pages 68-69 of the July 1, 2015 TRO. Documents responsive to the Swiss prosecutor's request include some that have been designated Confidential in whole or in part, including Ms. Devine's original Asset Listing (and the December 24, 2015 update), portions of Ms. Devine's July 29 deposition transcript, Exhibits 2 and 13 introduced during Ms. Devine's deposition, and certain exhibits from the July 30 hearing.... we intend to comply with the Swiss prosecutor's request and to produce the requested documents in the next day or two. (Doc. 248 at 6; see also Doc. 248-2 at 2). Defendant objects to the proposed production to the Swiss prosecutor based on paragraph 8 of the Protective Order, which provides in pertinent part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Protective Order, information or documents designated as Confidential by a Party under this Protective Order shall not be used or disclosed by any receiving Parties or their counsel ... for any purposes whatsoever other than preparing for and conducting the litigation in this lawsuit.” (Doc. 248 at 9 (citing Doc. 64 at ¶ 8)). Defendant contends that “Plaintiffs are engaged in a de facto joint venture with the Swiss prosecutor and are really utilizing documents from this case to support a private criminal complaint they have apparently submitted in Switzerland, as well as their asset recovery efforts.” (Id.). Defendant contends that “it is inconceivable that the Swiss prosecutor made her request with no input from Plaintiffs.” (Id.). Thus, Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs’ proposed production of documents is a violation of paragraph 8 of the Protective Order.” (Id.). *4 Additionally, pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Protective Order, Defendant states that “[a]s should be self-evident, there would be no point in providing for a notice provision if it did not provide the producing party with an opportunity to object.” (Id. at 10). Defendant contends that she “has exercised her right to object to Plaintiffs’ proposed production to the Swiss prosecutor, and requests judicial relief in support of that objection.” (Id.). Plaintiffs respond that Defendant “ignores the simple fact that the Protective Order – which Devine negotiated and executed – provides a mechanism for disclosing Confidential material ‘pursuant to a request for information from any international, federal or state criminal authority.’ ” (Doc. 268 at 10 (emphasis in original) (citing Doc. Doc. 64 at ¶ 14)).[5] Plaintiffs contend that “[t]here are no qualifications to [paragraph 14] apart from the notice requirement – which simply requires that the Funds ‘provide written notice of such request’ to Devine if she produced any of the Confidential material sought by the criminal authority.” (Id. at 10-11). Plaintiffs argue that “[b]ecause the Funds provided such notice to Devine, the Protective Order provides no room for her to stand in the way of the Funds’ production.” (Id. at 11). Further, Plaintiffs argue that paragraph 8 of the Protective Order “is not a lifeline because it provides certain limitations on the use of Confidential documents ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Protective Order.’ ” (Id. (emphasis in original)). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that “Paragraph 14 expressly provides for such an exception when a request is made by a criminal authority ‘[n]otwithstanding any provision of [the] Protective Order.’ ” (Id.). Plaintiffs contend that “Devine asks the Court to re-write the Protective Order by adding a provision that would permit Devine to prevent production once notice is given.” (Id.). Moreover, Plaintiffs state that “the Protective Order does not distinguish between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ requests; it authorizes production in response to any request ‘from any international, federal or state criminal authority.’ ” (Id. at 12 (emphasis in original)). In her reply (Doc. 305), Defendant contends that paragraph 8 stands for the proposition that the “agreement that forbids the use of information designated as confidential outside of the litigation not only prohibits Plaintiffs’ from using that information outside of this litigation” but that it “also entitles Ms. Devine to object to Plaintiffs’ efforts to do so and to seek any relief that is necessary for any threatened or actual breach of that limitation on use.” (Doc. 305 at 6-7 (emphasis in original)). Defendant posits that “[w]hat purpose would the advance notice provision of Paragraph 14 serve if a notified party were powerless to move to quash a subpoena or for a protective order to prevent the disclosure of information or to enforce her rights under applicable domestic or foreign laws?” (Id. at 7 (emphasis in original)). Defendant also points to paragraph 11, which states that “[n]othing in this Protective Order limits the right of any Party to seek any protection it deems necessary for any documents or information, in accordance with Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Id. at 7-8 (citing Doc. 64 at ¶ 11)). *5 Additionally, Defendant contends that “the Protective Order does not prohibit any domestic or foreign government from obtaining relevant information, through the appropriate legal process, whether it be through a lawful subpoena or a request pursuant to an MLAT or under 28 U.S.C. § 1782.” (Id. at 8). Here, Defendant argues that she “did not waive any of her rights to prevent disclosure under appropriate circumstances, and any lawful request must follow the appropriate legal procedure.” (Id.). Finally, Defendant contends that “even if Plaintiffs’ interpretation were correct ... and its [sic] proposed production were not overbroad, it was not Ms. Devine's intention in agreeing to the Protective Order that a solicited ‘informal’ request could result in information being turned over to a foreign prosecutor.” (Id. at 10). As such, in the alternative, Defendant “requests that this Court modify the Protective Order to explicitly preclude the turnover of confidential documents pursuant to informal and non-compulsory requests, particularly when those requests are solicited by Plaintiffs, as with the request at issue here.” (Id.). In their sur-reply (Doc. 308), Plaintiffs contend that, although Defendant cites paragraph 11 of the Protective Order, Defendant “has not identified any basis for relief under Rule 26 independent of the Protective Order.” (Doc. 308 at 4). Moreover, even if Defendant has the right under the Protective Order “to demand that the Court adjudicate the propriety of every ‘request for information from any international, federal or state criminal authority,’ ” Plaintiffs argue that “the Protective Order expressly permits the production requested by the Swiss prosecutor, and, as an agreement negotiated by the parties, the Protective Order should be enforced strictly according to its terms.” (Id.). *6 The parties’ Protective Order, in relevant part, states: 8. Except as otherwise provided in this Protective Order, information or documents designated as Confidential by a Party under this Protective Order shall not be used or disclosed by any receiving Parties or their counsel or any persons or entities identified in Paragraph 1 or 9 of this Protective Order for any purposes whatsoever other than preparing for and conducting the litigation in this lawsuit (including any appeals). (Doc. 64 at ¶ 8). Paragraph 8 of the Protective Order clearly limits the parties’ use and disclosure of information or documents designated as Confidential. (See id.). Nevertheless, the Protective Order also states: 14. Notwithstanding any provision of this Protective Order, the Parties may disclose Discovery Material marked as Confidential if necessary to comply with a subpoena or court order, whether or not originating with the Court in this captioned Protective Order; pursuant to any other form of legal process from any court, any international, federal or state regulatory or administrative body, any international, federal or state agency, any legislative body, or any other person or entity; or pursuant to a request for information from any international, federal or state criminal authority. In the event a Party receives a request for production of Discovery Material marked as Confidential pursuant to (1) subpoena or court order, (2) any form of legal process, or (3) request from any criminal authority seeking disclosure, such Party must provide written notice of such request to the Party that produced such Discovery Material before the Party receiving such request complies with such request. (Doc. 64 at ¶ 14 (emphasis added)). Paragraph 14 of the Protective Order provides three clear instances where disclosure of Discovery Material marked as Confidential is permitted “Notwithstanding any provision of this Protective Order.” (Id. (emphasis added)).