BATASKI BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. TRANS UNION LLC, Defendant CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:18-cv-1725-AT-JKL United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division Filed September 18, 2020 Counsel Bataski Bailey, Atlanta, GA, Pro Se. Alex Michael Barfield, Stanton Law, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Michael Adam Merar, Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., Plano, TX, for Defendant. Larkins III, John K., United States Magistrate Judge FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION *1 This consumer case arising under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq., is before the Court on Defendant Trans Union LLC's (“Trans Union”) Motion for Sanctions (the “Motion”). [Doc. 107.] In its Motion, Trans Union asks this Court to dismiss Mr. Bailey's claims as a sanction for his intentionally vexatious and bad faith conduct, whether under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 or the Court's inherent power to control the proceedings. Additionally, Trans Union requests an award of attorney fees for bringing the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant's motion be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Mr. Bailey's claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, but that Trans Union's request for attorney fees be DENIED. I. BACKGROUND Although the Court has previously summarized the history of this case in its discovery orders [see Docs. 95 at 4-11; 112 at 2-11], because Trans Union's present request is based on continued discovery problems and seeks dismissal of Mr. Bailey's case in full, the Court will provide a comprehensive chronicle of the events giving rise to the Motion. Mr. Bailey is not the typical pro se litigant. In this District alone, he has filed eleven separate lawsuits in less than a decade, sometimes represented by counsel and other times not. In every case that is not still pending here, Mr. Bailey's claims have been dismissed prior to trial, sometimes on the pleadings, but sometimes after years of litigation and discovery. See Bailey v. Am. Family Insur. Co., No. 1:19-cv-3232-AT (N.D. Ga.) (insurance dispute dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Bailey v. LifeStar Resp. of Ala. Inc., No. 1:18-cv-2714-SJC (N.D. Ga.) (employment contract dispute dismissed upon motion to dismiss and show cause order); Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Servs. Inc., No. 1:16-cv-4440-WMR (summary judgment granted in favor of defendant in three-year-long employment discrimination case, with costs of approximately $4,000 imposed against Mr. Bailey); Bailey v. Experian Info. Servs. Inc., Case. No. 1:16-cv-789-MHC (N.D. Ga.) (FCRA consumer case dismissed upon motions to dismiss); Bailey v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 1:15-cv-2818-AT (N.D. Ga.) (action to overturn arbitration decision in earlier consumer case dismissed following motion to dismiss); Bailey v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Inc., No. 1:14-cv-989-CC (N.D. Ga.) (FCRA consumer case dismissed following motion to dismiss); Bailey v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs. Inc., No. 1:14-cv-797-MHC (N.D. Ga.) (summary judgment granted in favor of defendants in a three-year-long FCRA consumer case, with costs of approximately $4,000 imposed against Mr. Bailey); Bailey v. EMS Ventures, Inc., 1:11-cv-1090-AT (N.D. Ga.) (summary judgment granted in favor of defendant in four-year-long employment discrimination case). In his still-pending cases, two have passed the pleading stage but are mired in discovery problems, while the other still faces a motion to dismiss. See Bailey v. Priority Ambulance, No. 1:20-cv-928-AT-JKL (N.D. Ga.) (employment discrimination action); Bailey v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-173-AT-JKL (N.D. Ga.) (“Bailey v. Trans Union II”) (FCRA consumer action). The majority of Mr. Bailey's actions have been brought under the FCRA, and by as early as 2016, Mr. Bailey had litigated multiple discovery matters and motions to compel, all of which were decided in against him, whether for Mr. Bailey's failure to follow procedural rules such as good-faith, meet-and-confer requirements or based upon substantive grounds. See e.g., Bailey v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs. Inc., No. 1:14-cv-797-MHC, Docket Entries 86, 150, 194, 204, 207. In other words, well before filing the present action, Mr. Bailey was informed on how to plead and litigate FCRA claims under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Local Rules. *2 Mr. Bailey filed this case well over two years ago, in April 2018. [Doc. 1.] Following multiple rounds of pleading and motions to dismiss, all but Mr. Bailey's FCRA claims were dismissed from the case. [See Docs. 31, 33, 51, 56.] Mr. Bailey filed his now-operative complaint in September 2019. [See Docs. 58.] On October 1, 2019, Trans Union served its First Requests for Admission, First Set of Interrogatories, and First Requests for Production on Mr. Bailey by United States First Class Mail and email. [Doc. 65.] Having received no response, a month later, counsel for Trans Union, Michael Merar, emailed Mr. Bailey to inquire about the status of Mr. Bailey's