GEORGE HARTZMAN, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, LLC, Defendant 1:14CV808 United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina Filed May 04, 2017 Auld, L. Patrick, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 The Court (per the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge) recently granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion for Protective Order (Docket Entry 78). (See Text Order dated Mar. 27, 2017.)[1] More particularly: 1) as to Defendant's request for a limit on the number of production requests to which it must respond, the Court noted that three orders related to other discovery motions “effectively limited the number of production requests to which Defendant must respond” (id. (citing Docket Entries 133 and 134, as well as Text Order dated Mar. 23, 2017)); 2) the Court observed that intervening events had mooted Defendant's request that the Court excuse Defendant from responding to two motions filed by Plaintiff (see id.); 3) the Court granted Defendant's request for screening procedures for further discovery motions from Plaintiff by relieving Defendant of the obligation to respond to any such motion unless ordered to do so by the Court (see id.); and 4) the Court opted to consider expense-shifting in connection with the Motion for Protective Order and other discovery-related orders, rather than sanctions against Plaintiff for discovery abuse (see id. (citing Docket Entries 133 and 134)). Given that disposition, the Court directed the parties to address apportionment of expenses related to Defendant's Motion for Protective Order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(C). (See id. (“[I]n the context of a motion for a protective order, ‘Rule 37(a)(5) applies to the award of expenses.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3). Under that cross-referenced provision, ‘if the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). Accordingly, ... each party shall file a notice addressing (A) whether the Court should apportion reasonable expenses as to [Defendant's Motion for Protective Order]; and (B) if so, what apportionment the Court should make.” (brackets and ellipsis omitted)).) Thereafter, Plaintiff made a filing contesting any such apportionment (see Docket Entry 144) and Defendant filed a Notice asking the Court to require Plaintiff to pay all the attorney's fees Defendant incurred in pursuing its Motion for Protective Order (see Docket Entry 145). After reviewing those materials, the Court will order Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant for at least a portion of the expenses it accrued litigating its Motion for Protective Order. As an initial matter, the Court concludes that, notwithstanding the partial mooting of the Motion for Protective Order prior to judicial resolution and the Court's decision to consider expense-shifting in lieu of sanctions, Defendant substantially prevailed. See generally Kelly v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 3:10CV1265, 2011 WL 2582517, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. June 29, 2011) (“[The p]laintiff substantially prevailed on the [m]otion to [c]ompel. Accordingly, the [c]ourt exercises its authority to apportion reasonable fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C).”). In addition, for reasons detailed below, Plaintiff lacked substantial justification for his discovery-related position(s) at issue in Defendant's Motion for Protective Order and no other circumstances make expense-shifting unjust. The Court will finalize the apportionment and will determine the payment due from Plaintiff after allowing the parties an opportunity to address the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees claimed by Defendant (see Docket Entry 145-1 at 11). *2 In opposing apportionment of expenses associated with Defendant's Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiff requested that the Court “schedule a hearing on these issues, as [the United States Supreme Court] requires courts to ensure fairness and accuracy, and to meet the requirements of due process in cases in which a pro se is a party.” (Docket Entry 144 at 1 (citing Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011)).) “Turner involved an indigent's right to counsel [or alternative procedural safeguards] in a civil contempt hearing for failure to pay court-ordered child support, and the [Supreme] Court there took care to limit the scope of its holding to the facts of the case.... Moreover, courts have declined to apply or extend Turner to factual circumstances beyond those in Turner.” Canaan v. City of El Paso, No. EP-16-CV-132-DCG, 2017 WL 129027, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2017). