JUAN CASTILLO Plaintiff, v. JLG INDUSTRIES, INC., OSHKOSH CORPORATION, and JORGE ESTRADA, Defendants CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18-CV-41 United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Laredo Division Filed May 07, 2019 Counsel Ronald Rodriguez, The Law Offices of Ronald Rodriguez PC, Laredo, TX, for Plaintiff. Kyle M. Rowley, Giorgio George Caflisch, Sheehy, Ware & Pappas, P.C., Houston, TX, Jamie Renee Guidry, Kelly Morgan et al, Odessa, TX, for Defendants. Kazen, John A., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Before the Court is Defendants' Opposed Motion for Protective Order. (Dkt. No. 25). Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Id.). Defendants' motion appeared to couch the dispute about the entry of a protective order as a disagreement about the language of the order, as reflected in emails exchanged between counsel and attached to the motion (Dkt. No. 25–1). But Plaintiff instead argues that Defendants have not yet met their burden of showing that this case warrants entry of a protective order at all. (Dkt. No. 28). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) permits the discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Under Rule 26(c) the court may issue a protective order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including...a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information.” Id. A party moving “to protect against the disclosure of sensitive information must first establish the confidential nature of the requested discovery.” Acme Truck Line, Inc. v. Gardner, No. CIV.A. H-13-3152, 2014 WL 6680667, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2014). The movant must also show “good cause” for the entry of the order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). To establish good cause, the movant must show “a particular and specific demonstration of fact” rather than merely “stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2035, at 483–86 (2d ed.1994)). Defendants contend that they would suffer a competitive disadvantage and economic injury if they were to be compelled to disclose their “contracts with third parties, employee information, financial data, technical data, and other confidential information.” (Dkt. No. 25 at 2). This information may well warrant a protective order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (permitting the court to enter an order “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential...commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way”). But Defendants have not established that the information sought by Plaintiff is confidential; nor have they articulated specific harms that might arise from disclosure of Defendants' putatively confidential information. The most that Defendants allege is that disclosure would “allow Defendants' competitors to benefit freely from Defendants' market research and product research and testing.” (Dkt. No. 25 at 3). Based on the information provided by Defendants at this time, the Court does not believe that Defendants have met their burden to show that the information sought by Plaintiff is confidential and to show through a “particular and specific demonstration of fact” that disclosure would harm them. For example, the Court does not have the benefit of knowing which of Plaintiff's discovery requests seek information that Defendants consider to be confidential, and Defendants have not provided a sufficiently specific description of the documents that Defendants consider to be “a trade secret or other confidential...commercial information.” *2 Accordingly, because Defendants have not shown good cause, Defendants' Opposed Motion for Protective Order is DENIED, without prejudice to Defendants filing a supplemental or amended motion. IT IS SO ORDERED. SIGNED on May 7, 2019 at Laredo, Texas.