NATHAN S. HASSEL, Plaintiff, v. CENTRIC BANK, et al., Defendants CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-02081 United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania Filed May 23, 2022 Counsel Nathan S. Hassel, Harrisburg, PA, Pro Se. Kari A. Morrigan, Daniel Rothenberg, Evan R. Rutter, Pro Hac Vice, Schuckit & Associates, P.C., Zionsville, IN, John W. Purcell, Jr., Purcell, Krug & Haller, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendant Tans Union, LLC. Mehalchick, Karoline, United States Magistrate Judge REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION *1 Presently before the Court is a motion to compel discovery filed by Defendant Trans Union, LLC (“Trans Union”) on May 4, 2022. (Doc. 77). This is a civil action brought pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“FCRA”), by pro se Plaintiff Nathan S. Hassel (“Hassel”) against Defendants Centric Bank (“Centric Bank”) and Trans Union (collectively, the “Defendants”) on December 6, 2019.[1] (Doc. 2). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be granted. (Doc. 77). I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Hassel initiated this action by filing a complaint on December 6, 2019. (Doc. 2). In his complaint, Hassel asserts that Centric Bank erroneously reported a mortgage payment as “late” to Trans Union and that Trans Union lowered Hassel's credit score as a result of this error. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 11-17). Hassel further avers that after he notified Defendants of the error, neither Centric Bank nor Trans Union performed an adequate investigation or communicated to him the details of the investigation as required by the FCRA. (Doc. 2, ¶ 21-28). Hassel alleges that as a result of Defendants' actions and his erroneous credit score, he has avoided applying for additional credit. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 34-35). On August 25, 2020, Trans Union served Hassel with Interrogatories and a Request for Production. (Doc. 77-1). On September 25, 2020, Hassel responded to the discovery requests with responses and objections. (Doc. 61-1; Doc. 77-2). On April 26, 2021, Trans Union filed a letter with the Court requesting a discovery conference to compel Hassel to participate in discovery by responding to the Interrogatories and producing documents in response to the Requests for Production. (Doc. 44). The Court held the discovery conference on April 29, 2021, and Hassel did not appear. (Doc. 46). Subsequently, the Court issued an Order requiring Hassel to provide responses to the discovery requests by May 10, 2021, and to show cause as to his failure to appear at the conference. (Doc. 48). On June 3, 2021, Trans Union filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as a sanction for violation of the Court's Order to provide discovery responses and for failure to prosecute. (Doc. 52). The Court held a second discovery conference on June 4, 2021, and issued an Order on June 8, 2021, which stated that Hassel should have responded to all outstanding discovery requests by June 7, 2021, and stayed the briefing deadlines for Trans Union's motion to dismiss pending the resolution of any motions to compel that may be filed. (Doc. 54). On July 15, 2021, Trans Union filed a motion to compel and enlarge discovery or, alternatively, to stay further discovery and to schedule briefing on Trans Union's previously filed motion to dismiss. (Doc. 55). On August 9, 2021, the Court deemed the motion unopposed as Hassel failed to file a brief in opposition and issued an Order granting a stay of further discovery pending the resolution of Trans Union's motion to dismiss. (Doc. 57). On August 20, 2021, Trans Union filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. (Doc. 59). On March 11, 2022, the undersigned recommended that Trans Union's motions to dismiss be denied, finding that dismissal was not warranted at that time, though it was indeed a “close call.” (Doc. 69). The Court adopted the recommendation on March 31, 2022. (Doc. 70). On April 8, 2022, the Court issued a Case Management Order ordering that all discovery be completed by May 9, 2022. (Doc. 71). On April 20, 2022, Trans Union filed a letter with the Court requesting to schedule an emergency discovery conference to compel Hassel to comply with the Court's Orders compelling discovery responses, arguing that Hassel continued to refuse to participate in the discovery process. (Doc. 72). A discovery conference was held before the undersigned on April 25, 2022. (Doc. 73). *2 On May 4, 2022, Trans Union filed the “emergency motion to compel [Hassel] to comply with the Court's two prior orders compelling discovery responses and enlarge May discovery and June motion deadlines; or dismiss [Hassel]'s complaint as a sanction for [Hassel]'s refusal to comply with prior discovery orders.” (Doc. 77). On May 18, 2022, Hassel filed a brief in opposition to the motion to compel, as well as a motion for summary judgment.[2] (Doc. 80; Doc. 81). The motion to compel has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. (Doc. 77; Doc. 80). II. LEGAL STANDARD The general scope of discovery is outlined by Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance is generally “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Funds, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and 34 provide that a party upon whom interrogatories and requests for production of documents have been served shall serve a copy of the answers, and objections, if any, to such discovery requests within thirty days after the service of the requests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2) and 34(b)(2)(A). A shorter or longer time may be directed by court order or by stipulation of the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2) and 34(b)(2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 29. Under Rule 37(a), a party may file a motion to compel discovery when the opposing party fails to respond or provides incomplete or evasive answers to properly propounded document requests or interrogatories. