YOLDAS ASKAN, Plaintiff, v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES INC., Defendant Case No. 6:21-cv-1366-PGB-DCI United States District Court, M.D. Florida Signed May 18, 2022 Counsel Yoldas Askan, Birmingham B2 4AY, Pro Se. Lloyd Garrett Farr, Nicolette Corso Vilmos, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Atlanta, GA, Thomas W. Hazlett, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, John A. Bauer, Pro Hac Vice, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant. Irick, Daniel C., United States Magistrate Judge Order *1 This cause comes before the Court for consideration without oral argument on the following motion: MOTION: Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production and for Sanctions (Doc. 129) FILED: March 23, 2022 THEREON it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. On October 8, 2021, Defendant served its First Set of Production Requests on Plaintiff. Doc. 129-1 (the RFP). That same day, Plaintiff served a request for production on Defendant which was identical to Defendant's RFP. Doc. 129-2 (“[Plaintiff] has served his third request for production on October 8, 2021 which is identical word by word to [Defendant's] present first request for production.”). On November 8, 2021,[1] Plaintiff responded to Defendant's RFP. Id. Plaintiff asserted the same objection to every one of Defendant's 77 requests: Objection. [Plaintiff] has served his third request for production on October 8, 2021 which is identical word by word to [Defendant's] present first request for production. Therefore, if [Defendant] believes it complied with [Plaintiff's] request for production then it has fulfilled its own request. What [Defendant] has produced under that request should therefore be accepted as release of documents for [Defendant's] present request. In addition, information sought is already within [Defendant's] possession, custody, or control, either already provided during the related case or publicly available or within [Defendant's] ability to obtain in a format it desires without complaining about formatting issues. Even further, [Defendant] deliberately and maliciously hides information by not complying with [Plaintiff's] discovery. For example, [Defendant] has participated in email exchanges with [Plaintiff] and produced few of the originals in the related case (see D.E. 34) but withholds the original files in native format and stops [Plaintiff] complying with the discovery. [Defendant] even plays games pretending not to know what is the related case [when] D.E. 34 was their own filing. Doc. 129-2 at 5. Plaintiff did not produce any documents in response to Defendant's RFP. Defendant has now filed a motion to compel responses to its RFP and for sanctions. Doc. 129 (the Motion). Plaintiff has responded to the Motion. Doc. 138. Plaintiff's response to Defendant's RFP, while creative, is wholly deficient. When a party receives an RFP, it cannot serve an identical RFP then consider itself absolved of its discovery obligations. In other words, asserting that “if [Defendant] believes it complied with [Plaintiff's] request for production then it has fulfilled its own request,” is not an appropriate response to an RFP.[2] For instance, “the fact that the opposing party may have a particular document in his possession, custody, or control, in and of itself, may have some significance.” Puccio v. Sclafani, 2013 WL 4068782, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2013). *2 Further, Plaintiff's only other objection—aside from accusing Defendant of malfeasance—is that the “information sought is already within [Defendant's] possession, custody, or control, either already provided during the related case or publicly available or within [Defendant's] ability to obtain ....” Doc. 129-2 at 5. As an initial matter, this objection is repeated verbatim for all 77 requests, essentially making it a general objection; Plaintiff made no attempt to tailor this objection to any particular request. It is unclear if this objection actually applies to each one of Defendant's 77 requests, and in his response Plaintiff does not appear to argue that the objection applies to every request. See, e.g., Penny v. AT&T Corp., 2015 WL 12852975, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 17, 2015) (“Ordinarily, general objections that do not apply to all discovery requests are improper.”) (citations omitted); see also Middle District Discovery at 22 (“General or blanket objections should be used only when they apply to every interrogatory.”). Regardless, this objection is due to be overruled on its merits. The fact that a party may already possess some documents does not excuse a complete failure to produce any documents. See Puccio, 2013 WL 406872, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2013); see also Rivers v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 2008 WL 5111300, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2008) (“[T]he fact that Defendant's counsel may already possess, by virtue of the EEOC investigation, some of the documents and information included in her discovery requests to Plaintiff does not excuse Plaintiff's failure to fully respond to the discovery requests.”). Thus, the Court overrules this objection. As a final matter, Plaintiff argues that Defendant should have conferred on a request-by-request basis to identify deficiencies. However, seeing as Plaintiff made the same objection to every request and did not produce a single document to Defendant, a request-by-request conferral was unnecessary. Indeed, it is somewhat odd for Plaintiff to now assert that Defendant should have conferred on a request-by-request basis, when Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's RFP on a request-by-request basis in the first instance. Accordingly, the Court rejects this argument. Thus, the Motion is due to be granted such that Plaintiff must produce non-privileged documents that are responsive to Defendant's RFP to Defendant. Defendant also requests attorney fees for bringing the Motion. The Court finds that awarding fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(c) is appropriate. Defendant served its RFP on Plaintiff on October 8, 2021. Doc. 129-1 at 17. Yet, as of the time of the filing of the Motion and the response, Plaintiff has failed to produce any documents to Defendant. Before filing the Motion, Defendant attempted in good faith to confer with Plaintiff regarding his deficient response to Defendant's RFP. See Docs. 129 at 15–16, 19; 138-1 at 2. Further, Plaintiff's deficient response was not substantially justified. Finally, there are no other circumstances that make awarding fees to Defendant unjust. Indeed, “[i]n this and his related case, Plaintiff has been reminded time and again concerning his obligation to follow the rules and orders of this Court, and though he is pro se, he will be held to follow those rules and orders.” Doc. 57 at 1–2. Plaintiff is well-aware of the consequences of failing to respond to a discovery request; in his related case, Plaintiff had attorney fees assessed against him for a substantively similar failure to respond to a request for production. See Askan v. Faro Technologies, Inc., Case No. 6:18-cv-1122-PGB-DCI at Doc. 93 (M.D. Fla. 2019). Thus, the Court finds that an award of fees is wholly appropriate under the circumstances. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Motion (Doc. 129) is GRANTED in part, such that: 1) On or before May 25, 2022, Plaintiff shall fully respond to Defendant's RFP (Doc. 129-1); 2) Plaintiff's objections are deemed WAIVED with the exception of privilege; 3) Defendant is awarded its fees incurred in making the Motion (Doc. 129). On or before June 1, 2022, Defendant may file a motion to quantify the amount of fees should the parties be unable to agree to an amount without the need for court intervention, provided that the motion fully complies with Local Rule 3.01(g). To the extent that the parties are able to agree to an amount of fees, then, on or before June 22, 2022, Plaintiff shall remit to Defendant the full amount of the agreed-upon fees; *3 4) The Motion (Doc. 129) is otherwise DENIED. ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on May 18, 2022. Footnotes [1] In Defendant's motion to compel, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's response to Defendant's RFP was due by November 8, 2021, but Plaintiff did not respond until November 12, 2021. Doc. 129 at 3. Therefore, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's response was untimely. However, Plaintiff's response to Defendant's RFP—which Defendant attached to its motion—states that the response was served on November 8, 2021. Doc. 129-2 at 1–2. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff's response was timely, and Defendant has provided no evidence showing otherwise. Accordingly, the Court rejects this argument. [2] This is particularly concerning given Plaintiff's conduct in his prior case. See Askan v. Faro Technologies, Inc., Case No. 6:18-cv-1122-PGB-DCI at Docs. 97; 103 (M.D. Fla. 2019).