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Turner does not require a hearing here. Nor does the Court deem a hearing necessary based on Plaintiff's assertion that he “didn't and still doesn't know what the procedures are to respond to expense related ‘apportion’ issues .... Plaintiff was unaware of the potential monetary consequences of Motions to Compel and [for] Protective Orders ....” (Docket Entry 144 at 1-2.) First, the Second Amended Complaint describes Plaintiff as “President and Economist, Hartzman Fiduciary, ... and author of Questions for America, What to do Now; Think; Fiduciary Guide/Retirement Plans and Hartzman's Inquisition, for CPA, Attorney and investor financial ethics, philosophy and economic continuing education classes ....” (Docket Entry 36, ¶ 1; see also id. (“Plaintiff has worked as a Financial Advisor since 1993, taught CPA and attorney financial ethics in North Carolina and was one of the only Advisors at Wells Fargo whose personal and client accounts performed well in the Financial Crisis of 2008 and early 2009.”).) Surely, a person with that background would know that the word “apportion” means “to divide and distribute in shares according to a plan,” Webster's New World Dictionary 67 (2d college ed. 1980), and would understand the clear procedural directive to “file a notice addressing (A) whether the Court should apportion reasonable expenses as to [Defendant's Motion for Protective Order]; and (B) if so, what apportionment the Court should make” (Text Order dated Mar. 27, 2017). Further, in a previous filing submitted in response to an identical order from the Court requiring the parties to address the possibility of apportioned expense-shifting for another discovery motion, Plaintiff manifested an understanding that he could oppose expense-shifting on the grounds that (A) the discovery-related conduct at issue “ ‘was substantially justified’ ” and/or (B) “ ‘other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.’ ” (Docket Entry 136 at 1 (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)).)[2] Finally, the record refutes Plaintiff's denial of prior notice that discovery litigation could result in expense-shifting; long before Plaintiff launched his fusillade of discovery requests and motions that ultimately caused Defendant to seek a protective order, the Court provided Plaintiff with a copy of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, which (as shown above) discusses discovery-related expense-shifting. (See Text Order dated Oct. 21, 2014.) Accordingly, the Court will review Plaintiff's objections to expense-shifting on Defendant's Motion for Protective Order (see Docket Entry 144 at 2-4), without holding a hearing. Substantially Justified *3 “A legal position is ‘substantially justified’ if there is a ‘genuine dispute’ as to proper resolution or if ‘a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.’ ” Decision Insights, Inc. v. Sentia Grp., Inc., 311 F. App'x 586, 599 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565–66 n.2 (1988)). Plaintiff has not developed any argument that he possessed a substantial justification for his service of more than a thousand discovery requests and/or his filing of numerous discovery motions that he lost (entirely or largely) or withdrew, all of which led Defendant to move for a protective order (see Docket Entry 79 at 1-2 (“[A]s of December 25, 2016, [Plaintiff] (proceeding pro se) had filed or served 422 requests for production (in 11 separate sets), 727 requests for admission (currently withdrawn, with indication they will be re-served later), four sets of interrogatories, four motions to compel, and a Motion for Clarification.... [T]he discovery requests and motions that [Plaintiff] has served in the two months since his counsel withdrew have been improper, repetitive, overly burdensome, and harassing.” (internal quotation marks omitted))); instead, in response to the Text Order soliciting his position on expense-shifting for Defendant's Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiff merely stated in conclusory fashion: [T]he requested discovery was in response to mostly legitimate, relevant discovery based on the dissuade from reporting, one sided investigation, contributing and pretextual aspects of Plaintiff's case, which [Plaintiff] didn't make apparent to the [C]ourt when the motions were filed, as the details of how to explain the allegations and enough specific cases to cite were discovered as the Motion for Summary Judgement was compiled after the discovery period was ended without extension. (Docket Entry 144 at 2 (emphasis added).)[3] That approach will not allow Plaintiff to escape expense-shifting. See generally United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[A] litigant has an obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold its peace.