Minerva26

JONATHAN R. MILLER, ESQUIRE v. BREM MOLDOVSKY, ESQUIRE, BREM MOLDOVSKY, L.L.C., and GERALD J. POMERANTZ, ESQUIRE CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-2219 United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania Filed April 15, 2022 Counsel Jonathan R. Miller, Princeton, NJ, Pro Se. Gerald Jay Pomerantz, Gerald Jay Pomerantz & Associates, Philadelphia, PA, for Gerald J. Pomerantz. Brem Moldovsky, Brem Moldovsky, LLC, Philadelphia, PA. Brem Moldovsky, Philadelphia, PA, Pro Se. Rueter, Thomas J., Special Master MEMORANDUM ORDER *1 Presently before the Special Master are five discovery motions, four filed by Plaintiff and one filed by the Moldovsky Defendants[1] (collectively, the “Motions”). The Special Master has carefully reviewed and considered the Motions, all responses thereto, the transcript from the Discovery Hearing, the entire docket in this case, all other documents related to the Motions, and all attachments and exhibits to all of the foregoing, as well as numerous letters received from the parties after the Discovery Hearing. The Special Master and the parties, who are attorneys proceeding pro se, have held numerous telephone discussions and conferences discussing the Motions and this case in general. On February 15, 2022, a hearing on the Motions was held (the “Discovery Hearing”). Additionally, the Special Master has engaged the parties, jointly and individually, in multiple settlement discussions/conferences. Unfortunately, despite these efforts, this case has not settled and the Motions must be decided. I. BACKGROUND The parties have a long and contentious history, which the Special Master will not summarize herein. Rather, the focus of this Memorandum Order will be on the Motions. The discussion of the background of this case below is intentionally a very brief summary of the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) and the Defendants' counterclaims. Although the Special Master provides only a brief summary of the background of this case below, the Special Master has reviewed all documents submitted in this matter in great detail. A. The Complaint. Plaintiff asserts two counts in his Complaint: Count I – Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings (Dragonetti Act) and Count II – Abuse of Process (Complaint ¶¶75-90). Plaintiff alleges that this case arises from a lawsuit, no longer pending, filed by the Defendants in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas on February 5, 2019, No. 2019-00793 (the “Bucks County Matter”) against Plaintiff, and his New York clients, Andrew Ellner, Lightbox Ventures, LLC (“LBV”) and Lightbox Capital Management, LLC (“LBC”) (Plaintiff's New York clients shall be collectively referred to herein as “Lightbox”). (Complaint ¶¶1, 3.)[2] In the Bucks County Matter, the Moldovsky Defendants sued Plaintiff and Lightbox alleging a variety of claims involving assertions of illegal wiretapping and attorney misconduct. Lightbox was represented by other counsel in the Bucks County Matter. (Complaint ¶¶2, 72.) Defendant Pomerantz represented Defendant Moldovsky as co-counsel in the Bucks County Matter. (Complaint ¶3.) *2 According to his Complaint, Plaintiff brought “this action for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for injuries suffered by [Plaintiff] in connection with the Bucks County Matter and due to Defendants' wrongful conduct.” (Complaint ¶66.) Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants filed and maintained the Bucks County Matter for a number of wrongful purposes, including: (a) to obtain and destroy evidence that Moldovsky believed would be used against him in the Scarola Matter; (b) to evade the ongoing stay of discovery in the Scarola Matter; (c) to join [Plaintiff] and Lightbox as co-defendants in the Bucks County Matter in order to get [Plaintiff] disqualified as Lightbox's counsel in the Scarola Matter and the Second Circuit Appeal; and (d) to generally harass and torment [Plaintiff] and Lightbox and cause them to incur enormous legal fees and expenses defending the Bucks County Matter, when in fact Moldovsky had no bona fide intention to engage in plenary litigation in that Matter and for the Bucks County court to issue a final, full and complete decision on the merits. (Complaint ¶69.) Plaintiff alleges that in addition to monetary losses incurred from having his time and attention diverted from his legal practice, “Defendants' vexatious, malicious and otherwise improper filing and maintaining the Bucks County Matter for nine months, including six original and amended complaints, improper use of discovery demands, and meritless motions and allegations of professional misconduct caused [Plaintiff] stress, embarrassment, distress, and reputational damage.” (Complaint ¶74.) B. The Counterclaims. In their “Second Amended Answer and New Matter by All Defendants to Plaintiff's Complaint and Second Amended Counterclaims by Brem Moldovsky, Esquire and Brem Moldovosky, L.L.C.” (Doc. No. 54) (the “Answer”)[3], the Moldovsky Defendants, the “Counterclaim Plaintiffs,” address the allegations in the Complaint, and assert fifty-three affirmative defenses and the following four counterclaims (the “Counterclaims”) (preceded by twenty-three pages and 102 paragraphs of background, argument and allegations): (1) “Malicious Prosecution (Malicious Abuse of Legal Process and Malicious Use of Process)” (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶¶103-07); (2) “Abuse (Perversion) of Process Against All Counterclaim Defendants”[4] (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶¶108-12); (3) “Set Off” (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶¶113-15); and (4) “False Light” (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶¶116-20).[5] *3 The Moldovsky Defendants (the Counterclaim Plaintiffs[6]) state the basis of their Counterclaims as follows: The Counterclaims include malicious prosecution based on [Plaintiff's] malicious and frivolous injunction proceedings (not including the one in N.J.) and four improper and baseless sanctions motions sanctions motions [sic] primarily premised on his improper attempts at temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctions (ostensibly on behalf of Lightbox, but that neither Lightbox nor [Plaintiff] had standing to bring) and malicious and purposely harmful litigation and process related to them; abuse of process based on constant, harmful, abusive and perverse use of process for wrongful purposes including attempting to improperly and illegally obtain goals that are unobtainable in such processes, such as seeking to restrain the Counterclaim Plaintiff's [sic] free speech, destroy, and conceal [Plaintiff's] deposition transcripts that were available and observed on a public docket – including in this very matter, wherein [Plaintiff] is attempting to obtain the sealing and restraint of his transcripts; false light based on malicious, unjustified, purposely misrepresented false light portrayals and allegations of and about the Counterclaim Plaintiffs; and set-off of [Plaintiff's] claims by these and claims to be plead in another action.... (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶4 (footnote omitted).) II. DISCUSSION A. The Law. The following general discussion of law apply throughout this Memorandum. Additional specific applicable legal analyses are provided in the text below. 1. The Attorney-Client Privilege. “The attorney-client privilege protects communications between attorneys and clients from compelled disclosure. It applies to any communication that satisfies the following elements: it must be (1) a communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.” In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The party asserting the privilege bears the burden of proving its applicability. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Abbvie, Inc., 2016 WL 478803, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2016). The attorney-client privilege does not apply “merely because [the documents] were transferred to or routed through an attorney.” Id. at *8-9. 2. Work Product Doctrine. The work product doctrine provides that “a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.” Fed. R. Evid. 26(b)(3). See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399 (1981); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495-509-12 (1947). See also In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 661-62 (3d Cir. 2003) (The work product doctrine “shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case.”) (quotation omitted). As explained by the Court in Hickman, the “ ‘work’ is reflected ... in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. A party may compel discovery of attorney work product “only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need for the materials in the preparation of the parties' case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). As with the attorney-client privilege, the party asserting the work product doctrine bears the burden of proving its applicability. Abbvie, 2016 WL 4478803, at *6. *4 3. Relevance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) permits parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefits. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Courts must limit the extent of discovery if: “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in this action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). B. The Plaintiff's Discovery Motions. 1. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Samuel Stretton, Esquire to Comply with Third Party Subpoena Duces Tecum. This motion is filed at Document No. 40 on the official docket in this case (the “Stretton Motion”). The response of the Moldovsky Defendants in opposition to the Stretton Motion is filed at Document No. 42 (the “Stretton Response”); Defendant Pomerantz has not filed a response to the Stretton Motion. Plaintiff submitted a reply at Document No. 43 (the “Stretton Reply”). (a) The Stretton Subpoena. After initially agreeing to waive personal service, the subpoena (the “Stretton Subpoena”) was faxed to Mr. Stretton on July 6, 2021, but Mr. Stretton failed to return the acknowledgement of service. (Stretton Motion Ex. 3.) The Stretton Subpoena was served on Mr. Stretton personally on July 26, 2021. (Stretton Motion Ex. 5.) Defendant Moldovsky admitted that he listed Mr. Stretton as both a fact witness and an expert witness in his Rule 26 disclosures. (Stretton Motion Ex. 10; Discovery Hearing Transcript at 16-17, 29.) Plaintiff also named Mr. Stretton as a fact witness in his Rule 26 disclosures. (Stretton Motion Ex. 9; Discovery Hearing Transcript at 29.) Among other things, Defendant Moldovsky asserts that he had probable cause to file and pursue the Bucks County Matter in reliance upon Stretton's expert opinions and advice issued in connection therewith. See, e.g., Answer ¶¶3, 42, 69, 77, 79. Stretton issued two letters, dated February 5, 2019 and July 24, 2019, concluding that Plaintiff was subject to a disqualifying conflict of interest by representing Ellner and Lightbox in the New York Litigation and, therefore, Defendants had probable cause to bring the Bucks County Matter. (Stretton Motion Exs. 7 and 8 (the “Stretton Letters”).) Throughout the filings in this case, the Stretton Letters are interchangeably referred to as “ethics reports” and “ethics letters.” The documents requested to be produced in the Stretton Subpoena are set forth in the Stretton Motion Exhibit 2 (Stretton Subpoena with attachments). Because the Moldovsky Defendants contend, inter alia, they had probable cause to bring the Bucks County Matter based upon the Stretton Letters, Plaintiff is entitled to explore, inter alia, what information Mr. Stretton relied upon when drafting the Stretton Letters and whether the Moldovsky Defendants made full disclosure of all facts to Mr. Stretton when soliciting Mr. Stretton's opinions and advice. See Glenmore Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 486 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The party opposing the defense of reliance on advice of counsel must be able to test what information had been conveyed by the client to counsel and vice-versa regarding that advice – whether counsel was provided with all material facts in rendering their advice, whether counsel gave well-informed opinion and whether that advice was heeded by the client.”). (b) Mr. Stretton's Response to the Stretton Subpoena. Mr. Stretton has not responded to the Stretton Subpoena or complied therewith; he has produced no responsive documents or raised any objections to the Stretton Subpoena. On August 19, 2021, Plaintiff called Mr. Stretton on the telephone. Mr. Stretton told Plaintiff he had intended to comply with the subpoena but that Defendant Moldovsky asked him not to do so. (Stretton Motion, Plaintiff's Certification ¶19.) Defendant Moldovsky argues that Plaintiff's “contention that Mr. Stretton ‘utterly ignored’ the Subpoena is entirely false and a blatant misrepresentation to the Court.” (Stretton Response at 1.) In any event, it is undisputed that Mr. Stretton did not respond to or comply with the Stretton Subpoena. The Special Master need not decide the reasons why Mr. Stretton did not respond in order to address the Stretton Motion. *5 (c) Defendant Moldovsky's Purported Response to the Stretton Subpoena. Defendant Moldovsky stated at the Discovery Hearing that he, working in conjunction with Mr. Stretton, produced the documents requested by the Stretton Subpoena. (Discovery Hearing Transcript at 42.) The Stretton Subpoena directed Mr. Stretton as a non-party fact witness to produce the identified documents, not Defendant Moldovsky. It is improper for Defendant Moldovsky to respond to a subpoena instead of the non-party fact witness to whom the subpoena was addressed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(D) (“A command in a subpoena to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things requires the responding person to permit inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of the materials.”) (emphasis added). In their opposition to the Stretton Motion, the Moldovsky Defendants state that the Stretton Subpoena received “two rounds of responses” that “were sufficient for Mr. Stretton to respond to the Subpoena as fully as possible.” (Stretton Response at 1.) The Moldovsky Defendants also assert: “To the extent there were any documents which included factual information provided to Mr. Stretton upon which he based either of his expert reports, such documents have already been provided to [Plaintiff].” Id. Attached as Exhibit 1 to the Stretton Reply is a letter dated September 23, 2021, with a twenty-seven page attachment, from the Moldovsky Defendants to Plaintiff identifying it as a “supplemental response” to the Stretton Subpoena. (Stretton Reply Ex. 1.) Review of this letter and attachment reveals that the documents are, for the most part, redacted and their responsiveness cannot be determined. Moreover, the alleged responses by the Moldovsky Defendants, if they were provided, were not provided by Mr. Stretton, the fact witness and expert witness to whom the Stretton Subpoena was addressed. To test the veracity of Defendant Moldovsky's reliance on Mr. Stretton's opinion defense, Plaintiff must receive the documents from Mr. Stretton himself, independent of any interference from Defendant Moldovsky. Therefore, alleged responses by Defendant Moldovsky to the Stretton Subpoena are improper and do not satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2456 (“Under Rule 45(a)(1)(D), a subpoena duces tecum requires the responding party to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of the designated materials.”) (emphasis added). (d) Defendant Moldovsky's Objections to the Stretton Subpoena. The Moldovsky Defendants, and their paralegal, sent several emails to Plaintiff regarding the Stretton Subpoena. These emails include an email dated July 6, 2021 at 2:59 p.m., in which the Moldovsky Defendants object to the Stretton Subpoena on the grounds of the attorney-expert privilege, the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. (Stretton Motion Ex. 13.) Later that day, July 6, 2021 at 7:38 p.m., Defendant Moldovsky's paralegal sent an email to Plaintiff again stating that the Stretton Subpoena should be withdrawn as the information requested was protected by the privileges detailed above. (Stretton Response attachment 2.) The next day, in an email dated July 7, 2021, the Moldovsky Defendants stated that if the Stretton Subpoena was not “retracted and withdrawn” by the end of the business in July 8, 2021, they would proceed to “motion the court for a protective order and/or to quash the subpoena.” (Stretton Motion Ex. 14.) The Moldovsky Defendants did not file such motions. In response, Plaintiff offered to hold the Stretton Subpoena in abeyance until the Defendants answered the Complaint, to consider limitations to the scope of the Stretton Subpoena proposed by the Moldovsky Defendants, and agreed to a teleconference with the Moldovsky Defendants and invited them to propose times for such conference. Id. On August 20, 2021 at 6:24 p.m., the paralegal for the Moldovsky Defendants sent another email to Plaintiff addressing a variety of issues including the Stretton Subpoena. The paralegal acknowledged that “[t]his email may be rough, and Mr. Moldovsky may chime in as needed or supplement the correspondence.” (Stretton Response attachment 2.) This is not a complete list of the email correspondence between the Moldovsky Defendants (and their paralegal) and Plaintiff regarding the Stretton Subpoena. However, the Moldovsky Defendants' contention that these emails constitute formal objections to the Stretton Subpoena is rejected. These unsigned emails to Plaintiff, some from a staff member not counsel, regarding the Stretton Subpoena fail to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2) and may be disregarded by the Special Master. *6 As an attachment to the Stretton Response, the Moldovsky Defendants submit a document titled “Response with Objection to Plaintiff's Subpoena to Produce Documents, Information, or Objects” directed at the Stretton Subpoena with a privilege log attached as Exhibit B. (Stretton Response attachment 3.) This document is dated August 23, 2021 and appears to be the Moldovsky Defendants' objection to the Stretton Subpoena that is in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2).[7] The Stretton Subpoena was personally served on Mr. Stretton on July 26, 2021. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(2)(B), addressing objections to subpoenas, provides as follows: “The objection must be served before the earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served.” According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B), objections to the Stretton Subpoena had to be filed within fourteen days from the July 26, 2021 date of service, i.e., by August 9, 2021. The Moldovsky Defendants' objections to the Stretton Subpoena are untimely and must be rejected. Moreover, as will be discussed below, the Moldovsky Defendants' objections to the Stretton Subpoena are meritless.[8] (e) The Moldovsky Defendants' Objections to the Stretton Motion. In the Stretton Response filed on September 23, 2021, the Moldovsky Defendants state objections to the Stretton Motion. The objections stated in this response are the same as the objections stated by the Moldovsky Defendants in their untimely objections to the Stretton Subpoena. These objections are without merit.[9] In the Stretton Response, the Moldovsky Defendants raise numerous objections to the Stretton Motion and the Stretton Subpoena. The Moldovsky Defendants assert that the documents requested in the Stretton Subpoena are protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney-expert privilege and the attorney work product doctrine, the information already has been provided or is available to the public, and the information sought is unduly burdensome and harassing because the documents are available to the public or already in Plaintiff's possession. With respect to Request No. 7 in the Stretton Subpoena, the Moldovsky Defendants object on the basis of a lack of time frame. The Moldovsky Defendants object on the basis of relevance only to document request numbers 8 and 9 in the Stretton Subpoena. (Stretton Response at 8.) *7 The Moldovsky Defendants assert that the discovery requested in the Stretton Subpoena, to the extent it has not been provided, is protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney-expert privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. The Moldovsky Defendants admit that Mr. Stretton does not represent them in this matter, and he did not represent them in the Bucks County Matter. (Stretton Response at 1.) See also Stretton Response at 6 (Plaintiff chooses “to argue the Mr. Stretton is Mr. Moldovsky's attorney on this case and was on the underlying Bucks case, both of which are facially untrue as Mr. Stretton was not and is not entered on either.”). The attorney-client privilege does not apply in the absence of an attorney-client relationship. Cellco Partnership v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 2006 WL 13200067, at *3 (D.N.J. May 12, 2006). The Moldovsky Defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving the applicability of the attorney-client privilege and, therefore, their assertion of the privilege is OVERRULED. As an affirmative defense to Plaintiff's Complaint, the Moldovsky Defendants assert that they had probable cause to bring the Bucks County Matter in reliance upon the Stretton Letters. See, e.g., Answer ¶¶3, 42, 69, 77, 79 and 88; Answer at Second Affirmative Defense. The Moldovsky Defendants contend that many of the documents requested in the Stretton Subpoena are protected from discovery by the attorney-expert privilege. In support of their claim of the application of Pennsylvania's attorney-expert privilege, the Moldovsky Defendants cite to 23 Pa.C.S.A. Rule 4003.5(a)(4) which states: A party may not discover the communications between another party's attorney and any expert who is to be identified pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A) or from whom discovery is permitted under subdivision (a)(3) regardless of the form of the communications, except in circumstances that would warrant the disclosure of privileged communications under Pennsylvania law. This provision protects from discovery draft expert reports and any communications between another party's attorney and experts relating to such drafts. (Response at 5 (quoting 23 P.C.S.A. Rule 4003.5(a)(4)). The Pennsylvania rule appears to be in conflict with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C). See discussion below. Assuming, arguendo, that this Pennsylvania rule applies to this federal court action, because Defendant Moldovsky is relying on the advice of Mr. Stretton to defend against the abuse of process action, he has waived any right to assert Pennsylvania's attorney-expert privilege. See Glenmede, 56 F.3d at 486 (“The attorney-client privilege may be waived by a client who asserts reliance on the advice of counsel as an affirmative defense. Under such circumstances, the client has made a conscious decision to inject the advice of counsel as an issue in the litigation.”). As explained by the court in Am. Int'l Airways, Inc, v, Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 1991 WL 255661 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1991): Defendant here has done more than merely deny the allegations in plaintiff's complaint. In its answer under a heading entitled “First Defense,” defendant states: “By way of further answer, [defendant] has probable cause (as defined in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8352) for the Underlying Action.” If this defense encompasses reliance on counsel's advice, the presentation of evidence of counsel's good faith belief on the merits of the underlying action effectively waives the privilege. Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (by asserting reliance on advice of counsel as defense, defendant deemed to waive privilege with respect to all documents and communications upon which he could reasonably have relied). It is unfair and contrary to the purpose underlying discovery rules to allow defendant to assert a privilege in refusing to comply with discovery requests for information and then to rely on this same information at trial, preventing any effective preparation by opposing counsel. See Fox v. California Sierra Financial Services, 120 F.R.D. 520, 530 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (defendant cannot conceal privileged information in discovery and expect to spring it upon plaintiff in the midst of trial). *8 Id. at *1-2. In the instant case, not only do the Moldovsky Defendants assert that they had probable cause under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8352 to bring the Bucks County Matter, they explicitly state that they relied upon the Stretton Letters and advice as a basis for asserting their probable cause defense and as a basis for their counterclaims. See, e.g., Answer ¶¶3, 42, 69, 77, 79 and 88; Answer at Second Affirmative Defense. Because the Moldovsky Defendants relied upon the Stretton Letters and Mr. Stretton's advice to support their advice-of-counsel or expert defense in this matter, the Moldovsky Defendants have waived all claims of privilege. Furthermore, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C), communications between a party's attorney and expert must be disclosed if they (1) relate to an expert's compensation; (2) identify facts or data provided by the party's attorney that the expert considered in forming expressed opinions; or (3) identify assumptions provided to the expert by the party's attorney and that the expert relied on. See Angell Healthcare Prods LCC v. Reckitt Bonckser, LLC, 2017 WL 6328149, at *1 (D.Del. Dec. 11, 2017). The discovery requests in the Stretton Subpoena are permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C). For all the above reasons, the Moldovsky Defendants' claim of attorney-expert privilege is OVERRULED.[10] The Moldovsky Defendants also assert application of the work product doctrine over the information requested in the Stretton Subpoena. Assuming that some of the information requested constitutes work product, Plaintiff has shown that he has a substantial need for the material to prepare his case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). The Moldovsky Defendants' assertion of the work product doctrine is OVERRULED. As noted above, the Moldovsky Defendants object to document request 7 in the Stretton Subpoena on the ground that it contains no time frame. Mr. Stretton, who will be responding to this request, has not objected to this request on this basis. The Moldvosky Defendants' objection to request 7 is OVERRULED. The Moldovsky Defendants also object to requests 8 and 9 in the Stretton Subpoena on the basis of relevance. The Special Master rejects these objections finding that the information requested satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Moldovsky Defendants' objections that the requests are meant to harass and are unduly burdensome because they seek information available to the public or already in the possession of Plaintiff are OVERRULED. For all these reasons, the objections of the Moldolvsky Defendants are OVERRULED, and the Stretton Motion is GRANTED. Mr. Stretton must personally respond to and comply in all respects with the Stretton Subpoena and produce all responsive documents regardless of whether the documents may exist in the public domain and regardless of conjecture that Plaintiff may or may not already be in possession thereof. *9 2. Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Third Party Subpoenas. This motion is filed at Document No. 44 on the official docket in this case (the “Motion to Quash”). The response of the Moldovsky Defendants in opposition to the Motion to Quash is filed at Document No. 51 (the “Response to Motion to Quash”); Defendant Pomerantz has not filed a response to the Motion to Quash. Plaintiff also submitted two letters addressing the Motion to Quash: (1) Letter dated October 10, 2021 filed at Document No. 52 (the “October 10, 2021 Letter”); and (2) Letter dated October 27, 2021 filed at Document No. 61 (the “October 27, 2021 Letter”). In the Motion to Quash, Plaintiff seeks to quash seven third-party subpoenas issued to: Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP (“Faegre Drinker”), Wong Fleming, P.C. (“Wong Fleming”), Linda Wong, Esquire, Daniel Fleming, Esquire, Jean O'Connor, Melissa Held, and Scott Miller, Esquire. The Moldovsky Defendants seek the information at issue for the following reasons: First, [Plaintiff's] Complaint in this matter seeks damages for emotional distress, and although, as [Plaintiff] contends (perhaps) he can provide some of the information (Moving Memo, ECF Doc. #44-1 at 23), the information should come from the sources and there is an underlying issue of poor trust based upon [Plaintiff's] history or purposeful concealment of the very information sought I the subpoenas (and more). Second, though at some point the Court has dismissed the Moldovsky Firm's Counterclaims without prejudice while allowing for the refiling of them, the claims that will be re-plead here include [Plaintiff's] pattern of malicious prosecution and abuse of process based on multiple frivolous sanctions motions premised in part on the discovery of [Plaintiff's] Kopel transcripts and the mere mention of them, a TRO based on trying to hide and suppress his conflicts and problematic conduct during his time at [Wong Fleming] and [Faegre Drinker], additional appeals and motion work related to the frivolous TRO, and his pattern of purposely portraying others in a false light. (Response to Motion to Quash at 1 (footnote omitted).) None of the subpoenas have been served. (Response to Motion to Quash at 6.) Plaintiff was employed at Faegre Drinker from 2005-2007, and at Wong Fleming from 2007-2013. (Motion to Quash at 3 n.7.) Ms. O'Connor was Wong Fleming's office manager for part of the time Plaintiff was employed at Wong Fleming. (Motion to Quash at 3 n.7, 4.) Melissa Held is a psychologist Plaintiff allegedly saw in 2012. (Motion to Quash at 3 n.7, 5.) Scott Miller, Esquire is Plaintiff's brother. The Moldovsky Defendants argue that when Defendant Moldovsky first met and befriended Plaintiff in the 2014-16 time frame, Plaintiff inaccurately described his reasons for leaving his employment at Faegre Drinker and Wong Fleming by failing to disclose the alleged difficulties he experienced with these employers. Defendant Moldovsky contends that this fraud led him to hire Plaintiff in November 2015 to represent Defendant Moldovsky in two lawsuits involving his childrens' school, and, in June 2017, to refer lucrative clients to Plaintiff for representation in the Scarola Matter. Importantly, none of these allegations are plead in the Complaint or Counterclaims pending before the court. (a) The Subpoenas. In these subpoenas, the Moldovsky Defendants request an extremely broad range of documents as detailed in the Motion to Quash Exs. 1-7. The documents requested in these separate subpoenas are almost identical and include documents “involved, shedding light upon, and or reasonably believed to lead to discoverable information” about the Counterclaims in this case including information and records regarding Plaintiff's “legal career,” “backgrounds [sic],” “resume,” “stated reasons for leaving his prior employments as well as actual reasons and information related thereto,” “requirements for [Plaintiff] to maintain employment including having to attend counseling, psychological, psychiatric and/or any other such treatment and/or behavior modification or improvement therapy or counseling,” and “[Plaintiff's] emotional, social, vocational or mental distress, stress, issues, challenges, psychiatric and/or psychological treatments, therapies and/or referrals.” (Motion to Quash Ex. 1.) See also Motion to Quash Exs. 2-7. Generally, the Moldovsky Defendants are seeking Plaintiff's employment records, including medical records contained therein, in these subpoenas. The subpoena directed to Scott Miller, Plaintiff's brother, is largely the same, but also seeks information regarding involvement between Plaintiff and his brother in each other's law practices. (Motion to Quash Ex. 5.) Each of these subpoenas also demands the production of documents responsive to the numerous interrogatories and document requests served on Plaintiff. (Motion to Quash at 8-14 and Ex. 8.) *10 The Moldovsky Defendants argue that the above information relates to their Counterclaims. (Motion to Quash Exs. 1-7.) As detailed above at pages 4-5 herein, the Moldovsky Defendants assert four Counterclaims: (1) “Malicious Prosecution (Malicious Abuse of Legal Process and Malicious Use of Process)” (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶¶103-07); (2) “Abuse (Perversion) of Process Against All Counterclaim Defendants” (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶¶108-12); (3) “Set Off” (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶¶113-15); and (4) “False Light” (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶¶116-20). Courts must quash or modify a subpoena that “(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3). “To determine whether a subpoena imposes an undue burden, the court must consider ‘(1) the relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.’ ” In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. 