[6] The first instance is when it is “necessary to comply with a subpoena or court order, whether or not originating with the Court in this captioned Protective Order.” (Id.). The second instance is “pursuant to any other form of legal process from any court, any international, federal or state regulatory or administrative body, any international, federal or state agency, any legislative body, or any other person or entity.” (Id.). The final instance is “pursuant to a request for information from any international, federal or state criminal authority.” (Id.). Here, the parties do not dispute that some of the Discovery Material that Plaintiffs proposed to produce in response to the Swiss prosecutor's request was designated as Confidential by Defendant. Nevertheless, an international criminal authority – the Swiss prosecutor Graziella de Falco Haldemann – requested information from Plaintiffs. (Doc. 248 at 6; see also Doc. 248-2 at 2). Pursuant to the unambiguous language of paragraph 14 of the Protective Order, Plaintiffs are expressly permitted to disclose Discovery Material marked as Confidential by Defendant to the Swiss prosecutor because the Swiss prosecutor is an international criminal authority requesting the information. (See Doc. 64 at ¶ 14). Thus, the Court finds that Protective Order expressly permits Plaintiffs to comply with the Swiss prosecutor's request. Further, paragraph 14 does not specifically address the difference between formal and informal requests. (See Doc. 64 at ¶ 14). On this point, the Court notes that the parties negotiated the terms of the Protective Order and agreed to be bound to them. If the parties wished to preclude disclosure pursuant “informal” requests from criminal authorities, then the parties could have included that term in their stipulation. That term is not included in the Protective Order, however, and the Court is unwilling to add a term or to create a new exception to prevent such disclosure pursuant to “informal” requests after the fact. Accordingly, the Court finds the plain language of the Protective Order does not prohibit disclosure pursuant to “informal” requests. *7 Because paragraph 14 of the Protective Order allows for the disclosure of Discovery Material marked as Confidential by Defendant to the Swiss prosecutor, the Court must look to the terms of the Protective Order to see what procedures must be undertaken before Plaintiffs can properly comply with the request. Paragraph 14 states, in pertinent part, that “[i]n the event a Party receives a request for production of Discovery Material marked as Confidential pursuant to ... [a] request from any criminal authority seeking disclosure, such Party must provide written notice of such request to the Party that produced such Discovery Material before the Party receiving such request complies with such request.” (Doc. 64 at ¶ 14 (emphasis added)). On this point, Defendant contends that “[t]he clear intent of this provision was to provide notice to the party making the confidentiality designation,” not necessarily the party or third-party that produced the documents. (Doc. 305 at 9 n.7 (citing Doc. 248-4)). Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs know it, as they disclosed to Ms. Devine the third-party documents they proposed to produce.” (Id.). Defendant contends that even were that not the case, Plaintiffs have not indicated that they provided any notice to the third-parties that produced the documents – Deutsche Bank or Bank of America – of their proposed production. (Id.). Defendant's point is well-taken. “Party” is defined in the Protective Order as “the parties to this litigation.” (Doc. 64 at 1). The term “Discovery Material,” however, includes documents produced between the Parties and by third-parties obtained through subpoenas. (See id. at ¶ 2). Thus, the terminology in paragraph 14 of the Protective Order appears to be internally inconsistent and vague to the extent that a “Party” might not have actually “produced” relevant Discovery Material—because a third party may have done so.[7] In light of this inconsistency, the Court hereby construes the second sentence of paragraph 14 as requiring notice to the “Party” that designated the materials as “Confidential” before the Discovery Material is disclosed.[8] B. Production in Excess of the Swiss Prosecutor's Request The Court next addresses Defendant's contention that the proposed production to the Swiss prosecutor actually exceeds the request from the Swiss prosecutor. For this issue, the parties disagree whether paragraph 14 of the Protective Order allows for Defendant to object to the proposed production to the Swiss prosecutor in the first place. Defendant argues that she can object. (Doc. 305 at 7). Plaintiffs argue, however, that the documents they propose to disclose to the Swiss prosecutor “are not even covered by the notice provision of Paragraph 14, which only requires notice when Confidential documents produced by Devine are to be disclosed.” (Doc. 268 at 12 (emphasis in original)). On this point, paragraph 14 does not specifically address whether any party is permitted to object after notice is given. Nonetheless, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1), the Court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ....” Although Plaintiffs argue that Defendant “has not identified any basis for relief under Rule 26 independent of the Protective Order” (Doc. 308 at 4), the decision to enter a protective order is within the Court's discretion and does not depend on a legal privilege. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (citing Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1985)). Further, paragraph 11 states that “[n]othing in this Protective Order limits the right of any Party to seek any protection it deems necessary for any documents or information, in accordance with Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Doc. 64 at ¶ 11). Accordingly, the Court finds that although paragraph 14 does not specifically address objections, paragraph 11 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) provide Defendant ample authority to contest any proposed production of Discovery Material to the Swiss prosecutor upon receiving notice of the intended production. Thus, while Plaintiffs are not precluded by the Protective Order from disclosing Discovery Material to the Swiss prosecutor, Defendant may object to the scope of proposed production of Discovery Material to the Swiss prosecutor pursuant to paragraph 11 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). *8 In the request for information from the Swiss prosecutor to Plaintiffs, the Swiss prosecutor made two specific requests: (1) “any documentation related to the transactions indicated on Pages 22 to 34 of the criminal complaint” and (2) “the list of assets, records of the hearing of Susan DEVINE, as well as any other document related to it arising from the requests of the abovementioned Federal Judge, which were mentioned on Pages 68 and 69 of [Judge Steele's July 1, 2015 ruling].” (Doc. 248-1 at 5).[9] In their response (Doc. 268), Plaintiffs state that the specific transactions referenced on pages 22-34 of that complaint include: (1) transfers by Devine to purchase gold coins involving Marius Grossenbacher; (2) Devine's transfers of funds held by the Floma Foundation; (3) transfers from the Brek Stiftung and Devine accounts at PHZ Privat- und Handelsbank (“PHZ”) shortly before those accounts were frozen; and (4) transfers from the Hosifa Stiftung account at PHZ after the Brek Stiftung and Devine accounts at PHZ were frozen. (Doc. 268 at 9). Plaintiffs state that they identified the following documents as being responsive to the Swiss prosecutor's request for information: (1) the July 22, 2015 Asset Listing produced by Devine pursuant to the Court's expedited discovery order in the TRO and the December 24 update; (2) Devine's July 29, 2015 deposition transcript and exhibits; (3) the transcript of the July 30, 2015 hearing before the Court concerning Devine's motion to modify the TRO, and the exhibits offered at that hearing; and (4) certain documents provided by third parties pursuant to subpoenas in this action relating to transfers from Devine's accounts at PHZ to institutions in the United States, as described in pages 22-34 of the Swiss criminal complaint. (Id. at 9-10). Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ proposed production of Discovery Material to the Swiss prosecutor exceeds the actual request from the Swiss prosecutor. (Doc. 248 at 11). Specifically, as to the first request, Defendant contends that the documents Plaintiffs propose to disclose “in no way reference a transfer for the purchase of gold coins involving Marius Grossenbacher, transfers of funds held by the Floma Foundation, or any funds from PHZ.” (Doc. 305 at 9). Defendant contends that the purpose of producing more materials than actually requested is “a clear attempt to facilitate the Swiss prosecutor's investigation with information she did not think (or know) to request.” (Doc. 248 at 11). Defendant states that “[i]t appears that using the ‘license’ of the letter request, Plaintiffs wish to send documents that they would wish the Swiss prosecutor to review, whether they were requested or not.” (Doc. 305 at 9). As to the Swiss prosecutor's second request, Defendant argues that “the Swiss prosecutor is clearly seeking documents related to this Court's order of expedited discovery.” (Id. (citing Doc. 248-5 at 1)). Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs nowhere explain how the documents they propose to produce ‘resulted from’ the expedited discovery ordered by the Court on July 1, 2015.” (Id. (citing Doc. 10 at 68-69)). Specifically, Defendant argues that “this request does not apply to Ms. Devine's December 24, 2015 asset listing, which was submitted in response to an Order to Show Cause issued by the Court on December 7, 2015, not as a result of the Court's expedited discovery order.” (Id. (citing Docs. 156, 176)). Defendant states that “Plaintiffs do not even address Ms. Devine's argument that the Swiss prosecutor's request for ‘minutes of the hearing’ is ambiguous and that they are proposing to produce both Ms. Devine's deposition transcript and the July 30, 2015 hearing transcript in response because they do not know what is being requested.” (Id.). Thus, Defendant argues that “it is apparent that the Plaintiffs seek to act as a conduit for the Swiss prosecutor in this action.” (Id.). *9 Plaintiffs disagree. (See Doc. 308 at 14-16). Plaintiffs argue that their proposed production is, in fact, within the scope of the request. (Id.).