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii-iv). Rule 37 allows the court to “issue further just orders” when a party “fails to provide or permit discovery” as directed by a court's order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). In addition, Rule 37 lists seven sanctions that the court may impose against a party that disobeys a discovery order: (i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims; (ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence; *3 (iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part; (iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed; (v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part; (vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or (vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (i – vii). “The scope and conduct of discovery are within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Pearson v. Williams, No. 1:13-CV-1988, 2016 WL 1732191, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 2016) (citing In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 661-62 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also McConnell v. Canadian Pacific Realty Co., 280 F.R.D. 188, 192 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (“Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the Court's discretion and judgment.”). III. DISCUSSION Trans Union seeks dismissal of this action as a sanction against Hassel for failing to comply with the Court's prior Orders compelling Hassel to provide responses to Trans Union's discovery requests. (Doc. 77, at 1). In addition, Trans Union requests an award of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by Hassel's failure to comply with the Court's Orders compelling him to respond discovery requests. (Doc. 77, at 2). In opposition, Hassel argues that dismissal is not appropriate because he timely responded to the discovery requests in good faith. (Doc. 80, at 2). In addition, Hassel avers that “Trans Union made no good faith attempts to communicate with [Hassel] or to obtain any additional discovery after October 2020 or prior to submitting any of their discovery related motions and letters to the Court.” (Doc. 80, at 2). Hassel maintains that Trans Union's “repeated false statements and disregard of good faith discovery practices are mere delay tactics and a waste of Court and party resources and at this point should be sanctioned.” (Doc. 80, at 2). Upon review of the record, the undersigned concludes that Hassel's history of dilatoriness, the prejudice suffered by Trans Union, and the ineffectiveness of other sanctions weigh in favor of dismissal of this action. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court grant the motion to compel and dismiss this case with prejudice. A. DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT Allowing dismissal of an action is an “extreme sanction [which is] reserved for the instances in which it is justly merited.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, the undersigned will analyze whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction according to the Poulis factors, which include: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. *4 Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original). In analyzing these factors, “no single Poulis factor is dispositive ... [it is also] clear that not all of the Poulis factors need to be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008). The court will discuss each factor in turn. 1. Plaintiff's Personal Responsibility The first factor requires the examination of the party's personal responsibility for the actions at issue, not merely their counsel's actions. Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps. Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873 (3d Cir. 1994). “As a general rule, a pro se litigant is responsible for his failure to comply with court orders.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011). Here, Hassel is proceeding pro se. Therefore, Hassel is responsible for his repeated failure to abide by the Court's Orders to provide responses to Trans Union's requests for discovery. (Doc. 48; Doc. 54). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 2. Prejudice to the Moving Party The second factor requires the examination of the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to comply with court orders. Evidence of prejudice “bear[s] substantial weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259. Examples of prejudice include “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259; see Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984). Prejudice does not need to be “irremediable harm” but “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222 (finding prejudice where the plaintiff repeatedly ignored the defendant's discovery request for the plaintiff's computation of damages and did not provide it until one week before trial); see Adams, 29 F.3d at 873-74. Trans Union submits that Hassel's failure to comply with the Court's discovery orders “wholly frustrates the litigation of this action, as Trans Union cannot determine what, or if any documents which supports [Hassel]'s claims or damage allegations in this matter.” (Doc. 77, at 6). Upon review of the record, the undersigned finds that Hassel's failure to respond to the Court's discovery orders frustrates and delays the resolution of this case. See Reshard v. Lankenau Hosp., 256 F. App'x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007) (failure to comply with discovery compels dismissal); Fahs v. Swift, No. 3:18-CV-0079, 2020 WL 1233634, at *2 (M.D. Pa. March 