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hughes v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 1:12CV717, 2014 WL 906220, at *1 n.1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2014) (“A party should not expect a court to do the work that it elected not to do.”). Alternatively, Plaintiff's foregoing statement acknowledges that he served at least some illegitimate discovery requests and that, during discovery litigation, he did not properly defend other requests contested by Defendant. In fact, the Court's review of the record confirmed that Plaintiff served numerous overly burdensome or otherwise improper discovery requests and moved to compel responses to such requests without substantial justification (even considering his belated effort to justify them). (See, e.g., Docket Entries 133, 134, 148.) Moreover, Plaintiff's above-quoted statement does not attempt to defend other discovery activity that Defendant cited to support its Motion for Protective Order, such as Plaintiff's “serv[ice of] over 700 Requests for Admission, amend[ment of] them, and then withdr[awal of] them entirely – after [Defendant] told [Plaintiff] the scheduling order provided for only 15 requests for admission and after [Defendant] had begun to gone [sic] through effort to object and respond” (Docket Entry 79 at 15). Given these considerations, the Court does not find a substantial justification for the discovery-related conduct by Plaintiff that resulted in the filing of Defendant's Motion for Protective Order. Other Circumstances Plaintiff has identified nine grounds he evidently would have the Court treat as circumstances rendering expense-shifting unjust: 1) “Plaintiff was placed in a short term shotgun type situation to achieve discovery before immovable Court imposed deadlines” (Docket Entry 144 at 2); 2) “Plaintiff made the mistake of allowing opposing council [sic] to affect [Plaintiff's] decision making as to the magnitude of [Local Rule] 5.4 concerning the proper response associated with the sealed portion of [his] Second Motion to Compel [Discovery]” (id.); *4 3) “Plaintiff should not be charged for discovery or apportion[ed expenses related to Defendant's Motion for] Protective Order Defendant didn't defend by admitting said documentation doesn't exist or was already produced” (id.); 4) “Plaintiff didn't receive discovery [Defendant] produced to his former council [sic] until mid-December, 2016” (id. at 3); 5) Plaintiff “tried to narrow and clarify requests as best he could, as [Defendant] refused to confer” (id.); 6) “Plaintiff tried to limit his [production] requests in good faith as [Defendant] tried to get out of the Sanchez deposition and delayed initial production by more than a month” (id.); 7) “[Defendant's] initially produced three-page privilege log was woefully incomplete, and was eventually supplemented with a 48-page document” (id.); 8) “Plaintiff has little ability to pay” (id. at 4); and 9) Plaintiff's status as “an unexperienced Pro Se who got played by some very experienced and well paid opponents” warrants “mercy” (id.). These contentions do not immunize Plaintiff from expense-shifting as to Defendant's Motion for Protective Order. Regarding the first of the foregoing items, Plaintiff has not explained how the reasonable, case-management deadlines in this case[4] caused him to take positions lacking substantial justification. (See id. at 2.) If anything, such deadlines should have encouraged Plaintiff to focus on material matters, instead of serving excessive discovery requests and filing ill-considered discovery motions. Plaintiff's second item above appears to refer to the Court's striking of Items 21-33 of his Second Motion to Compel Discovery under Seal. (See Text Order dated Mar. 23, 2017 (striking Docket Entry 88).) That Text Order did fault Plaintiff for failing to comply with the sealed filing requirements of Local Rule 5.4 (see id.); however, it also noted that he flagrantly violated the page limitations of Local Rule 7.3 (see id.). Assuming something Defendant's counsel conveyed to Plaintiff played some part in his non-compliance with Local Rule 5.4 (a contention for which he supplied no supporting evidence (see Docket Entry 144 at 2)), Plaintiff has not explained why he ignored Local Rule 7.3 (see id.). In any event, Defendant filed its Motion for Protective Order on December 28, 2016 (see Docket Entry 78 at 3), and Plaintiff did not make his stricken filing until January 12, 2017 (see Docket Entry 87-1 at 1 (re-docketing Certificate of Service from Docket Entry 88)). Nor did the Court's order granting in part Defendant's Motion for Protective Order rely on Plaintiff's non-compliance with Local Rule 5.4 to find in Defendant's favor; rather, the Court only noted that its prior striking of Items 21-33 of Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Discovery under Seal (along with