[10] Specifically, as to the first request, Plaintiffs contend that the documents from third-party Deutsche Bank reflects wire transfers made by Defendant “from her accounts at PHZ to avoid the Swiss freezes of those accounts.” (Id. at 14). Plaintiffs contend that the Swiss criminal complaint discusses these transfers on pages 28 and 33. (Id. at 15). Plaintiffs argue that, simply because the request from the Swiss prosecutor does not say the word “PHZ” does not mean that the documents are not subject to the request. (Id.). As to the second request, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs are taking advantage of the ambiguity in the request for “minutes of the hearing” is without merit. (Id. at 15-16). Plaintiffs argue that they “propose to produce the deposition transcript and exhibits because the Swiss prosecutor additionally asked for all documents referred to in the Court's expedited discovery order on pages 68-69 of the TRO, which includes Devine's July 29 deposition.” (Id. at 16 (emphasis in original)). Plaintiffs state that “[t]he Court's expedited discovery order also required Devine to produce the July 22 Asset Listing” and that “[b]y Devine's own admission, this Asset Listing was incorrect [ ], and it was only corrected when Devine produced her December 24 Asset Listing after being forced to do so by the Court's Order finding that she had violated the TRO.” (Id.). Thus, Plaintiffs contend that “both Asset Listings are properly included in the Funds’ production.” (Id.). In this instance, the Court finds that Defendant has not met her burden of showing that good cause exists to preclude Plaintiffs’ proposed disclosure to the Swiss prosecutor. To grant a protective order, Defendant must make “a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Auto-Owners, 231 F.R.D. at 429-30. Here, Defendant has not made a particular and specific demonstration of fact. Instead, she has only made conclusory statements that Plaintiffs’ proposed disclosure exceeds the scope of the request from the Swiss prosecutor. Moreover, upon review, the documents that Plaintiffs propose to disclose appear to be fairly implicated and encompassed by the Swiss prosecutor's request. As such, the Court is not prepared to prevent the disclosure of information pursuant to a lawful request when that production is expressly permitted by the parties’ negotiated Protective Order and not clearly in violation of the Protective Order. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's Emergency Motion on this ground. IV. The Alleged “De Facto Joint Venture” While the Court partly described the alleged joint venture above, it bears repeating here. According to Defendant, the DOJ is conducting an ongoing grand jury investigation in the Central District of California of Ms. Devine's ex-husband, Florian Homm and others. (Doc. 248 at 2). In those grand jury proceedings, certain records of Defendant and her accountants were subpoenaed by the grand jury. (Id.). At least some documents from those grand jury proceedings were transmitted to Swiss authorities through the U.S.-Swiss MLAT. (Id.). Later, the Swiss prosecutor provided Plaintiffs access to those documents in Switzerland. (Id.). *10 Defendant contends that the production of those documents to Plaintiffs is the result of a “de facto joint venture” between Plaintiffs and the Swiss prosecutor. (Id.). Defendant states that “[i]t is apparent that the Plaintiffs and the Swiss prosecutor are in regular communication and Plaintiffs now intend to reciprocate by sharing with the Swiss prosecutor by way of an ‘informal’ request, records, and testimony, they have obtained from Ms. Devine in discovery in this civil matter, many of which are subject to this Court's Protective Order.” (Id.). Defendant contends that this de facto joint venture violates the U.S.-Swiss MLAT, 28 U.S.C. § 1782, relevant grand jury secrecy rules, and Defendant's due process rights; thus necessitating the need for a protective order. (See Doc. 248 at 11-20). Plaintiffs dispute the assertion that they are in a collusive joint venture with the Swiss prosecutor. Specifically, Plaintiffs state that “[s]ince 2009, the Swiss prosecutor has been investigating, among others, Devine's former husband, Florian Wilhelm Jürgen Homm, and Urs Meisterhans for their laundering of improperly obtained assets, including funds obtained by fraud through the Penny Stock Scheme alleged in the Amended Complaint in this action.” (Doc. 248 at 3). As victims of the alleged crime, Plaintiffs indicate that Swiss law entitles them to access to the Swiss prosecutor's file. (Id.). In fact, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant has the same access to the Swiss file as Plaintiffs. (Id. at 4). Plaintiffs further state that their use of the material from the Swiss prosecutor's file is/was governed by an “order” from the Swiss prosecutor. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiffs state that on June 7, 2013, the Swiss prosecutor issued an order, which was provided concurrently to Defendant's Swiss counsel, authorizing “consultation of the file but temporarily prohibited the Funds from reproducing and disclosing the materials ‘until the end of the mutual judicial assistance procedure with the United States,’ pursuant to Article 73 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code (“SCPC”).” (Id.). Plaintiffs contend that “[o]n July 14, 2014, the Swiss prosecutor confirmed to the Funds’ Swiss counsel that the MLAT proceedings had been closed.” (Id.). Further, Plaintiffs state that on August 24, 2015, the Swiss prosecutor confirmed to Defendant's Swiss counsel that “the MLAT process was closed as of June 17, 2014.” (Id.). Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Swiss file contains documents received from MLAT proceedings, nor do they dispute that some of the documents were derived from grand jury proceedings. (Id. at 6). Instead, Plaintiffs contend that they acted within their rights under Swiss and domestic law such that the MLAT, 28 U.S.C. § 1782, relevant grand jury secrecy rules, and Defendant's due process rights are not implicated. (See Doc. 268; see also Doc. 308). A. Grand Jury Secrecy The Court first addresses Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs circumvented grand jury secrecy rules. Defendant contends that the proper procedure for obtaining grand jury materials was “to seek the disclosure of such materials from the Department of Justice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), as the documents Plaintiffs obtained originated from the government.” (Doc. 305 at 21). Defendant contends that Rule 6(e)(2)(E)(i) permits disclosure only if “particularized need” is shown and if “preliminarily or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” (Id. (citing United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 442-43 (1983)). Defendant argues that “[i]nstead, Plaintiffs clearly and unapologetically used their relationship with the Swiss prosecutor to obtain documents that they knew they would not be able to get from the Department of Justice because the documents at issue were produced to an active grand jury.” (Id.). Defendant contends that “Plaintiffs’ circuitous obtainment of grand jury documents from the Swiss prosecutor (who was entitled to obtain them by way of MLAT and through Rule 6(e)(2)(E)(iii) (an exception for government to government exchanges ‘in an official criminal investigation’) is a clear evasion of grand jury secrecy rules.” (Id.). Thus, Defendant states that “Plaintiffs’ arguments must be seen for what they are, a clear attempt to justify going around grand jury secrecy rules to promote their own interests” and that “[p]ermitting such a facile bypass of grand jury secrecy would have severe consequences within our legal system.” (Id.). *11 Plaintiffs disagree. (Doc. 268 at 22). Plaintiffs argue that the plain language of Rule 6 “imposes secrecy obligations only on a specific list of individuals involved with a grand jury proceeding” and that Plaintiffs are not on that list. (Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B))). Moreover, Plaintiffs point to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(A), which provides that “[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B).” (Doc. 268 at 22 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(A)-(B))). Plaintiffs note Defendant's acknowledgement that Rule 6(e) “permits disclosure ‘at the request of the government, when sought by a foreign court or prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation.’ ” (Doc. 268 at 22). Thus, Plaintiffs posit that “[p]resumably, the DOJ, which unlike the Funds is subject to the secrecy rules, followed all applicable procedures in disclosing the Collins materials to the Swiss prosecutor.” (Id. at 22-23 (emphasis in original)). Additionally, Plaintiffs take issue with Defendant's contention that they could not have “ever obtained information produced to an active grand jury in the United States.” (Id. at 23). Plaintiffs state that they can seek and have sought materials through civil discovery. (Id.). Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that “there is no blanket rule in this Circuit that all material produced pursuant to a grand jury subpoena is subject to Rule 6(e) secrecy in the first place.” (Id.). Indeed, Plaintiffs contend that Rule 6(e) only “prohibits a government attorney from disclosing ‘matter[s] occurring before the grand jury.’ ” (Id.). Plaintiffs argue that the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted “matter[s] occurring before the grand jury” to mean “anything that will reveal what transpired during the grand jury proceedings.” (Id. (citing United States v. Phillips, 843 F.2d 438, 441 (11th Cir. 1988)). Thus, Plaintiffs argue that “ ‘only documents that reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury investigation should be subject to the restrictions of [R]ule 6(e).’ ” (Id. (citing Phillips, 843 F.2d at 441)). Plaintiffs contend that Defendant has not shown that the documents in the Swiss file fall within the scope of Rule 6(e), much less that the Rule was violated by a U.S. federal prosecutor. (Id.). Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that they “had no obligation to preserve grand jury secrecy,” and, thus, “no obligation to actively avoid the documents in the Swiss file, which they had every right to access and use.” (Doc. 308 at 25). Upon review of the applicable legal standards and the parties’ arguments, the Court denies Defendant's Emergency Motion on this ground. Specifically, Defendant has not shown how grand jury secrecy rules apply to Plaintiffs under the circumstances presented here. Indeed, it is unclear how Plaintiffs could be subject to grand jury secrecy at all based on the circumstances alleged by Defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e)(2)(A) states that “[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B).” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B) states: Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury: (i) a grand juror; (ii) an interpreter; (iii) a court reporter; (iv) an operator of a recording device; (v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony; (vi) an attorney for the government; or (vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii). There is no category of persons listed above to which Plaintiffs could be included. Thus, under the Rule, no obligation of secrecy is imposed on Plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e)(2)(A). Moreover, DOJ attorneys are expressly permitted to make disclosures with court authorization, “when sought by a foreign court or prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e)(2)(E)(iii). Defendant has not shown that any DOJ attorneys violated the grand jury secrecy rules in complying with those requests. Furthermore, while DOJ attorneys are subject to grand jury secrecy rules, foreign prosecutors do not appear to be subject to those rules. See id. Thus, any disclosure of grand jury documents by the Swiss prosecutor obtained from DOJ attorneys in the United States does not appear to violate grand jury secrecy rules. *12 Likewise, Defendant has made no showing how documents used or obtained in grand jury proceedings are completely protected from any future disclosure. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B) only prevents persons from disclosing “a matter occurring before the grand jury.” As Plaintiffs note, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[t]he term ‘matters occurring before a grand jury’ has been defined to include anything that will reveal what transpired during the grand jury proceedings.” Phillips, 843 F.2d at 441 (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1980)). In Phillips, the Court refused to overturn the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress when “the documents in question in no way indicated the pattern of the grand jury investigation or the deliberations of the grand jury” and, therefore, “the later release of those documents could not compromise the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings.” (Id.). The Court stated that “only documents that reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury investigation should be subject to the restrictions of rule 6(e).” (Id.). In this case, Defendant has not shown how the documents received by Plaintiffs disclose “a matter occurring before the grand jury.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B). There is no allegation that the documents somehow “reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury investigation” or that they show “the pattern of the grand jury investigation or the deliberations of the grand jury.” See Phillips, 843 F.2d at 441. Instead, the Court is left with only conclusory allegations by Defendant that a conspiracy between the Swiss prosecutor and Plaintiffs – neither of which are subject to grand jury secrecy rules – somehow conspired to circumvent grand jury secrecy rules. These conclusory allegations fall far short of the “particular and specific demonstration of fact” this Court requires to issue a protective order. Auto-Owners, 231 F.R.D. at 429-30. Accordingly, Defendant has not shown that grand jury secrecy rules were violated such that good cause exists to issue a protective order. B. U.S.-Swiss MLAT and 28 U.S.C. § 1782 The Court next addresses Defendant's contention that the de facto joint venture violates the U.S.-Swiss MLAT and 28 U.S.C. § 1782. i. The Parties’ Original Briefing Defendant contends that the Swiss prosecutor's request to Plaintiffs stems from Plaintiffs’ violation of the U.S.-Swiss MLAT. (Doc. 248 at 11). Defendant contends that “Article 5 of the MLAT limits how documentation obtained pursuant to the treaty may be used, and prohibits Plaintiffs’ use of information collected by the Swiss prosecutor through the MLAT process in this civil proceeding.” (Id. at 13). Defendant contends that “Article 5 limits the use of information obtained via the MLAT procedure to investigative purposes, or other proceedings related to the offense for which assistance was granted, or other criminal and civil damages proceedings in the ‘requesting State.’ ” (Id.). In support, Defendant obtained an expert – Bruce Zagaris – who opined that “[n]othing in the MLAT permits Plaintiffs to utilize documents the Swiss prosecutor obtained from the U.S. DOJ pursuant to the MLAT process in a civil action in the United States, but that is precisely what Plaintiffs have done here.” (Id. (citing Doc. 248-1 at ¶ 31-32)). Instead, Mr. Zagaris opines that “[t]he appropriate procedure would have been for Plaintiffs to subpoena such evidence from the DOJ.” (Id.). Additionally, Defendant contends that “[t]he Swiss prosecutor's informal request for information to Plaintiffs is an improper attempt to circumvent the existing and long standing international channels for obtaining discovery within this jurisdiction by unilaterally seeking confidential data in the U.S. from a private party that has received that data in discovery.” (Id. at 15). Defendant states that “[i]f the Swiss prosecutor seeks information from Ms. Devine, she must go through the appropriate legal process to request such information from the U.S. government.” (Id.). Here, rather than following the proper process, Defendant argues that “the Swiss prosecutor's ‘informal request,’ undoubtedly at Plaintiffs suggestion, bypasses the MLAT and other legal methods, such as a request under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, in order to collect documents and testimony subject to the protective order entered by this Court.” (Id.). *13 Specifically, Defendant states that “[t]he Swiss prosecutor has made at least one MLAT request to the United States government for help in collecting information.” (Id.). Mr. Zagaris opines that “[b]ecause the Swiss prosecutor's request concerns the production of documents by parties in litigation in the United States, the MLAT governs.” (Id. (citing Doc. 248-1 at ¶ 22)). Defendant cites Article 38(1) of the MLAT which provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]henever the procedures provided by this Treaty would facilitate assistance in criminal matters between the contracting parties provided under any other convention or under the law in the requested state, the procedure provided by this Treaty shall be used to furnish such assistance.” (Id. at 15-16 (emphasis in original)). Defendant further argues that “[t]he bedrock principle that treaties are binding and must be performed in good faith, means that the Swiss Prosecutor must seek to utilize the MLAT procedures rather to circumvent them by way of a de facto joint venture with private litigants.” (Id.). Defendant further contends that the proposed documents for disclosure “are not Plaintiffs’ to turn over to the Swiss prosecutor” and that “Plaintiffs may not act as a conduit pursuant to a de facto joint venture with a foreign government to circumvent treaty requirements.” (Id. at 17). As an alternative to the MLAT process, Defendant states that the Swiss prosecutor could make a request pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782. (Id.). Plaintiffs disagree. (See Doc. 268). Plaintiffs contend that the Swiss prosecutor was not limited only to the MLAT or 28 U.S.C. § 1782. (Doc. 268 at 14 (citing Doc. 270 at 4-8)). In support, Plaintiffs cite their expert, Amy Jeffress, who opines that the MLAT does not even apply to Plaintiffs. (Id.). Ms. Jeffress points to Article 38(1), stating that the U.S.