responses and the status of a separate request for deposition dates. (Decl. of Michael Merar [Doc. 86-2] ¶ 6, Ex. A-5 [Doc. 86-7].) Mr. Bailey claimed to have mailed his objections and responses on October 30, 2019, and advised that he was “working on finding dates that will work” for a deposition and would be in touch. [Doc. 86-7 at 2.] Despite this statement, Mr. Bailey's responses were not received by mail, and in fact, were not received by Mr. Merar until November 17, 2019, when Mr. Bailey attached what he described as a “courtesy copy” of the responses to an email transmitting his own written discovery requests. [Doc. 86-11.] According to Mr. Merar, Trans Union never received the copy of Mr. Bailey's responses that Mr. Bailey said that he had mailed, and Mr. Bailey has, to date, not furnished any proof to Mr. Merar (or the Court) indicating that that he, in fact, mailed the responses. (Merar Decl. ¶ 7.) The most Mr. Bailey has done is file a certificate of service for those responses many months later, in February 2020. [See Docs. 83, 84.] The day after receiving the electronic copy of Mr. Bailey's responses, Mr. Merar followed up with an email to Mr. Bailey, stating that the responses were untimely and substantively deficient; indicating that he planned to “serv[e] a more detailed correspondence regarding the[ ] deficiencies”; and asking that Mr. Bailey to provide a time in the near future to discuss Trans Union's concerns. [Doc. 86-11 at 3.] Receiving no response, a few days later, Mr. Merar followed up again by email to schedule the meet-and-confer about the discovery issues, and reiterated Trans Union's position on the deficiencies. [Id. at 2.] After continued silence for almost two weeks, Mr. Bailey provided four dates for his deposition, but entirely failed to address the deficient responses. [Doc. 86-12 at 2-3.] When Mr. Merar again asked for a time to discuss the discovery issues, Bailey refused to discuss the issues, writing: My responses were in fact timely. They were also complete including objections to materials based on their respective reasonings. Many of the items requested were merely to harass and could not lead to any discoverable evidence. You are more than welcome to reach out to the courts and I will respond appropriately. [Id.][1] At Trans Union's request, the Court held a discovery conference on January 13, 2020. [Doc. 70.] Because of the failure of the meet-and-confer, the Court's conference was unproductive, and the Court directed the parties to try again. [Id.] Even so, during the conference, the Court forewarned Mr. Bailey that it appeared he had asserted improper boilerplate objections and other objections that seemingly had no application. Despite this, when the parties finally conferred: *3 Mr. Bailey continued to assert that he was not required to supplement his discovery responses. Mr. Bailey continued to rely on the same objections this Court previously cautioned him against, such as attorney-client privilege and work product privilege. Mr. Bailey also continued to contend, as he did at [first] discovery conference, that he was not obligated to respond to interrogatories about the nature or his claims and damages because Trans Union should be able to use his credit file and his Complaint and figure it out. [Doc. 86-1 at 4 (citing Decl. of Alex Barfield [Doc. 86-18] ¶ 5).] The Court held another discovery hearing on February 19, 2020. [Doc. 81.] The Court requested that the parties email—one day before the hearing—summaries concerning the status of discovery and their respective positions on the remaining issues. Mr. Bailey failed to do so, and so the Court contacted him about the status of his statement. [Doc. 86-15 at 2.] Mr. Bailey only then responded by email, and in doing so, attached a number of documents, including “amended” responses and objections to the discovery requests and interrogatories at the heart of the conference. [See Doc. 86-15 (Feb. 18 email with attachments) at 11-70.] Mr. Merar, who was copied on Mr. Bailey's email, represented that the first time Trans Union received the responses was in fact when Mr. Bailey sent the email to the Court, copying Mr. Merar (Merar Decl. ¶ 13), even though the certificate of service attached to the amended responses asserts that Mr. Bailey had served them February 8, 2020 by First Class Mail and email [see Doc. 86-15 at 70]. As mentioned above, Mr. Bailey did not file certificates of service for any of his discovery responses until February 21, 2020, after the second discovery conference [see Docs. 83, 84], despite his familiarity with the process, having filed certificates of service for his opposition to earlier motions to dismiss [see Doc. 21]. If that were not troubling enough, his handwritten signature was missing from the certificate of service attached to his February 18 email [see Doc. 86-15 at 70], but was included on the certificate of service subsequently filed on the docket [see Doc. 83]. At the February 19 discovery hearing, the Court found that due to the apparent intractability of the discovery issues, discovery should proceed in discrete phases—first with written discovery, and then with depositions—and directed the parties to file motions to compel in relation to written discovery. [Doc. 82.] Trans Union filed a