234, 252 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). A “court should be particularly sensitive to weighing the probative value of the information sought against the burden of production on [a] non-party.” Id. at 239 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). (b) Psychological Records/ Information. The Moldovsky Defendants seek employment records, including psychological records and information, from: (i) Faegre Drinker (where Plaintiff was employed from 2005-2007); (ii) Wong Fleming (where Plaintiff was employed from 2007-2013); (iii) Linda Wong, Esquire; (iv) Daniel Fleming, Esquire; (v) Jean O'Connor, Wong Fleming's office manager for part of the time period of Plaintiff's employment; and (vi) Scott Miller, Plaintiff's brother. The Moldovsky Defendants also seek and psychological records from Melissa Held, a psychologist Plaintiff allegedly saw in 2012. The Moldovsky Defendants request this information arguing that it is relevant because Plaintiff seeks damages for “stress, embarrassment, distress, and reputational damage.” (Complaint ¶74.) With respect to Ms. Held, a psychologist Plaintiff allegedly saw in 2012, Plaintiff's communications with a licensed New Jersey psychologist are privileged and protected from disclosure under New Jersey law. New Jersey law codified this privilege as follows: The confidential relations and communications between and among a licensed practicing psychologist and individuals, couples, families or groups in the course of the practice of psychology are placed on the same basis as those provided between attorney and client, and nothing in this act shall be construed to require any such privileged communications to be disclosed by any such person. N.J.S.A. § 45:14B-28. The statute identifies three exceptions to this privilege, none of which apply here. Id. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that “confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996). In Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556 (N.J. 1997), the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the psychologist-patient privilege in the context of a divorce where the patient was alleging extreme cruelty, and considered when this privilege should be pierced. The court stated: *11 Where no statutory or other traditional exceptions to the privilege apply, the court should not order disclosure of therapy records, even for in camera review by the court, without a prima facia showing that the psychologist-patient privilege should be pierced under Kozlov's tripartite test: (1) there must be a legitimate need for the evidence; (2) the evidence must be relevant and material to the issue before the court; and (3) by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the party must show that the information cannot be secured from any less intrusive means. Kinsella, 696 A.2d at 572 (citing In re Kozlov, 398 A.2d 882 (N.J. 1979) (establishing New Jersey's tripartite test for piercing the attorney-client privilege)). Here, the stress, embarrassment and distress Plaintiff alleges to have suffered as a result of the Defendants' actions occurred years after his employment with Faegre Drinker and Wong Fleming, and after his alleged consultations with Ms. Held. There is no evidence that Plaintiff has sought psychological treatment since 2012. His employment with the law firms ended some nine years ago. Hence, any psychological records or information from these sources, or employees of these sources, are too remote from the claims of emotional distress asserted here and are of little value to access the emotional distress damages asserted by Plaintiff in this matter. Plaintiff represents that he does not intend to call an expert witness to establish his emotional damages. Plaintiff's privacy interests in his employment and psychological records outweigh any evidentiary value in these dated records. Therefore, the Motion to Quash the Subpoenas with respect to all requests for information relating to Plaintiff's psychological condition and/or treatment is GRANTED. (c) Employment Records. The Subpoenas also seek all records regarding, inter alia, Plaintiff's legal career, backgrounds, resume, employment records, performance reviews and complaints, employment issues and conflicts, information regarding Plaintiff's deposition transcript in Kopel v. Wong Fleming, LLC, No. MER-L-1618-17 (N.J. Super. Ct.) (the “Kopel Transcript”) from Faegre Drinker, Wong Fleming, Linda Wong, Esquire, Daniel Fleming, Esquire, and Jean O'Connor, and “[a]ny information, records, communications, correspondence, notes, files, evidence, and/or other document about or related to responsive to [sic] the discovery requested from Mr. Miller, a copy of which is attached hereto.” The document requests in these Subpoenas seek information which is irrelevant to the claims and Counterclaims in this case. Defendant Moldovsky alleges that the information requested in the Subpoenas is relevant to the Moldovsky Defendants' current Counterclaims. When the Subpoenas were drafted, they made reference to Defendants' prior counterclaims which were attached to the Subpoena. However, those counterclaims have been reduced to the four detailed above. See pages 4-5, supra. In addition, Plaintiff's privacy interests in these records outweigh their likely benefit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Additionally, the Moldovsky Defendants demand information related to the Kopel Transcript.[11] The Special Master finds, however, that the Kopel Transcript is irrelevant to Plaintiff's claims and the Counterclaims in this instant matter and, therefore, no discovery regarding the Kopel Transcript will be permitted. *12 Finally, Plaintiff's professional relationship with Scott Miller, Plaintiff's brother, is irrelevant to the instant litigation. Scott Miller is not mentioned in any manner in the instant litigation. In their Response to the Motion to Quash, the Moldovsky Defendants explain the relevance of Scott Miller's responses to the Subpoena as follows: Scott Miller's testimony is reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable information about [Plaintiff's] claims for damages for emotional distress and legal fees. Aside from their familial relationship, both Scott and Jonathan Miller work out of the same office in Brooklyn. If there was ever a witness to [Plaintiff's] emotional distress over the course of the Lightbox litigations, it would be Scott Miller considering Mr. Miller's current lack of spouse or other known coworkers or family. The undersigned has not forecasted any desire or intent to “gin up” claims against Scott Miller (Miller Memo at 27). The subpoena seeks information seeking to determine facts about the extent to which Scott Miller has worked with [Plaintiff] and potentially seen his productivity and mental health decline such that damages are warranted. (Response to Motion to Quash at 15-16 (footnote omitted).) Plaintiff's professional relationship with his brother is irrelevant to Plaintiff's claim for emotional distress. Moreover, the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). For all the above reasons, the Motion to Quash is GRANTED and the Subpoenas addressed to: Faegre Drinkler, Wong Fleming, Linda Wong, Esquire, Daniel Fleming, Esquire, Jean O'Connor, Melissa Held and Scott Miller, Esquire are QUASHED. 3. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Moldovsky Defendants to Comply with Plaintiff's Discovery Demands. This motion is filed at Document No. 50 on the official docket in this case (“Plaintiff's Motion to Compel”). The response of the Moldovsky Defendants in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is filed at Document No. 55 (the “Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel”); Defendant Pomerantz has not filed a response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. At issue in Plaintiff's Motion to Compel are the following discovery requests served separately upon Defendant Moldovsky and Defendant Moldovsky LLC: (i) interrogatories and document requests served on July 5, 2021; (ii) interrogatories and document requests served on August 6, 2021 (collectively, “Plaintiff's Discovery Requests”); and (3) requests for admission served on August 7, 2021 (“Plaintiff's Requests for Admission”). (a) The Moldovsky Defendants' Objections – Plaintiff's Discovery Requests. Defendant Moldovsky filed a combined response to Plaintiff's Discovery Requests on August 4, 2021, as did Defendant Moldovsky LLC. (Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Ex. 4.) The Special Master notes that Defendant Moldovsky did not sign his response to Plaintiff's Discovery Requests as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2). Id. Plaintiff pointed out this deficiency to Defendant Moldovsky in a letter dated August 13, 2021. Id. Ex. 10. Defendant Moldovsky submitted a signed version of his objections with his October 18, 2021 Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. (Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Ex. B.)[12] Defendant Moldovsky's objections to Plaintiff's Discovery Requests are untimely, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 34, and, even if they were timely, they are meritless and should be denied. *13 The Moldovsky Defendants' objections can be placed into three general categories. First, the Moldovsky Defendants assert that the District Court's September 29, 2021 order (Doc. No. 45, the “September 29, 2021 Order”) limited Plaintiff's actions in the Complaint to only the “Defendants' alleged wrongful use of a wiretap action against Plaintiff that they filed in Bucks County, Pennsylvania.” (Order dated September 29, 2021 at 1 n.1.) The Special Master does not interpret the September 29, 2021 Order to limit Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in this manner. The September 29, 2021 Order granted Plaintiff's motion to dismiss Defendants' counterclaims. In a footnote, the court specifically recognized the Complaint and its two counts while commenting that the counterclaims “could overwhelm the original action.” Id. The court did not dismiss either of Plaintiff's two counts. Second, the Moldovsky Defendants assert that Plaintiff already is in possession of most of the documents and information he requests. This fact, alone, will not defeat Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. “[I]t is not a bar to the discovery of relevant material that the same material may be in the possession of the requesting party or obtainable from another source.” Fort Washington Rest. v. Tannen, 153 F.R.D. 78, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1994). However, because the Moldovsky Defendants do not identify the responsive documents in details, it is unclear what they are and whether Plaintiff possesses them. An example are the financial documents the Moldovsky Defendants assert they provided to Plaintiff in years past. In their objections, the Moldovsky Defendants state, inter alia, that Plaintiff “was told about and shown various financial documents in person at restaurants ... and visiting the Moldovsky Defendants' property,” and “[Plaintiff] was also shown and/or provided with insurance information and documents, banking information, QuickBooks information and printouts, banking and tax documents and/or information, and told about and/or shown various other financial information.” (Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Ex. 4.) The Moldovksy Defendants' response to the discovery request conflicts with their assertion that Plaintiff already has possession of these documents. The Moldovsky Defendants admit that not all these documents were given to Plaintiff and they are unsure which ones actually were given to Plaintiff. A similar issue exists with respect to Plaintiff's requests for information and documents regarding the ongoing nature of the attorney client relationship between Plaintiff and the Moldovsky Defendants. (Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel at 8.) While Plaintiff asserts that his representation of Defendant Moldovsky and his wife ended in 2016 and that Plaintiff never represented Defendant Moldovsky LLC, Defendant Moldovsky contends that Plaintiff represented both of the Moldovsky Defendants through mid-2018. In their objections, the Moldovsky Defendants assert that Plaintiff possesses all documents regarding his representation of the Moldovsky Defendants. A factual dispute clearly exists as to the timing and scope of Plaintiff's representation of the Moldovsky Defendants and Plaintiff is entitled to discovery relating thereto. Third, Plaintiff is seeking discovery concerning the Moldovksy Defendants' Bucks County illegal wire-tapping claims. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks production of “all telephone records and similar documents establishing that any of the defendants in the Bucks County Matter telephoned you while they were in Pennsylvania, recorded telephone conversation with you while they were in Pennsylvania, and/or transcribed such recordings while they were in Pennsylvania.” (Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Ex. 3 (emphasis in original).) The Moldovsky Defendants deny that they are in possession of any responsive documents. (Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel at 12-13.) However, the Moldovsky Defendants assert that they had “probable cause to bring the claims [in the Bucks County Case] based on knowing there were at least four recorded calls (sometimes referred to or confused as only two) while the undersigned was in Pennsylvania and that Mr. Ellner (who recorded them) often traveled to two-party states, and sought a reasonable extension, application and interpretation of existing law to make a claim for wiretapping.” (Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel at 13 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff is permitted to explore in discovery the basis of the Moldovsky Defendants' asserted knowledge of these claimed facts. *14 After careful review of all matters submitted relating to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, the Special Master finds as follows with respect to Plaintiff's July 5, 2021 Discovery Request (Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Exs. 1 and 2) and the August 6, 2021 Discovery Request (Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Ex. 3): July 5, 2021 Discovery Requests. Interrogatory Nos. 1-4 – Objections OVERRULED. Interrogatory No. 5 – Objections OVERRULED. (Defendant Moldovksy only.) August 6, 2021 Document Requests. Request Nos. 1-8 – Objections OVERRULED. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is GRANTED. The Moldovsky Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Discovery Requests within the time frame set forth herein. (b) The Moldovsky Defendants' Objections – Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions. Plaintiff served requests for admissions on the Moldovsky Defendants seeking two admissions. The requests for admissions and the Moldovsky Defendants' objections thereto are as follows: 1. All pretrial discovery (known as “disclosure” in New York) has been stayed in the Scarola Matter from your joinder as an additional defendant in that matter in September 2018, through the date of service of this request for admission. Objection inasmuch as this is not an appropriate request for admission. Admitted in part and denied in part. The docket speaks for itself and [sic] available to the public. 2. As of the date of service of this request for admission, no party in the Scarola Matter has moved to lift or vacate the stay of pretrial discovery. Objection inasmuch as this is not an appropriate request for admission. Admitted in part and denied in part. It had been raised in court recently to vacate the stay, but the matter has since settled. (Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Ex. 12.) The Moldovsky Defendants have failed to set forth the grounds for their objections to these requests for admissions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(5). Here, Defendants have been sued in part for misusing the Bucks County Matter in order to circumvent the stay of discovery in the Scarola Matter. The requests propounded by Plaintiff are proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). Additionally, the Moldovsky Defendants admit in part and deny in part the two requests for admissions without further explanation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4) requires: “A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the matter, the answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.” The Moldovsky Defendants' objections to the Requests for Admissions are OVERRULED and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is GRANTED. The Moldovsky Defendants must completely and fully respond to the Requests for Admissions in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within the time frame set forth herein. 4. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Extend Discovery. This motion is filed at Document No. 63 on the official docket in this case (“Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel”). The response of the Moldovsky Defendants in opposition to Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel is filed at Document No. 81 (the “Response to Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel”); Defendant Pomerantz has not filed a response to Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel. At issue in Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel are the following discovery requests: (i) first set of requests for admissions addressed to Defendant Moldovsky served October 10, 2021 (“Requests for Admissions,” Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Ex. 1); and (ii) fourth request for production of documents addressed to the Moldovsky Defendants served October 10, 2021 (“Fourth Request for Production,” Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Ex. 2). *15 (a) Requests for Admissions. The Special Master has reviewed Defendant Moldovsky's objections to the Requests for Admissions[13] at issue in Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel. The Requests for Admissions contain nine requests. The objections provided by Defendant Moldovsky are identical for the first seven requests. For request numbers 8 and 9, Defendant Moldovsky provides the same objection minus the last sentence. The requests all address a time frame of prior to October 10, 2021 and request admissions about the disclosure of, inter alia, personal financial information and/or fee arrangements to Plaintiff from Defendant Moldovsky, a member of his family or anyone from Defendant Moldovsky's law firm. Defendant Moldovsky's objection states as follows: Objection inasmuch as this is not an appropriate request for admission. The Court here has held that your claims are limited to allegations stemming from the Wiretap Act claims in its recent Order dated September 29, 2021, stating “This case involves Defendants' alleged wrongful use of a wiretap action against Plaintiff that they filed in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. It does not involve the parties' long history of grievances which occurred in other states.” (ECF Doc. #45 at 1 fn.1). In that same Order, the Court dismissed Brem Moldovsky and Brem Moldovsky, L.L.C.'s counterclaims without prejudice. Therefore, your discovery seeking discoverable information as to damages related to the now dismissed counterclaims or the underlying Bucks County claims related to your conflicts of interests, breaches of fiduciary duties, malpractice and other claims is no longer germane to your claims here. Nevertheless, you signed and verified the Amended Complaint in the Abrams matter, and as such, certified that you had been made privy to the described information. (Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Ex. 3.) As noted above, for request numbers 8 and 9, Defendant Moldovsky asserts the same objection minus the last sentence. As explained above, the Special Master does not interpret the September 29, 2021 Order as eliminating or dismissing one of Plaintiff's two counts in the Complaint. Consequently, Defendant Moldovsky's objections to the Requests for Admissions are OVERRULED. Defendant Moldovsky shall respond to the Requests for Admissions within the time frame set forth herein. (b) Fourth Request for Production of Documents. In his Fourth Request for Production of Documents, Plaintiff added four document requests, document requests numbers 12-15. (Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel at 8-9.) The Moldovsky Defendants object to these four new document requests. (i) Document Request No. 12. In this request, Plaintiff seeks: “All time records, invoices, and similar documents and communications indicating the amount of time spent by Defendants litigating the Bucks County Matter.” (Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Ex. 3.) The Moldovsky Defendants object to this request for production restating its now rejected position that the September 29, 2021 Order limited Plaintiff's claims in this litigation to the wiretap claim only. The Special Master does not interpret the September 29, 2021 Order in this manner and, therefore, that Order does not provide a basis for the Moldovsky Defendants to object to this document request. Additionally, Plaintiff has identified two ways in which the information sought in his document request could lead to relevant evidence under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). First, the Moldovsky Defendant's false light counterclaim makes reference to court filings in “three State Courts, two Federal Courts, and two Appellate Courts for over three years.” See Answer (Counterclaims) ¶118. Because these filings, Plaintiff asserts, include the Bucks County Matter, the information sought in Document Request No. 12 could reasonably lead to admissible evidence regarding the Moldovsky Defendants' false light counterclaim and damages. *16 Second, Plaintiff's own claim for damages is based in part on the time Plaintiff was required to devote to the Bucks County Matter. See Complaint ¶70. Evidence relating to the time the Moldovsky Defendants spent on the Bucks County Matter is admissible because it would bear on Plaintiff's time spent on the litigation and would provide perspective for a jury to consider Plaintiff's damages. (ii) Document Request No. 13. In this document request, Plaintiff seeks information in preparation for the deposition of Samuel Stretton, Esquire. (Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Ex. 3.) The Moldovsky Defendants object to this document request on the grounds of the attorney-client and attorney-expert privileges and the work product doctrine. They also object of the basis that the September 29, 2021 Order eliminated all but Plaintiff's wiretap claim from this litigation. For the reasons stated above, the Special Master has concluded that the attorney-client and attorney-expert privileges and the work product doctrine do not bar Plaintiff's request for this information where, as here, the Moldovsky Defendants' defense is based upon advice of counsel. The Special Master also has concluded that the September 29, 2021 Order did not limit Plaintiff's claims in this litigation and does not provide a basis to object to this document request. (iii) Document Requests Nos. 14 and 15. In their Counterclaims, the Moldovsky Defendants seek compensatory, punitive, incidental and consequential damages as well as attorneys' fees, litigation costs and other forms of monetary damages and relief. (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶¶ 90-92.) In these document requests, Plaintiff seeks documents addressing the Moldovsky Defendants' alleged damages. The Moldovsky Defendants