DAVID ISRAEL, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL BUCON; JAMES ADAMS; and XTREME PROTECTION SERVICES, LLC, Defendants. DAVID ISRAEL, Plaintiff, v. DIANE ISRAEL, Defendant No. 17 C 6452 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division Filed: June 17, 2019 Counsel Ariel Weissberg, Lindsey Louise Purdy, Weissberg and Associates, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Nemura G. Pencyla, Patrick L. Provenzale, Terry A. Ekl, Tracy L. Stanker, Ekl, Williams & Provenzale LLC, Lisle, IL, for Plaintiff in 17 C 6452. Daniel Francis Lynch, Lynch Thompson LLP, Chicago, IL, Stephen Michael Donnelly, Parikh Law Group, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Michael Bucon in 17 C 6452. Jonathan M. Cyrluk, Steven Christopher Moeller, Carpenter Lipps & Leland LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants James Adams, Xtreme Protection Services, LLC in 17 C 6452. Ariel Weissberg, Weissberg & Associates, Chicago, IL, Devvrat Vikram Sinha, United States Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff in 17 C 6643. Daniel Francis Lynch, James L. Thompson, Melinda Sue Schwab, Lynch Thompson LLP, Chicago, IL, Onyinyechukwu Koplan Nwabuoku, Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendant in 17 C 6643. Valdez, Maria, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Diane Israel's Renewed Petition for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) [Doc. No. 642]. For the reasons that follow, Diane's petition is granted in part and denied in part. BACKGROUND The parties in this unusually contentious case filed, in the Court's view, an “unnecessarily high volume” of discovery motions on matters that should have been resolved without judicial intervention or should not have been disputed at all. In an effort to curb the parties’ worst impulses, the Court entered an order on July 2, 2018 stating that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) will be strictly enforced, and the losing party (or non-party movant or respondent) must pay the reasonable fees and costs in bringing or defending against the motion.” (7/2/18 Minute Order) [Doc. No. 310]. The order seemed to have a positive effect, with the parties resolving some motions then pending, and reducing the overall number of motions filed. Nevertheless, there were numerous motions requiring resolution, and Diane now seeks reimbursement for her attorney's fees for those motions in which she was the victor. Diane's original petition for fees was stricken on February 22, 2019, and the parties were ordered to meet and confer, in compliance with Local Rule 54.3(d)-(f). The Court also noted that “[a]ccording to the filing, the parties interpret this Court's 7/2/18 statement that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) will be strictly enforced to mean that the losing party must always pay fees and expenses, even if they were not expressly awarded in a court order. Strict enforcement of the rule includes strict enforcement of its subsections.” (2/22/19 Minute Order) [Doc. No. 632]. According to Diane, her efforts to comply with Local Rule 54.3 have been thwarted due to Plaintiff's counsel's unwillingness to participate in the process in good faith. Specifically, she claims that counsel has delayed and postponed conferences; did not appear at some scheduled conferences; failed to adequately prepare for conferences that did take place; and did not complete other tasks contemplated by Local Rule 54.3. DISCUSSION In its prior discovery orders, the Court expressly awarded attorney's fees for three motions, Docket Nos. 293, 327, and 376, and Diane's petition seeks a total of $26,745.50 for those motions. She also prays for an award of $52,232.00 for another six motions in which fees were not expressly mentioned in the Court's orders, on the theory that as the winning party, Diane should be awarded fees automatically by operation of the July 2 order. Finally, Diane asks for $7,356.50 spent in preparing her renewed petition and another $12,980.00 in fees related to the petition incurred after the petition was filed. Diane argues that her petition should be granted in its entirety because Plaintiff's counsel refused to participate in a meet and confer process. Plaintiff first argues that the July 2, 2018 order “changed the rebuttable presumption set forth in [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 37 into an ‘automatic’ hard and fast ‘rule’ that apparently could not be rebutted, even by facts showing that the failure to comply with the discovery request was substantially justified and/or that circumstances would make an award of expenses unjust.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 4.) However, as discussed above, the Court clarified on February 22, 2019 that “strict enforcement of the rule includes strict enforcement of its subsections,” and those subsections provide that fees should not be granted if the party opponent's discovery behavior was substantially justified or an award would otherwise be unjust. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)-(B). *2 Plaintiff next maintains that all of his discovery responses were substantially justified, and an award of fees would be unjust under the circumstances. He argues that he “has acted in good faith in this litigation at all times; has not remotely exhibited conduct calculated to frustrate discovery; and has not filed any response or objection for improper reasons.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 5.) Plaintiff generally contends that his behavior was justified because he was frustrated in his discovery efforts by Defendants’ litigation strategy and this Court's discovery rulings. Plaintiff believes that Diane's Fifth Amendment defense was disingenuous and a moving target, allowing her to assert it during discovery but not stand on the admission in her response to summary judgment. Plaintiff's quarrel with this Court's discovery rulings does not justify his disregard of those rulings in subsequent motions, and it is not unjust to award fees against him when he did so. The Court also disagrees with Plaintiff's characterization of his and his counsel's discovery behavior, and evidence to the contrary is on display throughout the record, including at hearings in open court. Furthermore, the Court has already determined that Plaintiff was not substantially justified in his refusal to respond to the discovery requests that were the subjects of three of Diane's motions, Nos. 293, 327, and 376.[1] As to the six remaining motions, Plaintiff makes specific arguments only in relation to his motion to compel discovery related to Diane's net worth [Doc. No. 397]. Plaintiff acknowledges that “[t]his Court took a minimalist view on Diane's disclosures, allowing Diane to produce a skeletal financial statement with little or no detail, and a minimal amount of back-up documentation.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 7.) Nevertheless, he sought financial data going back years, even though the Court had already ruled that only current information was relevant. It was also clear as a matter of law that financial minutiae was not relevant to the extremely narrow issue of whether Diane had sufficient wealth to warrant a large punitive damages award, and thus the requested discovery was entirely disproportionate to its potential relevance. Therefore, his motion to compel was not substantially justified, and Diane will be awarded her fees in responding to the motion. Diane's Renewed Motion Regarding Deposition Safety Seeking to Bar David from Appearing at Future Depositions [Doc. No. 401] and Motion to Bar Harey Israel From Testifying or for Whatever Alternative Sanction the Court Deems Proper [Doc. No. 403] were denied without prejudice, so she will not be awarded fees for those motions. Given the circumstances that prompted the motions, and the colloquy at the motion hearing, fees will also not be awarded to Plaintiff for opposing the motions, because Diane was substantially justified in bringing them. Plaintiff does not argue he was justified in bringing or opposing the remaining motions listed in the petition, so fees will be awarded to Diane. Plaintiff also disputes the amount of attorney time claimed in the petition. However, he does not challenge Diane's characterization of his counsel's behavior during the Local Rule 54.3 process, and thus he has waived any objections to particular entries or rates in the petition. See Degorski v. Wilson, No. 04 C 3367, 2014 WL 6704561, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 26, 2014) (“[T]he Court finds that Defendants have waived the specific objections to Plaintiff's entries in view of their failure to comply with the spirit and letter of Local Rule 54.3 as they neither provided estimates of their hours and rates on a timely basis nor engaged in meaningful discussion about Plaintiff's request for attorneys’ fees.”); Ratliff v. City of Chi., No. 10 C 739, 2013 WL 3418070, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2013) (waiving specific objections when the opponent's submission “did not comport with either the letter or the spirit of Local Rule 54.3”). CONCLUSION *3 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Diane Israel's Renewed Petition for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) [Doc. No. 642] is granted in part and denied in part, and fees are awarded in the total amount of $83,197.00. SO ORDERED. ENTERED: Footnotes [1] Plaintiff's response attempts to relitigate the issue of fees for Doc. No. 376, but he offers no manifest error that would allow the Court to reconsider its prior ruling. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Tyrer v. City of S. Beloit, 516 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 2008).