other orders on discovery motions) “effectively limited the number of production requests to which Defendant must respond.” (Text Order dated Mar. 27, 2017 (citing Docket Entries 133 and 134, as well as Text Order dated Mar. 23, 2017).) *5 The third item in Plaintiff's list of mitigating circumstances seemingly focuses on Defendant's argument that the Court should require Plaintiff to pay all the attorney's fees Defendant incurred in opposing Plaintiff's First Motion to Compel Discovery (rather than just a portion) – despite the fact that the Court granted Plaintiff relief as to two production requests – because Defendant actually possessed no responsive documents as to one of those requests and already produced all documents responsive to the other of those requests (see Docket Entry 139 at 2). Plaintiff's argument on that front might have some bearing on the apportionment of expense-shifting on his First Motion to Compel Discovery (although Plaintiff did not raise any such contention when the Court solicited his position on that subject (see Docket Entry 136)); however, it does not bear directly on the question of whether and to what extent the Court should shift expenses associated with Defendant's Motion for Protective Order. As to the fourth item cited by Plaintiff (i.e., delay in obtaining documents Defendant previously produced to Plaintiff's former counsel), Plaintiff has not explained how such delay caused him to serve more than a thousand discovery requests (including 712 more requests for admission than the Court's scheduling order permitted). (See Docket Entry 144 at 3.) In addition, Plaintiff has acknowledged that, by mid-December 2016, he personally had received the discovery originally produced to his then-counsel (see id.), yet, after that time, Plaintiff served/ filed many of the discovery requests/motions that led Defendant to move for a protective order (see Docket Entry 79 at 4, 6). Lastly, to the extent Plaintiff did not know what production Defendant had made (and that fact somehow led Plaintiff to serve/file unnecessary discovery requests/motions), he must accept the consequences for pursuing such matters before performing a proper review. Plaintiff's fifth, above-quoted item states that he “tried to narrow and clarify requests as best he could, as [Defendant] refused to confer” (Docket Entry 144 at 3 (citing Docket Entries 144-2, 144-12, and 144-13)); however, the evidence tendered to support that proposition (e-mails from Plaintiff to Defendant's counsel dated December 19, 23, 24, and 28, 2016, and an e-mail from Defendant's counsel to Plaintiff dated January 3, 2017 (see Docket Entries 144-2, 144-12, and 144-13)) does not do so, particularly in light of Plaintiff's subsequent certification on January 12, 2017, “that after multiple dispute conferences and good faith efforts to confer on December 9, 19, 23, 201[6], and January 6, 2017, Plaintiff and Defendant's counsel ... both agree we have been unable to resolve the matters contained within [Plaintiff's Second] Motion to Compel Discovery satisfactorily ....” (Docket Entry 87 at 1 (emphasis added).)[5] The first of the e-mails cited by Plaintiff identifies “a total of 54 [production] requests” that he proposed to “meet and confer over.” (Docket Entry 144-2 at 1.) The second cited e-mail “withdraw[s]” a handful of production requests and expresses Plaintiff's desire “to meet and confer” about others. (Docket Entry 144-12 at 1-3.) The third and fourth cited e-mails ask if Defendant's counsel “received the[ ] changes to [Plaintiff's] discovery requests [in the second cited e-mail].” (Docket Entry 144-12 at 1.) In the fifth cited e-mail, Defendant's counsel responded to the foregoing e-mails from Plaintiff, as follows: We have met and conferred several times now regarding your voluminous document requests. As I told you each time: • Unless you withdrew [production] requests [sets] 4-11 in their entirety, we were going to file our motion for Protective Order. You refused to do so (and instead served more requests) and that motion is now on file. Your piecemeal email amendments are improper and do not solve the problem that most of your requests are entirely irrelevant to the issues left in your remaining claim. *6 • You also filed a motion to compel documents on December 25, which we will respond to in due course. • As I have advised you previously, we are still working on pulling and reviewing documents to see if any additional production is necessary in response to your over 250 requests for production served over the past two months. This process takes time--especially when we receive new motions and discovery requests from you almost daily. If additional responsive documents are located, we will produce them. It is unlikely that process will be completed before [January 13, 2017]. We will also