motion to compel relating to both its interrogatories and requests for production. [Doc. 86.] In it, Trans Union asked the Court to order Mr. Bailey to supplement his responses to various interrogatories and each of its thirty-five Requests for Production, which were littered with boilerplate objections[2] and provided very little substance outside of parroting portions of his complaint. [Doc. 86-1 at 11-21; see also Doc. 86-10 (Mr. Bailey's responses to the Requests for Production).] Trans Union also noted that Mr. Bailey's actual production seemed inadequate, as it consisted of only four pages of documents—three letters that Mr. Bailey purportedly wrote to Trans Union and a letter he received from a utility provider. [See 86-1 at 22; see also Doc. 86-10 at 71-74 (four-page production).] As with many items Mr. Bailey assertedly sent, Trans Union stated that it had no record of receiving any of those letters and suggested that they may be fabricated. [Doc. 86-1 at 21.] *4 As he has been wont to do, Mr. Bailey largely ignored Trans Union's arguments and the Court's concerns, and simply asserted that he had “exercised his right to object to information and materials he believes are protected by the mentioned privileges,” [Doc. 89 at 3]; stated that he had no other documents to produce [id. at 11]; and asserted that he was entitled to “leeway” as a pro se litigant and should be allowed to use “extreme caution in his production of documents and materials” [id. at 13]. Mr. Bailey also filed his own motion to compel, complaining that Trans Union “refused to provide documents that will conclusively allow the plaintiff to prove essential elements of his claims,” though recognizing that Trans Union had agreed to produce documents after entry of an agreed upon protective order. [Doc. 87 at 2-4.] Significantly, in February 2020, before the parties filed their motions to compel, Mr. Bailey had in fact exchanged numerous emails with defense counsel in which he made it clear that he had no intention of agreeing to a protective order for the production of confidential information [see Doc. 88-4 at 3], despite the fact that in a previous FCRA case of his, another judge in this District had entered a protective order virtually identical to the one that Trans Union proposed to him in this case, see Bailey v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-797-MHC-JCF, 2016 WL 11540574, at *2-4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2016). On April 24, 2020, the Court issued a lengthy order on the motions to compel. [Doc. 95 (the “April 24 Order”).] Starting with the interrogatory responses, the Court concluded that Trans Union's requests were proper, Mr. Bailey's responses inadequate, and his objections boilerplate and inapplicable. [Doc. 95 at 26-31.] Likewise, the Court found Mr. Bailey's single response to thirty-five requests to be in plain violation of Rule 34, and made worse by Mr. Bailey's refusal to amend them in response to Mr. Merar's and the Court's voiced concerns. [Id. at 31-33.] As a result, the Court overruled Mr. Bailey's objections and ordered him to provide supplemental responses (or affirm that he had no additional responsive documents). [Id. at 31, 33.] Finally, the Court found that because Trans Union had tried in good faith to resolve the issues without court intervention; because Mr. Bailey's responses and objections were without substantial justification; and because Mr. Bailey has attempted these precise tactics before—and was sanctioned for them—in one of his earlier cases against Trans Union and other credit reporting agencies; his behavior was deliberately vexatious and amounted to bad faith, and fee-shifting was appropriate. [Id. at 33-39.] In directing Mr. Bailey to supplement his discovery responses, the Court warned, “Mr. Bailey is CAUTIONED IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS that failing to comply with this Order may result in sanctions, including a recommendation that his case be dismissed with prejudice.” [Id. at 50 (emphasis in original).] The Court also found that Trans Union's objections and responses to Mr. Bailey's requests were appropriate, directed that the parties confer on the entry of a protective order, and declined to order the production of additional documents until such an order was entered. [Id. at 39-47.] Rather than comply with the Court's April 24 Order and provide responsive discovery, on May 20, 2020, Mr. Bailey filed an untimely appeal of a portion of the Order with the District Court [Doc. 100] and moved to stay the entire case [Doc. 101].