object to these document requests on the grounds of the attorney-client and attorney-expert privileges and the work product doctrine. They also object of the basis that the court's September 29, 2021 Order eliminated all but Plaintiff's wiretap claim from this litigation. Plaintiff is entitled to seek discovery addressing a counterclaimant's claim for damages. Plaintiff has proposed a discovery confidentiality order to mitigate concerns about confidentiality of financial information. (Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel at 20-21.) To the extent that the requested billing records contain privileged communications, the Moldovsky Defendants may redact the privileged communications. However, it appears that the Moldovsky Defendants at times throughout the matters involving the parties have represented themselves. It is unlikely that the attorney-client and attorney-expert privileges would apply in the context of pro se counsel. The Special Master also has concluded that the court's September 29, 2021 Order did not limit Plaintiff's claims in this litigation and does not provide a basis to object to this document request. For all the above reasons, the Moldovsky Defendants' objections to the Fourth Request for Production of Documents at issue in Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel and are OVERRULED. The Moldovsky Defendants shall respond to the Fourth Request for Production of Documents within the time frame set forth herein. (c) Extension of Discovery and Other Pretrial Deadlines. In his Second Motion to Compel, Plaintiff requests that discovery and other unexpired pretrial deadlines be extended by sixty to ninety days. (Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel at 28-29.) This request is DENIED; the Special Master will enter a Scheduling Order. *17 For all the above reasons, Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. C. The Moldovsky Defendants' Discovery Motion. Also before the Special Master is the Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel. 1. The Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel. This motion is filed at Document No. 64 on the official docket in this case (the “Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel”). Plaintiff's response of the Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel is filed at Document No. 82 (the “Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel”). Defendant Moldovsky served a request for production of documents and interrogatories on Plaintiff on August 27, 2021. (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 1.) Defendant Moldovsky LLC served discovery requests on Plaintiff on October 22, 2021. Id. at 2. Plaintiff asserts that he produced more than 9,600 pages of documents not subject to privilege or relevancy objections to the Moldovsky Defendants. (Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 1, 4.) (a) Defendant Moldovsky's Discovery Requests. Defendant Moldovsky groups his discovery requests into the following categories. (i) Document Requests and Interrogatories Nos. 1-3. The discovery requests of Defendant Moldovsky are attached to the Moldovksy Defendant's Motion to Compel at Exhibit A. Interrogatory No. 1 seeks, inter alia, all facts, circumstances and information surrounding any telephone calls recorded between Defendant Moldovsky and any employee or person acting on behalf of Defendants Moldovsky LLC, and Lightbox, see supra 2 n.2, Jill Ellner, and Plaintiff. (Moldvosky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 3.) Interrogatory No. 2 seeks “all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transcription of any telephone calls that were recorded.” Id. at 4. Interrogatory No. 3 seeks “all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the handling, processing and storage of any audio recordings and/or transcriptions of any telephone calls that were recorded.” Id. See also Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at Ex. 3 at 3-6. The Moldovsky Defendants demand that Plaintiff “turn over all of the recorded phone calls, and to respond regarding the details of them, the transcription of them, and the storage and handling of them.” (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 4.) Defendant Moldovsky argues that this information is relevant to his probable cause defense and describes the information sought in these discovery requests as follows: [ ] Brem Moldovsky's Document requests and Interrogatories numbered 1-3 seek disclosure of information and records related to the telephone calls that Mr. Miller's client Mr. Ellner surreptitiously recorded and Mr. Miller transcribed parts of, as well as the turnover of full recordings and transcriptions.... [ ] These requests are germane and reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable evidence because the actionable elements of the underlying action that the claims of this case are based are claims against Mr. Miller and his clients for violations of the Pa. Wiretap Act (and those of other states) as well as the defense of probable cause. It is believed it is likely based on Plaintiff misleading about there being not more than two recorded calls when there were at least four calls, and that discovery likely will expose that there were many more recorded calls and specifically recorded by Mr. Ellner when both he and Defendants were in two consent states, which has not been denied. Obviously, this is central to a probable cause argument. *18 (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 2-3.) Plaintiff asserts that the requested information is irrelevant as all wiretapping-related claims have been dismissed and that the attorney-client privilege applies with respect to telephone calls between Plaintiff's then-client, Mr. Ellner,[14] and Mr. Ellner's then-attorney Defendant Moldovsky, and that Mr. Ellner, the client, controls that the privilege. (Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 7-13.) The telephone conversations at issue were between Mr. Ellner and his then-counsel Defendant Moldovsky. Clearly, Defendant Moldovsky knows the contents of the conversations as he was a party to them. The Moldovsky Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot assert the attorney-client privilege with respect to these calls because Plaintiff was not a party to them. (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 3.) However, when Plaintiff became Mr. Ellner's counsel in 2018, Mr. Ellner and Plaintiff engaged in attorney-client communications regarding these prior telephone conversations with Defendant Moldovsky which were recorded by Ellner. At a point in time, transcripts of some of these conversations were created. Citing to both Pennsylvania and New York law, Plaintiff asserts that “any information [Plaintiff] has concerning the recordings, the transcripts, who made them and on what device, etc. is subject to attorney-client confidentiality.” (Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 7.) Plaintiff represents that Mr. Ellner has not waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to the information demanded by the Moldovsky Defendants in these discovery requests. (Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 8.) In light of the foregoing discussion, the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between Plaintiff and his client Mr. Ellner regarding the telephone conversations between Mr. Ellner and his then-counsel Defendant Moldovsky. Additionally, Moldovsky Defendants contend that the requested information regarding the telephone calls recorded by Mr. Ellner are relevant to their probable cause defense, i.e., that the Moldovsky Defendants had probable cause to allege in the Bucks County Matter that Plaintiff and Mr. Ellner had violated the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. Judge Robreno addressed this issue in Moldovsky v. Ellner, et al., No. 21-CV-01365, at n.1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2021), in which the Moldovsky Defendants brought, inter alia, two claims alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act against Lightbox. Judge Robreno, undertaking a conflicts of law analysis, dismissed both of these claims with prejudice stating as follows: Plaintiffs contend that Ellner recorded without authorization at least two phone calls between Ellner in New York and Moldovsky in Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs do not allege that Ellner recorded any calls while Ellner was in Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs contend that Ellner's actions violate the Pa. Wiretap Act. However, several Pennsylvania courts and one federal district court have concluded that the Pa. Wiretap Act does not apply to the unauthorized recording of phone calls where the recording was made from outside of Pennsylvania.... Therefore, Counts I and II must be dismissed with prejudice as Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Ellner recorded calls while in Pennsylvania. *19 Id. (Civil Action No. 21-01365, Doc. No. 23). See also Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 16 (quoting Mr. Ellner's sworn statement that Mr. Ellner “was physically in New York every time I recorded a phone conversation” with the Moldovsky Defendants). The Defendants do not raise claims that Plaintiff violated the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act in this case. Discovery regarding these calls, therefore, is irrelevant to this case. Defendants assert that discovery regarding these calls is relevant to their probable cause defense which is based upon the Stretton Letters. Review of the Stretton Letters, however, reveals no references to the recorded telephone calls between Mr. Ellner and Defendant Moldovsky. See Plaintiff's Certification in Support of the Stretton Motion (Doc. No. 40-2) at Exs. 6 and 7. Discovery regarding the telephone calls between Mr. Ellner and Defendant Moldovsky are irrelevant to the Moldovsky Defendants' probable cause defense as asserted in the Stretton Letters. For all these reasons, Plaintiff's objections to Document Requests and Interrogatories Nos. 1-3 are SUSTAINED. (ii) Document Requests Nos. 4-5 and 8-9, Interrogatory Nos. 4-5 and 9. The Moldovsky Defendants state that the information requested in these discovery requests is reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable evidence related to Plaintiff's claim for damages including claims for damages for emotional distress and damage to reputation. (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 5-7.) Document Request No. 4 and Interrogatory No. 4 seek information regarding Plaintiff's “demand for any and all damages in this matter, including but not limited to money damages, including all legal fees and costs, business losses, and reputational damage.” (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. 