log documents identified as responsive, but withheld as privileged or work product, if any exist. Based on the status outlined above, we do not believe there is anything currently to meet and confer about. If you intend to file another motion of some sort, however, we are glad to discuss its contents with you prior to your filing in accordance with local rules[.] (Docket Entry 144-13 at 1 (emphasis added).) The record thus establishes that: A) in late December 2016, Plaintiff proposed a meet and confer regarding certain of his production requests; B) in early January 2017, Defendant's counsel responded that (i) the two sides already had met and conferred about the requests at issue (and had reached an impasse resulting in Defendant's filing of its Motion for Protective Order), but that (ii) Defendant's counsel remained willing to meet and confer again if Plaintiff intended to file another discovery motion; and C) the parties did meet and confer again (on January 6, 2017) before Plaintiff filed his Second Motion to Compel Discovery. Simply put, this sequence of events does not show that Plaintiff “narrowed” or “clarified” his production requests in any materially significant manner (particularly not before Defendant filed its Motion for Protective Order), much less that Defendant refused to confer appropriately (before filing its Motion for Protective Order or at any other time). Item six from Plaintiff's list of grounds that should inhibit expense-shifting on Defendant's Motion for Protective Order alleges that Defendant's “initially produced three-page privilege log was woefully incomplete, and was eventually supplemented with a 48-page document.” (Docket Entry 144 at 3 (citing Docket Entries 144-4, 144-5, and 144-6).) This allegation entitles Plaintiff to no relief. As an initial matter, the privilege log pilloried by Plaintiff comes from his earlier administrative action, not this case. (Compare Docket Entry 1 at 1 (reflecting filing date of September 22, 2014, for Plaintiff's Complaint in this case), with Docket Entry 144-5 at 1 (“enclos[ing] Respondent's privilege log in [Hartzman v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, Case No. 2013-SOX-45]” with letter dated July 23, 2014, to Plaintiff from attorneys not involved in this case).) Further, Plaintiff apparently did not raise any objection to Defendant's privilege log until December 28, 2016 (see Docket Entry 144-4 at 1), the day Defendant filed its Motion for Protective Order (see Docket Entry 78 at 3). Plaintiff has not explained how an objection he raised to a privilege log on December 28, 2016, caused him to serve excessive discovery requests and to engage in unwarranted discovery motion practice before December 28, 2016 (which conduct caused Defendant to file its Motion for Protective Order). (See Docket Entry 144 at 3.) *7 For a seventh mitigating item, Plaintiff would have the Court deny expense-shifting on Defendant's Motion for Protective Order based on Plaintiff's declaration that he “tried to limit his requests in good faith as [Defendant] tried to get out of the Sanchez deposition and delayed initial production [of discovery] ....” (Id. (citing Docket Entries 144-7, 144-8, 144-9, 144-10, and 144-11).) Again, the record does not support a finding either that Plaintiff materially limited his excessive production requests or that Defendant acted improperly. In that regard: A) on January 1, 2017, Plaintiff purported to withdraw nine production requests, including Requests for Production 375, 384, and 385 (see Docket Entry 144-7 at 1), despite the fact that, on December 26, 2016, he had moved to compel responses to Requests for Production 384 and 385 (see Docket Entry 75 at 5-6); B) on January 3, 2017, Defendant's counsel e-mailed Plaintiff that (i) Defendant was “still working on pulling and reviewing documents to see if any additional production is necessary in response to [Plaintiff's] over 250 requests for production served over the past two months” (Docket Entry 144-13 at 1; see also id. (“This process takes time--especially when we receive new motions and discovery requests from you almost daily. If additional responsive documents are located, we will produce them. It is unlikely that process will be completed before [January 13, 2017].”)), and that (ii) “Mr. Sanchez [wa]s still available for deposition on Jan. 13th at Robinson Bradshaw's offices in Charlotte” (id.; see also id. (“If you intend to go forward with that date, please provide the name of the court reporting service you have contracted with to report on the deposition so that we can confirm their attendance. Please also know that if Mr. Sanchez makes arrangements to fly here (something he is not obligated to do under the Federal Rules) and you cancel after his ticket is purchased, we expect you to reimburse the price of