[3] Notably, Mr. Bailey appealed only the Court's decision to deny his own motion to compel discovery from Trans Union, but not the portion of the Order granting Trans Union's motion to compel and directing him to supplement discovery. [Doc. 100 at 2-4; see also Doc. 95 at 39-48 (order denying Mr. Bailey's motion to compel).][4] The District Court denied Mr. Bailey's appeal and affirmed the undersigned's order in full. [Doc. 114 at 8.] *5 On May 28, 2020, Trans Union filed the present Motion for Sanctions. [Doc. 107.] The certificate of service reflects that Mr. Merar served Mr. Bailey with the Motion via first class mail and that Mr. Merar emailed Mr. Bailey a copy of the motion to the email address listed on Mr. Bailey's filings and used by Mr. Bailey to communicate with opposing counsel and the Court. [Id. at 15.] Despite this, and despite the Court's repeated warnings about meeting filing deadlines, Mr. Bailey did not submit a timely response to the Motion. Instead, on June 18, 2020, three days after the deadline had passed, he filed an Emergency Motion for Extension of Time to File Response (“Emergency Motion”), stating that he did not receive a copy of the Motion until June 10, 2020; that there was “severe delay in the US Mail system currently”; and that he could “definitively show the Court where ... mailing took close to 14 days ....” [Doc. 109 at 1.] He did not, however, present any evidence in support of such a delay. After the parties fully briefed the Emergency Motion, the Court issued an order finding that “although Mr. Bailey has failed to demonstrate excusable neglect and appears to have mispresented facts to the Court about the service and receipt of the motion for sanctions (and his ability to respond), he should be given an opportunity to [respond to the Motion].” [Doc. 112 at 15 (footnote omitted).] On July 1, 2020, a day before the present Motion was fully briefed, Mr. Bailey notified the Court that he was diagnosed with COVID-19 and feeling “terribly ill” and asked the Court for a 45-day stay of all proceedings in this case, as well as the proceedings in the Bailey v. Trans Union II. [See Doc. 118.] The Court granted the request and entered an order staying both cases, and all discovery deadlines, for 45 days. [Id.] See also Bailey v. Trans Union II, Docket Entry 45. Notably, Mr. Bailey did not request a stay of proceedings in his employment case currently pending before this Court, and in fact filed a response to a motion to dismiss during that 45-day period.[5] See Bailey v. Priority Ambulance, No. 1:20-cv-928-AT-JKL, Docket Entry 25. II. TRANS UNION'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS In the present Motion, submitted to the undersigned following the 45-day stay, Trans Union argues that based upon Mr. Bailey's repeated bad faith discovery violations, continued refusal to comply with Court's orders (in particular, the April 24 Order), and disregard for the Court's prior warnings, dismissal of the case is appropriate, whether under the Local and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Court's inherent authority, and that fees and costs are warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. [Doc 107 at 4-13.] In his two-page response, Mr. Bailey submits that he “has always acted in good faith and has never intentionally done anything to rule [sic] afoul of the Court in any way.” [Doc. 117 at 1.] In substance, though, Mr. Bailey mostly relies on his repeated contention that as a pro se litigant, he should be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” [Id. at 2 (internal quotation and citation omitted).] Additionally, he asserts that sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 are inappropriate against pro se litigants. [Id.] Mr. Bailey does not refute, however, any of the factual assertions presented by Trans Union. Nor does he attempt to explain his defiance of the Court's order. On reply, Trans Union notes Mr. Bailey's failure to address its arguments and emphasizes (1) that his pro se status does not shield him from compliance with the law and the Court's rules; (2) that he has engaged in a repeated pattern of misconduct in this case and others, despite repeated warnings and sanctions; and (3) that he has failed to explain or cure his conduct and deficiencies, and has instead offered only what appear to be misrepresentations regarding his conduct and the events relating to this case. [Doc. 120.] III. DISCUSSION The Court addresses each of Trans Union's substantive arguments for sanctions below.[6] A. Rule 37 *6 Trans Union first argues that Mr. Bailey's defiance of this Court's discovery orders and failure to serve proper written discovery warrants the dismissal of his claims. [Doc. 107 at 4-6.] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) provides that “[i]f a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders[ that] may include ... dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.” In imposing these sanctions: Courts have broad inherent powers to regulate litigation and to punish litigants for abusive conduct [under] Rule 37(b)[, which] provides that a district court may impose sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders. Rule 37 sanctions are intended to prevent unfair prejudice to litigants and [ensure] the integrity of the discovery process. The failure to comply with the Court's order need not be willful or in bad faith unless the court imposes the most severe sanction—default or dismissal. Agilysys, Inc. v. Hall, No. 1:16-CV-3557-ELR-JFK, 2019 WL 3483173, at *5 (N.D. Ga. May 29, 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, “the district court retains the discretion to dismiss a complaint [only] where the party's conduct amounts to flagrant disregard and willful disobedience of the court's discovery orders.” Kelly v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 376 F. App'x 909, 913 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hashemi v. Campaigner Publ'ns, Inc., 737 