-Swiss MLAT only applies “between the contracting parties”—i.e., the United States and Switzerland. (Id. (citing Doc. 270 at ¶ 25)). Plaintiffs argue that “the MLAT does not govern information requests from the Swiss prosecutor to private parties who are subject to her jurisdiction, such as the Funds.” (Doc. 268 at 14). Plaintiffs point to Article 38(2), which states “[t]his Treaty shall not prevent the Contracting Parties from conducting investigations and proceedings in criminal matters in accordance with their respective municipal laws.” (Id. at 15). Plaintiffs contend that their status as victim-claimants, under Swiss law, allowed the Swiss prosecutor to request documents directly from Plaintiffs, who are “generally obliged to cooperate with that investigation.” (Id.). Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that the Swiss prosecutor was not “required to make a request pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which authorizes a court order of discovery from a person who resides in the district court's district” because Plaintiffs are Cayman Islands entities. (Doc. 268 at 15). Additionally, Plaintiffs state that “nothing in Section 1782 requires use of this mechanism.” (Id.). Instead, Plaintiffs point out that the statute provides that it “ ‘does not preclude a person within the United States from voluntarily ... producing a document ... for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal before any person and in any manner acceptable to him.’ ” (Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782(b))). Plaintiffs further reject the notion that the materials provided by Defendant to Plaintiffs in discovery “belong to Ms. Devine.” (Id. at 16 n.11). In support, Plaintiffs cite numerous cases for the proposition that a party may use evidence obtained in discovery as it sees fit. (Id. at 16). For instance, Plaintiffs contend that “[c]ross-use of discovery materials is permissible even where the collateral proceeding is abroad, and can even be the basis for modifying a protective order to loosen the restrictions on sharing documents.” (Id. (citing In re Kolon Indus. Inc., 479 F. App'x 483, 485-86 (4th Cir. 2012)). Plaintiffs further contend that, notwithstanding Defendant's arguments to the contrary, the parties’ Protective Order “already includes a negotiated exception authorizing disclosure by the Funds when they receive a request for Confidential documents from an international criminal authority.” (Id. at 17 (emphasis in original)). *14 Plaintiffs also contest Defendant's argument that “Article 5 of the MLAT limits how documentation obtained pursuant to the treaty may be used, and prohibits [the Funds’] use of information collected by the Swiss prosecutor through the MLAT process in this civil proceeding.” (Id. (citing Doc. 248 at 13)). Plaintiffs point to the relevant language of Article 5, which states: Any testimony or statements, documents, records or articles of evidence or other items, or any information contained therein, which were obtained by the requesting State from the requested State pursuant to the Treaty shall not be used for investigative purposes nor be introduced into evidence in the requesting State in any proceeding relating to an offense other than the offense for which assistance has been granted. (Id. at 19-20). Plaintiffs argue that Article 5 “does not speak to the use of such information by parties to whom the Swiss prosecutor has disclosed that information, under Swiss law, in the course of her criminal investigation – including the Funds (as victim-claimants) and Devine herself.” (Id. at 20). Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that the facts of this case demonstrate that “the Swiss prosecutor has been working on the same criminal investigation all along.” (Id. at 21). Further, Plaintiffs quote Article 37 of the MLAT, which states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he existence of restrictions in this Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any person to take any action in the United States to suppress or exclude any evidence or to obtain any other judicial relief in connection with requests under this Treaty.” (Id. at 21). Thus, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant “cannot rely on the MLAT to argue before this Court that information obtained through the MLAT and placed into the Swiss file is inadmissible in this case.” (Id. (citing United States v. Duboc, 694 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2012) for the proposition that “there is a presumption that international agreements do not create private rights ... in domestic courts.”)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's contention that the request is somehow a “derivative violation of the MLAT” is incorrect because the Swiss prosecutor did not violate the MLAT by opening the Swiss file to Plaintiffs and because “the MLAT creates no private rights for Devine in this action such that she can attempt to suppress or exclude evidence she claims was improperly obtained through the MLAT.” (Doc. 268 at 22). In her reply, Defendant reiterates her position that the provisions of the MLAT control in this case. (Doc. 305 at 12). Additionally, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ arguments ignore “the fact that they are acting as an arm of the Swiss government by way of their announced ‘party’ status with the Swiss.” (Id. at 13). Defendant further argues that the Swiss prosecutor could have made a valid request to Plaintiffs using 28 U.S.C. § 1782. (Id. at 14-15). Moreover, Defendant contends that the Protective Order specifically prevents disclosure here, even if Plaintiffs could otherwise use the materials they received in discovery. (See id. at 15). Additionally, Defendant argues that the Swiss prosecutor violated the terms of the MLAT by “provid[ing] documentation received from the Department of Justice to Plaintiffs and sanctioned its use in a civil case initiated in the United States.” (Id. at 17). Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ argument “that nothing in the MLAT precludes the Swiss government from providing materials to parties who can then use them any way they wish” cannot be the law because “[o]therwise, any country could avoid Article 5's restrictions by giving the documents to any third party they pleased who could then ignore the treaty restrictions.” (Id. at 18). Moreover, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs were incorrect that the MLAT concluded in 2014, meaning that Plaintiffs’ use of materials violated the prosecutor's order. (See id.). Finally, Defendant contends that Article 37 does not prevent her from “making an unclean hands argument against Plaintiffs who seek equitable relief in this case despite trampling upon the restrictions created by an international treaty for their own interests.” (Id. at 19). *15 In their sur-reply, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant “ignores the fundamental point set forth in Amy Jeffress's first declaration, which is that the MLAT simply does not apply to the Request.” (Doc. 308 at 10). Instead, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he Request was made pursuant to the Swiss prosecutor's authority under Swiss domestic law; she did not use any process that would require the MLAT to be invoked.” (Id. (citing Doc. 270 at ¶ 23-24; Doc. 311 at ¶ 5). In support, Plaintiffs cite a law review article authored by Mr. Zagaris in which he purportedly states that “the MLAT exists to ‘supplement international law enforcement assistance.’ ” (Id. at 10 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct of International Business, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 749, 812-13 (1995-96))). Moreover, Plaintiffs reiterate their position that “the MLAT only applies to interactions between the contracting parties, i.e., the governments of Switzerland and the U.S.” (Id. at 11; see also id. at 10). Furthermore, to the extent that Defendant claims that the Swiss prosecutor's request to Plaintiffs violates her rights under Swiss law, Plaintiffs argue that her claims can be adjudicated in Switzerland. (Id.). Finally, Plaintiffs reiterate their arguments that the MLAT does not prohibit their use of the materials from the Swiss file and that Defendant does not have standing to contest their use. (See id. at 21-25). ii. The Parties’ Supplemental Briefing In her supplemental briefing, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ expert, Ms. Jeffress, is unreliable, speculative, and should not be credited over her expert, Mr. Zagaris. (Doc. 392 at 5-6). Additionally, Defendant argues that the expert testimony she provided demonstrates that the Court can properly review the issues presented. (Id. at 6). Specifically, Defendant contends that Article 37 is not implicated in the present case. (Id. at 8). Defendant states that her “motion to prevent Plaintiffs from improperly using documents previously obtained by the Swiss government through the MLAT process is simply not an action seeking to obtain judicial relief in connection with a treaty request prohibited by Article 37.” (Id.). Instead, Defendant notes that “as Plaintiffs are not parties to the treaty and therefore cannot make such a request, Ms. Devine's Emergency Motion is not implicated by Article 37.” (Id. (emphasis in original)). Accordingly, Defendant argues that “Article 37 of the MLAT does not prevent Ms. Devine from seeking judicial relief for Plaintiffs’ improper actions, particularly given that Plaintiffs, who seek equitable relief in this case, have repeatedly acted with unclean hands, circumventing the restrictions on use of MLAT materials for their own interests.” (Id. at 9). Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs failed to provide support for the proposition that the Swiss prosecutor's request is permissible under Swiss law. (Id. at 10). Defendant contends that the expert testimony shows that the Swiss prosecutor should have made her request pursuant to the MLAT rather than directly from Plaintiffs. (Id.). Defendant states that Article 38(3) shows that the MLAT controls when presented with inconsistent provisions of Swiss law. (Id. at 11). Further, Defendant states that Plaintiffs’ expert agreed that “any time the Swiss government attempts to compel the production of evidence from another country, the MLAT applies.” (Id. (citing Doc. 389-1 at 60:5-61:5)). Here, Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs have clearly stated that they do not believe that they have a choice in complying with the Swiss prosecutor's request.” (Id. at 12 n.4). Thus, Defendant contends that Ms. Jeffress’ position that the Swiss Prosecutor's request did not seek to exercise compulsory process in the United States is untenable. (See id.). Furthermore, Defendant argues that the letters of transmittal for the materials sent from the DOJ to the Swiss prosecutor pursuant to the MLAT prohibit any use of those materials in a civil proceeding. (See id. at 14). Defendant argues that Ms. Jeffress acknowledged that the Swiss prosecutor knew that Plaintiffs intended to use the MLAT materials in the present action. (Id. at 18). Accordingly, Defendant contends that “Plaintiffs’ use of materials provided by the United States to the Swiss prosecutor under the MLAT was impermissible and that Plaintiffs have come into court with unclean hands.” (Id. at 20). *16 Finally, Defendant argues that Ms. Jeffress’ opinion should be discounted because she relied on outdated case law. (Id. at 21). Moreover, Defendant argues that parts of her testimony should be stricken, or, in the alternative, discounted because Ms. Jeffress was coached at the deposition. (Id. at 24).[11] Conversely, Plaintiffs argue that their experts should be credited over Defendant's experts. (Doc. 390 at 3-7). Additionally, Plaintiffs reiterate their positions from the original briefing and argue that the expert testimony supports their positions. (See id. at 7-26). Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that “the MLAT explicitly prohibits private parties such as Devine from seeking judicial relief for alleged violations of its terms.” (Id. at 7). On this point, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he MLAT is an agreement exclusively between the two “Contracting Parties” – the governments of the U.S. and Switzerland.” (Id.). Plaintiffs cite their expert's opinion that “[t]he treaty does not give rise to a right on the part of any person to take any action in [the] United States to obtain judicial relief[.]” (Doc. 389-1 at 35:13-14). Further, Plaintiffs cite United States v. Little, No. 12-CR-00647 ALC, 2014 WL 3604417, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014) for the proposition that Ms. Devine “lacks standing under MLAT to attempt to enforce it.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend that even if Defendant's rights were violated under the MLAT, she has no power to challenge those violations in this Court. (Doc. 390 at 11). Moreover, Plaintiffs point out that, even though Defendant argues that the MLAT was violated by the Swiss prosecutor, Defendant herself responded to requests by the Swiss prosecutor in 2012 and did not raise a protest under the MLAT then. (Id. at 13). Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that the expert testimony demonstrates that, even under the MLAT framework, the Swiss prosecutor's request to Plaintiffs was proper. (Id. at 14). Plaintiffs – citing Defendant's expert Mr. Zagaris – contend that the MLAT is only meant to supplement international law enforcement. (Id. (citing Zagaris, supra at 812-13)). Plaintiffs also cite instructional materials from the Federal Judicial Center for the same proposition. (Id. (citing Marcus Funk, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters Rogatory: A Guide for Judges, at 23 (Federal Judicial Center 2014) “Although formal MLATs, letters rogatory, and other international conventions are the ‘public face’ of transnational legal assistance, a significant amount of criminal investigation-related information is exchanged through informal channels.”)) Plaintiffs further contend that the Swiss prosecutor's request does not violate Devine's right against self-incrimination under Swiss law. (Id. at 17). Specifically, Plaintiffs note that the request only seeks documents from Plaintiffs, not Defendant. (Id.). Plaintiffs contend that Devine's right, at most, only prevents the Swiss government from compelling Defendant to testify or produce documents. (Id.). Plaintiffs’ production, they argue, does not implicate this right. (Id. at 17-18). Moreover, Plaintiffs note that Defendant has not asserted any right against self-incrimination in this case. (Id. at 18). *17 Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that their use of MLAT documents was proper. (Id. at 21-27). Specifically, Plaintiffs – citing a letter from the Swiss prosecutor to Defendant's counsel – argue that any use restrictions placed on the documents by the Swiss prosecutor ended in June 2014. (Id. at 21). Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that the MLAT does not prohibit the use of documents in this case. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the MLAT only limits the “requesting State” and its use of materials received under the MLAT—not private parties such as Plaintiffs. (Id. at 23 (citing Article 5)). Finally, notwithstanding Defendant's arguments to the contrary, Plaintiffs contend that the Swiss prosecutor acted in full compliance with the MLAT. (Id.). Plaintiffs note that the records from the Swiss file all contain the same case number and, therefore, Plaintiffs argue that they were not used in other investigations in Switzerland. (Id. at 24). Further, Plaintiffs contend that their status as “private claimants” entitled them to access to the file under Swiss law as part of the Swiss criminal investigation. (Id. at 25). Thus, Plaintiffs argue that their access is consistent with the MLAT's provisions. (Id.). iii. Analysis As an initial matter, although the Court allowed expert discovery on the issues presented, the Court declines to credit any one expert over the others. The Court evaluates the expert opinions together with the other evidence and arguments presented by the parties. Next, the Court addresses Defendant's argument that the proposed documents obtained by Plaintiffs in discovery “are not Plaintiffs’ to turn over to the Swiss prosecutor.” (Doc. 248 at 17). The Court finds that this argument is not well-taken. As stated above, Plaintiffs are expressly permitted by paragraph 14 of the Protective Order to disclose Discovery Material marked as Confidential by Defendant to the Swiss prosecutor. Thus, the parties’ Protective Order covers the proposed request for information by the Swiss prosecutor in this case. The Court next addresses the applicability of the U.S.-Swiss MLAT to (1) Plaintiffs’ receipt of MLAT documents, (2) Plaintiffs’ proposed production of Discovery Material, and (3) Plaintiffs’ use of MLAT documents in this case. First, as to Plaintiffs’ receipt of materials via the MLAT, the Court finds that Defendant has not met her burden of demonstrating the MLAT applies to Plaintiffs’ receipt of documents from the Swiss prosecutor. The MLAT provides a means of evidence gathering in criminal cases for both the United States and for Switzerland. Nevertheless, as the Eleventh Circuit explained in Weber v. Finker, “[a] plain reading of the U.S.-Switzerland MLAT indicates that it is designed to help federal and state prosecutors.” 