13, 2020) (failure to file a brief in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment compels dismissal). The Court warned Hassel that going forward, such failure to litigate would prejudice Trans Union, who without timely responses by Hassel cannot seek a prompt resolution of the case. (Doc. 69, at 7); see Fahs, 2020 WL 1233634, at *2. Despite this warning, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Hassel has sufficiently responded to Trans Union's discovery requests to satisfy the Court's Orders to compel discovery. Accordingly, the second Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 3. History of Dilatoriness *5 The third factor to examine is the history of dilatoriness. For a history of dilatoriness to be sufficient to favor a dismissal, there must be “extensive or repeated delay or delinquency ... such as consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260; see Ware, 322 F.3d at 222 (finding a history of dilatory conduct where the plaintiffs repeatedly failed to provide a calculation of damages for the defendant); Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding a history of dilatory conduct where plaintiff repeatedly requested stays and failed to comply with court-mandated deadlines). Conversely, “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a history of dilatoriness.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 261 (citation removed) (refusing to find a history of dilatory conduct where plaintiff did not attend one scheduled deposition but had no “prior instances of dilatory conduct that could constitute a continuous stream of dilatory conduct.”). The dilatory conduct must be evaluated “in light of [the party's] behavior over the life of the case.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 261; Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. In opposition to the motion to compel, Hassel argues that he sufficiently responded to Trans Union's August 25, 2020, Requests for Interrogatories and Production of Documents on September 25, 2020. (Doc. 80, at 2). Objecting to all eighteen Requests for Production, Hassel states: “[Hassel] objects to these requests as overbroad, oppressive and unduly burdensome to the extent it seeks documents and/or information that is readily or more assessable to [Trans Union] from [Trans Union]'s own files, from documents or information in [Trans Union]'s possession and documents/information not relevant to this proceeding.” (Doc. 61-1, at 5; Doc. 77-2, at 6). Trans Union submits that Hassel's “single improper objection” to all eighteen Requests for Production “failed to articulate any legitimate reason as to how producing documents in this manner may be ‘burdensome.’ ” (Doc. 77, at 5-7). Therefore, Trans Union states that Hassel's “complete refusal to provide any responses to Interrogatories frustrates Rule 33 and should be treated as a failure to respond.” (Doc, 77, at 7-8). The Court has granted the parties multiple extensions of time to complete discovery and has given Hassel the opportunity to respond to Trans Union's discovery requests or, alternatively, to explain the reasons for his conduct. (Doc. 48; Doc. 54; Doc. 69; Doc. 71). Yet, Hassel's failure to comply with these Orders was neither substantially justified nor harmless. Therefore, the undersigned finds that Hassel's incomplete responses shall be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(1)(4) (“an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.”). Here, as discussed supra, there is a history of dilatoriness throughout the life of this case. This history includes: (1) failure to appear for a telephonic scheduling conference call; (2) failure to comply with Trans Union's Requests for Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; (3) failure to file a brief in opposition to Trans Union's motion to compel discovery; (4) failure to comply with the Court's Orders directing Hassel to respond to Trans Union's discovery requests; and (5) failure to comply with the Court's warning to make all reasonable efforts to resolving discovery disputes without the Court's involvement. (Doc. 48; Doc. 54; Doc. 69; Doc. 71). Since this conduct of responding late or failing to respond altogether has occurred numerous times over the course of this case, there is a clear history of dilatoriness. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal as well. 4. Party's Willful Bad Faith The fourth factor to consider is whether the party's conduct was willful or in bad faith. For this factor to weigh in favor of dismissal, the conduct at issue must be “willful and not merely negligent or inadvertent.” Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. “Willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. “Under this factor, the District Court must consider whether the conduct was the type of willful or contumacious behavior which [can be] characterized as flagrant bad faith.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262. Conversely, “[i]f the conduct is merely negligent or inadvertent, [the court] will not call the conduct ‘contumacious.’ ” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262. In Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., et al., the United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a case after seventeen months in which the plaintiffs failed to answer crucial interrogatories despite numerous extensions and broke promises and commitments to the court. 