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1984)); see also Griffin v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 564 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that the Circuit “has approved dismissal as a sanction imposed under Rule 37(d), [where] plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery has involved either repeated refusals or an indication of full understanding of discovery obligations coupled with a bad faith refusal to comply”). Circumstances evincing willful or bad faith discovery violations include: where a party disobeys a court order compelling discovery; when a party consistently disregards court-imposed deadlines; and when a fine or prospect of dismissal has not compelled a plaintiff to abide by the court's orders. Lavalle v. One Buckhead Loop Condo. Ass'n, No. 1:08-CV-3678-BBM-AJB, 2009 WL 10711903, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 29, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2009 WL 10711941 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2009) (citing Mene v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 238 F. App'x 579, 582 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2007)). “Rule 37[ also] grants the Court the power to impose sanctions for ... a party's failure to disclose information” required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1). Agilysys, Inc, 2019 WL 3483173, at *5. As set forth in detail above, Mr. Bailey has disregarded the Court's clear verbal and written instructions regarding his discovery responses and objections, ignored the Court's imposed deadlines, and has demonstrated that monetary sanctions and the prospect of dismissal are not sufficient motivation for him to change his behavior. As discussed in this Court's April 24 Order, the Court first “advised Mr. Bailey that ... he had asserted improper boilerplate objections and other objections that seemingly had no application, including attorney-client privilege and work product protection” during the January 13, 2020 discovery teleconference with the Court. [Doc. 95 at 8.] Although Mr. Bailey eventually supplemented his responses to Trans Union's discovery requests after the conference, he continued to set forth both boilerplate objections and inapplicable assertions of attorney-client privilege and work product protection. The Court formally considered and rejected the objections in its April 24 Order and directed Mr. Bailey to serve complete supplemental responses to interrogatories and requests for production; produce all responsive documents within his possession, custody, control; and serve his initial disclosures (which remained outstanding). [Doc. 95 at 31-33, 50.] Notably, the Court warned “that failing to comply with th[e] Order may result in sanctions, including a recommendation that his case be dismissed with prejudice.” [Id.] Following the Court's April 24, 2020 Order, it appears that Mr. Bailey served his second supplemental objections and responses to Trans Union's Interrogatories and Requests for Production; however, in spite of this Court's comprehensive and detailed order, Mr. Bailey reasserted the same boilerplate objections, same assertions of privilege, and same copied-and-pasted responses from his complaint. [See Doc. 107-1.] Further, it appears that Mr. Bailey has yet to serve his Rule 26 initial disclosures, despite being ordered to do so by the Court. [See Doc. 107 at 4; Doc. 120 at 3; see also Doc. 95 at 50.] *7 Such behavior readily satisfies the willfulness and bad faith requirements for the imposition of dismissal sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2). Mr. Bailey has ignored explicit directives to supplement his discovery responses in a substantive way, appears unphased by fee shifting to Trans Union for its motion to compel, and remains undeterred by warnings to that his failure to abide by the Court's order may result in dismissal of his claims. And Mr. Bailey's conduct is not an isolated occurrence. He has attempted these precise tactics before in his earlier case against Trans Union and other credit reporting agencies, see Bailey v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-797-MHC-JCF, 2015 WL 13774791, at *23 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2015), and violated the court's discovery orders in that case by supplementing his responses to assert the exact same boilerplate responses and rehashing overruled objections, see Bailey, 2016 WL 11540467, at *2, which resulted in sanctions prohibiting him from relying on any information that he had not previously disclosed through discovery, id. at *4. Yet he has persisted in the same conduct in this case, and has already begun the same problematic tactics in Bailey v. Trans Union II. See Bailey v. Trans Union II, No. 1:20-cv-00173-AT-JKL Docket Entries 63, 64 (motions to compel discovery responses to written discovery because Mr. Bailey has again served inadequate responses filled with inapplicable objections and claim of privilege and refuses to engage with defense counsel to resolve discovery disputes). Given Mr. Bailey's (1) nearly identical conduct in Bailey v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc.; (2) his continued obstinance in this case despite (a) the imposition of sanctions in his prior case, (b) the Court's