554 F.3d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 2009). Specifically, the Court noted that “[a]ll of the language in the treaty speaks to facilitating discovery for the “Contracting Parties” or “Contracting States,” namely, the United States and Switzerland. Id. In this case, Plaintiffs are private third-parties, not a contracting state or a prosecutor from a contracting state. Because Plaintiffs are not a contracting party to the MLAT, there is no indication that Plaintiffs must use the MLAT to receive information. While Defendant argues that Article 38 of the MLAT requires that the MLAT be used, Defendant has not met her burden of showing that Plaintiffs must use the MLAT to receive documents from the Swiss prosecutor. Accordingly, Defendant's argument that MLAT should have been used by Plaintiffs to receive documents from the Swiss prosecutor is without merit. *18 Second, the Court addresses the implications of the MLAT to Plaintiffs’ proposed production of Discovery Material to the Swiss prosecutor. On this point, it appears that the parties do not dispute that the MLAT must be used to compel a person to testify or to person to produce documents. (See Doc. 392 at 11; see also Doc. 389-1 at 60-61 (deposition transcript of Plaintiffs’ expert Ms. Jeffress)). Nevertheless, the parties appear to disagree regarding testimony or document production that is not compelled. In this instance, the Court finds that Defendant has not shown that Plaintiffs’ proposed production is being compelled by the Swiss government such that the MLAT is implicated. Here, the Swiss government informally requested certain information from Plaintiffs. (See Doc. 248-1). In response, Plaintiffs stated their intention to cooperate with that request. (See Doc. 268 at 15). Plaintiffs contend that their status as victim-claimants, under Swiss law, allowed the Swiss prosecutor to request documents directly from Plaintiffs, who are “generally obliged to cooperate with that investigation.” (Id.). While Plaintiffs are “generally obligated to cooperate,” Defendant has not met her burden of showing that Plaintiffs’ are compelled to produce those documents. Instead, Plaintiffs appear to be willing to voluntarily produce those documents. Regardless, the Court finds that Defendant has not met her burden of showing that the MLAT must be used by the Swiss prosecutor for the request to Plaintiffs. In fact, as Plaintiffs point out, even though Defendant argued that the MLAT must be used, it appears that Defendant herself responded to requests by the Swiss prosecutor in 2012 and did not protest under the MLAT then. (Doc. 390 at 13; see also Docs. 27-14, 27-15)). Thus, Defendant has not shown that the U.S.-Swiss MLAT must be used for the request from the Swiss prosecutor to Plaintiffs. Furthermore, while Defendant argues that Plaintiffs “are acting as an arm of the Swiss government by way of their announced ‘party’ status with the Swiss,” such that the MLAT must be used (See Doc. 305 at 13), the Court finds that Defendant has not met her burden of demonstrating that Plaintiffs are acting in an unlawful joint venture with the Swiss prosecutor. Instead, it appears that Plaintiffs are acting independently, and within their rights under Swiss and domestic law. While Defendant has made striking accusations that Plaintiffs and the Swiss prosecutor are working together in a collusive relationship, the Court finds these allegations to be “stereotyped and conclusory statements” that fall far short of the “particular and specific demonstration” of fact Defendant must prove to demonstrate that good cause exists to grant a protective order. Auto-Owners, 231 F.R.D. at 429-30. In the alternative, the Court notes that Defendant argues that the Swiss prosecutor's production of documents to Plaintiffs violated of Article 5 of the MLAT and the letters of transmittal for the information transferred between the United States and Switzerland. (Doc. 392 at 14). This arguments fails for two reasons. First, Defendant has not met her burden of demonstrating that the document production by the Swiss prosecutor to Plaintiffs, in fact, violates Article 5 of the MLAT. Second, assuming arguendo that the MLAT was violated by the Swiss prosecutor, Defendant has not shown how this Court has the power or authority to remedy those violations. As to the first issue, the Court is not convinced that the Swiss prosecutor violated Article 5. Article 5 of the MLAT states, in pertinent part: *19 Any testimony or statements, documents, records or articles of evidence or other items, or any information contained therein, which were obtained by the requesting State from the requested State pursuant to the Treaty shall not be used for investigative purposes nor be introduced into evidence in the requesting State in any proceeding relating to an offense other than the offense for which assistance has been granted. (emphasis added). Here, Defendant has not shown that the materials were “used for investigative purposes” or “introduced into evidence” in the requesting State – i.e., Switzerland – in any proceeding relating to an offense other than the offense for which assistance has been granted. In fact, Plaintiffs provided evidence that the Swiss prosecutor used the same case number for all of the documents in the Swiss file. (Doc. 390 at 24). Furthermore, the Court notes that both Plaintiffs and Defendant received access to documents from the Swiss file. (See Doc. 305 at 3). This access was presumably permitted based on applicable Swiss law resulting from the parties’ respective statuses in the Swiss investigation for which the documents were requested and received by the Swiss prosecutor. Accordingly, Defendant has not met her burden of showing that having access to the Swiss file or receiving documents from it violates Article 5 of the MLAT. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the MLAT was violated by the Swiss prosecutor – in any way – Defendant has not shown how this Court has the power to remedy those violations. The case law seemingly indicates that Defendant does not have standing to remedy MLAT violations before this Court. In United States v. Davis, for example, the Second Circuit held that the criminal defendant had no standing to contest a treaty violation. 767 F.2d 1025, 1027 (2d Cir. 1985). In coming to this conclusion, the Court cited Article 37 of the MLAT for the proposition that the defendant did not have standing to contest a violation of the MLAT. (Id. at 1029). In addition to Article 37, the Court noted that the interpretative letters to the treaty signed by the United States and Switzerland state that a person alleging a violation of Article 5 of the treaty “has no standing to have such allegations considered in any proceeding in the United States.” Id. at 1030 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the Court noted that the Technical Analysis of the treaty states that the “restrictions in the Treaty shall not give rise to a right of any person to take action to suppress or exclude evidence or to obtain judicial relief.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In fact, the Court noted that the only recourse for a person alleging a violation of Article 5 “would be for him to inform the Central Authority of Switzerland for consideration only as a matter between governments.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In United States v. Little, the Court reached a similar conclusion. No. 12-CR-00647 ALC, 2014 WL 3604417, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014). There, the Court held that the criminal defendant had no standing to contest a violation of the U.S.-Swiss MLAT. Id. Specifically, while the defendant argued that Article 38(1) of the MLAT required that “MLAT procedures must be utilized to request Swiss assistance,” the Court found that Article 37 precluded defendant from having standing under the MLAT to enforce it. Id. *20 In this case, the Court notes that Article 37(1) states, in pertinent, that “[t]he existence of restrictions in this Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any person to take any action in the United States to suppress or exclude any evidence or to obtain other judicial relief in connection with requests under this Treaty.” (Emphasis added). The Courts in Davis and Little specifically found that Article 37 precluded the criminal defendants from having standing to contest an MLAT violation. Unlike the cases cited above, the present case is a civil action, not a criminal proceeding. Upon review, however, the Court is persuaded that Article 37 is equally applicable to the present civil action. Specifically, Article 37 clearly states that it does not give rise to a right on the part of any person to take any action in the United States to obtain other judicial relief in connection with requests made under the treaty. There is no indication in the treaty, or otherwise, that Article 37's effect is limited to criminal proceedings. Moreover, while Defendant argues that the Court has the power to review the alleged violations of the MLAT in this case because the Plaintiffs are seeking equitable relief (Doc. 305 at 9), Defendant has not cited any examples of Courts granting such relief. Accordingly, the Court finds that Article 37 precludes Ms. Devine from having standing to contest any MLAT violations in the present civil action in the United States. This conclusion is consistent with other Eleventh Circuit precedent, which states that “the general rule is that ‘[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.’ ” Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 827 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cornejo v. Cty. of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, the Court finds that even if the MLAT has been violated by the Swiss prosecutor, Defendant lacks standing under the MLAT to remedy any violation of the MLAT before this Court.[12] Similarly, while Defendant alleges that her rights have been violated under Swiss law (Doc. 305 at 19), Defendant has cited no legal authority for the proposition that this Court can adjudicate those rights, nor has she explained why those violations must be adjudicated in the United States instead of Switzerland. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has not met her burden of demonstrating that good cause exists to grant a protective order for any purported violations of her rights under Swiss law. Accordingly, the Court denies the protective order on this ground. Third, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ use of the MLAT materials. As stated above, Defendant has not shown that Plaintiffs violated the MLAT by receiving documents from the Swiss file. Moreover, Defendant does not have standing to contest any MLAT violation. Furthermore, to the extent Ms. Devine's rights were violated in Switzerland, Defendant has not shown how this Court can properly adjudicate those violations. Nevertheless, the Court previously denied Defendant's Emergency Motion to Preclude Plaintiffs from Relying on Materials in the Swiss Investigative File Obtained through the U.S.