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). The Supreme Court found that dismissal was appropriate by reason of the plaintiffs' “flagrant bad faith and their counsel's callous disregard of their responsibilities.” Nat'l Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643 (citations omitted). *6 Here, Hassel's conduct can be described as willful because he has failed to respond to multiple Court Orders directing Hassel to reply to Trans Union's discovery requests, after being personally served with such Orders and discovery requests. (Doc. 48; Doc. 54; Doc. 69). Rather than explaining why he has not responded to the discovery requests, Hassel argues: Over the past twenty-plus months instead of using their time and effort on good faith discovery practices [Trans Union] has repeatedly chosen to take actions to delay proceedings, mislead and attempt to divert the Court's attention from the material fact of this matter which is that [Trans Union] has completely failed to support its position that it did not disregard its PCRA duties to proactively provide information to [Hassel] and willfully disregarded [Hassel's] request for information as entitled under the PCRA. (Doc. 80, at 2). However, this allegation does not explain why Hassel has failed to respond to Trans Union's discovery requests. Moreover, the Court has granted the parties multiple extensions of time to complete discovery on numerous occasions and has given Hassel the opportunity to respond to Trans Union's discovery requests or, alternatively, to explain the reasons for his conduct. (Doc. 48; Doc. 54; Doc. 69; Doc. 71). Yet, Hassel has failed to comply with these Orders, which has delayed and frustrated the resolution of this case. Therefore, Hassel's conduct appears to be willful, and this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 5. Availability of Alternative Sanctions Since dismissal of a case is an “extreme” sanction, the court must analyze whether other sanctions would “better serve the interests of justice.” Titus v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., 695 F.2d 746, 749 (3d Cir. 1982). Moreover, “the analysis regarding alternative sanctions does not begin and end with a determination that monetary sanctions are not available.” Adkins v. Reynolds, 788 F. App'x 824, 828 (3d Cir. 2019). The sanctions must “be effective toward mitigating the prejudice caused by dilatory behavior or delinquency.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 923 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 2019). However, “where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se ... [the Third Circuit has] upheld the District Court's conclusion that no alternative sanctions existed because monetary sanctions, including attorney's fees, ‘would not be an effective alternative.’ ” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63 (citing Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191.); see eg., Nowland v. Lucas, No. 1:10-CV-1963, 2012 WL 10559, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012) (“This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion.”). Here, Hassel's status as a pro se litigant limits this Court from sanctioning him or utilizing lesser alternative sanctions to steer this litigation onward because there is no attorney to impose fees upon for failing to comply with Orders, and imposing fees upon Hassel himself appears futile. See Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263. “Imposing additional sanctions or prolonging this case through orders requiring compliance with federal and local rules would be ineffective given the history of the failure to comply with prior orders.” Barkhorn v. Est. of Shiley, No. 1:18-CV-02173, 2020 WL 3976938, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 14, 2020); see Kim v. Columbia Cty. Children and Youth Servs., No. 4:15-CV-02331, 2016 WL 8257721, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2016). Therefore, dismissing this case is appropriate in light of the ineffectiveness of alternative sanctions. 6. Meritoriousness of Plaintiff's Claim *7 The sixth and final factor to consider is the meritoriousness of the claim. Meritoriousness of the claim is determined by using the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Thus, a claim is meritorious “when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff or would constitute a complete defense.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870). “Where a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, but the defendant raises a prima facie defense, the factor may not weigh in favor of the plaintiff.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 876-77. Here, the undersigned found that Hassel's complaint sufficiently alleges a prima facie cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(B) and § 1681i(a)(7). (Doc. 2, ¶ 60; Doc. 69, at 10-13). Hassel does indeed plead an inaccuracy in the investigation completed by Trans Union as Hassel asserts that Trans Union's investigation contained an inaccurate representation of his credit score. (Doc. 2, 27); see Klotz v. Trans Union, LLC, 246 F.R.D. 208, 212 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The FCRA imposes an explicit duty on CRAs, upon request, to supply a description of its investigation procedures within 15 days of such request. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i(a)(6)(B), 1681i(a)(7); see Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 713 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 1997)). Hassel asserts that Trans Union failed to comply with this duty despite Hassel's specific request for its investigation procedures after discovering the alleged inaccuracy in the investigation report. (Doc. 2, at ¶ 60-61). These allegations raise a plausible claims under the FCRA, including actual damages in the form of a drop in credit rating and loss of credit opportunities. (Doc. 2, at ¶ 16); see Klotz, 246 F.R.D. at 212; Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 866 (3d Cir. 2014). As such, “allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff....” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870. Accordingly, the sixth Poulis factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal. 7. Balancing of the Poulis Factors To reiterate, when weighing the Poulis factors, there is no “magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” that automatically warrants dismissal for failure to prosecute. Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263. Quite the contrary, the Court is guided by the Third Circuit's warning that “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, five out of the six Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal. Although Hassel has a potentially meritorious claim, he has failed to prosecute his case, resulting in prejudice to Trans Union, and dismissal is the only effective sanction available as Hassel is a pro se litigant. Having considered evidence in the record, the undersigned finds that dismissal is appropriate. Barkhorn, 2020 WL 3976938, at *6 (dismissing action where five out of six Poulis factors weighed in favor of dismissal). As such, the undersigned declines to address Trans Union's remaining arguments in the motion to compel. (Doc. 77). Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Trans Union's motion to compel and dismiss Hassel's complaint with prejudice as a sanction for violation of the Court's Orders to provide discovery responses. (Doc. 77). B. AWARD OF REASONABLE EXPENSES In addition to the request for dismissal of the complaint, Trans Union seeks an award of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, for Hassel's “unjustified failure to provide the promised and Court-ordered discovery.” (Doc. 77, at 2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) governs the payment of expenses when a motion to compel has been granted and reads, in pertinent part: *8 If the motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). The rule directs the court not to award fees when there is evidence of good faith attempts to make discovery disclosures; however, those safe havens do not apply in the instant matter. See ASD Specialty Healthcare, Inc. v. New Life Home Care, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-0068, 2013 WL 1482777, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2013) (granting award of attorney's fees for defendants' failure to provide discovery). “The starting point for a determination of attorney's fees, the lodestar calculation, is the product of: [1] the number of hours reasonably expended ... [2] times an hourly fee based on the prevailing market rate.” Doering v. Union Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001); O'Quinn v. Recovery Partners, LLC, No. 1:10-CV-2361, 2011 WL 2976288, *3 (M.D. Pa. June 27, 2011), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. O'Quinn v. Recovery Partners, 2011 WL 2971795 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2011). The burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of both the hours expended and hourly rates falls on the party seeking attorney's fees. See Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) ). The party requesting fees must submit “fairly definite information as to hours devoted to various general activities, e.g., partial discovery, settlement negotiations, and the hours spent by various classes of attorneys.” United Auto. Workers Local 259 Social Sec. Dept. v. Metro Auto Ctr., 501 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Evans v. Port Auth., 273 F.3d 346, 361 (3d Cir. 2001)). Here, Trans Union's request for an award of reasonable expenses does not request a specific amount of monetary damages, nor does it attach an accounting of the tasks performed and hours expended by attorneys related to the discovery dispute. (Doc. 77, at 9-10). Hassel does not oppose the request for reasonable expenses. (Doc. 80). As discussed supra, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant Trans Union's motion to compel as Hassel has failed to participate in the discovery process in violation of several Orders of the Court, including Court Orders directing Hassel to provide responses to Trans Union's discovery requests and a Scheduling Order to further extend the discovery deadline. (Doc. 48; Doc. 54; Doc. 71). Therefore, it is further recommended that the Court grant Trans Union's request for an award of reasonable expenses. (Doc. 77). To determine this award, Trans Union shall submit a statement of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in the preparation of the motion to compel, as well as supporting documentation. Hassel shall be given the opportunity to file a response thereto upon service of Trans Union's statement of expenses. IV. RECOMMENDATION For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that Trans Union's motion to compel be GRANTED, dismissing Hassel's complaint with prejudice and granting Trans Union an award of its reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees. (Doc. 77). In addition, it is recommended that Hassel's motion for summary judgment be DENIED. (Doc. 81). *9 BY THE COURT: NOTICE NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated May 23, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides: Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Footnotes [1] On November 17, 2021, Hassel filed a stipulation of dismissal of Centric Bank, and Centric Bank was dismissed from this action. (Doc. 65). [2] Hassel argues that the Court should grant summary judgment in his favor because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Trans Union's failure to satisfy its obligations under the FCRA. (Doc. 81, at 2). For the reasons outlined in this recommendation, the undersigned finds that an examination of the Poulis factors weighs in favor of dismissing this action as a sanction for Hassel's failure to respond to Trans Union's discovery requests and the Court's Orders compelling his response to such discovery. Accordingly, it is recommended that the motion for summary judgment be DENIED. (Doc. 81).