clear discovery orders (including shifting fees on Mr. Bailey), and (c) the broadcast warning about the possibility dismissal; and (3) his similar conduct in Bailey v. Trans Union II forewarning of ongoing intransigence in future cases, the Court cannot avoid the inescapable conclusion that lesser sanctions would not serve as a deterrent for Mr. Bailey's conduct. As the undersigned has already explained: This is hardly a situation where a pro se litigant, uninitiated in the rules of procedure or the law, is doing his level best to litigate his case. To the contrary, Mr. Bailey has been down this road before: he has been ordered to comply with his discovery obligations, he has defied court orders, and he has been sanctioned for same conduct he has engaged in here. The sanction imposed in Bailey I clearly did not suffice to stop Mr. Bailey from repeating the same vexatious discovery tactics. [Doc. 95 at 37-38.] As a result, the Court concludes that even though Mr. Bailey is proceeding pro se, a dismissal without prejudice is not unjust in this case, and is indeed, the only option to stop Mr. Bailey from continuing his vexatious litigation tactics in future cases. Mr. Bailey's assertion that his pro se status entitles him to a different outcome is unavailing. “Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, ‘procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation’ should not be interpreted ‘so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.’ ” Old Dominion Freight Line, 376 F. App'x at 913 (quoting McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)). Mr. Bailey's inexhaustible reliance on his pro se status does not absolve him from complying with the Federal Rules, the Local Rules of this District, or the express orders of the Court. Id. at 914 (“[Plaintiff]'s pro se status does not excuse noncompliance with [the] rules.”). This is especially true in light of Mr. Bailey's familiarity with federal litigation and this Court having explained—in unmistakable terms, both verbally and in writing—what was expected and required of him under the applicable discovery rules. Ultimately it is not that Mr. Bailey, as a pro se litigant, does not or cannot understand what is required of him, it is that he does not care, whether as a strategic decision to deliberately multiply the cost of the proceedings for his opposing parties, or out of abject disregard for the Court and its requirements. Considering the totality of Mr. Bailey's past and ongoing conduct, the Court has no choice but to conclude that his conduct is willful and that dismissal is the only option available with a chance of ending it. As a result, the Court should DISMISS Mr. Bailey's claims WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2). B. 28 U.S.C. 1927 *8 Relying on Meidinger v. Healthcare Industries Oligopoly, 391 F. App'x 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2010), Trans Union argues separately that a financial award is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which allows the Court to require an “attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases” to pay costs and fees when he has “multiplie[d] the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” Id. According to Trans Union, Meidinger has made such sanctions applicable to pro se litigants. [Doc. 107 at 6.] Contrary to Trans Union's position, however, the Meidinger decision expressly noted that the Eleventh Circuit “has not addressed the question of whether sanctions under § 1927 could apply to a pro se litigant[.]” Meidinger, 391 at 779; see also Inst. for Motivational Living, Inc. v. Doulos Inst. for Strategic Consulting, Inc., 110 F. App'x 283, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting circuit split on whether a court may sanction a pro se party under § 1927). This Court is more persuaded that based upon the express language applying only to an “ ‘attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States,’ it is doubtful that sanctions may be imposed under § 1927 against a pro se litigant.” Mack v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-1162-SCJ-AJB, 2014 WL 12628620, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 12629941 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2014), aff'd, 639 F. App'x 582 (11th Cir. 2016) and 639 F. App'x 582 (11th Cir. 2016); see also Godwin v. Marsh, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1359 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (holding that § 1927 sanctions may not be levied against pro se litigants because they are not “admitted” to practice in the court). This reading is supported by the fact that the Eleventh Circuit has described § 1927 as “penal” in nature, and instructed that it be strictly construed. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App'x 781, 786 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). As a result, Trans Union's request for costs and fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 should be DENIED. C. The Court's Inherent Power Trans Union last asks the Court to impose sanctions under its inherent authority. “Courts have the inherent authority to control the proceedings before them, which includes the authority to impose reasonable and appropriate sanctions.” Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002). Unlike sanctions under § 1927, sanctions pursuant to the court's inherent authority may be imposed against pro se litigants. Wachovia Bank v. Tien, 406 F. Appx. 378, 382 (11th Cir. 2010). The Court's “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses” though “[t]he key to unlocking [it] is a finding of bad faith.” Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991)); see also Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017). Along these lines: A finding of bad faith is warranted where the individual knowingly or recklessly ... delays or disrupts the litigation, or hampers enforcement of a court order. The district court must do more than conclude that the individual acted in bad faith. Rather, it must make specific findings as to the individual's conduct that warranted sanctions. The court's inquiry should focus primarily on the individual's conduct and motive, rather than the validity of the case. Mack, 2014 WL 12631477, at *2 (internal citations omitted). Though Mr. Bailey's conduct in this case very likely meets the bad faith standard, the Court remains cognizant that the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the Court's inherent authority must be exercised with restraint, see Martin, 307 F.3d at 1336-37, and that “when there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the inherent power.” Chambers, 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). Further, in exercising the discretion to sanction a party under its inherent authority, “a court must take into consideration the financial circumstances of the party being sanctioned.” Martin, 307 F.3d at 1337. Here, for all the reasons set forth above, dismissal is warranted under Rule 37(b)(2). Further, Mr. Bailey, as this Court well knows, is a part-time emergency paramedic, who like the rest of us, finds himself in the middle of a pandemic. Finally, the Court has already ordered Mr. Bailey to pay almost $5,000.00 in attorney fees associated with Trans Union's motion to compel. [See Doc. 124.] Given the foregoing, the Court should rely on Rule 37 for imposing sanctions, and should DECLINE to exercise its inherent authority to impose any additional sanctions at this time. IV. CONCLUSION *9 For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Trans Union's Motion for Sanctions [Doc. 107] be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Mr. Bailey's claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, but that Trans Union's request for attorney fees be DENIED. As there are no further matters pending before the undersigned related to this case, the Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate the reference to the undersigned magistrate judge. IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 18th day of September, 2020. Footnotes [1] While Mr. Merar and Mr. Bailey eventually agreed on a date to meet and confer in mid-December, that did not go forward because Mr. Merar fell ill. (Merar Decl. ¶ 11.) When Mr. Merar emailed Mr. Bailey to reschedule, Mr. Bailey responded that he would not have any availability until mid-January 2020. [Doc. 86-13 at 2.] [2] Indeed, Mr. Bailey provided a single response consisting of a litany of boilerplate objections in response to all 35 requests for production. [See Doc. 86-10.] [3] The parties also filed additional papers pertaining to issue of attorney fees. [See Docs. 97, 102, 104.] While the Court found attorney fees appropriate and necessary given Mr. Bailey's lack of justification, it also allowed that Mr. Bailey may avoid them if they imposed a financial burden. [See Doc. 95 at 37-38.] The Court will address those separately. [4] As the Court and Trans Union have repeatedly highlighted for Mr. Bailey, however, Trans Union did not refuse production, but only insisted that a protective order be entered to protect confidential and commercially sensitive information. [See Doc. 95 at 45-47.] Despite his refusal to agree to a proposed protective order, Mr. Bailey did not file a response in opposition to Trans Union's motion for entry of a protective order following the Court's April 24 Order. [See Doc. 98 at 3.] Considering the motion on its merits, the Court granted it and noted that “the proposed protective order is substantively identical to a protective order this Court recently entered in [Bailey v. Trans Union II], over Mr. Bailey's objections.” [Doc. 115 at 4.] [5] To be clear, the Court does not question that Mr. Bailey tested positive for COVID-19; however, his activity in the other pending case suggests that he was not, in fact, incapacitated during the entire 45-day stay period. [6] As noted, Mr. Bailey did not respond to some of Trans Union's arguments, including its entire argument for sanctions under the Court's inherent power, and Trans Union argues that as a result of this failure, Mr. Bailey has conceded its position. [Doc. 120 at 5 (citing Hudson v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2001), Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995), and Bute v. Schuller Int'l Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (N.D. Ga. 1998)).] Though Trans Union's contention may have some merit, given the severity of the requested sanctions, the Court will address the substance of each argument for dismissal.