that ticket.”)); C) on January 6, 2017, Plaintiff and Defendant's counsel conferred (see Docket Entry 87 at 1; Docket Entry 144-11 at 1), after which Defendant's counsel e-mailed Plaintiff “confirming that [the parties had] agreed to postpone the deposition of Mr. Sanchez (previously scheduled for Friday, January 13th) because [Plaintiff's] pending [First M]otion to Compel [Discovery] relates to Mr. Sanchez's potential testimony” (Docket Entry 144-11 at 1; see also id. (“We will work together to reschedule that deposition, if necessary, after the Court rules on the motion.”)); D) on January 12, 2017, Plaintiff moved to compel a response to Requests for Production 375 and 384 (see Docket Entry 87 at 10-11, 13), despite having purportedly withdrawn both those Requests on January 1, 2017 (see Docket Entry 144-7 at 1); E) at 12:55 p.m., on January 13, 2017, Plaintiff e-mailed Defendant's counsel asking to “schedule a date for the Sanchez deposition before the end of the discovery deadline” (Docket Entry 144-8 at 2) and stating that he “expect[ed] the initial discovery [Defendant] said [it] would produce today” (id.); F) at 1:27 p.m., on January 13, 2017, Defendant's counsel responded that (i) she “did not at any time tell [Plaintiff] that [he] would get documents [on January 13, 2017]” (id. at 1), (ii) Defendant was “still working on some additional documents and will forward [them] once they are ready” (id.), and (iii) she would “discuss [Plaintiff's] request for Sanchez dates with [her] client and get back with [Plaintiff]” (id.); G) at 10:04 a.m., on January 17, 2017, Plaintiff e-mailed counsel for Defendant that Plaintiff was “[w]aiting on production” and “to hear back on Sanchez” (Docket Entry 144-9 at 2); *8 H) at 10:51 a.m., on January 17, 2017, Plaintiff e-mailed counsel for Defendant (i) asking for “a good time to discuss depositions considering the end of discovery, non-provided [sic] and outstanding motions to compel production” (Docket Entry 144-10 at 2), and (ii) stating that Plaintiff was “open to delay on the depositions until production is ruled on as long as [Plaintiff is] allowed to conduct the depositions after discovery closes” (id.); I) at 5:48 p.m., on January 17, 2017, Defendant's counsel responded that (i) she did “not believe it productive to get Sanchez dates until [the parties] hear [from the Court] on [Plaintiff's First M]otion to [C]ompel” (Docket Entry 144-9 at 1; see also id. (“[Mr. Sanchez] has already had to reschedule twice and we have no idea how long it will take to get a ruling.”)), and (ii) “if [the parties] cannot schedule [Mr. Sanchez's deposition] within the current discovery cut off, [Defendant was] willing to provide [Mr. Sanchez] after the cutoff if necessary” (id.); J) on January 20, 2017, after a meet-and-confer, Defendant's counsel e-mailed Plaintiff confirming that Plaintiff “want[ed] to schedule the deposition of Hank Sanchez before the deposition cut off of February 13, 2017, even though [Plaintiff] previously agreed to delay that deposition until [his First M]otion to [C]ompel [Discovery] was ruled on” (Docket Entry 144-10 at 1; see also id. (“As you know, we were willing to stipulate that [Mr. Sanchez's] deposition[ ] could be taken outside of the discovery period (and ask for court approval if necessary) because of the pending discovery motions and because [Defendant] is still reviewing documents to see if any additional materials need to be produced in response to your discovery requests received late in discovery. I also made clear that we believe this could be completed so that there was no need to seek any delay in the summary judgment or trial deadlines. You declined our offer.”)); and K) on January 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Reply in support of his First Motion to Compel Discovery, but did not acknowledge therein that said Motion sought relief as to Requests for Production 384 and 385, both of which he subsequently had withdrawn, before including one (Request for Production 384) in his Second Motion to Compel Discovery (see Docket Entry 97 at 1-6). This evidence does not demonstrate that Plaintiff “tried to limit his requests in good faith” (Docket Entry 144 at 3), that Defendant “tried to get out of the Sanchez deposition” (id.), or that Defendant unreasonably “delayed initial production” of discovery (id.). To the contrary, it reflects that (i) Plaintiff withdrew a handful of requests, but then instituted or continued litigation regarding some of those very requests, (ii) Defendant consistently took reasonable positions about Mr. Sanchez's deposition, and (iii) Defendant understandably required more than 30 days to gather, to review, and to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff's voluminous requests. In any event, Plaintiff has not explained how any of Defendant's