3 at 7.) Document Request No. 5 and Interrogatory No. 5 seek information regarding Plaintiff's “demand for punitive damages for stress and distress.” Id. at 9. Document Requests Nos. 8 and 9 seek information relating to the Wong Fleming law firm. Id. at 16-17. Interrogatory No. 9 seeks information, covering a span of twenty years, regarding any, inter alia, complaint, disciplinary action, etc. “with any agency, employer or client.” Id. 13-14. Document Request and Interrogatory Nos. 4. These discovery requests seek information regarding Plaintiff's “demand for any and all damages in this matter, including but not limited to money damages, including all legal fees and costs, business losses, and reputational damages.” (Moldovsky Defendants' Interrogatory No. 4.) The Moldovsky Defendants are entitled to discovery regarding Plaintiff's claimed damages. Subject to the limitations set forth herein sustaining Plaintiff's objections to discovery requests seeking information regarding his medical/psychiatric/psychological records, Plaintiff shall respond to the Moldovsky Defendants' Document Request No. 4 and Interrogatory No. 4. To the extent Plaintiff has already responded to these discovery requests, Plaintiff shall identify his prior responses that are responsive to these discovery requests by identifying numbers and supplement those responses as necessary. See Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 19-26. Document Request and Interrogatory Nos. 5. These discovery requests seek information and records regarding Plaintiff's psychiatric, psychological, medical, social work and counseling history and treatment. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's objections to these discovery requests are SUSTAINED. See Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 17-19. *20 Document Requests Nos. 8-9. In Document Request No. 8, Defendant Moldovsky seeks documents between Plaintiff and the Kopels, and Frank Derby “related to any disputes and litigation against Wong Fleming and as between yourself, Mr. Ellner, Lightbox, and the Defendants to this action regarding this and/or other litigation.” In Document Request No. 9, Defendant Moldovsky seeks every document “made by you about Wong Fleming, P.C. or any representative or employee thereof.” The Special Master has held herein that information from Plaintiff's employment at Wong Fleming is irrelevant to this case. Plaintiff's objections to these discovery requests are SUSTAINED. See Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 29-30. Interrogatory No. 9. In this discovery request, Defendant Moldovsky seeks information in response to the following inquiry: “In the last twenty (20) years have you been or are you currently involved in, party to, or the subject of any criminal or civil inquiry, complaint, disciplinary action, or other administrative action or of a lawsuit, either civil or criminal or complaint, formal or informal, with any agency, employer or client?” Plaintiff's objections that this discovery request is irrelevant to the instant matter, unduly burdensome, overly broad, and vague are SUSTAINED. In his response to Interrogatory No. 9, Plaintiff identifies the lawsuits to which he has been a party in the last twenty years. See Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 28-29. (iii) Document Requests and Interrogatory Nos. 6-7. The Moldovsky Defendants state that the information requested in these discovery requests “form a basis of Mr. Miller's demand for damages for fees and costs related to the Bucks County Matter.” (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 7.) Discovery Request No. 6 seeks information related to “any defense, crossclaim or third party claim for contribution or similar to the allegations and claims alleged by the Counterclaims in this matter, including probable and any other defense as they may have already been articulated, for instance in your motion to dismiss the counterclaims, or may be raised at any time.” (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. 3 at 11-12.) Discovery Request No. 7 seeks information regarding, inter alia, Plaintiff's sources of income, and Plaintiff's yearly gross income and adjusted gross income for the past ten years and/or for the duration of Plaintiff's practice of law or any other profession. Id. at 12-13. Document Request and Interrogatory No. 6. Plaintiff's objections to these discovery requests on the grounds that they are vague and ambiguous are SUSTAINED. Plaintiff has not asserted any cross or third party claims, and has not filed an answer to the extant Counterclaims. Moreover, the four Counterclaims presently filed by the Moldovsky Defendants were filed on October 14, 2021, see Doc. No. 54. The discovery requests at issue herein submitted by the Moldovksy Defendants were served on August 27, 2021. The counterclaims at issue with respect to these discovery requests have been dismissed. Document Request and Interrogatory No. 7. Plaintiff has been directed to respond to the Moldovsky Defendants' discovery requests regarding Plaintiff's demand for damages in this litigation. The overly broad request for information in these discovery requests is not calculated to lead to discoverable evidence. As explained by Plaintiff in his response to these discovery requests, he is a solo attorney whose billing rate ranges from zero in pro bono cases to $600 per hour in other matters. Plaintiff further explained that his “billing rate depends on a number of factors, including but not limited to the type of matter, the type of client, the nature of the dispute, and the legal market in which services are to be performed. There is no set formula, and Plaintiff occasionally offers other types of fee arrangements including flat fees, contingency fees, and/or hybrid fees.” (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. 3 at 12.) Plaintiff's objections to these discovery requests are SUSTAINED. *21 (iv) Document Request and Interrogatory Nos. 10. The final discovery request, Document Request No. 10, seeks all non-privileged documents between Plaintiff, Clifford Haines, Esquire, Danielle Weiss, Esquire, Lightbox and the Defendants. (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. 3 at 17.) The Moldovsky Defendants state that this discovery request seeks documents “including correspondences between [Plaintiff] and Mr. Ellner and Mr. Ellner's Pennsylvania counsel Mr. Haines and Ms. Weiss,” see id. at 9. Plaintiff and Mr. Ellner shared a common interest as defendants in the Bucks County Matter. During this same period of time, Plaintiff represented Mr. Ellner in the New York Litigation. Plaintiff continued to represent Mr. Ellner when he retained Mr. Haines and Ms. Weiss to file Dragonetti Act and abuse of process claims in Ellner v. Moldovsky, No. 20-CV-06190 (E.D. Pa.) in December 2020. See Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 30-31 (history of litigation between and among the Moldovsky Defendants, Lightbox and Plaintiff). Plaintiff contends that the requested communications are subject to the common interest/ joint litigation privilege and the attorney-client privilege. See Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 364 (the common interest privilege “allows attorneys representing different clients with similar legal interests to share information without having to disclose it to others); Matter of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The joint defense privilege protects communications between and individual and an attorney for another when the communications are part of an on-going and joint effort to set up a common defense strategy.”) (quotation omitted). At all relevant times to this matter, Plaintiff and Mr. Ellner shared a common interest as defendants in the Bucks County Matter. Plaintiff's assertions of these privileges are SUSTAINED. The Moldovsky Defendants do not state how this information is reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable evidence. Additionally, Plaintiff's objections to this discovery request as overly broad, vague and irrelevant are SUSTAINED. In Interrogatory No. 10, the Moldovsky Defendants seek the following information: “Identify each and every expert or layperson witness you presently intend or at one time considered or will consider calling at trial, and set forth the topic and/or subject matter as to which said witness is expected to testify.” (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. 3 at 14-15.) The Moldovsky Defendants state that the information requested in Interrogatory No. 10 is relevant as it may lead to discoverable evidence regarding the “identity and expected testimony of [Plaintiff's] expert witnesses and/or fact witnesses,” see Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 9. Plaintiff's objections to this discovery request as vague, overly broad and premature are SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART. Plaintiff represents that he has yet to obtain an expert and, upon doing so, will comply with all applicable rules and pretrial orders regarding expert discovery. (Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 29.) Plaintiff shall produce this information as required by the applicable rules and pretrial orders. However, Plaintiff need not reveal the name of an expert he “at one time considered” calling at trial as this would reveal attorney work product. (b) Defendant Moldovsky LLC's Discovery Requests. The discovery requests of Defendant Moldovsky LLC are attached to the Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at Exhibit B. Plaintiff states that he has not responded to these discovery requests which were stayed by Judge Robreno's November 15, 2021 Order (Doc. No. 72). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to move to compel responses to discovery only after the other party fails to respond to a discovery request. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). The Special Master can address certain of these requests based upon argument provided above. *22 (i) Document Request No. 1 and Interrogatory No. 1. In these discovery requests, Defendant Moldovsky LLC seeks information regarding the nature of Plaintiff's relationship with the Law Firm of Scott Miller, Esquire. (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. B at 7-8.) For the reasons stated above, the Special Master has determined that Plaintiff's relationship with his brother's law firm is irrelevant to the instant proceeding. See Response to the Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 33-34. Plaintiff need not respond to these discovery requests. (ii) Document Request Nos. 2 and 3, and Interrogatory No. 2. In Document Request and Interrogatory Nos. 2, Defendants Moldovsky LLC seeks information regarding Plaintiff's arrangement to provide services to Lightbox in the Scarola Matter “and all other matters, particularly related to the [Moldovsky Defendants].” (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. B at 8-9.) In Document Request No. 3, Defendant Moldovsky LLC seeks documents regarding “billing and time spent by [Plaintiff] litigating [sic] related specifically to the TRO and Injunction proceedings, each sanctions motion in that matter, and any appellate proceeding related to the TRO and injunction proceeding or sanctions, billed or unbilled on behalf of” Lightbox. (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. B at 9.) In these discovery requests, Defendant Moldovsky LLC seeks information concerning Plaintiff's fee arrangements and fees with Lightbox in the Scarola Matter. The Moldovsky Defendants argue as follows with respect to these discovery requests: Combined requests #2-4 [sic] seek information and documents about Mr. Miller's agreements for fees, billing and actual time, discounting, contingencies and related meta data related [sic] to his work for Mr. Ellner and Lightbox that is the subject of the counterclaims in this matter. The discovery in particular is germane to establishing the element of malice as a motivation for some or all of Mr. Miller's representation and litigation of Mr. Ellner and Lightbox, particularly related to injunction and sanction requests. It is believed that the evidence will show that Mr. [sic] did not bill or get paid for significant work done as the motivation was malice and not work and service to be paid. (Moldovsky Defendants' Mem. of Law Supp. Motion to Compel at 10.) This information may be relevant to the malicious prosecution counterclaim asserted by the Moldovsky Defendants in this litigation. Subject to any assertions of attorney-client privilege, Plaintiff must respond to these discovery requests. (iv) Document Requests Nos. 4-5 and Interrogatory Nos. 4-5. In these discovery requests, Defendant Moldovsky LLC seeks information regarding any legal professional consultation Plaintiff had regarding the claims and counterclaims plead in this matter, including the Defendants' defense of probable cause. (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. B at 9-11.) This discovery request clearly seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine and Plaintiff need not respond. (v) Document Requests Nos. 6-8 and Interrogatory Nos. 6-7. In these discovery requests, Defendant Moldovsky LLC requests information regarding all fact witnesses Plaintiff may call and any and all defenses Plaintiff may raise to the Counterclaims (Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 7). Documents Request Nos. 6-8 seek any documents and communications related to this litigation. (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. B at 11-12.) Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 7 request the same information as the discovery requests addressed above at 39 (regarding potential defenses to counterclaims) and 41 (regarding potential witnesses), supra. For the same reasons stated, Plaintiff need not respond to these discovery requests, with the exception that Plaintiff must identify the witnesses he intends to call at trial. Document Request Nos. 6-8 are overly broad and vague[15] and Plaintiff need not respond to them. III. CONCLUSION *23 AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2022, for all the reasons set forth herein, it is hereby ORDERED 1. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Samuel Stretton, Esquire to Comply with Third Party Subpoenas (Doc. No. 40) is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Third Party Subpoenas (Doc. No. 44) is GRANTED. 3. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Moldovsky Defendants to Comply with Plaintiff's Discovery Demands (Doc. No. 50) is GRANTED. 4. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Extend Discovery (Doc. No. 63) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 5. Moldovksy Defendants' Motion to Compel (Doc. No. 64) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth herein. 6. All discovery ordered to be responded to or produced herein shall be responded to or produced by May 18, 2022. Honorable Thomas J. Rueter (Ret.) Special Master Footnotes [1] Individual defendant Brem Moldovsky, Esquire shall be referred to herein as “Defendant Moldovsky.” Individual defendant Brem Moldvosky, L.L.C. shall be referred to herein as “Defendant Moldovksy LLC”. Individual defendant Brem Moldovsky and individual defendant Brem Moldovsky, LLC shall be collectively referred to herein as the “Moldovsky Defendants.” Individual defendant Gerald J. Pomerantz, Esquire shall be referred to herein as “Defendant Pomerantz.” All three defendants shall be collectively referred to herein as the “Defendants.” [2] The parties were involved in several cases in the New York courts. Lightbox and the Moldovsky Defendants were adverse parties in a New York Supreme Court matter involving disputed legal fees and allegations of attorney misconduct (the “Scarola Matter”), and LBV and the Moldovsky Defendants were adverse parties in a Southern District of New York proceeding (the “SDNY Case”) and a Second Circuit Court of Appeals case (the “Second Circuit Appeal”) involving similar issues (collectively, the “New York Litigation”). (Complaint ¶2.) Plaintiff represented Lightbox in the Scarola Matter since May 2017. Defendant Moldovsky previously represented Ellner and LBV in a related matter in the Southern District of New York until Defendant Moldovsky withdrew in April 2018 due to a fee dispute. (Complaint ¶¶ 16-17.) [3] Defendant Pomerantz, appearing pro se, signed the Answer “for the Answer and Defenses only.” Defendant Pomerantz states that he “is not a party to the Counterclaims or Counsel on Them.” (Answer at 79.) [4] Despite the use of the plural “All Counterclaim Defendants” in their second counterclaim, the Moldovsky Defendants, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs, clearly identify a single counterclaim defendant: “Counterclaim Defendant is Jonathan R. Miller, Esq.” (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶6.) And see Answer (Counterclaims) ¶11 (“Counterclaim defendant Jonathan Miller is a citizen of the State of New Jersey ....”). The Special Master also finds that the Counterclaim Plaintiffs' use of the term “Counterclaim Defendants” in paragraph 113 of the Counterclaims is a typographical error; the Special Master recognizes that the proper term should have been “Counterclaim Plaintiffs.” [5] The Moldovsky Defendants filed two letters seeking permission to further amend the Counterclaims (Doc. Nos. 66 (Letter dated November 8, 2021) and 68 (Letter dated November 9, 2021).) Plaintiff filed a letter in opposition thereto. (Doc. No. 67 (Letter dated November 8, 2021).) The District Court has not ruled on these requests. By Order dated November 15, 2021, this case was stayed until further order of the court. (Doc. No. 72.) [6] Throughout their Counterclaims, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs, the Moldovsky Defendants, interchangeably utilize both the singular term “Counterclaim Plaintiff” and the plural term “Counterclaim Plaintiffs.” For clarity, Defendant Moldovsky and Defendant Moldovksy LLC are BOTH Counterclaim Plaintiffs. (Answer (Counterclaims) ¶6, 48.) Defendant Pomerantz is not a Counterclaim Plaintiff. (Complaint at 79.) [7] Also attached to the response of the Moldovsky Defendants is another copy of the “Response with Objection to Plaintiff's Subpoena to Produce Documents, Information, or Objects” directed at the Stretton Subpoena. (Stretton Response attachment 4.) This document also is dated August 23, 2021 and appears to be identical to the objection at attachment 3, except for the privilege log attached as Exhibit B which is different. [8] The Defendants did not move for a protective order or to quash the Stretton Subpoena in their objection to the Stretton Subpoena. In their opposition to the Stretton Motion, the Moldovsky Defendants explain this failure by stating: “[N]othing [Plaintiff] is seeking is worth motion practice.” (Stretton Response at 1.) [9] In the Stretton Response, the Moldovsky Defendants move to quash the Stretton Subpoena. The response was filed September 23, 2021. A party seeking to quash a subpoena must satisfy the threshold requirement of filing a “timely motion” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). Rule 45 does not state when such a motion to quash is timely. Some courts have held that the motion to quash must be filed within the fourteen-day deadline for serving objections set forth in Rule 45(d)(2)(B). Other courts have held that a motion to quash is timely if it is filed before the return date on the subpoena. See Ace Hardware Corp. v. Celebration Ace Hardware, LLC, 2009 WL 324561, at *2 (D.Del. Oct. 8, 2009) (discussing conflict in court holdings). Applying the latter approach, as it provides the Moldovsky Defendants the most time within which to file a motion to quash, the instant motion to quash is untimely. The return date in the Stretton Subpoena is August 23, 2021. The Moldovsky Defendants' motion to quash contained within the Stretton Response was filed on September 23, 2021. The motion to quash is untimely and must be denied. [10] To the extent the Moldovsky Defendants would possess a viable claim of attorney-client privilege, the privilege logs attached to the Stretton Response, see attachments 3 and 4 thereto, are deficient. Generally, a privilege log's description of each document and its contents must provide sufficient information to permit courts and other parties to test the merits of the privilege claim. Blanket claims of privilege, generalized descriptions of a document, and conclusory statements that a document is privileged are not sufficient to prove a privilege claim. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Ben, ERISA Litig., 1994 WL 6883, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 1994). The privilege logs submitted by the Moldovsky Defendants fail to meet these requirements. [11] The Moldovsky Defendants do not refer to the Kopel Transcript in the Counterclaims. (Doc. No. 54.) On May 30, 2018 and June 13, 2018, Plaintiff was deposed as a fact witness in the Kopel matter. Plaintiff was subject to cross-examination by counsel for Wong Fleming using confidential information and documents from Plaintiff's personnel file, including medical information. Despite these documents and many pages of the Kopel Transcript being designated “confidential” pursuant to a confidentiality order in that case, the Kopel Transcript was inadvertently filed on the public docket in New Jersey in July 2018. [12] In his Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, Defendant Moldovsky, addressing his unsigned objections, stated “that [Plaintiff] knows full well that if somehow the version he received was unsigned and he needed a signed version that it would have been provided upon request.” (Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel at 6.) This is untrue. Plaintiff notified Defendant Moldovsky of this serious deficiency, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2), by letter dated August 13, 2021; Defendant Moldovsky did not provide the required signed version of his objections until after Plaintiff filed the Motion to Compel. [13] The Requests for Admissions at issue in Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel are addressed only to Defendant Moldovsky. See Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Ex. 1. In the Response to Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel, Defendant Moldovsky states that the Requests for Admissions were made to Defendant Moldovsky LLC. See Response to Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel at 4. Regardless of this error, the Response was signed by defendant Moldovsky individually, and on behalf of Defendant Moldovsky LLC. The Special Master accepts this response with objections as the response and objections of Defendant Moldovsky to the Requests for Admissions addressed solely to him individually. [14] As detailed above, Mr. Ellner was a former client of the Moldovsky Defendants and Plaintiff became Mr. Ellner's “New York attorney” in 2018. (Response to Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel at 14.) [15] Document Request No. 6 requests: “All documents and/or communications referring or relating to any aspect of this litigation not specifically requested above.” Document Request No. 7 requests: “All documents and/or communications upon which you intend to rely in connection with the instant action, as well as any other material document not otherwise requested in connection with this Request.” Document Request No. 8 requests: “Copies of any document referenced by or related to ay Interrogatory herein that has not been specifically requested.” (Moldovsky Defendants' Motion to Compel Ex. B.)