-Swiss MLAT and All Information and Material Derived Therefrom and for Related Relief (Doc. 349) without prejudice to being refiled after the Court resolved Defendant's Emergency Motion (Doc. 248). Because the Court fully resolves Defendant's Emergency Motion herein, Defendant may now bring any motion directed at preventing Plaintiffs from using the documents derived from the MLAT. Nonetheless, to the extent any such motion raises issues addressed and resolved herein, the Court may summarily deny any such motion and request. *21 Finally, Defendant has not met her burden of demonstrating that the Swiss prosecutor should have made a request pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782. (See, e.g., Doc. 305 at 15). Assuming that the statute even applies – as Plaintiffs are Cayman Islands entities not Unites States entities – the statute “does not preclude a person within the United States from voluntarily ... producing a document ... for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal before any person and in any manner acceptable to him.” (Doc. 268 at 15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782(b))). Thus, it appears that Plaintiffs could voluntarily produce any documents without being required to do so by the processes outlined in the statute. The Court, therefore, denies the protective order on this ground. C. Defendant's Due Process Rights The Court next addresses Defendant's contention that Plaintiffs are engaged in a de facto joint venture with the Swiss prosecutor and, thus, are violating Defendant's due process rights. As stated above, however, Defendant has not shown that Plaintiffs and the Swiss prosecutor are engaged in an unlawful joint venture. Accordingly, because the Court cannot find that Plaintiffs are involved in a joint venture with the Swiss prosecutor, the Court declines to grant the protective order sought by Defendant on the basis that the alleged joint venture violates her due process rights. V. Defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. 402) In her Motion, Defendant requests that the Court strike the “supplemental submissions Plaintiffs made under the guise of the Court's April 14, 2016 Order [Doc. 363]. (Doc. 402 at 1). Defendant claims that Plaintiffs’ supplemental submission exceeded the scope of the Court's Order (Doc. 363) allowing the supplemental submission by re-litigating Defendant's underlying Emergency Motion (Doc. 248). (Doc. 402 at 3). In the alternative, however, Defendant states that “[i]f the Court is inclined to excuse Plaintiffs’ deviation from its April 14, 2016 Order, Ms. Devine respectfully requests ... leave to file a supplemental memorandum and any necessary expert rebuttal opinion in the form of a declaration to address the foregoing arguments and documents in Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Submissions.” (Id. at 9). Additionally, in her supplemental briefing, Defendant requests that the Court strike Ms. Jeffress’ deposition testimony because she was improperly coached by counsel on re-direct at her deposition. (Doc. 392 at 24). Defendant contends that “[b]y discussing with Ms. Jeffress her testimony on a break between cross-examination and redirect, Plaintiffs’ counsel clearly violated the rules against coaching witnesses, and the entirety of Ms. Jeffress’ redirect testimony should be stricken.” (Id.). In the alternative, Defendant states that “[t]o the extent that the Court is not inclined to strike Mr. Jeffress’ improper re-direct testimony, the Court should recognize it for what it is: a completely unreliable and incredible attempt to bolster Ms. Jeffress’ opinions after their fatal weaknesses were exposed by cross-examination.” (Id.). Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that their submission is properly within the scope of the Court's April 14, 2016 Order (Doc. 363). (Doc. 421). Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that their counsel's conduct at the deposition of Ms. Jeffress was entirely permissible. (Doc. 400 at 3-6). The Court's April 14, 2016 Order (Doc. 363) ordered supplemental briefs setting forth “the parties’ positions as to the effect, if any, of the experts’ deposition testimony on the issues raised by the Motion (Doc. 248) or any other discovery-related motion pending before the Court.” (Doc. 363 at 4). Upon review, it appears that Plaintiffs’ supplemental submission properly addressed the issues contemplated by the Court's Order. *22 Moreover, as stated above, the Court declines to credit any expert opinion over any other opinion. The Court evaluated the expert opinions together with the other evidence and arguments presented by the parties. Upon review, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs’ counsel's actions were improper, the Court finds that the outcome of the Defendant's Emergency Motion would not change. Thus, after evaluating Ms. Jeffress’ testimony together with the other evidence of record, the Court declines to strike the testimony of Ms. Jeffress. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. 402). VI. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that a hearing and oral argument are not required to resolve the issues presented by Defendant's Emergency Motion (Doc. 248). Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby ORDERS that: 1) Defendant's Emergency Motion (Doc. 248) and Defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. 402) are DENIED, as set forth above. 2) Because the Court denies Defendant's Emergency Motion (Doc. 248), Plaintiffs may comply with the Swiss prosecutor's request. Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that Defendant may object to this Amended Order. Accordingly, the Court stays Plaintiffs’ compliance with the Swiss prosecutor's request until after any objection to this Amended Order is resolved, or if no objection is filed, until twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Amended Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on December 21, 2016. Footnotes [1] This Amended Order is entered to clarify language from the Court's previous Order (Doc. 501) appearing at page 13, see infra at 13 and n.8, and other non-substantive typographical corrections. [2] The parties’ proclivity for excessive filing greatly overcomplicated the issues presented by the pending Motions. Going forward, the Court reserves its ability to limit the parties’ briefing by, among other constraints, imposing shorter page limits and denying requests for leave to file replies, sur-replies, and supplemental briefing. [3] The treaty in question is the Treaty for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019. The Court refers to this treaty herein as “U.S.-Swiss MLAT” or “MLAT.” [4] The parties’ Stipulation and Protective Order (“Protective Order”) is entered at Doc. 64. [5] The pinpoint citations in this Order are to the CM/ECF pagination, not the parties’ pagination. [6] “Discovery Material” is defined in the Protective Order as: all documents (including but not limited to initial disclosures, transcripts, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and responses to requests for admissions), deposition testimony, and any other written, recorded, transcribed or graphic matter or data or anything else produced (including all copies, excerpts and summaries thereof), as between the Parties and through the third-party subpoenas served, in the course of discovery in connection with this litigation. (Doc. 64 at ¶ 2). The designation “Confidential” includes “information that is protected from disclosure by statute or that should be protected from disclosure as confidential personal information, financial information, trade secrets, personnel records, or commercial information.” (Id. at ¶ 4). [7] Plaintiffs disagree, stating that they only notified Defendant of the proposed disclosure of third-party documents “as a professional courtesy” and only “after Devine requested a list of all documents the Funds intended to share in response to the Funds’ notice.” (Doc. 308 at 14 (emphasis in original)). [8] Due to a scrivener's error, the word “or” was inadvertently included in the original Order. (Doc. 501 at 13). [9] The July 1, 2015 ruling by Judge Steele was his Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. (Doc. 10). The Court and the parties refer to this Order as the “TRO.” [10] Some of the specifics of Plaintiffs’ argument was redacted in the public Court file and filed under seal. Nevertheless, to the extent the sealed information is implicated in the issues raised by Defendant's Motion, the Court un-seals the information as it appears in this Order. [11] The Court addresses the issue of striking Ms. Jeffress’ deposition testimony in Section V, infra. [12] As noted by the Court in Davis, Defendant's remedy under the MLAT appears to be to contact the relevant central authorities. 767 F.2d at 1025. On this point, the Court notes that Defendant's expert, Mr. Zagaris, testified that he had used this remedy in other cases with favorable results. (Doc. 388-1 at 42:12 – 43:1, 100:3-8).