actions regarding Mr. Sanchez's deposition and/or document production caused Plaintiff to serve excessive or otherwise improper discovery requests and/or to file unwarranted discovery motions. (See id.) Nor does Plaintiff's pro se status or his alleged impecuniosity (the eighth and ninth items from his mitigation list) preclude expense-shifting. See, e.g., Garity v. Donahoe, No. 2:11CV1805, 2014 WL 1168913, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 21, 2014) (“[A] litigant's pro se status does not relieve [him] of obligations to comply with discovery rules.”); Bosworth v. Record Data of Md., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 518, 521 (D. Md. 1984) (“A flat per se policy against the imposition of sanctions under ... Rule 37 upon any party who is financially indigent does not accord with the purposes of that rule and would open the door to many possible abuses.”).[6] *9 In sum, Plaintiff has shown no circumstances that would make expense-shifting on Defendant's Motion for Protective Order unjust. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay at least some portion of the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Defendant in litigating its Motion for Protective Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, on or before May 18, 2017, Plaintiff shall file EITHER (A) a Notice stating that he concedes the reasonableness of the attorney's fees claimed by Defendant in Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of Robert W. Fuller Re[garding] Apportionment of Reasonable Fees for Defendant's Motion for Protective Order (Docket Entry 145-1 at 11), OR (B) a Memorandum of no more than five pages (excluding any appropriate attachments) regarding any challenge Plaintiff wishes to assert to the reasonableness of those claimed attorney's fees. Failure by Plaintiff to comply with this Order will result in an award of the attorney's fees claimed by Defendant in Exhibit 3. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Plaintiff timely files a Memorandum challenging the reasonableness of the attorney's fees claimed by Defendant in Exhibit 3, Defendant shall file a Response Memorandum of no more than five pages (excluding any appropriate attachments) by June 1, 2017. Failure by Defendant to comply with this Order will result in the denial of any expense-shifting as to attorney's fees contested by Plaintiff as unreasonable. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Defendant timely files a Response Memorandum regarding the reasonableness of the attorney's fees claimed by Defendant in Exhibit 3, Plaintiff may file a Reply Memorandum of no more than three pages (excluding any appropriate attachments) by June 8, 2017. Footnotes [1] Neither party has objected to that Text Order (see Docket Entries dated Mar. 27, 2017, to present) and the time to do so has run, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“A party may serve and file objections to [a non-dispositive, pretrial] order within 14 days after being served with a copy.”). [2] The Court agrees that those exemptions from expense-shifting apply to orders partially granting and denying a discovery-related motion. See generally Charter Practices Int'l, LLC v. Robb, No. 3:12CV1768 (RNC), 2014 WL 273855, at *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2014); Switch Commc'ns Grp. LLC v. Ballard, No. 2:11CV285 JCM (GWF), 2011 WL 5041231, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2011). [3] Contrary to Plaintiff's statement above, the Court did extend the discovery deadline from December 15, 2016, to February 13, 2017. (See Text Order dated Sept. 20, 2016.) [4] Notably, the Court adopted the discovery deadline originally proposed by the parties (see Text Order dated Apr. 27, 2016 (adopting Docket Entry 50)), and later extended that deadline as requested by the parties (see Text Order dated Sept. 20, 2016 (granting in pertinent part Docket Entry 59)). [5] That certification also directly refutes Plaintiff's bald declaration that, “[b]y not conferring on the requests in [his] Second Motion to [C]ompel [Discovery], [Defendant] ran up Plaintiff's price tag” (Docket Entry 144 at 3) and engaged in “manipulation of the discovery process to financially profit at [Plaintiff's] expense” (id.). [6] Additionally, the Court finds no basis for Plaintiff's unsupported, conclusory assertion that he “got played” by Defendant's counsel, but does find evidence that, notwithstanding Plaintiff's alleged financial hardship, he continues to engage in spending patterns not generally associated with grim poverty (see Docket Entry 136-2 (documenting debited expenditures of approximately $1,000 at Harris Teeter, Fresh Market, and Food Lion, and of approximately $300 at bars and restaurants, as well as $500 in cash withdrawals, all within a seven-week period in 2017)).